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United States District Court
Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

IN RE TOYOTA RAV4 HYBRID FUEL
TANK LITIGATION.

Case No. [20-cv-00337-EMC](#)

**AMENDED ORDER GRANTING IN
PART AND DENYING IN PART
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS
CONSOLIDATED COMPLAINT**

(Changes are in **bold** and **yellow highlight**)

Docket No. 66

I. INTRODUCTION

This putative consumer class action is brought by thirty-six plaintiffs (“Plaintiffs”) from twenty-eight states on behalf of a nationwide class of “[a]ll persons who purchased or leased” 2019 and 2020 Toyota RAV4 Hybrid vehicles (“Vehicle[s]”), as well as twenty-eight subclasses based on the state in which the Vehicles were purchased or leased. *See* Docket No. 55 (“Compl.”) ¶¶ 84-85. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. (“Toyota” or “TMS”) falsely represented in marketing and ownership materials that the Vehicles’ fuel tank capacity is 14.5 gallons when it is actually 8-11 gallons, thus significantly reducing the Vehicles’ range on a single tank of gas. Plaintiffs bring ninety state-law claims against Toyota for breach of express warranty, breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, violations of various consumer protection and unfair competition statutes, and unjust enrichment. Plaintiffs seek damages as well as injunctive and declaratory relief.

Pending before the Court is Toyota’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ consolidated class action complaint on the grounds that Plaintiffs lack Article III standing, that they fail to state claims for relief under Rule 12(b)(6), that they lack standing for injunctive and declaratory relief,

1 and that they cannot pursue their claims as a nationwide class. The Court previously ruled on a
2 number of these issues at the motion hearing of December 18, 2020; it here reiterates those
3 conclusions and resolves the issues it declined to decide at the hearing. For the reasons given
4 below, Toyota’s motion to dismiss is **GRANTED in part** and **DENIED in part**.

5 **II. BACKGROUND**

6 The facts alleged in Plaintiffs’ consolidated class action complaint are straightforward.
7 Toyota “is a manufacturer and distributor of new motor vehicles”; it “markets and advertises”
8 RAV4 Hybrids, oversees Toyota dealers, and develops the company’s nationwide marketing and
9 informational materials.” Compl. ¶ 2. Plaintiffs allege that “Toyota advertises and represents in
10 its promotional materials, specifications, and owner’s manual that the RAV4’s fuel tank capacity
11 is 14.5 gallons” and that the Vehicles’ “total mileage range is 580 miles.” *Id.* ¶ 3. Toyota,
12 however, “failed to disclose that the RAV4s will not accept a full tank of fuel” and are in fact
13 capable of holding only 8-11 gallons of fuel. *Id.* ¶ 3, 63. Plaintiffs point to “[n]ews reports,
14 customer complaints, and Toyota’s own statements” as showing “that the RAV4s’ fuel tank shape
15 prevents a full fuel tank refill by up to several gallons” such that “the vehicles’ mileage range on a
16 full tank of fuel is approximately 330-480 miles.” *Id.* ¶¶ 3-4 (emphasis removed). Plaintiffs thus
17 allege that they “have “suffered diminished market value of their RAV4 vehicles as a direct result
18 of Toyota withholding material information and/or making misleading statements regarding the
19 RAV4’s fuel tank capacity and mileage range.” *Id.* ¶ 5.

20 This case is brought on behalf of thirty-six plaintiffs from twenty-eight states, including
21 California, Florida, New York, and Texas.¹ *Id.* While the details of Plaintiffs’ allegations
22 occasionally vary, the essentials of their accounts are consistent. Each argues that he “believed
23 and relied upon Toyota’s representations that the RAV4’s fuel tank capacity was 14.5 gallons”
24 with “a combined 40 MPG rating,” and that its “mile range [was] approximately 580 miles”; that
25 “Toyota’s representations were material” to him; that he “purchased his RAV4 in part because of
26

27 _____
28 ¹ Toyota has included in its motion a comprehensive table listing, *inter alia*, Plaintiffs’ states of
residence, the model year of the car they purchased or leased, and the date of their purchase or
lease. *See* Docket No. 66-1 at 4-6.

1 the long distance he expected to be able to travel on a single tank of fuel”; that he discovered
2 shortly after purchase or lease “that the vehicle will only accept approximately [8-11] gallons of
3 fuel when the tank is nearly empty,” resulting in a mileage range of only 330-480 miles; that this
4 defect caused him “to make more frequent trips to refuel his RAV4 than he should have been
5 required to based on Toyota’s misrepresentation,” and that he has “suffered actual damages in the
6 form of the diminished value of his RAV4,” as well as “more frequent fueling” and “future
7 attempted repairs.” *See, e.g.*, Compl. ¶ 6; *see also id.* ¶¶ 7-39. Each plaintiff concludes by
8 alleging that had he “known the actual fuel tank capacity and mileage range prior to his purchase,
9 he would either not have purchased the RAV4 or would have paid less for it.” *See id.*

