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16	UNITED STATES	S DISTRICT COURT
17	NORTHERN DISTR	RICT OF CALIFORNIA
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19	Pedro Figueroa Zarceno,	CASE NO. 3:17-cv-229
20	Plaintiff	COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AND DAMAGES
21	V.	DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
22	The City and County of San Francisco, Acting Chief of Police Toney Chaplin,	
23	Sheriff Vicki Hennessey in their official capacities; Sergeant Eric Balmy, Public	
24	Service Agent Nicole Chambers, Officer Kevin Clifford, Sergeant Trevor Kelly,	
25	Central Warrant Bureau Agent Dayna Thibeaux individually and in their official	
26	capacities; DOES 1-50 inclusive,	
27	Defendants.	
28		
	II.	

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
SAN FRANCISCO

COMPLAINT

Plaintiff Pedro Figueroa Zarceno alleges, upon personal knowledge as to himself and upon information and belief as to all others, as follows:

## I. <u>INTRODUCTION</u>

- 1. This case arises from the unlawful arrest and detention of Plaintiff Pedro Figueroa Zarceno at the hands of the San Francisco Police Department.
- 2. Mr. Figueroa's car was stolen in November 2015. Within days, Mr. Figueroa was informed that the San Francisco Police Department had recovered his car and towed it to an impound lot. On December 2, 2015 following the Police Department's instructions, Mr. Figueroa went to the impound lot, where he was then directed to the nearest police station to get the paperwork necessary to retrieve his car. However, instead of being assisted by the police, Mr. Figueroa was victimized yet again when he was unlawfully arrested and detained by San Francisco Police Department officers.
- 3. Working together, San Francisco Police Department officers and the San Francisco Sheriff's Department identified a civil immigration warrant for Mr. Figueroa, and then proceeded to violate San Francisco's Sanctuary Ordinance by contacting federal immigration authorities, providing them with Mr. Figueroa's location, and coordinating to hold him in custody long enough for federal immigration agents to arrive at the police station. When the officers finally "released" Mr. Figueroa, they led him—still handcuffed—to a side exit of the police station, where immigration agents were waiting just outside the station door. In truth, this was anything but a "release." The San Francisco Police Department directly transferred Mr. Figueroa to Immigration and Customs Enforcement custody, where he remained for the next two months. To add insult to injury, the San Francisco Police Department auctioned off Mr. Figueroa's car while he remained in custody and without providing any notice to him or his family. Immigration and Customs Enforcement continues to seek to deport Mr. Figueroa.
- 4. San Francisco is a sanctuary city—a city of refuge for immigrants, where everyone should be safe to report crimes to law enforcement. Mr. Figueroa's plight is not the first time that San Francisco Police Department personnel have unlawfully and wrongfully arrested or detained the victim of a crime based solely on a civil immigration matter, nor is it the

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first time that San Francisco Police Department personnel have violated San Francisco's Sanctuary Ordinance. This action seeks to make it the last.

5. Mr. Figueroa seeks an end to Defendants' unlawful actions, practices, and policies, recognition that he was the victim of an unlawful arrest and detention, money damages for the injuries and lost wages that he has suffered, and restitution for his property. The specific relief sought by Mr. Figueroa against each Defendant is alleged herein.

### II. **JURISDICTION**

6. This Court has jurisdiction over the claims alleged in this Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question), 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (declaratory relief), 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and 28 U.S.C. § 1651. Supplemental jurisdiction over pendant state law claims is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 because all of the claims arise from a common nucleus of operative facts that are so intertwined that they cannot be reasonably separated.

#### III. VENUE AND INTRA-DISTRICT ASSIGNMENT

7. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.SC. § 1391(b) because Defendant City and County of San Francisco resides in and can be found in this judicial district. This action arises in San Francisco County and assignment in either the Oakland Division or San Francisco division is appropriate pursuant to Civil Local Rule 3-2.

#### IV. **PARTIES**

- Plaintiff Pedro Figueroa Zarceno is a 32-year old Salvadoran male who resides in the City and County of San Francisco, in the State of California. He resided in San Francisco during the events relevant to and described in this Complaint.
- 9. Defendant City and County of San Francisco ("the City" or "San Francisco") is a political subdivision of the State of California that can be sued in its own name. Upon information and belief, Defendant San Francisco includes, operates, governs, and is responsible for the San Francisco Police Department ("SFPD") and the San Francisco Sheriff's Department ("Sheriff's Department") pursuant to the laws of the State of California and San Francisco.
  - Defendant Acting Chief of Police Toney Chaplin is the current Acting Chief of 10.

Police of the San Francisco Police Department and is responsible for the policies, practices, and
customs of the San Francisco Police Department. Defendant Chaplin directs the hiring,
screening, training, retention, supervision, discipline, counseling, and control of the officers
under his supervision and command. At all relevant times, Defendant Chaplin was acting under
color of law. He is sued in his official capacity.

- 11. Defendant Public Service Agent Nicole Chambers is an employee of the San Francisco Police Department. At all relevant times, Defendant Chambers was acting under color of law. She is sued in her individual and official capacities.
- 12. Defendant Officer Kevin C. Clifford is an officer with the San Francisco Police Department. At all relevant times, Defendant Clifford was acting under color of law. He is sued in his individual and official capacities.
- 13. Defendant Sergeant Eric S. Balmy is an officer with the San Francisco Police Department. At all relevant times, Defendant Balmy was acting under color of law. He is sued in his individual and official capacities.
- 14. Defendant Sergeant Trevor Kelly is an officer with the San Francisco Police Department. At all relevant times, Defendant Kelly was acting under color of law. He is sued in his individual and official capacities.
- 15. Defendant Sheriff Vicki Hennessey is the current Sheriff of the San Francisco Sheriff's Department. Defendant Hennessey is responsible for the policies, practices, and customs of the San Francisco Sheriff's Department. Defendant Hennessey also directs the hiring, screening, training, retention, supervision, discipline, counseling, and control of the deputy sheriffs under her supervision and command. At all relevant times, Defendant Hennessey was acting under color of law. She is sued in her official capacity.
- 16. Defendant Central Warrant Bureau Agent Dayna Thibeaux is an employee with the San Francisco Sheriff's Department. At all relevant times, Defendant Thibeaux was acting under color of law. She is sued in her individual and official capacities.
- 17. At all relevant times, Defendants DOES 1 through 50 (also "DOE defendants") were agents, employees, or otherwise representatives of the City. At all relevant times, DOES 1

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through 50 were acting under color of law. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff alleges that many, if not all, of DOES 1 through 50 are residents of the Northern District of California. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff alleges that DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, are legally responsible for the wrongs committed against Plaintiff, as alleged herein. When Plaintiff becomes aware of the true identities of one or more DOE defendants, Plaintiff will amend this complaint to add or substitute them as named Defendants.

### SAN FRANCISCO IS A SANCTUARY CITY V.

- 18. The City and County of San Francisco is a City and County of Refuge.
- 19. San Francisco declared itself a city of refuge on December 23, 1985 when the San Francisco Board of Supervisors passed San Francisco Resolution 1087-85, the City of Refuge Resolution, in response to the Salvadoran and Guatemalan refugee crises. The resolution provided, in part, that: "San Francisco finds that immigration and refugee policy is a matter of Federal jurisdiction; that federal employees not City employees, should be considered responsible for implementation of immigration and refugee policy."
- 20. Under the City of Refuge Resolution, then-Mayor of San Francisco Dianne Feinstein was urged by the San Francisco Board of Supervisors to "affirm that City Departments" shall not discriminate against Salvadoran [] refugees because of immigration status, and shall not jeopardize the safety and welfare of law-abiding refugees by acting in a way that may cause their deportation."
- 21. Mayor Feinstein explained that the resolution "has one purpose and that is to emphasize that persons are not going to be discriminated against or hassled in San Francisco because of their immigration status as long as they are law-abiding." She also explained that the resolution addressed the fear that refugees had of using basic public services that most people take for granted such as calling the police when there is trouble.
- 22. Four years later, in October of 1989, San Francisco Supervisor Jim Gonzales sponsored the City of Refuge Ordinance, also known as the "Sanctuary Ordinance," to codify the policy in the 1985 City of Refuge Resolution.
  - 23. The Sanctuary Ordinance was described by Supervisor Gonzales as, "in essence,"

a civil rights ordinance, and was unanimously approved by the San Francisco Board of Supervisors. The Sanctuary Ordinance was signed into law by then-Mayor Art Agnos on October 24, 1989. *See* San Francisco Admin. Code Chpt. 12H.

