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4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

6
7 HALCYON HORIZONS,
8 INCORPORATED,

9 Plaintiff,

10 v.

11 DELPHI BEHAVIORAL HEALTH
12 GROUP, LLC, et al.,

13 Defendants.

Case No.17-cv-00756-JST

**ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND
DISMISSING CASE**

Re: ECF No. 5

14 Before the Court is Plaintiff Halcyon Horizon, Inc., d/b/a Elevate Addiction Services'
15 ("Elevate") motion for preliminary injunction. The Court will deny the motion and dismiss the
16 case for lack of standing.¹

17 **I. BACKGROUND**

18 Elevate is a California company that operates addiction recovery centers. Specifically,
19 Elevate is a "licensed, certified and accredited detoxification, residential and outpatient facility."
20 ECF No. 5 at 7; Nos. 5-5, 5-6. In September and November 2015, respectively, Elevate CEO and
21 Chairman of the Board Daniel Manson filed applications for the "ELEVATE ADDICTION
22 SERVICES" word mark and a related figurative mark. ECF Nos. 5-2 (word mark), 5-3 (figurative
23 mark) (collectively, the "ELEVATE Marks"). Manson filed the applications as an individual, but
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26 ¹ On April 14, 2017, the Court ordered Plaintiff to file a brief explaining why the Court should not
27 amend its March 30, 2017 Order, ECF No. 33, to eliminate the discussion of the validity of the
28 ELEVATE Marks given that the Court's standing determination was sufficient to resolve the then-
pending motions for preliminary injunction and to dismiss. ECF No. 39. Plaintiff's brief does not
demonstrate that the Court's validity findings were necessary to its decision to dismiss the case.
Therefore, the Court now re-issues its Order to eliminate that discussion. This Order replaces the
March 30, 2017 Order.

1 now states that “[he] made that filing in [his] capacity as the President and Chairman of the Board
2 for Halcyon Horizons, Incorporated, for use by the company.” ECF No 23 ¶ 5. Elevate claims to
3 have used the ELEVATE Marks “in connection with addiction recovery services since that date.”
4 The Elevate Marks were registered in early 2016. Id.

5 On October 12, 2016, Manson and Halcyon entered into an Exclusive Trademark License
6 Agreement. ECF No. 5-4. Under the licensing agreement, Manson “retains the right . . . to
7 monitor the quality of the Services” provided using the ELEVATE Marks. Id. (Section 2(b)).
8 Moreover, “[a]ll use of any Trademarks licensed by this Agreement and used in connection with
9 any Services shall inure to the benefit of [Manson].” Id. (Section 2(d)). With respect to
10 enforcement and protection of the marks, the licensing agreement provides that “Licensee shall
11 have the right, at its own expense to prosecute actions against infringers and defend against
12 infringement actions, subject to the prior written approval of the Licensor.” Id. (Section 3(b)).
13 Manson also retains the option to “prosecute such actions independently” if he believes the marks
14 are being infringed and Elevate declines to file suit. Id.

15 Elevate asserts that it has “established itself as a trusted and respected addiction recovery
16 center, and has spent substantial resources establishing its brand under the ELEVATE Marks.”
17 ECF No. 5 at 8. For example, Elevate obtained a license from the State of California’s
18 Department of Health Care Services to provide “individual sessions; recovery or treatment
19 planning; group sessions; educational sessions and detoxification.” ECF No. 5-6. Elevate is also
20 accredited by the Joint Commission as a Behavioral Health Care Program. ECF Nos. 5-7, 5-8, 5-
21 10.² The California Consortium of Addiction Program and Professionals recognized Elevate as a
22 “Program of Distinction.” ECF No. 5-10. Each of these licenses, accreditations, and awards
23 occurred under the Elevate Addiction Services name.

24 Elevate claims to have received positive reviews on various websites where customers can
25 post comments. One person wrote, for example, “[t]his facility is your best chance if you have an
26 addiction problem.” ECF No. 5-11 (screen shots of comments). Another stated, “Elevate saved

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28 ² “The Joint Commission is an independent, not-for-profit national body that oversees the safety
and quality of health care and other services provided in accredited organizations. ECF No. 5-7.

1 my family, I would recommend it to anyone and everyone who is in need of treatment.” Id. Also
2 to promote its brand, Elevate “participates in a number of community events,” including co-
3 hosting a sober grad night and sponsoring local women’s shelters, all using the Elevate Marks.
4 ECF No. 23 at 3. Finally, Elevate has spent money “advertising, branding and marketing the
5 Elevate Addiction Services name.” ECF No. 5 at 10. For example, Elevate spent several hundred
6 thousand dollars on direct marketing, and several hundred thousand more for website branding
7 and marketing, website maintenance and promotion, and television commercial advertising. ECF
8 No. 23 at 3; see also ECF Nos. 23-1-23-5 (exhibits to Manson declaration).