10 The complaint further alleges that Toyota’s guarantees about the Vehicles’ fuel-tank size,
11 mileage range, and/or miles-per-gallon (“MPG”) estimates are included on the company’s website
12 (*id.* ¶¶ 47-49), in the Vehicles’ owner’s manual (*id.* ¶ 50), on the “Monroney” sticker displayed in
13 the Vehicles’ windows prior to purchase (*id.* ¶ 51), in the 2019 RAV4 marketing brochure (*id.*
14 ¶ 55), and in video advertisements (*id.* ¶¶ 56-57). In the latter two instances, TMS also
15 incorporated the marketing slogan “Go farther. Go faster.” and boasted that the Vehicles’ drivers
16 will make “fewer trips to the pump.” *Id.* ¶¶ 55, 57. Plaintiffs also note that RAV4’s hybrid model
17 has a suggested retail price that is “nearly \$2000 higher than the non-hybrid model.” *Id.* ¶ 59.
18 Moreover, the Vehicles come with an express warranty—the “New Vehicle Limited Warranty”
19 (“NVLW”)—that covers “repairs and adjustments needed to correct defects in materials or
20 workmanship of any part supplied by Toyota.” *Id.* ¶ 60-61 (quoting Docket No. 66-2 (“Landis
21 Decl.”), Ex. 2 at 13).

22 Plaintiffs further allege that, as of September 2020, “more than 200 complaints have been
23 filed with the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (‘NHTSA’) regarding
24 ‘fuel/propulsion system’ issues with the 2019/2020 RAV4,” all of which are substantially similar
25 to Plaintiffs’ allegations in the instant case. *Id.* ¶ 65; *see also id.* ¶¶ 65-69 (quoting NHTSA
26 complaints). Plaintiffs also charge that “[t]housands of RAV4 owners have logged similar
27 complaints on online forums and discussions” and that some “have even posted videos to
28 youtube.com, filming their refuels.” *Id.* ¶ 70, 74.

1 The complaint next asserts that “[a]t least as early as November 5, 2019, Toyota knew
2 about the RAV4’s fuel tank” problems. *Id.* ¶ 75. On that date, TMS “notified at least some
3 Toyota service providers” about the issue via a “Toyota Tech Tip,” noting that the “[c]oncern is
4 under investigation.” *Id.* ¶ 76. In late December 2019, an article in the trade publication
5 *Automotive News* reported complaints among Vehicle owners that the Vehicles could only hold
6 approximately 11 gallons of gasoline and so could not “get anywhere close to the 580 miles of
7 expected range.” *Id.* ¶ 78. In response to the article, TMS confirmed that it was “investigating a
8 fuel tank shape issue on certain RAV4 Hybrid vehicles,” where “variations in fuel tank shape may
9 prevent a full refill by up to several gallons.” *Id.* ¶ 79 (emphasis removed). As plaintiffs point
10 out, the article also noted that Toyota had “changed the design of its fuel tank” starting with the
11 2019 RAV4 Hybrid model. *Id.* ¶ 80. In February 2020, the Fox television affiliate for the Dallas-
12 Fort Worth, Texas, area also reported on the Vehicles’ “[g]as tank design flaw,” “detailing
13 complaints by RAV4 purchasers throughout the country.” *Id.* ¶ 81. In response, Toyota again
14 confirmed that it was investigating the problem and theorized that “variations in fuel tank shape
15 may prevent a full refill by up to several gallons.” *Id.* ¶ 82. In a follow-up segment that same
16 month, the Fox affiliate reported that Toyota “would offer RAV4 owners an ‘interim fix’ for the
17 fuel tank issues until a final remedy is identified”; Toyota acknowledged, however, that this fix
18 “may not prevent the condition from recurring.” *Id.* ¶ 83 (emphasis removed).

19 As part of its motion to dismiss, Toyota observes that Plaintiffs “do not allege that the
20 Environmental Protection Agency (‘EPA’)-estimated Miles Per Gallon (‘MPG’) numbers are
21 false, and admit that, even with the alleged defect, the vehicles have a range of approximately 330-
22 480 miles.” Docket No. 66-1 (“Mot.”) at 3 (citing Compl. ¶ 4). Toyota also notes that Plaintiffs
23 do not “identify any advertisement or representation by TMS that [they specifically] reviewed and
24 relied on regarding mileage range.” *Id.* at 6 (citing Compl. ¶¶ 6-39) (emphasis removed). Toyota
25 goes on:

26 None of [the Plaintiffs] allege that they have been unable to drive
27 their RAV4 Hybrid vehicles, or that they have run out of gas. Nor
28 do Plaintiffs allege any physical injury or that they have incurred
any out-of-pocket losses as a result of repairs (or otherwise)
regarding the alleged defect. . . . [With one exception,] [n]one of the

1 Plaintiffs allege that they attempted to re-sell their vehicles and
2 received less value for their vehicles than they would have absent
the alleged defect.²

3 *Id.* Finally, TMS observes that eighteen of the thirty-six plaintiffs fail to allege that they presented
4 their vehicles for repair to an authorized Toyota dealership after discovering the fuel-tank defect.
5 *Id.* at 13 (citing Compl. ¶¶ 6-15, 17-18, 20-23, 26, 28, 30-39).