- 24. Among other provisions, the Sanctuary Ordinance created a blanket prohibition on the use of City funds or resources to assist in the enforcement of federal immigration law.
- 25. This includes a prohibition on San Francisco employees assisting or cooperating with any investigation, detention, or arrest conducted by the federal agency charged with enforcement of federal immigration law.
- 26. In 1992, the Sanctuary Ordinance was amended to create an exception allowing the use of City funds or resources to report an individual to federal immigration authorities if the person had been convicted of certain felonies. *See* San Francisco Admin. Code Chpt. 12H § 2-1.
- 27. For more than 20 years, San Francisco employees, including San Francisco Police Department officers and San Francisco Sheriff's Department deputies, have been prohibited from cooperating with and assisting federal immigration officials in regards to the vast majority of immigrants.
- 28. In March 2007, then-Mayor Gavin Newsom issued Executive Directive 07-01, instituting the Sanctuary City Initiative, which required all City Departments to ensure that departmental rules, regulations, and protocols adhere to the Sanctuary Ordinance. The Executive Directive emphasized that no department, agency, commission, officer, or employee of the City and County of San Francisco may assist federal immigration authorities unless required by law.
- 29. Executive Directive 07-01 also included an educational outreach campaign, entitled "Know Your Rights." The campaign aimed to ensure that immigrants were informed of their civil rights when reaching out and receiving vital services from City employees including those services provided by the SFPD, and covered the main provisions of the Sanctuary Ordinance.
- 30. There was also a media campaign consisting of print ads, newspaper ads, public transit ads, and television public service announcements aimed to ensure that residents of San Francisco, regardless of their immigration status, felt safe when reaching out and receiving vital

services provided by City employees.

- 31. Upon information and belief, the City also created brochures titled "San Francisco is a Sanctuary City," which indicated that San Francisco employees would not report immigrants or their immigration status to federal immigration authorities and that immigrants could feel safe when contacting the police.
- 32. Mayor Gavin Newsom, on or about April 2, 2008, explained the purpose of the public awareness campaign regarding the Sanctuary Ordinance:

The City's public awareness campaign is a reminder that City employees will not report individuals or their immigration status to federal immigration agents. San Francisco residents should feel safe when they . . . report a crime to the Police Department. . . . We've been very concerned that in the last year and a half at the renewed vigor of the federal government or ICE for immigration raids. . . . [T]o calm people's fears, people's instinct to go underground, to not come forth and report a crime because of that fear, . . . . We are standing up to say to all of our residents, 'We don't care what your status is in terms of its legal certification, we care that you, as a human being are a resident of our city. We want you to participate in the life of our city.'

33. At the time of Mr. Figueroa's unlawful arrest and detention, section 2 of Chapter 12H of the San Francisco Administrative Code provided:

No department, agency, commission, officer, or employee of the City and County of San Francisco shall use any City funds or resources to assist in the enforcement of federal immigration law or to gather or disseminate information regarding the immigration status of individuals in the City of and County of San Francisco unless such assistance is required by Federal or State statute, regulation or court decision.

- 34. In particular, section 2 prohibits City employees from "[a]ssisting or cooperating, in one's official capacity, with any Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) investigation, detention, or arrest procedures, public or clandestine relating to alleged violations of the civil provisions of the Federal immigration law." San Francisco Admin. Code Chpt. 12H § 2(a).
- 35. Additionally, section 2 prohibits City employees from "[r]equesting information about, or disseminating information regarding, the immigration status of any individual, or conditioning the provision of services or benefits by the City and County of San Francisco upon

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1	immigration status, except as required by federal or State statute or regulation, City and County
2	public assistance criteria, or court decision." San Francisco Admin. Code Chpt. 12H § 2(c).
3	VI. SAN FRANCISCO LAW ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL HAVE NO ROLE IN
4	THE ENFORCEMENT OF IMMIGRATION LAW
5	A. Local Law Enforcement Agencies Lack the Independent Authority to
6	Enforce Immigration Law
7	36. Local law enforcement officers of a State or a State subdivision are not permitted
8	unilaterally to enforce federal immigration laws. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(10)(B) (2006).
9	37. The United States Attorney General may enter into a written agreement with a
10	State or any of its subdivisions that, in essence, deputizes law enforcement officers to carry out
11	immigration laws at the expense of the State or the appropriate subdivision. 8 U.S.C.
12	§ 1357(g)(1).
13	38. None of San Francisco, the Sherriff's Department, nor the SFPD have entered into
14	a written agreement with federal immigration authorities pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) to
15	authorize City employees to enforce civil immigration law.
16	39. Mere unauthorized presence in the United States alone is not a criminal matter,
17	and as such, does not give rise to an inference of criminal activity. Arizona v. United States, 132
18	S. Ct. 2492, 2506 (2012). Thus, without an agreement with the United States Attorney General,
19	local law enforcement officers cannot arrest or detain individuals based on mere unauthorized
20	presence in the United States.
21	B. San Francisco Police Department General Orders Prohibit the Enforcement
22	of Immigration Laws
23	40. The SFPD has explicitly acknowledged San Francisco's status as a Sanctuary
24	City. SFPD General Order ("DGO") 5.15, governing the Enforcement of Immigration Laws, has
25	been in effect since December 13, 1995. It provides, in pertinent part:
26	<ul> <li>"In accordance with the City of Refuge Ordinance Members shall not stop, question, or detain any individual because of the</li> </ul>
27	individual's national origin, foreign appearance, inability to speak
28	English, or immigration status []. The mere presence of so-called 'illegal aliens' is not a criminal offense."

- "Members shall not enforce immigration laws or assist the INS in the enforcement of immigration laws."
- "Members shall not assist the INS in transporting persons suspected solely of violating federal immigration laws."

DGO 5.15, §§ I.B.1, B.2, B.3.d.

41. Upon information and belief, in a 2007 press release, the SFPD reaffirmed that:

By virtue of San Francisco Administrative Code Chapter 12H and Police DGOs, members of the SFPD are prohibited from contacting or stopping individuals solely because of their immigration or perceived immigration status. Members of the SFPD do not enforce immigration laws and do not assist any other agency in enforcing immigration laws. All persons, regardless of their immigration status, have a right to receive essential city services. Anyone who is the victim of a crime, or has information about a crime, or is in need of any other service provided by the SFPD, is encouraged to contact the SFPD.

- 42. While the SFPD and Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") entered into a 2013 Memorandum of Understanding allowing the Secretary of Homeland Security to designate members of the SFPD as Custom Officers (the "2013 MOU"), this was done for the limited purpose of authorizing SFPD officers to assist in the enforcement of customs laws and does not grant SFPD officers the authority to enforce immigration laws. For the avoidance of any doubt, the 2013 MOU specifically states: "This agreement does not grant the designated Custom Officers the authority to enforce 'immigration' laws."
- 43. The SFPD Implementing Instructions for the 2013 MOU ("Implementing Instructions") underscore that the 2013 MOU does not grant SFPD members authority to enforce immigration laws: "SFPD members assigned . . . under the MOU shall not participate in any investigation of immigration status or violation of immigration laws, nor shall they participate in gathering or disseminating information regarding the immigration status of individuals within the City and County of San Francisco, unless required by state or federal law, regulation or court decision."
- 44. The Implementing Instructions also provide that the 2013 MOU does not supersede the Sanctuary Ordinance or SFPD General Orders: "SFPD members assigned . . . under the [2013] MOU shall at all times . . . remain subject to all SFPD rules, policies and

procedures. In the event of a conflict between ICE and SFPD direction, rules, policies and procedures, SFPD members shall adhere to those of the SFPD."

## C. The San Francisco Police Department Has Repeatedly Violated the Sanctuary Ordinance

- 45. Unfortunately, Mr. Figueroa's case was not the first time the SFPD violated the Sanctuary Ordinance and breached the trust of an immigrant who had come forward to report a crime and seek the SFPD's protection. Despite San Francisco's long-standing ordinance and DGO 5.15, the SFPD and its officers have a history of violating the Sanctuary Ordinance.
- 46. As reported, nearly 10 years ago, in the *San Francisco Bay Guardian* article, "Call the cops, get deported," SFPD officers violated the Sanctuary Ordinance in 2006 when a stabbing victim contacted SFPD officers for help and instead they arrested her—the victim—based on her immigration status and turned her over to federal immigration authorities. *See* Philip Hwang, *Call the cops, get deported*, S.F. Bay Guardian, Feb. 6, 2006, at 7.
- 47. Upon information and belief, the San Francisco Office of Citizen Complaints ("OCC") launched an investigation into the 2006 incident and concluded that SFPD officers had violated the Sanctuary Ordinance, and forwarded the case to the SFPD for discipline.
  - 48. In 2010, SFPD officers again violated the Sanctuary Ordinance.
- 49. On or about June 2, 2010, SFPD officers performed a routine traffic stop during which a computer query had revealed a non-criminal civil immigration warrant for an individual.
- 50. While in immigration custody, the individual filed a complaint with the OCC. On or about May 12, 2011, the OCC sustained the complaint, OCC Case No. 0416-10, finding that the SFPD violated DGO 5.15 by affirmatively communicating with federal immigration authorities.
- 51. Then-Chief of the San Francisco Police Department Greg Suhr was informed specifically about this incident in a letter urging him to take "prompt steps to ensure SFPD officers are adequately trained so that violations of General Order 5.15 such as these never happen again."
  - 52. These incidents provided notice to all Defendants and City policymakers that, at

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best, local law enforcement personnel did not have adequate training with respect to the legal significance of a civil immigration warrant, the database in which they are contained, and how such warrants should be handled in light of San Francisco's Sanctuary Ordinance. At worst, these incidents constitute repeated, knowing, and deliberate violations of the Sanctuary Ordinance and DGO 5.15.

