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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TAPGERINE, LLC, a Nevada limited liability company, and TAPMEDIA, LLC, a Ukraine limited liability company;

No. C 16-06504 WHA

Plaintiffs,

v.

**ORDER GRANTING
MOTION FOR SANCTIONS**

50MANGO, INC., a Delaware corporation, and DOES 1-10;

Defendants.

INTRODUCTION

Following voluntary dismissal of this trade secret misappropriation action, defendant moves for an award of attorney’s fees. For the reasons stated below, the motion is **GRANTED**.

STATEMENT

This is a dispute between plaintiffs Tapgerine, LLC, and TapMedia, LLC, and defendant 50Mango, Inc. TapMedia is a Ukraine limited liability company with its principal place of business in Ukraine. Tapgerine is a Nevada limited liability company with its principal place of business allegedly in Las Vegas, and an office in Ukraine. Defendant 50Mango, Inc., is a Delaware corporation with its virtual principal place of business in Redwood City, California, and its only physical office in Ukraine.

On November 8, 2016, plaintiffs commenced this civil action here in the district court in San Francisco, alleging misappropriation of trade secrets by 50Mango (Dkt. No. 1).

1 Defendant moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim and based on forum non conveniens
2 (Dkt. No. 17). In opposition to the motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens, plaintiffs
3 asserted that all the sources of proof in this case were located in the United States and that
4 Ukraine was too war-torn and unstable to provide an adequate remedy (Dkt. No. 21 at 8).
5 In preparation for the hearing, scheduled for March 23, 2017, and to illuminate the actual extent
6 to which the Ukrainian parties had any presence here in the United States, the Court sent out an
7 order for supplemental evidence to be submitted by March, 16, 2017 (Dkt. No. 29). The purpose
8 of this request was to corroborate the actual extent of any real presence in the United States of
9 the parties, as claimed by counsel.

10 Instead of providing the Court with photographic evidence of their presence here in
11 the United States, plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the action 21 days after the request was
12 made (Dkt. No. 34). 50Mango then brought this motion for attorney’s fees (Dkt. No. 37).
13 Shortly after, 50Mango filed an administrative motion to continue the hearing on its motion in
14 an attempt to remedy its failure to meet and confer in compliance with Local Rule 54-5 before
15 making a motion for award of attorney’s fees (Dkt. No. 39). The Court denied the administrative
16 motion but reserved ruling on the real issue teed up by this dispute — whether 50Mango’s
17 failure to comply with our local rules warrants denial of its motion to attorney’s fees — pending
18 consideration of the motion on its merits (Dkt. No. 43). This order follows full briefing and
19 oral argument.

20 ANALYSIS

21 1. PLAINTIFFS’ BAD FAITH.

22 Both sides in this dispute are Ukraine businesses, although they each have tiny presences
23 here in the United States. 50Mango contends that plaintiffs acted in bad faith when choosing the
24 present forum and that the only basis for plaintiffs’ choice was to force 50Mango to endure the
25 expense and inconvenience of litigating in the United States, rather than in the actual situs of the
26 parties and events — Ukraine.

27 Under its inherent power, federal court’s can levy sanctions, including attorney’s fees, for
28 bad faith. *See Roadway Exp., Inc. v. Piper*, 447 U.S. 752, 766–67 (2001); *Chambers v. NASCO*,

1 *Inc.*, 501 U.S. 32, 46 (1991). “Bad faith” encompasses a wide range of willful conduct,
2 including “recklessness when combined with an additional factor such as frivolousness,
3 harassment, or an improper purpose.” *Fink v. Gomez*, 239 F.3d 989, 994 (9th Cir. 2001).
4 Whether to impose inherent power sanctions is “a determination that rests in the sound discretion
5 of the district court.” *Ibid*.

6 Before delving into the underlying arguments of the parties, this order will address
7 Tapgerine’s transparent attempt to distance itself from its purely Ukrainian co-plaintiff
8 TapMedia for the purposes of this motion. Tapgerine — for the first time in this action —
9 contends that “it is Tapgerine and not TapMedia that has primarily suffered from 50Mango’s
10 actions” (Dkt. No. 42-1 ¶ 10). Ironically, plaintiffs’ complaint tells a different story. According
11 to the complaint, 50Mango’s principals were former employees of TapMedia, and furthermore, it
12 was TapMedia’s clients and proprietary software source code 50Mango allegedly attempted to
13 misappropriate (Compl. ¶¶ 11–17). This order therefore will evaluate plaintiffs’ bad faith in
14 filing their complaint here in light of 50Mango’s alleged conduct towards both Tapgerine as
15 well as TapMedia.

16 50Mango argues that even though plaintiffs were aware, prior to filing this suit, that all
17 of the relevant people, documents, and other evidence were located in Ukraine, plaintiffs chose
18 to proceed here. Moreover, 50Mango contends that, once challenged, “plaintiffs misled their
19 counsel into believing 50Mango’s server and relevant witnesses were located in the United
20 States, in a belated attempt to justify their suit” (Dkt. No. 37 at 4).