6 Plaintiffs originally filed a class action complaint on January 15, 2020. Docket No. 1.
7 Over the following months, several cases from elsewhere in this District were related to, and
8 eventually consolidated with, the instant case. *See, e.g.*, Docket Nos. 37 and 53. Pursuant to these
9 developments, Plaintiffs filed their 198-page consolidated class action complaint on September 14,
10 2020. *See* Compl. Toyota’s motion to dismiss followed on October 14, 2020. *See* Mot. Plaintiffs
11 then submitted an opposition brief on November 4, 2020. *See* Docket No. 69 (“Opp’n”).
12 Following a brief continuation of the motion hearing, Toyota filed its reply brief on November 25,
13 2020. *See* Docket No. 75 (“Reply”).³

14 III. LEGAL STANDARD

15 A. Rule 12(b)(1)

16 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), a district court must dismiss a complaint
17 if it lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear the claims alleged in the complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P.
18 12(b)(1). In order for a district court to have subject matter jurisdiction over a plaintiff’s claims

19 _____
20 ² Toyota adds that, “[a]lthough one plaintiff alleges he got less value for his vehicle when he
21 traded it in[,] that allegation is not plausible considering the trade-in value he alleges is within
market norms.” Mot. at 6.

22 ³ The parties were permitted additional pages for all three briefs, with the motion to dismiss and
23 opposition briefs extending to thirty-seven pages and the reply brief to twenty-five pages. *See*
Docket Nos. 64 and 65.

24 In the parties’ Joint Case Management Statement of December 10, 2020, Toyota asserts
25 that in May 2020 it “issued a Customer Support Program to address [the] alleged refueling
26 performance issue with the Subject Vehicles that is the subject of this litigation.” Docket No. 77
27 at 2. “In late October 2020, TMS launched the repair portion of the Customer Support Program
28 and began [n]otifying owners and lessees of the Subject Vehicles, including but not limited to
Plaintiffs, regarding the availability of the repair in early November 2020.” *Id.* TMS represents
that the repair is “currently being implemented” and that it “remedies the alleged refueling
performance issues for Toyota customers with affected Subject Vehicles.” *Id.* As of December
2020, Plaintiffs were “evaluating whether the repair program . . . which Toyota recently began to
roll out . . . mitigates the fuel-tank defect.” *Id.*

1 they must present a live case or controversy, as required by Article III of the U.S. Constitution.
2 See U.S. Const. art. III § 2, cl. 1. And in order for there to be a case or controversy within the
3 meaning of Article III, a plaintiff must have standing to pursue his claims. To satisfy the standing
4 requirement, a plaintiff bears the burden of establishing three elements: (1) “the plaintiff must
5 have suffered an injury in fact—an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete
6 and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical”; (2) “there must be
7 a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of—the injury has to be fairly
8 traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and not the result of the independent action of
9 some third party not before the court”; (3) “it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative,
10 that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” *Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife*, 504 U.S. 555,
11 560–61 (1992) (internal quotations omitted).

12 A party moving to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) may mount a facial challenge to the
13 complaint by asserting that “the allegations contained in the complaint are insufficient on their
14 face to invoke federal jurisdiction.” *Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer*, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th
15 Cir. 2004). In ruling on a facial challenge, a court “must accept as true all material allegations of
16 the complaint and must construe the complaint in favor of the complaining party.” *Warth v.*
17 *Seldin*, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975).

18 B. Rule 12(b)(6)

19 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires a complaint to include “a short and plain
20 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A
21 complaint that fails to meet this standard may be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). See Fed. R.
22 Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

23 To overcome a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss after the Supreme Court's decisions in
24 *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), and *Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544 (2007),
25 a plaintiff's “factual allegations [in the complaint] must . . . suggest that the claim has at least a
26 plausible chance of success.” *Levitt v. Yelp! Inc.*, 765 F.3d 1123, 1135 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal
27 quotation omitted). The court “accept[s] factual allegations in the complaint as true and
28 construe[s] the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” *Manzarek v. St.*

1 *Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.*, 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). But “allegations in a
 2 complaint . . . may not simply recite the elements of a cause of action [and] must contain sufficient
 3 allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself
 4 effectively.” *Levitt*, 765 F.3d at 1135 (quoting *Starr v. Baca*, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir.
 5 2011)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
 6 court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
 7 *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 678. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it
 8 asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” *Id.* (quoting
 9 *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 556).