# VII. SAN FRANCISCO HAS REAFFIRMED ITS COMMITMENT TO BEING A SANCTUARY CITY

- 53. San Francisco and its officials have reaffirmed the City's commitment to the Sanctuary Ordinance and its underlying policy goals, both before and after the events described in this Complaint.
- 54. Addressing the importance of the Sanctuary Ordinance, on or about July 6, 2015, Mayor Ed Lee stated: "Our City's policy helps immigrant and limited-English speaking communities where sometimes people fear and mistrust the criminal justice system. We want people to report crimes . . . I want others to know, San Francisco is a city where we protect the well-being and success of all families, regardless of immigration status."
- 55. On or about November 15, 2016, the Board of Supervisors adopted San Francisco Resolution No. 484-16 providing that: "San Francisco will remain a Sanctuary City. We will not turn our back on the men and women from other countries who help make this city great, and who represent over one third of our population."
- 56. The SFPD also provided a statement on or about November 2016 "reaffirming its commitment to fostering trust and cooperation with all people of our City." The statement provided in part that: "We encourage everyone to communicate with San Francisco police officers without fear of inquiry regarding their immigration status."

# VIII. <u>DEFENDANTS' UNLAWFUL AND WRONGFUL CONDUCT TOWARD MR. FIGUEROA</u>

- A. Mr. Figueroa's Arrival in the United States
- 57. Mr. Figueroa, originally from El Salvador, arrived in the United States in Eagle Pass, Texas on September 11, 2005, after fleeing his home country.

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- 58. Upon his arrival in Texas, Mr. Figueroa was detained by United States Customs and Border Protection officers, who issued Mr. Figueroa a Notice to Appear ("NTA")—an ICE charging document, which initiates removal proceedings.
- 59. The NTA did not include a removal hearing date or location, and although Mr. Figueroa provided an address in San Francisco, he never received notice of his removal hearing.
- 60. On December 7, 2005, Mr. Figueroa was ordered removed *in absentia* by an immigration judge in San Antonio, Texas. Mr. Figueroa was not made aware that he was subject to a removal order until after he was detained by ICE, following his unlawful arrest by SFPD.
  - B. Mr. Figueroa Became the Victim of a Crime and Reported His Vehicle Stolen to the SFPD
- 61. On November 30, 2015, Mr. Figueroa discovered that his 1991 Acura Integra was missing from where he had last parked it. Mr. Figueroa spoke with his fiancée (now wife), Dora Alicia Cortes ("Mrs. Cortes"), about his missing car, and they decided to report it stolen.
- 62. Mr. Figueroa believed he could approach the SFPD to report the theft without fear of reprisal or negative immigration consequences. Mrs. Cortes also was not fearful of reaching out to the SFPD for help, either for herself as a U.S. Citizen or for her fiancé as an immigrant.
- 63. On November 30, 2015, Mr. Figueroa and Mrs. Cortes went to the Ingleside SFPD station located at 1 Sgt. John V. Young Ln., San Francisco, CA 94112 and reported the car theft.
- 64. Mr. Figueroa, whose primary language is Spanish, speaks and understands very little English. Mrs. Cortes, despite her limited English proficiency, which is apparent by her vocabulary, accent, and sentence construction, spoke directly with the SFPD officer who made the report ("Report Officer"). As part of this process, Mr. Figueroa provided his Salvadoran identification to the Report Officer.
- 65. The Report Officer did not provide, or offer to provide, a Spanish-speaking officer to facilitate communication between the parties, despite both Mr. Figueroa and Mrs. Cortes' readily apparent English proficiency limitations.
  - 66. In order to facilitate the SFPD's criminal investigation of the vehicle theft, Mr.

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Figueroa and Mrs. Cortes cooperated with the SFPD. As best as they could through their limited English, they provided information about the vehicle and the circumstances leading up to its theft.

- 67. During this interaction, the Report Officer indicated to Mr. Figueroa and Mrs. Cortes that Mr. Figueroa needed to sign a consent form, allowing the SFPD to tow Mr. Figueroa's car. Even though neither of them fully understood what Mr. Figueroa was signing, in an effort to cooperate, Mr. Figueroa signed his name to the consent form. Without this consent form—which Mr. Figueroa did not fully understand—the SFPD would not have been authorized to tow Mr. Figueroa's car. Mr. Figueroa also would not have had to obtain a vehicle release form from SFPD to retrieve his car.
- 68. Prior to the theft, Mr. Figueroa's car was in good working condition and had a value of approximately \$2,100. Mr. Figueroa's vehicle also contained construction tools for his job worth approximately \$500.

## C. Trusting in the SFPD, Mr. Figueroa Attempted to Retrieve His Stolen Vehicle

- 69. On the morning of December 2, 2015, an officer from the SFPD left Mr. Figueroa a voicemail. His niece listened to the voicemail. She informed him that it said his vehicle had been found and towed to an AutoReturn impound lot (located at 450 7th Street), and the SFPD officer instructed Mr. Figueroa to go there to retrieve it.
- 70. Following the SFPD officer's instructions, at or around 6:00 p.m. on December 2, 2015, Mr. Figueroa and Mrs. Cortes travelled to the impound lot to retrieve Mr. Figueroa's vehicle.
- 71. When they arrived at the impound lot, the lot attendant explained to Mr. Figueroa and Mrs. Cortes that, before he could retrieve his vehicle, Mr. Figueroa needed a "vehicle release form" from the SFPD.
- 72. The lot attendant directed Mr. Figueroa to the SFPD's Southern Station located at 1251 3rd Street ("Station" or "Southern Station") to procure the vehicle release form. Mr. Figueroa and Mrs. Cortes followed the attendant's directions and went to the Southern Station.

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- 73. Upon arriving at Southern Station, Mr. Figueroa and Mrs. Cortes entered through the front entrance on 3rd Street into a waiting room area. Mr. Figueroa, along with Mrs. Cortes, approached a female employee of the SFPD, in full uniform, stationed at the front desk behind a glass window. Upon information and belief, that employee was Public Service Agent Nicole Chambers. Mrs. Cortes explained, in obviously limited English, that Mr. Figueroa needed a vehicle release form to retrieve his car from the AutoReturn lot. Without summoning a Spanishspeaking officer, Defendant Chambers asked Mr. Figueroa in English for his driver's license, and then told him and Mrs. Cortes to sit and wait. After Mrs. Cortes communicated to Mr. Figueroa in Spanish what Defendant Chambers wanted, Mr. Figueroa provided the officer with his Salvadoran identification card. Mr. Figueroa and Mrs. Cortes then sat down in the waiting area and waited for Defendant Chambers to return with the completed vehicle release form.
- 74. Upon information and belief, from this initial interaction forward, Defendant Chambers, and in turn the SFPD, identified or should have identified Mr. Figueroa and Mrs. Cortes as "limited English proficient ("LEP") persons."
- 75. DGO 5.20 requires that "[w]hen performing law enforcement functions, [SFPD] members shall provide free language assistance to LEP individuals whom they encounter . . . . " The procedures to accomplish this policy include identifying the "primary language" and then providing the LEP individual access to a "qualified bilingual member [of the SFPD]" competent in the LEP individual's primary language.
- 76. Upon information and belief, at least one qualified bilingual member of the SFPD competent in Spanish was present at Southern Station on December 2, 2015.
- 77. Upon information and belief, at some time after Mr. Figueroa and Mrs. Cortes spoke with Defendant Chambers, Defendants Balmy and Chambers identified Mr. Figueroa "as a wanted suspect"—solely and wrongfully based on the suspicion that Mr. Figueroa was unlawfully present in the United States.
- 78. Defendants Balmy and Chambers then informed Defendant Clifford that Mr. Figueroa was a "possible wanted suspect." Upon information and belief, Defendants Chambers and Balmy did not provide Defendant Clifford with any reasonable or articulable facts to support

their accusation that Mr. Figueroa was a "possible wanted suspect." Without any further investigation into the matter, nor the presence of exigent circumstances, Defendants Balmy and Clifford decided to unlawfully arrest and detain Mr. Figueroa.