21 Plaintiffs counter that at the time of filing, they were completely unaware of 50Mango’s
22 presence in Ukraine since all of their information about 50Mango came from 50Mango’s
23 website. Plaintiffs further assert that as soon as they received information that the key
24 components of the lawsuit were situated in Ukraine, plaintiffs dismissed the motion.

25 *First*, notwithstanding plaintiffs’ latest assertion that they had only scant evidence as to
26 who supplied 50Mango with the misappropriated trade secrets, plaintiffs’ complaint alleged that
27 TapMedia’s former employees Ekaterina Stepanova, Tatyana Gripachevska, Denis Yashanov,
28 and Eugene Khvedchenia were now principals at 50Mango and responsible for the alleged trade

1 secret misappropriation (Compl. ¶¶ 11–18). As TapMedia’s office is in Ukraine, it is therefore
2 reasonable to assume that plaintiffs knew their former Ukrainian employees remained in Ukraine
3 when they jumped ship. This fact alone, without considering the implausibility that all four
4 individuals moved to California, eviscerates plaintiffs’ asserted ignorance of the location of key
5 witnesses.

6 *Second*, notwithstanding plaintiffs’ misleading statement that they in good faith
7 voluntarily dismissed the complaint when they discovered the true location of 50Mango,
8 TapMedia, back on November 29, 2016, filed an action in Ukraine against 50Mango on the
9 same facts as the complaint before us (RJN, Exh. E). Therefore, plaintiffs — at the latest —
10 were aware 21 days after filing the complaint in San Francisco and prior to 50Mango moving
11 to dismiss (filed January 20) that 50Mango was present and amenable to the courts in Ukraine.
12 In addition, 50Mango in its motion to dismiss submitted a sworn declaration of 50Mango’s CEO
13 Ekaterina Stepanova, declaring that of the four who allegedly jumped ship, two were in Ukraine
14 and two had nothing to do with 50Mango. Stepanova further states that all key evidence, as well
15 as witnesses were located in Ukraine and all points of contact between 50Mango and plaintiffs
16 took place in Ukraine. (Dkt. No. 17-2 ¶¶ 1-13). Instead of dismissing this suit then and pursuing
17 these theories in Ukraine, plaintiffs vigorously opposed forum non conveniens and clung here
18 until the order for supplemental evidence to show the supposed presence in the United States.
19 Knowing how the requested photograph would expose the scheme, they dismissed voluntarily.

20 *Third*, plaintiffs contend that their operations are not at issue and that they complied
21 (after the fact) with the Court’s order for supplemental evidence. Even though the Court
22 appreciates plaintiffs eventually providing pictures of what seems like principal Maxim
23 Korolevich’s residential home, the absence of an official place of business here in the United
24 States indicates that not only 50Mango, but also plaintiffs are physically present only in Ukraine
25 and any “presence” here was manufactured, to be generous.

26 *Lastly*, in response to this Court’s request at oral argument, 50Mango’s counsel provided
27 the transcript of the case management conference held February 16, 2017, in which plaintiffs’
28 counsel asserted that Tapgerine has “significant operations in California” (Dkt. No. 49).

1 Plaintiffs’ counsel further stated that Tapmedia and Tapperine have real employees “located in
2 Las Vegas and California.” This was a severe overstatement of plaintiffs’ actual presence in the
3 United States. According to plaintiffs’ CEO Korolevich, Tapperine — not Tapmedia — has
4 “one additional employee . . . located in Las Vegas” and no mention was made of any operations
5 in California (Dkt. No. 42-1).

6 This order therefore finds that plaintiffs’ reckless disregard in ascertaining the proper
7 forum for this action, combined with the apparent improper purpose of this litigation, constitutes
8 bad faith.

9 **2. MEET AND CONFER.**

10 In connection with the motion for attorney’s fees, 50Mango’s counsel violated our
11 district’s rules. 50Mango’s counsel failed to meet and confer with the opponent prior to filing
12 the motion for attorney’s fees. Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 54-5(a), “[c]ounsel for the
13 respective parties must meet and confer for the purpose of resolving all disputed issues relating
14 to attorney’s fees before making a motion for award of attorney’s fees.” Prior to ruling on the
15 merits of the motion before us, this Court ordered the parties to meet and confer in good faith
16 “for the purpose of resolving all disputed issues relating to the attorney’s fees.” The belated
17 meet and confer took place on April 18, 2017.

18 The meet and confer requirement is meant to avoid unnecessary and burdensome
19 litigation over the issue of attorney’s fees and failing to comply with it is a permissible ground
20 for the denial of attorney’s fees. Nevertheless, district courts within the Ninth Circuit have
21 granted attorney’s fees despite a plaintiff’s failure to meet and confer when compliance with
22 the requirement would be futile. *Yue v. Storage Technology Corp.*, No. C 07-05850 JW, 2008
23 WL 4185835, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2008) (Judge James Ware); *May v. Metropolitan Life Ins.*
24 *Co.*, No. C 03-5056CW, 2005 WL 839291, at *1 (N.D. Cal. April 7, 2005) (Judge Claudia
25 Wilken).

26 The situation before us, in which counsel for 50Mango apologizes for the violation, but
27 does not proffer an explanation, involves two contentious opponents, stubborn to the nth degree.
28 The communications of the attempted meet and confer on the day of the deadline, the settlement

