Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN L. DAVIS,

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Plaintiff,

v.

GREG SUHR, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 16-cv-04487-JD

ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

Plaintiff, a detainee, has filed a pro se civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The complaint was dismissed with leave to amend and plaintiff has filed an amended complaint (Docket No. 22).

DISCUSSION

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review, the Court must identify any cognizable claims, and dismiss any claims which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. *Id.* at 1915A(b)(1),(2). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Although a complaint "does not need detailed factual allegations, . . . a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a

cause of action will not do. . . . Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." *Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted). A complaint must proffer "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." *Id.* at 570. The United States Supreme Court has explained the "plausible on its face" standard of *Twombly*: "While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. *West v. Atkins*, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

LEGAL CLAIMS

Plaintiff alleges that he was the victim of a false arrest and was improperly treated in jail. He seeks money damages. In order to recover damages for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. *Heck v. Humphrey*, 512 U.S. 477, 486-487 (1994). A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983. *Id.* at 487.

In *Wallace v. Kato*, 549 U.S. 384, 393 (2007), the Court held that the "*Heck* rule for deferred accrual is called into play only when there exists 'a conviction or sentence that has not been . . . invalidated,' that is to say, an 'outstanding criminal judgment." *Id.* at 391-93 (quoting *Heck*, 512 U.S. at 486-87). The *Heck* rule delays accrual only if there is an existing conviction on the date the statute of limitations begins to run, which in the case of wrongful arrest or wrongful imprisonment claims is when the plaintiff's confinement is no longer without legal process, but rather becomes a confinement pursuant to legal process – that is, for example, when he or she is

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bound over by a magistrate or arraigned on charges. *Id.* at 389-90. The Court stated that the contention that "an action which would impugn an anticipated future conviction cannot be brought until that conviction occurs and is set aside" goes "well beyond Heck" and rejected it. Id. at 393 (italics in original). Although the Court was only considering when the statute of limitations began running on a false arrest/false imprisonment claim, the discussion quoted suggests that *Heck* does not apply if there is no extant conviction – for instance, if plaintiff has only been arrested or charged.

If a plaintiff files a § 1983 false arrest claim before he or she is convicted, or files any other claim related to rulings that likely will be made in a pending or anticipated criminal trial, it is within the power of the district court, and accords with common practice, to stay the civil action until the criminal case or the likelihood of a criminal case is ended. *Id.* at 393-94. If the plaintiff is then convicted, and if the stayed civil suit would impugn that conviction, Heck requires dismissal; otherwise, the case may proceed. *Id.* at 394.

When a pretrial detainee challenges conditions of his confinement, the proper inquiry is whether the conditions amount to punishment in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16 (1979). "[T]he State does not acquire the power to punish with which the Eighth Amendment is concerned until after it has secured a formal adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law. Where the State seeks to impose punishment without such an adjudication, the pertinent guarantee is the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671-72 n.40 (1977)).

The state may detain a pretrial detainee "to ensure his presence at trial and may subject him to the restrictions and conditions of the detention facility so long as those conditions and restrictions do not amount to punishment or otherwise violate the Constitution." Id. at 536-37. If a particular condition or restriction of pretrial detention is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective it does not, without more, amount to "punishment". See id. at 539; cf. Wagner v. County of Maricopa, 701 F.3d 583, 589 (9th Cir. 2012) (remanding to trial court to determine whether the unexplained procedure of "dressing-out" a detainee, known to be in need of

psychiatric treatment, from civilian clothes to jail garb, which included wearing pink underwear, was punishment without legal justification when detainee believed he was being raped and humiliated). For example, states must be able to take steps to maintain security and order at pretrial facilities, and restraints that are reasonably related to a facility's interest in maintaining jail security are not, without more, unconstitutional punishment. *See Bell v. Wolfish*, 441 U.S. at 540.

Plaintiff states that various San Francisco Police Officers and federal probation officials conspired to have him arrested using surveillance drones and wiretaps. He also states they were trying to kill him. For relief he seeks money damages. It is not clear if plaintiff has been convicted of any crime, charges are currently pending, or if charges have been dismissed. The amended complaint is dismissed with leave to amend to provide more information about the current status of the charges against him. In addition, plaintiff must present more information on how his arrest was unlawful and violated the constitution. Simply providing a few conclusory allegations is insufficient. He must also describe the actions of specific defendants.

Plaintiff also alleges that a jail deputy turned off the lights to his cell so other inmates could assault him. It is not clear if plaintiff was assaulted or what transpired. Plaintiff should provide more information about this claim as well in an amended complaint. Plaintiff is reminded that he must present sufficient allegations that plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 679.

CONCLUSION

1. The amended complaint is **DISMISSED** with leave to amend. The second amended complaint must be filed within **twenty-eight** (28) days of the date this order is filed and must include the caption and civil case number used in this order and the words SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT on the first page. Because an amended complaint completely replaces the original complaint, plaintiff must include in it all the claims he wishes to present. *See Ferdik v. Bonzelet*, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). He may not incorporate material from the original complaint by reference. Failure to amend within the designated time will result in the dismissal of this case.

United States District Court Northern District of California

2. It is the plaintiff's responsibility to prosecute this case. Plaintiff must keep the Court informed of any change of address by filing a separate paper with the clerk headed "Notice of Change of Address," and must comply with the Court's orders in a timely fashion. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 6, 2017

JAMES DONATO United States District Judge

United States District Court Northern District of California

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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Plaintiff,

v.

GREG SUHR, et al.,

JOHN L. DAVIS.

Defendants.

Case No. 16-cv-04487-JD

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District Court, Northern District of California.

That on February 6, 2017, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing said envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle located in the Clerk's office.

John L. Davis 16664426 850 Bryant Street San Francisco, CA 94103

Dated: February 6, 2017

Susan Y. Soong Clerk, United States District Court

By:
LISAR. CLARK, Deputy Clerk to the
Honorable JAMES DONATO