10 C. Rule 9(b)

11 Claims sounding in fraud or mistake are subject to the heightened pleading requirements of
 12 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), which requires that a plaintiff bringing such a claim “state
 13 with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). To clear
 14 the heightened standard of Rule 9(b), a plaintiff must identify the “who, what, when, where, and
 15 how” of the alleged misconduct and explain how the statement or omission complained of was
 16 false or misleading. *Vess v. Ciba–Geigy Corp. USA*, 317 F.3d 1097, 1106 (9th Cir. 2003); *see*
 17 *also Kearns v. Ford Motor Co.*, 567 F.3d 1120, 1124 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that nondisclosure
 18 claims sound in fraud and are subject to Rule 9(b)). The purpose of Rule 9(b) is to require that a
 19 plaintiff’s allegations be “specific enough to give defendants notice of the particular misconduct
 20 which is alleged . . . so that they can defend against the charge and not just deny that they have
 21 done anything wrong.” *Swartz v. KPMG LLP*, 476 F.3d 756, 764 (9th Cir. 2007). Rule 9(b)
 22 allows, however, that “[m]alice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person’s mind may
 23 be alleged generally.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). Notably, “a fraud by omission claim can succeed
 24 without the same level of specificity required by a normal fraud claim” since plaintiffs in such
 25 cases “will not be able to specify the time, place, and specific content of an omission as precisely
 26 as would a plaintiff” in an affirmative misrepresentation case. *Falk v. Gen. Motors Corp.*, 496 F.
 27 Supp. 2d 1088, 1098-99 (N.D. Cal. 2007); *see also Sciacca v. Apple, Inc.*, 362 F. Supp. 3d 787,
 28 799-800 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (applying the pleading standard of Rule 8 to an omission-based

1 consumer protection claim).

2 D. Leave to Amend

3 If the court dismisses a complaint, it “should grant leave to amend even if no request to
4 amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured
5 by the allegation of other facts.” *Lopez v. Smith*, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000). In making
6 this determination, the court should consider factors such as “the presence or absence of undue
7 delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by previous amendments,
8 undue prejudice to the opposing party and futility of the proposed amendment.” *See Moore v.*
9 *Kayport Package Express*, 885 F.2d 531, 538 (9th Cir. 1989).

10 **IV. DISCUSSION**

11 Toyota’s motion to dismiss is divided into seven main parts. Toyota first argues that
12 Plaintiffs lack standing “because they do not plausibly allege an actual, non-speculative injury”
13 from the purported fuel-tank defect, such as an imminent “safety hazard,” “out-of-pocket costs for
14 repairs,” or “diminution in value” on resale. Mot. at 1-2, 8-10. Second, Plaintiffs cannot plead
15 breach of express warranty as “TMS’s express warranty in question does not cover *design* defects”
16 but only manufacturing defects. *Id.* at 2, 10-15 (emphasis in original). Third, Plaintiffs’ claims
17 for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability are also inadequate because “they make no
18 plausible allegations that the vehicles are unfit for their ordinary purpose.” *Id.* at 2, 15-19.
19 Fourth, Plaintiffs fail to state consumer-protection or unfair-competition claims because, *inter*
20 *alia*, (a) the claims are preempted by federal law, (b) Plaintiffs fail to allege reliance on Toyota’s
21 marketing materials, and (c) various state-specific requirements have not been met. *Id.* at 2-3, 19-
22 34. Fifth, Plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment claim fails because they erroneously seek to apply
23 California law to the entire class and, in any event, California doesn’t recognize a standalone
24 claim for unjust enrichment. *Id.* at 3, 34-36; Reply at 2 (revising argument). Sixth, Plaintiffs lack
25 standing to seek injunctive and declaratory relief since none of them “alleges that s/he is likely to
26 purchase another Subject Vehicle.” Mot. at 3, 36. And seventh, Plaintiffs cannot represent a
27 nationwide class since “they have no standing to represent consumers in states where Plaintiffs do
28 not reside and did not purchase a Subject Vehicle.” *Id.* at 3, 36-37. The Court addresses each of

1 these arguments in turn.⁴

2 A. Standing (Injury-in-Fact)

3 Injury-in-fact is “the first and foremost of standing’s three elements.” *Spokeo, Inc. v.*
4 *Robins*, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016) (internal quotation omitted). “To establish injury in fact, a
5 plaintiff must show that he or she has suffered ‘an invasion of a legally protected interest’ that is
6 ‘concrete and particularized’ and ‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.’” *Id.* at
7 1548 (quoting *Lujan*, 504 U.S. at 560). For an injury to be “concrete,” the *Spokeo* Court
8 explained, it “must actually exist”: It must be “real, and not abstract.” *Id.* (internal quotation
9 marks omitted). And for an injury to be particularized, “it must affect the plaintiff in a personal
10 and individual way” such that the plaintiff “personally has suffered some actual or threatened
11 injury.” *Id.* (internal quotation omitted).