### D. Defendants Balmy and Clifford Unlawfully Arrested Mr. Figueroa

- 79. At one point, while waiting in the lobby of Southern Station, Mr. Figueroa walked out of Southern Station's main entrance to look for a trash can and throw away some trash. As he did so, two SFPD officers followed him outside and proceeded to track him before he reentered Southern Station and sat back down.
- 80. Soon after Mr. Figueroa reentered Southern Station, Defendants Balmy and Clifford approached Mr. Figueroa where he sat. Without probable cause or a reasonable, articulable suspicion that Mr. Figueroa had engaged in, or was going to engage in any criminal activity, Defendant Clifford stood in front of Mr. Figueroa—who had his back against a wall—and demanded in English that he stand up because he was under arrest.
- 81. Mr. Figueroa quickly complied with Defendant Clifford's instructions to stand up, but he did not fully comprehend what was going on because of his limited English proficiency.
- 82. Immediately after standing up, Defendant Clifford handcuffed Mr. Figueroa.

  Upon information and belief, Defendant Clifford then double-locked the handcuffs on Mr.

  Figueroa and checked them for tightness.
- 83. Then, along with Defendant Balmy, Defendant Clifford began to escort Mr. Figueroa out of the waiting area and into the Southern Station's booking area.
- 84. Mrs. Cortes, in shock from the sudden arrest of her fiancé and the father of her child, but also knowing that Mr. Figueroa did not speak English, asked Defendants Balmy and Clifford, as best as she could in her limited English, why Mr. Figueroa was under arrest.
- 85. Upon information and belief, Defendant Clifford stated words to the effect that they needed to figure out if he (Mr. Figueroa) was who they were looking for.
- 86. Mr. Figueroa was never read any of his Miranda rights or advised of any right to counsel.

SAN FRANCISCO

- 87. Upon information and belief, Defendants Balmy and Clifford, acting in their official capacities, made the decision to arrest Mr. Figueroa on the basis of his outstanding civil immigration warrant and/or his race and/or national origin.
- 88. While being led to the booking area, Mr. Figueroa never communicated or attempted to communicate with Defendants Balmy and Clifford because Mr. Figueroa cannot speak or understand English. Nonetheless, it was apparent that Mr. Figueroa was of limited English proficiency, and no qualified Spanish-speaking officer was summoned to explain to Mr. Figueroa what was happening to him.
- 89. Mr. Figueroa was led through closed doors into another area. Upon information and belief, this was Southern Station's booking area, where there was a bench and two other doors. One door was marked "exit" and the other door was unmarked.
- 90. Once they reached the booking area, Defendants Balmy and Clifford, without communicating their reason for doing so, conducted a pat-down search of Mr. Figueroa. All of Mr. Figueroa's belongings were removed and passed through a small window to another SFPD officer.
- 91. Without communicating their reason for doing so, Defendants Balmy and Clifford also fingerprinted Mr. Figueroa.
- 92. Mr. Figueroa was then led to the bench. Defendants Balmy and Clifford then handcuffed Mr. Figueroa to the bench and left him there.
- 93. At one point, another SFPD officer entered and asked Mr. Figueroa in English to sign some documents, which were also only in English. Now fearful of cooperating with the SFPD, Mr. Figueroa refused to sign because he did not understand what the documents said. The officer left and, within a few minutes, a Spanish-speaking SFPD officer arrived and explained to Mr. Figueroa that the documents were related to his personal property. Mr. Figueroa signed the documents, and the Spanish-speaking officer exited and never returned.
- 94. Mr. Figueroa was never offered language assistance prior to this point. Nor was he subsequently offered language assistance, despite the obviousness of Mr. Figueroa's limited English proficiency.

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Upon information and belief, the warrant check did not reveal any felony

1	convictions, o	or any other outstanding warrants of any kind, criminal or otherwise, with respect to
2	Mr. Figueroa.	
3	106.	Upon information and belief, if any additional warrants for Mr. Figueroa had
4	existed, the N	CIC database would have reflected them as well.
5	F.	In Violation of the Sanctuary Ordinance, the SFPD Affirmatively Communicated with ICE Regarding Mr. Figueroa's Immigration Status
7	107.	While Mr. Figueroa sat handcuffed to the bench, the SFPD communicated with
8	the Sheriff's l	Department and ICE regarding Mr. Figueroa's immigration status.
9	108.	Defendant Kelly called to confirm the civil immigration warrant with Defendant
10	Thibeaux of t	he Sheriff's Department's Central Warrant Bureau.
11	109.	Upon information and belief, Defendant Thibeaux, as a member of the Central
12	Warrant Bure	au, understood that Mr. Figueroa's ICE warrant was a civil warrant, related to Mr.
13	Figueroa's im	amigration status, and was not to be enforced.
14	110.	Upon information and belief, using the information provided by Defendant Kelly,
15	Defendant Th	ibeaux contacted ICE and disseminated information with regard to Mr. Figueroa's
16	immigration s	status and other personal, identifying information, and provided the ICE agent with
17	Defendant Ke	elly's contact information.
18	111.	Defendant Kelly also was in contact with ICE. Defendant Kelly provided ICE
19	with Mr. Figu	eroa's current location at Southern Station.
20	112.	Upon information and belief, Defendants Thibeaux, Clifford, and Kelly are not
21	trained or aut	horized to enforce civil immigration warrants. In fact, Defendants Thibeaux,
22	Clifford, and	Kelly are expressly prohibited under the Sanctuary Ordinance from enforcing
23	immigration l	aws in this instance.
24	113.	Upon information and belief, at some point after Mr. Figueroa was arrested by
25	SFPD officers	s, ICE Agent Cepeda contacted Defendant Kelly and informed him that he would
26	respond to So	outhern Station.
27	G.	The SFPD Coordinated with ICE to Transfer Mr. Figueroa Into ICE
28		Custody

- 114. At no time during this ordeal was Mr. Figueroa ever told that the SFPD had discovered an outstanding civil immigration warrant attached to his name, or that the SFPD had affirmatively communicated this to ICE.
- 115. Rather, upon information and belief, and unbeknownst to Mr. Figueroa, at some point before Mr. Figueroa's release, ICE Agent Cepeda and another ICE agent arrived at the Southern Station to take custody of Mr. Figueroa. Upon information and belief, Agent Cepeda informed SFPD of his presence at Southern Station, and both Defendants Clifford and Kelly were advised of Agent Cepeda's presence at Southern Station while Mr. Figueroa was still in SFPD custody.
- 116. Upon information and belief, the ICE agents were directed by SFPD officers to position themselves near a side exit door (the "Alley Exit") located in a small dead-end alley that is not readily accessible to the public.
- 117. Upon information and belief, the ICE agents' positioning at this side exit—and not the main and commonly used entrance—immediately before Mr. Figueroa was pushed through it, indicates that the transfer of custody was coordinated and in cooperation with the SFPD, and not a coincidental encounter.
- 118. Upon information and belief, after learning of Agent Cepeda's arrival, Defendant Kelly advised Defendant Clifford that the SFPD booked prisoners at the County Jail and instructed Defendant Clifford to "release" Mr. Figueroa per Section 849b of the Penal Code and to give him a Certificate of Release. This Certificate of Release was SFPD's attempt to retroactively downgrade Mr. Figueroa's arrest to a detention in its paperwork.
- 119. Shortly before Mr. Figueroa's so-called release, Defendant Clifford and another SFPD officer entered, un-handcuffed Mr. Figueroa from the bench, stood him up, and then rehandcuffed Mr. Figueroa's wrists behind his back.
  - 120. Upon information and belief, the other SFPD officer also did not speak Spanish.
- 121. Defendant Clifford and the other SFPD officer, each standing behind one of Mr. Figueroa's shoulders, walked Mr. Figueroa down a dark corridor in the booking area towards the unmarked door. This was not the same door through which Mr. Figueroa had entered the

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As Mr. Figueroa stepped through the Alley Exit, both ICE agents positioned

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Defendant Chambers' explanation, and, again, at no point did any SFPD officer attempt to

Because of her limited English proficiency, Mrs. Cortes did not fully understand

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153.

Upon being detained by ICE, Mr. Figueroa was transported from the Southern

Christmas without his family and was separated from his wife and daughter for two months.

Station to the Martinez Detention Facility, where he was held until the following morning.

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uncontrollably out of fear that her father would be removed from the United States and had

difficulties at school. Her teacher contacted Mrs. Cortes and suggested that Mrs. Cortes seek a

child therapist.

