

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN CONNELLY,
Plaintiff,
v.
R. BRANCH, et al.,
Defendants.

Case No. [17-cv-01407-JD](#)

**ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH
LEAVE TO AMEND**

Plaintiff, a state prisoner, has filed a pro se civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants removed this case from state court and paid the filing fee. Defendants have also requested that the Court screen the complaint.

DISCUSSION

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review, the Court must identify any cognizable claims, and dismiss any claims which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. *Id.* at 1915A(b)(1),(2). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. *Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't*, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Although a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations, . . . a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a

cause of action will not do. . . . Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” *Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted). A complaint must proffer “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” *Id.* at 570. The United States Supreme Court has explained the “plausible on its face” standard of *Twombly*: “While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. *West v. Atkins*, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

LEGAL CLAIMS

Plaintiff alleges that he was denied medical treatment and a doctor verbally harassed him. Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs violates the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. *Estelle v. Gamble*, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); *McGuckin v. Smith*, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), *overruled on other grounds*, *WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller*, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). A determination of “deliberate indifference” involves an examination of two elements: the seriousness of the prisoner’s medical need and the nature of the defendant’s response to that need. *Id.* at 1059.

A serious medical need exists if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant injury or the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” *Id.* The existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of comment or treatment, the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an individual’s daily activities, or the existence of chronic and substantial pain are examples of indications that a prisoner has a serious need for medical treatment. *Id.* at 1059-60.

A prison official is deliberately indifferent if he or she knows that a prisoner faces a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable steps to abate it. *Farmer v. Brennan*, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). The prison official must not only “be aware of

facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,” but also “must also draw the inference.” *Id.* If a prison official should have been aware of the risk, but did not actually know, the official has not violated the Eighth Amendment, no matter how severe the risk. *Gibson v. County of Washoe*, 290 F.3d 1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002). “A difference of opinion between a prisoner-patient and prison medical authorities regarding treatment does not give rise to a § 1983 claim.” *Franklin v. Oregon*, 662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981). In addition “mere delay of surgery, without more, is insufficient to state a claim of deliberate medical indifference.... [Prisoner] would have no claim for deliberate medical indifference unless the denial was harmful.” *Shapely v. Nevada Bd. Of State Prison Comm’rs*, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985).

Allegations of verbal harassment and abuse fail to state a claim cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. *See Freeman v. Arpaio*, 125 F.3d 732, 738 (9th Cir. 1997) overruled in part on other grounds by *Shakur v. Schriro*, 514 F.3d 878, 884-85 (9th Cir. 2008); *see, e.g., Keenan v. Hall*, 83 F.3d 1083, 1092 (9th Cir. 1996), amended 135 F.3d 1318 (9th Cir. 1998) (disrespectful and assaultive comments by prison guard not enough to implicate 8th Amendment).

Plaintiff alleges that defendant Branch was verbally hostile to him and later told him to continue treatment when plaintiff complained of adverse effects of certain medication. Plaintiff alleges that defendant Mindoro denied a sleep apnea treatment device, but the device was later provided in July 2015. Plaintiff also alleges that defendants Posson, Lewis and Tarrar¹ denied a TENS unit for pain treatment and a referral for pain management. Though, the TENS unit was later provided in May 2016. Plaintiff also states that defendants denied his inmate appeals related to these issues. Plaintiff is informed that there is no constitutional right to a prison administrative appeal or grievance system. *See Ramirez v. Galaza*, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003); *Mann v. Adams*, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988).

The complaint is dismissed with leave to amend to provide more information in light of the legal standards set forth above. The allegations of verbal harassment and denial of inmate appeals

¹ Tarrar has not been served.

1 fail to state a claim, but plaintiff will be allowed to present more allegations related to these
2 claims. With respect to the claims of denial of medical care, plaintiff must present more
3 information how defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. He should
4 also address how the claims may proceed in that mere delay in providing the TENS unit and sleep
5 apnea device, without more, is insufficient to state a claim. Plaintiff must present enough facts
6 that plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. See *Iqbal* at 679.


7 CONCLUSION

8 1. The complaint is **DISMISSED** with leave to amend. The amended complaint must
9 be filed within **twenty-eight (28) days** of the date this order is filed and must include the caption
10 and civil case number used in this order and the words AMENDED COMPLAINT on the first
11 page. Because an amended complaint completely replaces the original complaint, plaintiff must
12 include in it all the claims he wishes to present. See *Ferdik v. Bonzelet*, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th
13 Cir. 1992). He may not incorporate material from the original complaint by reference. Failure to
14 amend within the designated time will result in the dismissal of this case.

15 2. It is the plaintiff's responsibility to prosecute this case. Plaintiff must keep the
16 Court informed of any change of address by filing a separate paper with the clerk headed "Notice
17 of Change of Address," and must comply with the Court's orders in a timely fashion. Failure to
18 do so may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute pursuant to Federal Rule of
19 Civil Procedure 41(b).

20 **IT IS SO ORDERED.**

21 Dated: April 7, 2017

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25 JAMES DONATO
26 United States District Judge
27
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District Court, Northern District of California.

That on April 7, 2017, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing said envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle located in the Clerk's office.

John Connelly ID: H-83535
Correctional Training Facility (CTF)
P.O. Box 705
Soledad, CA 93960

Dated: April 7, 2017

Susan Y. Soong
Clerk, United States District Court

By: 
LISA R. CLARK, Deputy Clerk to the
Honorable JAMES DONATO