12
13 ⁴ Toyota also filed a request for judicial notice along with its motion to dismiss. *See* Docket No.
14 67 (“RJN”). Under Federal Rule of Evidence 201, a court “may judicially notice a fact that is not
15 subject to reasonable dispute because it: (1) is generally known within the trial court’s territorial
16 jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot
17 reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). Courts generally “may not consider material
18 outside the pleadings when assessing the sufficiency of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6),” but a
19 defendant “may seek to incorporate a document into the complaint if the plaintiff refers
20 extensively to the document or the document forms the basis of the plaintiff’s claim.” *Khoja v.*
21 *Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc.*, 899 F.3d 988, 998, 1002 (9th Cir. 2018). Here, Toyota asks the
22 Court to take notice of excerpts from the Vehicle Owner’s Manuals and Warranty Manuals (RJN,
23 Exs. 1-4), a printout from the EPA website titled “Your Mileage Will Vary” (*id.*, Ex. 5), and a
24 printout from the online version of the Kelley Blue Book concerning car depreciation (*id.*, Ex. 6).
25 “Plaintiffs do not oppose judicial notice of Exhibits 1-4 . . . to the extent these documents are
26 incorporated by reference in” the complaint. Docket No. 70 at 1. Plaintiffs do, however, oppose
27 notice of Exhibits 5 and 6 “because these webpages are not central to Plaintiffs’ claims, are not
28 referenced in Plaintiffs’ Complaint, improperly introduce expert opinion, and are introduced by
TMS for the truth of their contents.” *Id.* Toyota counters that, under Ninth Circuit law, courts
“may take judicial notice of matters of public record,” particularly “records and reports from
administrative agencies,” Docket No. 76 at 2 (quoting *MGIC Indem. Corp. v. Weisman*, 803 F.2d
500, 504 (9th Cir. 1986)); Toyota also argues that district courts “have taken judicial notice of
information from the Kelley Blue Book website, finding that [it] is not subject to reasonable
dispute,” *id.* at 5 (citing, *e.g.*, *Weisz v. Volkswagen Grp. of Am., Inc.*, 2016 WL 9342527, at *1
(C.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2016)).

Regarding Exhibits 5 and 6 of the RJN, Plaintiffs are correct that the complaint does not
“refer[] extensively to the document[s],” nor do they “form[] the basis of the[ir] claim[s].” *See*
Khoja, 899 F.3d at 1002. However, insofar as the complaint briefly references EPA MPG
estimates and the Kelley Blue Book, *see, e.g.*, Compl. ¶¶ 52, 63 n.14, , and Plaintiffs do not
contest the documents’ authenticity, the Court hereby takes notice of the documents themselves
without acknowledging the truth of any matters asserted therein. *See Lee v. City of Los Angeles*,
250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001).

1 Plaintiffs’ theory of standing in this case is based on the “diminished market value of their
 2 RAV4 vehicles as a direct result” of Toyota’s misrepresentations about “fuel tank capacity and
 3 mileage range.” Compl. ¶ 5. In arguing that Plaintiffs lack standing to pursue their claims, Toyota
 4 argues that allegations of “diminished value,” overpayment, or “disappointed expectations” do not
 5 establish a cognizable harm for purposes of Article III. *Id.* at 8-9. Toyota points out that only one
 6 plaintiff claims to have attempted to resell his vehicle and received less money than he would have
 7 absent the alleged fuel-tank defect. *Id.* at 9; *see also* Compl. ¶ 22 (stating that Plaintiff Martin
 8 from Montana “has suffered actual damages in the form of the diminished trade-in value of his
 9 RAV4”).⁵ Toyota also asserts that Plaintiffs fail to allege “that they personally incurred any out-
 10 of-pocket damages related to any repairs performed on their vehicles,” “that they have suffered
 11 physical injury,” or that they “have stopped driving their vehicles.” *Id.* The company relies on a
 12 series of cases from the Central District of California—including *Tae Hae Lee v. Toyota Motor*
 13 *Sales, U.S.A., Inc.*, 992 F. Supp. 2d 962 (C.D. Cal. 2014), *In re Toyota Motor Corp. Unintended*
 14 *Acceleration Marketing, Sales Practices, and Products Liability Litigation*, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1145
 15 (C.D. Cal. 2010), and *Gertz v. Toyota Motor Corp.*, 2011 WL 13142144 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2011)
 16 (“*Gertz I*”)—for the proposition that plaintiffs cannot rely on vague allegations that they did not
 17 receive the benefit of their bargain to establish injury in fact. Mot. at 9.

18 Plaintiffs respond that the complaint adequately alleges “actual damages in the diminished
 19 value of their RAV4s and ascertainable losses . . . including[] more frequent fueling” and “future
 20 attempted repairs.” Opp’n at 4 (citing Compl. ¶¶ 6-21, 23-29). Plaintiffs further allege that had
 21 they “known the actual fuel tank capacity prior to purchase or lease, they would not have
 22 purchased or leased the RAV4s or would have paid less for them.” *Id.* (citing Compl. ¶¶ 6-39).
 23 Plaintiffs argue that under Ninth Circuit law, as articulated in cases such as *Mazza v. American*
 24 *Honda Motor Co.*, 666 F.3d 581 (9th Cir. 2012), “overpayment constitutes ‘injury in fact’ under
 25 Article III.” *Id.* at 3.

26 As the Court stated at the motion hearing, it finds that Plaintiffs have adequately pleaded
 27

28 ⁵ In its motion, Toyota incorrectly attributes the trade-in allegation to Plaintiff Dennis Klinkhammer. *See* Mot. at 9.