- 162. Mrs. Cortes was also severely emotionally distressed by Mr. Figueroa's detention. She suffered anxiety, worry, humiliation, shame, and fear due to Mr. Figueroa's detention and his possible removal from the United States.
- 163. On February 2, 2016, Mr. Figueroa's bond was set at \$2,500. The next day, his bond was paid, and he was released. Mr. Figueroa, who went to the police station on December 2, 2015 thinking he was simply going to obtain a form to recover his stolen car, was detained for two full months.

### K. Mr. Figueroa's Immigration Case Has Been Reopened

- 164. Upon Mr. Figueroa's detention on December 2, 2015, ICE sought to effectuate his 2005 removal order.
- 165. Following his arrest and detention, Mr. Figueroa retained an immigration lawyer who filed a motion to reopen Mr. Figueroa's removal proceedings on the grounds that there was deficient notice of his 2005 removal hearing, and that Mr. Figueroa was seeking asylum. An immigration judge in San Antonio, Texas, reopened Mr. Figueroa's case on January 13, 2016.
- 166. While Mr. Figueroa is no longer subject to a final order of removal, deportation remains a possibility at the conclusion of his immigration proceedings. Mr. Figueroa remains anxious and fearful of that possibility. If Mr. Figueroa is deported, he will be permanently separated from his wife and his daughter.

### L. Defendants Wrongfully Auctioned Off Mr. Figueroa's Vehicle

- 167. A few weeks after Mr. Figueroa's unlawful arrest and detention by the SFPD, Mrs. Cortes received a phone call from an SFPD officer, who spoke to her in English, regarding Mr. Figueroa's vehicle. The SFPD officer inquired whether anyone was going to retrieve the vehicle. Mrs. Cortes informed the caller that Mr. Figueroa could not because he was in custody.
- 168. Mr. Figueroa, as the registered owner, was the only person authorized to retrieve the vehicle. However, he was unable to do so because the SFPD had transferred him to ICE custody, where he remained.
  - 169. Within a few days of Mr. Figueroa's release from ICE custody, on or around

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176.

SFPD Captain Jerry Difilippo also misled reporters on the same day stating that:

the media, claiming: "We do not cooperate on immigration matters."

"We're going to confirm a warrant and if it's not confirmed we'll release the individual, which is what we did in this case. I think it was out of the norm for an ICE agent to have showed up at the station. I don't think anyone expected that to happen."

- 177. Sheriff's Department Chief of Staff Eileen Hurst also misled the media, falsely asserting that "[i]n this case, we are talking about a warrant signed by a judge for probable cause."
- 178. These statements by SFPD Sergeant Andraychak, SFPD Captain Difilippo, and Sheriff's Department Chief of Staff Hurst were false. SFPD cooperated with ICE, unlawfully arrested and detained Mr. Figueroa, provided Mr. Figueroa's exact location at Southern Station to ICE, and the warrant was a non-criminal civil immigration warrant lacking the requisite probable cause. Not only did the SFPD expect ICE to show up at Southern Station, when SFPD officers "released" Mr. Figueroa, they transferred him directly into ICE's custody at the Alley Exit of Southern Station.
- 179. These falsehoods were initially uncovered when Mr. Figueroa received ICE's internal records. These records showed, among other things, that an SFPD officer had contacted ICE directly and informed ICE that Mr. Figueroa was being unlawfully detained at Southern Station.

## B. Defendants Acknowledged Their Wrongdoing

- 180. On February 5, 2016, Mr. Figueroa's immigration attorneys and immigrants' rights advocates, including ALC, held another press conference in City Hall, during which they released documents disclosing the false statements made by the SFPD. As discussed above, the documents evidenced the cooperation between the SFPD, the Sheriff's Department, and ICE.
- 181. In response to the document release, former SFPD Chief of Police Greg Suhr acknowledged that Mr. Figueroa never should have ended up in the custody of federal immigration authorities.

# C. The Office Of Citizen Complaints Found that the SFPD Engaged in Wrongful Conduct

182. On April 7, 2016, Mr. Figueroa filed a complaint with the Office of Citizen

Complaints ("OCC Complaint"). The OCC Complaint described in detail the events leading up to, during, and after SFPD's unlawful arrest and detention of Mr. Figueroa and his subsequent arrest by ICE agents.

- 183. The Addendum to the OCC Complaint listed five claims: (1) the SFPD violated its own departmental policy against (a) detaining individuals based on their immigration status and (b) helping ICE enforce federal immigration laws; (2) the SFPD violated the City's Sanctuary Ordinance for the same reasons; (3) the SFPD violated department policy in failing to contact a Deputy Chief before engaging in an investigation with the Sheriff's Department; (4) the SFPD, in failing to provide an interpreter for Mr. Figueroa, violated its language access policy; and (5) the SFPD's actions, which violated several of its own department policies, resulted in Mr. Figueroa's unlawful detention and constructive transfer to ICE custody.
- 184. The OCC Complaint alleged that, as a result of his treatment by the SFPD, Mr. Figueroa suffered severe emotional distress in addition to the loss of his car, wages, and other money that he had to pay to his immigration attorneys.
- 185. On November 21, 2016, the OCC wrote to Mr. Figueroa regarding his OCC Complaint. The OCC sustained the majority of Mr. Figueroa's allegations against the SFPD, including that he was detained without justification, handcuffed without cause, that the SFPD neglected its duty in aiding ICE to enforce immigration law, and that SFPD violated its language access policy.

### D. The SFPD Internal Investigation

- 186. The SFPD also has commenced an internal investigation to determine if there was any wrongdoing with regard to Mr. Figueroa's treatment.
  - E. The City Denied Any Relief to Mr. Figueroa for Its Wrongful and Unlawful Conduct
- 187. Four months after Mr. Figueroa's release, on June 2, 2016, Mr. Figueroa filed a complaint with the City to challenge the unlawful treatment he endured at the hands of the SFPD and the Sheriff's Department ("City Complaint").
  - 188. The City Complaint asserted claims against the SFPD and the Sheriff's

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1	Department for wrongful arrest, wrongful detention, false imprisonment, violation of Mr.
2	Figueroa's right to be free from unlawful seizure under the Fourth Amendment, his rights under
3	the California Constitution, and infliction of emotional distress.
4	189. In addition, the City Complaint alleged that the SFPD, in arresting and detaining
5	Mr. Figueroa without probable cause: (1) violated the City's Sanctuary Ordinance by assisting in
6	the enforcement of federal immigration law; (2) violated its own departmental policy against
7	detaining individuals based on their immigration status and assisting ICE in enforcing
8	immigration laws; (3) violated its own departmental policy requiring that an interpreter be
9	provided to those with limited English language proficiency skills; and (4) illegally sold off Mr.
10	Figueroa's car while he was in custody.
11	190. On July 18, 2016, the City denied Mr. Figueroa's City Complaint in its entirety.
12	X. <u>CLAIMS FOR RELIEF</u>
13	FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF
14	Fourth Amendment (42 U.S.C. § 1983) – Unreasonable Search and Seizure
15	(Against all Defendants)
16	191. Mr. Figueroa incorporates by reference the allegations in the paragraphs above as
17	though fully set forth here.
18	192. Federal law preempts state or local police from enforcing federal civil
19	immigration laws and does not grant local law enforcement officials the authority to make civil
20	immigration arrests beyond narrow circumstances not relevant to Mr. Figueroa's arrest.
21	193. There is no agreement under 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(1) in place in the City or County
22	of San Francisco, and as such, Defendants, collectively, and each of them, did not have authority
23	to enforce federal immigration law under 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(1).
24	194. At all times Defendants Balmy, Chambers, Clifford, Kelly, and DOES 1 through
25	50 wore full uniforms and acted under the color of state law. At all times Defendant Thibeaux
26	acted under the color of state law.
27	195. Defendants Balmy, Chambers, Clifford, Kelly, Thibeaux and DOES 1 through 50

had no reasonable, individualized, articulable suspicion that Mr. Figueroa was involved in any

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unlawful activity.