9 Defendant Delphi Behavioral Health Group, LLC, also operates addiction recovery
10 centers, one of which it calls “Elevate Recovery Center.” ECF No. 5 at 10.³ Like Elevate’s
11 facilities, the Elevate Recovery Center is located in California. Elevate Recovery Center
12 registered to do business in California with the Secretary of State on November 24, 2014. ECF
13 No. 27-1 ¶ 4, signed a lease with a May 15, 2015 effective date, id. ¶¶ 6, 8, employed over a dozen
14 staff since June 2015, id. ¶¶ 5, 14, and claims to have served over 50 patients between June 2015
15 and September 23, 2015, id. ¶ 16. According to both parties’ websites, the facilities offer similar
16 categories of service. ECF No. 5 at 11.

17 Despite these similarities, Elevate claims that compared with its own clinics, the Elevate
18 Recovery Center has poor treatment services and bad business practices. Elevate Recovery Center
19 is not licensed by the State of California to provide “detoxification or residential addiction
20 treatment services,” despite advertising them on its website. ECF No. 5-13. Elevate also claims
21 to have identified unfavorable reviews of Defendants’ center on Facebook. ECF No. 5 at 11.

22 Elevate claims that Defendants’ use of the “Elevate” name has created confusion among its
23 customers because both companies advertise similar services and operate facilities in California.
24 Id. at 11. For example, consumers have called Elevate to complain about the poor business
25 practices at Elevate Recovery Center, not realizing that Elevate Recovery Center is operated by

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27 ³ Elevate states that “[o]n information and belief, ‘Elevate Recovery Center’ is operated by
28 Defendant Elevate Recovery LLC,” which is subsidiary of Defendant Delphi. ECF No. 5 at 7 n.1.
For purposes of this motion, the Court refers to Delphi and Elevate Recovery jointly as
“Defendants.”

1 Defendants, not Plaintiff. ECF No. 5-1 at 3.

2 Seeking to prevent further confusion, Elevate contacted Defendants to inform them of their
3 “infringement of the registered service mark–ELEVATE Addiction Services” and to demand that
4 Defendants “cease and desist from using Elevate Recovery in public branding or promotion.”
5 ECF No. 5-15. In spite of this warning, Defendants have continued to operate the Elevate
6 Recovery Center under that name. ECF No. 5-1 at 4. Instead, Defendant Elevate Recovery LLC
7 filed an application for trademark registration of the mark “ELEVATE” for “[a]ddiction treatment
8 services, rehabilitation of drug, alcohol and narcotic addicted patients.” ECF No. 5-14 at 3. On
9 December 28, 2016, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) refused
10 registration of Defendants’ applied-for mark based on a likelihood of confusion with Plaintiff’s
11 ELEVATE Marks. Id.

12 On February 17, 2017, Elevate filed suit against Defendants alleging trademark
13 infringement of the ELEVATE Marks under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114, unfair
14 competition in violation of California Business Code § 17200, and cybersquatting in violation of
15 15 U.S.C. § 1125. Then, on February 21, 2017, Elevate filed the present motion for preliminary
16 injunction to stop Defendants “from further use of the ‘Elevate Recovery Center’ name, and all
17 similarly confusing names, in connection with its addiction recovery centers.” ECF No. 5 at 6.

18 **II. LEGAL STANDARD**

19 “A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on
20 the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the
21 balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v.
22 Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). Courts use different
23 formulations to describe the first factor, including “reasonable probability,” “fair prospect,”
24 “substantial case on the merits,” and “serious legal questions . . . raised.” Lair v. Bullock, 697
25 F.3d 1200, 1204 (9th Cir.2012). These formulations “are largely interchangeable,” and “indicate
26 that, ‘at a minimum,’ a petitioner must show that there is a ‘substantial case for relief on the
27 merits.’” Id. (quoting Leiva–Perez v. Holder, 640 F.3d 962, 968 (9th Cir. 2011)). “The standard
28 does not require the petitioners to show that ‘it is more likely than not that they will win on the

1 merits.” Id. (quoting Leiva–Perez, 640 F.3d at 966). “[S]erious questions going to the merits
2 and a balance of hardships that tips sharply towards the plaintiff can support issuance of a
3 preliminary injunction, so long as the plaintiff also shows that there is a likelihood of irreparable
4 injury and that the injunction is in the public interest.” Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell,
5 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). A preliminary injunction
6 is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 24.