1 injury-in-fact and therefore have standing to pursue their claims for damages. *See* Docket No. 83
2 (“Hearing Tr.”) at 3. As Plaintiffs argue, the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly held that when a
3 consumer alleges that she would not have purchased property, or would have paid less for it had
4 the seller not misrepresented the property or failed to disclose its limitations, the consumer has
5 plausibly alleged an injury-in-fact. In *Mazza*, for example, a class of consumers alleged that they
6 would not have purchased Honda vehicles equipped with an enhanced braking system, or would
7 have paid less for them, had the manufacturer disclosed the system’s limitations, including that the
8 system might not warn drivers in time to avoid an accident. *See* 666 F.3d at 586-87. The
9 defendant, a vehicle manufacturer, argued that plaintiffs had not suffered a cognizable injury but
10 the court disagreed, crediting class members’ contentions that they “paid more for the [braking
11 system] than they otherwise would have paid, or bought it when they otherwise would not have
12 done so,” because of the manufacturer’s alleged misrepresentations. *Id.* at 595. “To the extent
13 that class members were relieved of their money by Honda’s deceptive conduct,” the court held,
14 “they have suffered an injury in fact.” *Id.* (internal quotation omitted); *see also Hinojos v. Kohl’s*
15 *Corp.*, 718 F.3d 1098, 1104 n.3 (9th Cir. 2013) (relying on *Mazza* to hold that consumers who
16 purchased merchandise that a store falsely advertised as being “on sale” had suffered an injury-in-
17 fact because they “paid more for a product than they otherwise would have paid, or bought it when
18 they otherwise would not have done so”); *Maya v. Centex Corp.*, 658 F.3d 1060, 1069 (9th Cir.
19 2011) (holding that homeowners in a housing development had suffered an injury-in-fact from
20 homebuilders’ alleged failure to disclose that they were advertising to unqualified buyers because
21 “plaintiffs spent money that, absent defendants’ actions, they would not have spent”).

22 In contrast, the cases that Toyota cites to argue against standing are distinguishable, as they
23 involved plaintiffs’ claims of overpayment based on “speculative” product defects that had yet to
24 occur or that did not contradict the defendant’s representations about product quality. *See* Opp’n
25 at 4. In *Tae Hae Lee*, for example, plaintiffs who purchased Toyota vehicles with an advanced
26 braking function asserted that “they overpaid for their vehicles” and “did not receive the benefit of
27 their bargain” because the function achieved “only a ‘negligible’ reduction in speed.” *See* 992 F.
28 Supp. 2d at 972, 968. Plaintiffs, however, did not allege that the braking system failed to

1 “perform[] as described” or that they “experienced any problems” with the system. *Id.* at 972.
2 The district court thus held that plaintiffs failed to plead “an actual economic injury because they
3 ha[d] not had any negative experience with the [system] and ha[d] not identified any false
4 representations about the [system] made by Toyota.”⁶ *Id.* Toyota also cites *Cahen v. Toyota*
5 *Motor Corp.*, 717 Fed. Appx. 720 (9th Cir. 2017), an unpublished Ninth Circuit opinion, to argue
6 that plaintiffs cannot plead overpayment where “allegations of economic loss are merely
7 conclusory and unsupported by any facts regarding the value of the product” or the alleged
8 defect’s “effect on the market.” Reply at 3. But in *Cahen* plaintiffs’ “economic loss theory [was]
9 not credible,” as it was based on the speculative fear “that their vehicles [were] vulnerable to being
10 hacked” even though plaintiffs did “not allege that any of their vehicles ha[d] actually been
11 hacked” or that they were “aware of any vehicles that ha[d] been hacked” in real-world conditions.
12 717 Fed. Appx. at 723.

13 Here, Plaintiffs plausibly allege that their vehicles suffer from an existing, provable defect
14 of substantially diminished fuel-tank capacity, and that this defect is significant enough to make
15 the vehicles worth less than they would be without the defect. While Plaintiffs have not provided
16 a quantitative analysis of the defect’s impact on the market for their Vehicles (a matter disputed by
17 Toyota), the magnitude of that impact is a question of fact not appropriate for resolution on a
18 motion to dismiss. *See Warth*, 422 U.S. at 501 (stating that, on a facial challenge to subject matter
19 jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), a court “must construe the complaint in favor of the complaining
20 party”). Plaintiffs’ harms are therefore “real” and not “abstract” or merely speculative, *see*
21 *Spokeo*, 136 S. Ct. at 1548, as in cases like *Tae Hae Lee* and *Cahen*.

22 Plaintiffs have adequately pled a cognizable injury for purposes of Article III and have
23 standing to pursue their claims. The Court **DENIES** TMS’s motion to dismiss under Rule
24 12(b)(1).