- 196. When Defendants Balmy, Chambers, Clifford, Kelly, Thibeaux and DOES 1 through 50 ordered, authorized, or physically placed Mr. Figueroa in handcuffs to prevent him from leaving the premises of Southern Station, they "seized" him because no reasonable person, including Mr. Figueroa, would feel that he or she were free to leave after being handcuffed by two uniformed officers.
  - 197. Mr. Figueroa was not charged or arrested for any violation of a criminal law.
- 198. Defendants Balmy, Chambers, Clifford, Kelly, Thibeaux and DOES 1 through 50, collectively, and each of them, seized Mr. Figueroa without the legal authority to do so and in the absence of any exigent circumstances, probable cause, or reason to believe that he had or was engaged in criminal activity.
- 199. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants Balmy, Chambers, Clifford, Kelly, Thibeaux and DOES 1 through 50's actions, as alleged above, Defendants, collectively, and each of them, deprived Mr. Figueroa of his constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment.
- 200. Upon information and belief, Defendants Balmy, Chambers, Clifford, Kelly, Thibeaux and DOES 1 through 50 are vested by law—or by a "custom or usage" having the force of law—with "final policymaking authority" to effect arrests and/or ratify or sanction arrests made by other officers. Defendants Balmy, Kelly, Clifford, and DOES 1 through 50 were acting as municipal officials with "final policymaking authority" when they effected, ratified, or sanctioned Mr. Figueroa's arrest.
- 201. Defendants' training programs, monitoring, and supervision failed to actually train their officers and employees to handle the frequent, usual, and reoccurring situations where: (1) a NCIC database query reveals a civil immigration warrant; and (2) an individual is suspected of nothing more than a civil immigration violation.
- 202. Defendants in their official capacities were on actual notice of the City's failure to train, monitor, and supervise SFPD officers and Sheriff's Department personnel: (1) to properly read the NCIC database in order to correctly determine which warrants give officers and deputies the legal authority to detain or arrest an individual; and (2) that individuals may not be arrested

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Mr. Figueroa seeks compensatory damages against all Defendants in their official

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1	capacities and compensatory and punitive damages against Defendants Balmy, Chambers,
2	Clifford, Kelly, Thibeaux and DOES 1 through 50 in their individual capacities for violations of
3	Mr. Figueroa's right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth
4	Amendment of the United States Constitution according to proof, including but not limited to:
5	a. Detaining individuals without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity;
6	b. Arresting individuals without probable cause of criminal activity;
7	c. Detaining or arresting individuals on the basis of a civil immigration
8	warrant without authority to arrest for civil immigration violations;
9	d. Failing to train, monitor, or supervise the agents, employees, or
10	representatives of the San Francisco Police Department and the San Francisco Sherriff's
11	Department regarding authority to arrest and detain individuals based on a civil immigration
12	warrant; and
13	e. Transferring individuals from SFPD custody to ICE custody, resulting in
14	ICE detention.
15	207. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' conduct, collectively and
16	individually, Mr. Figueroa has been damaged in an amount within the jurisdiction of this Court,
17	according to proof. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' actions, collectively and
18	individually, Mr. Figueroa suffered damages, including but not limited to violation of his
19	constitutional rights, loss of liberty, monetary damages, emotional distress, and physical pain and
20	suffering.
21	208. At all relevant times herein, the actions and omissions of Defendants, and each of
22	them, as set forth above, occurred deliberately, intentionally, knowingly, maliciously, willfully,
23	wantonly, and with conscious and reckless disregard for Mr. Figueroa's rights, entitling
24	Mr. Figueroa to an award of punitive damages.
25	SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF
26	California Constitution, Art. I, § 13 – Unreasonable Search and Seizure
27	(Against all Defendants)
28	209. Mr. Figueroa incorporates by reference the allegations in the paragraphs

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218.

Thibeaux and DOES 1 through 50 are vested by law—or by a "custom or usage" having the

Upon information and belief, Defendants Balmy, Chambers, Clifford, Kelly,

force of law—with "final policymaking authority" to effect arrests and/or ratify or sanction arrests made by other officers. Defendants Balmy, Kelly, Clifford, and DOES 1 through 50 were acting as municipal officials with "final policymaking authority" when they effected, ratified, or sanctioned Mr. Figueroa's arrest.

- 219. Defendants' training programs, monitoring, and supervision failed to train their officers and employees to handle the frequent, usual, and reoccurring situations where: (1) a NCIC database query reveals a civil immigration warrant; and (2) an individual is suspected of nothing more than a civil immigration violation.
- 220. Defendants in their official capacities were on actual notice of the City's failure to train, monitor, and supervise SFPD officers and Sheriff's Department personnel: (1) to properly read the NCIC database in order to correctly determine which warrants give officers and deputies the legal authority to detain or arrest an individual; and (2) that individuals may not be arrested or detained based solely on a non-criminal, civil immigration warrant. As such, Defendants were aware that the City's failure to train, monitor, and supervise SFPD officers and Sheriff's Department personnel has caused, and is highly likely to cause, officers and deputies to detain or arrest individuals without, respectively, reasonable suspicion or probable cause, and in the absence of exigent circumstances, in violation of Article I, Section 13 of the California Constitution.
- 221. Defendants, in their official capacities also knew such a failure to train adequately made it highly predictable that their officers and employees would engage in conduct that would deprive individuals, including Mr. Figueroa, of their Article I, Section 13 rights under the California Constitution.
- 222. Defendants' failure to train adequately is closely related to the deprivation of Mr. Figueroa's constitutional rights as to have caused the ultimate injury.
- 223. Mr. Figueroa seeks injunctive and declaratory relief against all Defendants in their official capacities, enjoining them from continuing to engage in the above-described policies, practices, and conduct violating Mr. Figueroa's right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures under Article I, Section 13 of the California Constitution including, but not limited to:

1	a. Detaining individuals without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity;
2	b. Arresting individuals without probable cause of criminal activity;
3	c. Detaining or arresting individuals on the basis of a civil immigration
4	warrant without authority to arrest for civil immigration violations;
5	d. Failing to adequately train, monitor, or supervise the agents, employees, or
6	representatives of the San Francisco Police Department and the San Francisco Sherriff's
7	Department regarding authority to arrest and detain individuals based on a civil immigration
8	warrant; and
9	e. Transferring individuals from SFPD custody to ICE custody, resulting in
10	ICE detention.
11	224. Mr. Figueroa seeks compensatory damages against all Defendants in their official
12	capacities and compensatory and punitive damages against Defendants Balmy, Chambers,
13	Clifford, Kelly, Thibeaux and DOES 1 through 50 in their individual capacities for violations of
14	Mr. Figueroa's right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures under Article I, Section
15	13 of the California Constitution according to proof, including but not limited to:
16	a. Detaining individuals without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity;
17	b. Arresting individuals without probable cause of criminal activity;
18	c. Detaining or arresting individuals on the basis of a civil immigration
19	warrant without authority to arrest for civil immigration violations;
20	d. Failing to train, monitor, or supervise the agents, employees, or
21	representatives of the San Francisco Police Department and the San Francisco Sherriff's
22	Department regarding authority to arrest and detain individuals based on a civil immigration
23	warrant; and
24	e. Transferring individuals from SFPD custody to ICE custody, resulting in
25	ICE detention.
26	225. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' conduct, collectively and
27	individually, Mr. Figueroa has been damaged in an amount within the jurisdiction of this Court,
28	according to proof. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' actions, collectively and

1	investigating a federal civil immigration warrant;
2	b. Violating section 2 Chapter 12H of the San Francisco Administrative
3	Code by contacting, assisting, and cooperating with federal immigration authorities in relation to
4	individuals who do not have a felony conviction;
5	c. Violating section 2 Chapter 12H of the San Francisco Administrative
6	Code by detaining an individual for transfer to federal immigration custody; and
7	d. Transferring Mr. Figueroa to ICE custody.
8	233. Mr. Figueroa seeks compensatory damages against all Defendants in their official
9	capacities and compensatory, incidental, and punitive damages against all Defendants named in
0	their individual capacities for violations of his right to due process under the Fourteenth
1	Amendment of the United States Constitution including, but not limited to:
12	a. Violating section 2 Chapter 12H of the San Francisco Administrative
13	Code by arresting and detaining an individual, without any lawful authority for purposes of
4	investigating a federal civil immigration warrant;
15	b. Violating section 2 Chapter 12H of the San Francisco Administrative
6	Code by contacting, assisting, and cooperating with federal immigration authorities in relation to
17	individuals who do not have a felony arrest or conviction;
8	c. Violating section 2 Chapter 12H of the San Francisco Administrative
9	Code by detaining an individual for transfer to federal immigration custody; and
20	d. Transferring Mr. Figueroa to ICE custody.
21	FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
22	California Constitution Art. I, § 7(a) – Due Process
23	(Against all Defendants)
24	234. Mr. Figueroa incorporates by reference each of the allegations in the preceding
25	paragraphs as though fully set forth here.
26	235. Article I, Section 7 of the California Constitution guarantees individuals due
27	process of law when the state seeks to deprive that individual of his or her liberty. Due process
28	protects individuals from the arbitrary exercise of power and forbids the infringement of certain