7 **III. ANALYSIS**

8 **A. Lanham Act Standing**

9 Defendants claim that Elevate lacks standing to assert its trademark claims. ECF No. 27 at
10 18. Although the Ninth Circuit has yet to address the question, most district courts in this circuit
11 have concluded that an exclusive licensee of a federal trademark can have standing to sue for
12 trademark infringement under Section 32 of the Lanham Act.⁴ That said, even the courts taking
13 this more lenient approach have stated that standing can only “exist where the licensing agreement
14 both grants an exclusive license and grants to the exclusive licensee a property interest in the
15 trademark, or rights that amount to those of an assignee.” Innovation Ventures, LLC v. Pittsburg
16 Wholesale Grocers, Inc., No. C 12-05523 WHA, 2013 WL 1007666, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13,
17 2013), at *26 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2013) (quoting Visa U.S.A., Inc. v. First Data Corp., No. C 02-
18 01786, 2005 WL 6271242, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2005)).

19 In Innovation Ventures, another court in this district concluded that it was a “close call”
20 whether the licensing agreement granted “‘all’ significant rights” to the licensee, Innovation
21 Ventures. Id. at *6. First, the Court noted that the licensor, International IP, retained “the right to
22 inspect Innovation Ventures’ use of the marks in order to maintain quality control,” but gave that
23 fact little weight because “[t]his type of supervision clause . . . is a required feature of any valid
24 trademark license.” Id. at *5. Second, the court explained that “International IP also retained a
25 slice of control over litigation . . . because the agreement states that Innovation Ventures ‘may not

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28 ⁴ Courts in other jurisdictions have strictly construed the statute as applying to only to owners of
federal trademarks. E.g., DEP Corp. v. Interstate Cigar Co., Inc., 622 F.2d 621, 622–23 (2d Cir.
1980).

1 settle [a] lawsuit/proceeding if the settlement includes admissions of patent invalidity or other
2 matters that adversely affect the viability of any of the Intellectual Property unless previously
3 agreed to by the Parties.” Id. But the court described this limitation as a “narrow” one, that did
4 “not, as a practical matter, alter Innovation Ventures’ status as the party that controls the
5 exploitation of the intellectual property.” Id. at 6. Finally, the court found that “[t]he structure of
6 the transaction executed between International IP and Innovation Ventures is also significant,”
7 because “the validity of assignments and reciprocal license grant-backs is well-established.” Id.
8 Overall, “[t]he rights retained by International IP were few.” Id. Given those facts, the court
9 refused to resolve standing on a Rule 12 motion, reserving for trial “questions regarding how
10 plaintiffs contractual arrangement has operated in practice, the extent of the control actually
11 exercised by the licensor, and the intent of the parties at the time of the assignment and license-
12 back transaction.” Id.

13 Lasco Fittings, Inc. v. Lesso America, Inc., No. CV-1302015, 2014 WL 12601016 (C.D.
14 Cal. Feb. 21, 2014), provides another example of this analysis. The Lasco court contrasted the
15 licensing agreement before it with the one in Innovation Ventures and concluded it was “more
16 limited in scope.” Id. at *4. First, the court explained that the “License is only for certain types of
17 products and not for the trademark in its entirety.” Id. Second, “the license contains clauses
18 explicitly stating that the licensor retains title and ownership of the mark and all rights not
19 expressly granted in the exclusive license.” Id. Third, “the licensor retains control over the
20 nature and quality of the products sold by LASCO using the mark, a requirement that is not
21 consistent with an assignment.” Id. And forth, “although the License gives LASCO the right to
22 sue to enforce the mark for certain products covered under the License, LASCO must notify the
23 licensor and may not enforce the trademark in relation to other products.” Id. The court also
24 noted that “[u]nlike in Innovation Ventures, the License [was] not an assignment and license-back
25 agreement.” Id. The “structure of the License agreement [therefore] [did] not suggest the parties
26 intended the exclusive License to be equivalent to an assignment.” Id. Based on these facts, the
27 court dismissed LASCO’s trademark infringement claims for lack of standing. Id. at *5.