25 _____
26 ⁶ In reaching this conclusion, the *Tae Hae Lee* court cited the pre-*Mazza* decision of *Toyota Motor*
27 *Corp.* for the principle that “claims of ‘diminished value’ and ‘overpayment’ [are] only allowed to
28 proceed for those plaintiffs who ha[ve] pled ‘something more’.” 992 F. Supp. 2d at 973 (quoting
Toyota Motor Corp., 790 F. Supp. 2d at 1166 n.11). The court implied, however, that allegations
that a vehicle feature “fails to work as described” could constitute the requisite “‘something
more” that it believed was required for standing. *Id.*

1 B. Express Warranty Claims

2 As Toyota explains, “Plaintiffs assert breach of express warranty claims under the laws of
3 various states that have adopted some iteration of U.C.C. § 2-313.” Mot. at 10 (citing, *e.g.*,
4 Compl. ¶¶ 2, 6, 11). That provision of the U.C.C. states, in relevant part: “Any affirmation of fact
5 or promise made by the seller to the buyer which relates to the goods and becomes part of the
6 basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the affirmation or
7 promise.” U.C.C. § 2-313(1)(a). While Plaintiffs’ express warranty claims focus most
8 prominently on Toyota’s New Vehicle Limited Warranty (“NVLW”), the claims are also founded
9 on statements in Toyota’s advertising materials and the Vehicles’ owner’s manuals.

10 1. NVLW: Design and Manufacturing Defects

11 TMS argues that Plaintiffs’ express warranty claims fail for several reasons, most notably
12 because the complaint alleges a design—rather than a manufacturing—defect, and design defects
13 are not covered by the NVLW’s “materials or workmanship” language. Mot. at 10 (emphasis
14 removed). The NVLW for both the 2019 and 2020 Vehicles stipulates that it “covers repairs and
15 adjustments needed to correct *defects in materials and workmanship* of any part supplied by
16 Toyota,” with some additional exceptions. Landis Decl., Exs. 2 and 4 at 13 (emphasis added).

17 The parties do not dispute that, as a general matter, “[a]n express warranty covering
18 ‘materials and workmanship’ does not include design defects.” *Johnson v. Nissan N. Am., Inc.*,
19 272 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1176 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (citing, *e.g.*, *Toyota Motor Corp.*, 754 F. Supp. 2d at
20 1180-81; *Gertz v. Toyota Motor Corp.*, 2011 WL 3681647, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2011)
21 (“*Gertz IP*”)); *see also Sloan v. Gen. Motors LLC*, 2017 WL 3283998, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1,
22 2017) (stating that “the overwhelming weight of state law authority holds that design defects are
23 *not* covered” under “materials or workmanship” warranties and collecting cases). California
24 courts have held that a design defect “exists when the product is built in accordance with its
25 intended specifications, but the design itself is inherently defective.” *McCabe v. Am. Honda*
26 *Motor Co.*, 100 Cal. App. 4th 1111, 1120 (2002). “[A] design defect ‘cannot be identified simply
27 by comparing the injury-producing product with the manufacturer’s plans or with other units of the
28 same product line, since by definition the plans and all such units will reflect the same design.’”

1 *Cabebe*, 2018 WL 5617732, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2018) (quoting *Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co.*,
2 20 Cal. 3d 413, 429 (1978)). A manufacturing defect, in contrast, “exists if the product differs
3 from the manufacturer's intended result or if the product differs from apparently identical products
4 from the same manufacturer.”⁷ *Id.* (quoting Cal. Jury Instr. (BAJI) No. 9.00.3). With a
5 manufacturing defect, therefore, “the design was appropriate but the manufacturing process
6 deviated from the design.” *Rodas v. Porsche Cars. N. Am., Inc.*, 2015 WL 12762064, at *4 (C.D.
7 Cal. Feb. 13, 2015).

8 The question here is whether Plaintiffs allege only a design defect or some combination of
9 design and manufacturing defects, as the complaint is not explicit one way the other. In Toyota’s
10 view, “[t]he Complaint alleges the defect is due to the design of the fuel tank in the vehicles,” as
11 the complaint states that “the RAV4s’ fuel tank shape prevents a full fuel tank refill by up to
12 several gallons,” references a trade-publication article discussing “the design of [the Vehicles’]
13 fuel tank,” and at numerous points expressly alleges that “Toyota failed to inform [Plaintiffs] that
14 RAV4s’ [*sic*] contain defectively designed fuel tanks” *See* Mot. at 12, Reply at 6 (quoting
15 Compl. ¶¶ 3, 80, 162) (emphasis removed).

16 Plaintiffs counter that their “allegations support a reasonable inference that the defect is a
17 manufacturing defect.” Opp’n at 5. They cite to an unpublished Ninth Circuit opinion stating that
18 “under California law a manufacturing defect encompasses instances where products differ, even
19 uniformly, from a manufacturer’s intended result or design.” *Barakezyan v. BMW of N. Am., LLC*,
20 715 Fed. Appx. 762, 762 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing *Barker*, 20 Cal.3d at 429). As a result, allegations
21 that all vehicles in a particular make and model “exhibit the defect does not preclude the defect
22 from being a manufacturing defect.” *Id.* Plaintiffs also rely on *Johnson*, in which the court found
23 that plaintiffs did not exclusively allege a design defect simply because they argued “that the
24 defect”—exploding sunroofs—was “present in all relevant models.” 272 F. Supp. 3d at 1177.
25 Insofar as plaintiffs in that case “plausibly alleged that their vehicles differ[ed] from the product
26 the manufacturer intended to sell,” the court concluded that they plausibly pled a manufacturing
27

28 ⁷ “The classic example” of a manufacturing defect “is the one soda bottle in ten thousand that
explodes without explanation.” *Cabebe*, 2018 WL5617732 at *11 (internal quotation removed).