1	Code by contacting, assisting, and cooperating with federal immigration authorities in relation to		
2	individuals who do not have a felony arrest or conviction;		
3	c. Violating section 2 Chapter 12H of the San Francisco Administrative		
4	Code by detaining an individual for transfer to federal immigration custody; and		
5	d. Transferring Mr. Figueroa to ICE custody.		
6	FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF		
7	California Civil Code § 52.1 – Violation of Bane Act		
8	(Against all Defendants)		
9	241. Mr. Figueroa incorporates by reference each of the allegations in the preceding		
10	paragraphs as though fully set forth here.		
11	242. The Bane Act protects an individual's federal and state constitutional, and		
12	statutory rights from being interfered with through threats, intimidation, or coercion.		
13	243. At all relevant times, upon information and belief, Defendants, armed law		
14	enforcement officers, wore uniforms and commanded Mr. Figueroa to comply with their		
15	requests.		
16	244. Mr. Figueroa believed that if he exercised his constitutional rights, the Defendants		
17	would commit violence against him.		
18	245. Mr. Figueroa seeks injunctive and declaratory relief pursuant to California Civil		
19	Code § 52.1 against all Defendants enjoining them from continuing to engage in the above-		
20	described policies, practices, and conduct interfering with the exercise and enjoyment of Mr.		
21	Figueroa's rights under the United States and California Constitutions, according to proof and		
22	including, but not limited to:		
23	a. Depriving Mr. Figueroa of his federal and state constitutional rights by		
24	using their authority as law enforcement officers to subject him to an unreasonable search and		
25	seizure without probable cause to believe that Mr. Figueroa had committed or was committing a		
26	crime, and without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity or that he posed a threat to public		
27	safety;		
28	b. Depriving Mr. Figueroa of his federal and state constitutional rights by		

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cause to believe that Mr. Figueroa had committed or was committing a crime;

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1	c. Depriving Mr. Figueroa of his right to be free from false arrest by using		
2	their law enforcement authority to handcuff Mr. Figueroa and arrest and detain him without:		
3	(i) probable cause to believe that Mr. Figueroa had committed or was committing a crime;		
4	(ii) reasonable suspicion of criminal activity or that he posed a threat to public safety; and		
5	(iii) reasonable cause to believe Mr. Figueroa's arrest and detention was lawful;		
6	d. Depriving Mr. Figueroa of his federal and state constitutional rights to due		
7	process by violating the Sanctuary Ordinance; and		
8	e. Depriving Mr. Figueroa of his federal and state constitutional rights to due		
9	process by using their law enforcement authority to prolong his unlawful arrest/detention by		
10	preventing him from leaving the police station upon his "release" and instead transferring him to		
11	ICE custody.		
12	SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF		
13	False Imprisonment		
14	(Against Defendants San Francisco,		
15	Balmy, Chambers, Clifford, Kelly, Thibeaux and DOES 1-50)		
16	248. Mr. Figueroa incorporates by reference each of the allegations in the preceding		
17	paragraphs as though fully set forth here.		
18	249. Pursuant to California Government Code section 815.2, a public entity is liable		
19	for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of an employee of the public entity within		
20	the scope of his or her employment. All of Defendants' conduct alleged in this Complaint was		
21	undertaken in the course and scope of their employment.		
22	250. Mr. Figueroa seeks compensatory and incidental damages against all Defendants		
23	acting in their official capacity, and compensatory and punitive damages against Defendants		
24	Balmy, Chambers, Clifford, Kelly, and Thibeaux and DOES 1 through 50 in their individual		
25	capacities, for inflicting personal injury on him by subjecting him to false arrest and		
26	imprisonment according to proof by acts including, but not limited to: (1) detaining him against		
27	his will, in the absence of exigent circumstances, without reasonable suspicion of criminal		
28	activity; (2) unreasonably arresting him against his will without probable cause of criminal		

1	activity and without authority; (3) detaining him, handcuffed, at the police station; and (4)		
2	transferring custody of him to ICE, which continued to detain him for two months.		
3	251. The wrongful acts of Defendants were done maliciously, oppressively,		
4	fraudulently, and in conscious disregard of the rights, safety, and health of Mr. Figueroa and		
5	others. Mr. Figueroa is entitled to punitive and exemplary damages in the amount to be		
6	ascertained according to proof, which is appropriate to punish or set an example of Defendants		
7	and deter such behavior by Defendants and others in the future.		
8	252. Mr. Figueroa seeks an affirmative injunction requiring Defendant San Francisco		
9	(and SFPD) to provide, for purposes of a U-Visa petition, a law enforcement certification form,		
10	certifying that Mr. Figueroa was the victim of false imprisonment.		
11	SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF		
12	Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress		
13	(Against Defendants San Francisco,		
14	Balmy, Chambers, Clifford, Kelly, Thibeaux, and DOES 1 through 50)		
15	253. Mr. Figueroa incorporates by reference each of the allegations in the preceding		
16	paragraphs as though fully set forth here.		
17	254. Defendants engaged in outrageous conduct that goes beyond all possible bounds		
18	of decency and is intolerable in a civilized community, by and through conduct including, but		
19	not limited to:		
20	a. Arresting and detaining Mr. Figueroa without reasonable suspicion or		
21	probable cause, which included patting him down, handcuffing him, and failing to provide an		
22	explanation to Mr. Figueroa;		
23	b. Contacting ICE to inform ICE of Mr. Figueroa's whereabouts and		
24	facilitating the transfer of custody of Mr. Figueroa to ICE, which subsequently detained him for		
25	two months; and		
26	c. Failing to provide Mr. Figueroa with an interpreter despite his apparent		
27	limited English proficiency.		
28	255. As a result of the named Defendants' outrageous conduct, Mr. Figueroa has and		

continues to suffer severe emotional distress, including, but not limited to, anxiety, worry, humiliation, shame, and fear. This includes, but is not limited to: (1) the fear of being removed to his home country; (2) humiliation for being arrested and detained in front of his wife, for being taken away by ICE in front of his daughter and wife, and for spending two months in an ICE detention facility; and (3) anxiety, shock, worry, and shame for being falsely arrested and detained, handcuffed, and patted down without probable cause or reasonable suspicion.

- 256. Upon information and belief, the named Defendants' conduct was intentional and malicious, and done to cause Mr. Figueroa emotional distress.
- 257. Alternatively, the named Defendants acted with reckless disregard to the high likelihood that Mr. Figueroa would suffer emotional distress. The named Defendants knew that emotional distress was the probable result of their conduct; or, Defendants gave little or no thought to the probable effects of their conduct.
- 258. Defendants' outrageous conduct was a substantial factor in causing Mr. Figueroa's severe emotional distress.
- 259. Mr. Figueroa seeks compensatory damages against Defendants San Francisco, Balmy, Chambers, Clifford, Kelly, Thibeaux, and DOES 1 through 50 in their official capacities for their extreme and outrageous conduct and compensatory and punitive damages against the Defendants Balmy, Chambers, Clifford, Kelly, Thibeaux, and DOES 1 through 50 in their individual capacities.
- 260. The wrongful acts of Defendants were done maliciously, oppressively, fraudulently, and in conscious disregard of the rights, safety, and health of Mr. Figueroa and others. Mr. Figueroa is entitled to punitive and exemplary damages in the amount to be ascertained according to proof, which is appropriate to punish or set an example of Defendants and deter such behavior by Defendants and others in the future.
- 261. Defendants, in the course of their outrageous conduct, were not exercising their legal rights or protecting their economic interests. Nor was their conduct consistent with community standards. Finally, Defendants did not have a good-faith belief that they had a legal right to engage in such outrageous conduct.

268.

The above referenced conduct goes against the explicit purpose of the Sanctuary

1	Ordinance, which is to protect immigrants and maintain relations with the large immigrant		
2	community in San Francisco, by creating a city of refuge.		
3	269. Mr. Figueroa falls within the class of persons the Sanctuary Ordinance was		
4	designed to protect. Further, Mr. Figueroa suffered harm for reporting a crime, which is exactly		
5	the type of harm the Sanctuary Ordinance is designed to prevent.		
6	270. The conduct of Defendants directly and proximately caused physical, economic,		
7	and emotional harm to Mr. Figueroa.		
8	271. San Francisco Administrative Code Chapter 12H creates a mandatory duty on the		
9	part of the City and its officials protect immigrants such as Mr. Figueroa. Defendant San		
10	Francisco failed to follow its mandatory duty created by San Francisco Administrative Code		
11	Chapter 12H when it failed to properly implement and enforce the Sanctuary Ordinance.		
12	272. Defendant City and County of San Francisco may be held vicariously liable for		
13	the conduct of Defendants Balmy, Chambers, Clifford, Kelly, Thibeaux, and DOES 1 through 50		
14	under California Government Code section 815.2(a).		
15	273. The wrongful acts of Defendants were done maliciously, oppressively,		
16	fraudulently, and in conscious disregard of the rights, safety, and health of Mr. Figueroa and		
17	others. Mr. Figueroa is entitled to punitive and exemplary damages in the amount to be		
18	ascertained according to proof, which is appropriate to punish or set an example of Defendants		
19	and deter such behavior by Defendants and others in the future.		
20	NINTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF		
21	Negligence		
22	(Against Defendants San Francisco,		
23	Balmy, Chambers, Clifford, Kelly, Thibeaux and DOES 1-50)		
24	274. Mr. Figueroa incorporates by reference the allegations in the paragraphs above, as		
25	though fully set forth here.		
26	275. Defendants Balmy, Chambers, Clifford, Kelly, Thibeaux, and DOES 1 through 50		
27	are liable for breaching the standard duty of care owed to Mr. Figueroa by: (1) arresting and		
28	detaining him without probable cause or reasonable suspicion, and without explanation, based on		

though fully set forth here.