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1 This case falls somewhere between LASCO and Innovation Ventures.⁵ Weighing in favor
2 of standing, the license allows Elevate to use the ELEVATE Marks “in connection with providing
3 addiction treatment and rehabilitation services for alcohol and substance-addicted individuals.”
4 ECF No. 5-4. This, for all practical purposes, is a license for the trademarks in their entirety, not
5 for “only certain types of [services].” Lasco, 2014 WL 12601016, at *4. Also pointing toward
6 standing is the fact that the agreement contains no clause “explicitly stating that the licensor
7 retains title and ownership of the mark and all rights not expressly granted in the exclusive
8 license.” Id. On the other hand, Manson retains even greater control over the litigation than did
9 the licensor in Innovation Ventures. There, as here, the agreement contained a provision requiring
10 licensor approval of settlements that affect the trademarks. 2013 WL 1007666, at *6. But
11 Manson’s licensing agreement also requires his approval to “prosecute actions against infringers
12 and defendant against infringement actions.” ECF No. 5-4 (Section 3(b)). And while Elevate can
13 decide affirmatively to bring litigation, it cannot decide that such litigation will not be brought; if
14 it declines to bring suit, Manson may then do so. Id. These latter two provisions constitute more
15 than just “a slice of control over litigation.” 2013 WL 1007666, at *6. Finally, unlike in
16 Innovation Ventures, Manson and Elevate did not enter into an assignment and license-back
17 agreement, which the Lasco court found weighed against standing.

18 Nor does Spin Master, LTD v. Zobmondo Entertainment, LLC, No. CV 06-3459 ABC,
19 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94905 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2011), help Elevate’s case. Elevate claims that
20 in Spin Master, the licensor retained “sole discretion” over litigation decisions, and yet the court
21 still found that the licensee had standing to enforce trademark rights. ECF No. 32 at 11 (quoting
22 Spin Master, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94905, at *22-23). Elevate gets its facts wrong. It was Spin
23 Master, the licensee, who had “‘sole discretion’ to decide . . . whether to litigate, settle, or
24 otherwise resolve the lawsuit.” Spin Master, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94905, at *22-23. By
25 contrast here, Elevate had to obtain Manson’s written approval for all litigation decisions, and

26 ⁵ As an initial matter, there is no dispute that the licensing agreement gives Manson control over
27 the quality of the services associated with the ELEVATE Marks, but the Court agrees with the
28 reasoning in Innovate Ventures that this fact is not particularly helpful. This type of supervision
clause is a required feature of any valid trademark license. Innovation Ventures, 2013 WL
1007666, at *5.

1 Manson could decide to bring suit even when Elevate would not. Given the factual dissimilarities,
2 the fact that standing existed in Spin Master in no way supports Elevate’s standing argument here.

3 There is no question that the licensing agreement between Manson and Elevate grants
4 Elevate an exclusive license to the ELEVATE Marks. ECF No. 5-4 (Section 1). Based on the text
5 of the licensing agreement, however, the Court cannot conclude that it “grants to the exclusive
6 licensee a property interest in the trademark, or rights that amount to those of an assignee.”
7 Innovation Ventures, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34937, at *26 (quoting Visa, 2005 WL 6271242, at
8 *3). Most importantly, Manson retains too much control over Elevate’s litigation decisions
9 through the licensing agreement’s written approval requirement. If the agreement were the
10 assignment and license-back variety, the Court might have concluded, like in Innovation Ventures,
11 that sufficient factual disputes remained about standing to proceed to trial. But here, the Court
12 concludes as a matter of law that Elevate lacks standing to bring trademark infringement claims
13 over the ELEVATE Marks.⁶

14 **C. UCL Standing**

15 Elevate also moves for a preliminary injunction based on a UCL violation. To the extent
16 the UCL claim is predicated on its trademark infringement claim, that claim fails. Elevate
17 separately argues, however, that Defendants violated the UCL by “offering recovery services
18 without a license as required by under California law.” ECF No. 5 at 17. But as Defendants point
19 out, Elevate does not explain how that practice, even if true, has harmed Elevate separate and apart
20 from the alleged trademark infringement. Without a showing of injury in fact, Elevate lacks
21 standing to pursue its UCL claim as well. Hall v. Time Inc., 158 Cal. App. 4th 847, 854 (2008)
22 (explaining that “a plaintiff suffers an injury in fact for purposes of standing under the UCL when
23 he or she has: (1) expended money due to the defendant’s acts of unfair competition; (2) lost
24 money or property; or (3) been denied money to which he or she has a cognizable claim.”)
(internal citations omitted).

25 **CONCLUSION**

26 The Court denies Elevate’s motion for preliminary injunction. The Court dismisses
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28 ⁶ The Court therefore does not reach the Defendants’ alternative arguments.

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Plaintiff's Lanham Act and UCL claims without prejudice for lack of standing based on the analysis above. Because Plaintiff recently filed a new case that appears to supersede this one, the Court dismisses the remainder of the case without prejudice also. See Case No. 3:17-cv-756.⁷ The Court will administratively close the case if an amended complaint is not received by May 25, 2017.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 11, 2017



JON S. TIGAR
United States District Judge

⁷ This includes Plaintiff's cybersquatting claim, even though that claim was not raised in the motion for preliminary injunction or addressed in this Order, because it is re-alleged in Plaintiff's second case.