- 281. Mr. Figueroa seeks compensatory and punitive damages against Defendants Balmy, Chambers, Clifford, Kelly, Thibeaux, and DOES 1 through 50, in their individual and official capacities for their negligent infliction of emotional distress on Mr. Figueroa.
- 282. Mr. Figueroa seeks compensatory damages against San Francisco, either on the basis of direct liability, or vicarious liability.
- 283. Defendants not only acted negligently in failing to adhere to the City's Sanctuary Ordinance, but also exposed Mr. Figueroa to an unreasonable risk of harm through ICE's reasonably foreseeable decision to arrest Mr. Figueroa after SFPD officers and the Sheriff's Department contacted ICE to inform them of Mr. Figueroa's whereabouts.
- 284. As a result, Mr. Figueroa has suffered serious emotional distress that any ordinary reasonable person in his situation would suffer including, but not limited to, anxiety, worry, humiliation, shame, and fear. This includes, but is not limited to: (1) the fear of being removed to his home country; (2) humiliation for being arrested and detained in front of his wife, for being arrested by ICE in front of his daughter and wife, and for spending two months in an ICE detention facility; and (3) anxiety, shock, worry, fear and shame for being falsely arrested and detained, handcuffed, and patted down without probable cause and reasonable suspicion.
- 285. Defendants' negligence was a substantial factor in causing Mr. Figueroa's serious emotional distress. But for Defendants' actions, Mr. Figueroa would not have been falsely arrested at the police station, and would not have been detained by ICE.
- 286. Defendant San Francisco may be held vicariously liable for the conduct of Defendants Balmy, Chambers, Clifford, Kelly, Thibeaux, and DOES 1 through 50 under California Government Code section 815.2(a).
- 287. The wrongful acts of Defendants were done maliciously, oppressively, fraudulently, and in conscious disregard of the rights, safety, and health of Mr. Figueroa and others. Mr. Figueroa is entitled to punitive and exemplary damages in the amount to be ascertained according to proof, which is appropriate to punish or set an example of Defendants and deter such behavior by Defendants and others in the future.

## **ELEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF**

immigration status and whereabouts; and

- 302. California Government Code section 11135 provides, in relevant part: "No person in the State of California shall, on the basis of race, national origin, ethnic group identification . . . , be unlawfully denied full and equal access to the benefits of, and be unlawfully subjected to discrimination under, any program or activity that . . . receives any financial assistance from the state."
- 303. California Code of Regulations section 98101(a) prohibits a recipient of state funding from denying "a person the opportunity to participate in, or benefit from an aid, benefit, or service" on the basis of "ethnic group identification," and sections 98101(i)(1) and (2) prohibit a recipient of state funding from utilizing criteria or methods of administration which have the effect of discriminating against protected groups.
- 304. Upon information and belief, the SFPD receives financial assistance and funding from the State of California, thus subjecting it to the prohibitions of California Government Code Section 11135.
- 305. By and through its agents, employees, and representatives—Defendants Balmy, Chambers, Clifford, Kelly, and DOES 1 through 50 acting in their official capacities—San Francisco and the SFPD intentionally refused to administer its own language access policy and provide Mr. Figueroa with a qualified bilingual SFPD member despite numerous objective indications that Mr. Figueroa qualified as an LEP individual, thereby discriminating against Mr. Figueroa on account of his national original or ethnic group identification by denying him participation in, and the benefits of, a state funded program or activity.
- 306. Defendants Balmy, Chambers, Clifford, Kelly, and DOES 1 through 50 repeatedly decided not to provide Mr. Figueroa with language assistance, thereby discriminating against Mr. Figueroa on account of his national origin or ethnic group identification.
- 307. Mr. Figueroa is entitled to compensatory damages against San Francisco and the SFPD because of the unlawful conduct of denying Mr. Figueroa a Spanish-speaking interpreter.
- 308. Mr. Figueroa is also entitled to injunctive and declaratory relief against San Francisco and the SFPD, enjoining it from continuing to engage in its discriminatory application of its language access policy on the basis of national origin or ethnic group identification

1	including, but not limited to, denying the benefits of its language access policy based on an		
2	individual's national origin.		
3	FOURTEENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF		
4	UNJUST ENRICHMENT/QUASI-CONTRACT		
5	(Against Defendants San Francisco and DOES 1-50)		
6	309. Mr. Figueroa incorporates by reference each of the allegations in the preceding		
7	paragraphs as though fully set forth here.		
8	310. By unlawfully detaining Mr. Figueroa and cooperating with federal immigration		
9	authorities, San Francisco wrongfully prevented Mr. Figueroa from reclaiming his vehicle and		
10	then received improper benefits that it otherwise would not have obtained including proceeds		
11	from the sale of Mr. Figueroa's vehicle.		
12	311. Retention of the benefits would be unjust and inequitable because Defendants		
13	voluntarily accepted and retained the proceeds from the sale of Mr. Figueroa's vehicle, with full		
14	knowledge and awareness that the proceeds were only obtained as a result of its own		
15	wrongdoing.		
16	312. In consequence of the acts set forth in this claim, Defendant San Francisco has		
17	been unjustly enriched at the expense of Mr. Figueroa. Mr. Figueroa is entitled to San		
18	Francisco's unjust enrichment and disgorgement of the proceeds as restitution.		
19	XI. PRAYER FOR RELIEF		
20	WHEREFORE, Mr. Figueroa prays that the Court:		
21	1. Issue a permanent injunction against San Francisco prohibiting its officers, agents,		
22	successors, employees, representatives, and any and all persons acting in concert		
23	with San Francisco from:		
24	a. Detaining and arresting persons without reasonable suspicion of criminal		
25	activity or probable cause based solely on a civil immigration warrant;		
26	b. Denying language access services to individuals who are limited English		
27	proficient;		
28	c. Assisting or cooperating with federal immigration authorities unless		
M C	COMPLAIN		

1		otherwise required by federal or state law; and		
2		d. Any practices that facilitate the above conduct.		
3	2.	Issue a permanent injunction against Defendants Balmy, Chambers, Clifford,		
4		Kelly, Thibeaux, and DOES 1-50 prohibiting them from:		
5		a. Detaining and arresting persons without reasonable suspicion of criminal		
6		activity or probable cause based solely on a civil immigration warrant;		
7		b. Denying language access services to individuals who are limited English		
8		proficient;		
9		c. Assisting or cooperating with federal immigration authorities unless		
10		otherwise required by federal or state law; and		
11		d. Any practices that facilitate the above conduct.		
12	3.	Issue an injunction against San Francisco and the SFPD requiring them to provide		
13		a U-Visa I-918 Supp B certification that Mr. Figueroa was the victim of false		
14		imprisonment.		
15	4.	Issue declaratory relief finding that Defendants' actions as alleged in this		
16		Complaint violate the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States		
17		Constitution, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), Article		
18		I, Sections 7 and 13 of the California Constitution, California Civil Code § 52.1,		
19		and California Government Code § 11135 and its implementing regulations.		
20	5.	Award Mr. Figueroa nominal, compensatory, incidental, special, statutory, and		
21		punitive damages.		
22	6.	Award Mr. Figueroa restitution.		
23	7.	Award pre-judgment and post-judgment interest to the extent permitted by law.		
24	8.	Award Mr. Figueroa his costs and expenses, including reasonable attorneys' fees		
25		under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and the Equal Access to Justice Act, 5 U.S.C. § 504, 28		
26		U.S.C. § 2412.		
27	9.	. Award such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper.		
28				

1	XII. DEMAND FOR JURY TI	RIAL	
2	In accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 38(b), and Northern District Local		
3	Rule 3-6(a), Plaintiff hereby demands a jury trial on all issues triable by a jury.		
4	Dated: January 17, 2017	Respectfully submitted,	
5	24.04. 54.14.2		
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