1 defect. *Id.* at 1177-78. Plaintiffs further argue that “to the extent there is any ambiguity on this
2 matter, the issue is better left for post-discovery resolution.” Opp’n at 7.

3 As the Court indicated at the motion hearing, it finds that the complaint alleges a design,
4 rather than a manufacturing, defect and that Plaintiffs’ express warranty claims are therefore not
5 covered by the NVLW. Hearing Tr. at 9. While it is not entirely clear from the complaint whether
6 Plaintiffs are alleging that *all* 2019 and 2020 RAV4 Hybrid vehicles suffer from the fuel-tank
7 defect or that only some do (which would be probative of whether they were pleading design or
8 manufacturing defects),⁸ Toyota is correct that the complaint focuses exclusively on Toyota’s
9 decisions relating to the fuel tank’s design rather than its materials or workmanship. For example,
10 in one key section of the complaint, Plaintiffs emphasize statements in a trade publication article
11 and a television news report asserting, *inter alia*, that Toyota was “investigating a *fuel tank shape*
12 *issue* on certain RAV4 Hybrid vehicles,” that “Toyota *changed the design* of its fuel tank” starting
13 with the 2019 Vehicles, and that numerous consumers were experiencing an apparent “[g]as tank
14 *design flaw*” with their Vehicles. Compl. ¶¶ 79-81 (emphasis added). Even more tellingly, the
15 complaint alleges that “Toyota failed to inform” each plaintiff and fellow members of each state-
16 based class “that RAV4s contain *defectively designed fuel tanks* that prevent the tank from filling
17 to capacity.” *See, e.g., id.* ¶¶ 115, 162, 221 (emphasis added). In contrast, the complaint appears
18 to lack any specific allegations that Toyota’s choice of materials or the manufacturing process
19 contributed to the fuel tank defect. The complaint also fails to allege that the fuel tanks were *not*
20 manufactured in accordance with their design. The instant case thus differs from the authorities
21 cited by Plaintiffs in support of their express warranty claims. *Cf. Barakezyan*, 715 Fed. Appx. at
22 762 (holding that plaintiffs adequately pled a manufacturing defect where they alleged that the
23 defective vehicles exhibited “tension relief cracks, deviating from [the manufacturer’s] design”);
24 *Johnson*, 272 F. Supp. 3d at 1177-78 (holding that plaintiffs adequately pled a manufacturing
25 defect where they alleged that defects in vehicles’ sunroofs resulted from a “tempering process”
26

27 ⁸ *See, e.g.,* Compl. ¶¶ 81-82 (quoting a television news segment that referred to the Vehicles’
28 “design flaw,” but also quoting Toyota’s contemporaneous statement that “*certain* RAV4 Hybrid
vehicles” were affected and theorizing that “*variations* in fuel tank shape may prevent a full
refill”).

1 that “compromised” the roofs’ glass).

2 At the motion hearing, Plaintiffs once more contended that their express warranty claims
3 should be permitted to go forward at this early stage of the litigation. They argued that their
4 understanding of the nature of the fuel tank defect was limited by the “asymmetry of information
5 at play” in the case and that they might “learn a lot more about . . . the underlying defect . . .
6 through discovery.” Hearing Tr. at 6. In response, the Court ruled in favor of dismissal but noted
7 that, “if discovery produces something that sheds a different light” on the fuel tank defect, then it
8 would entertain a motion to amend Plaintiffs’ express warranty claims pursuant to Federal Rule of
9 Civil Procedure 15(a). *Id.* at 9.

10 Toyota’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ express warranty claims under the NVLW is
11 therefore **GRANTED** without leave to amend at this time.⁹

12 2. Marketing Materials and Owner’s Manuals

13 In addition to their claims under the NVLW, Plaintiffs charge that Toyota breached express
14 warranties based on its representations about the Vehicles’ fuel tank capacity and mileage range in
15 marketing materials and the Vehicles’ owner’s manual. *See* Mot. at 14 (citing, *e.g.*, Compl. ¶¶ 3,
16 113, 160). As described above, a claim for breach of express warranty under U.C.C. § 2-313 (and
17 associated statutes) requires the plaintiff to plead and prove an “affirmation of fact or promise
18 made by the seller to the buyer which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the

19 _____
20 ⁹ Toyota also argues that eighteen Plaintiffs’ express warranty claims under the NVLW are barred
21 because they failed “to present their vehicles to TMS for repair,” as the NVLW requires. Reply at
22 7; *see also* Landis Decl., Exs. 2 and 4 at 16, 33 (providing, in the NVLW, that “[t]he performance
23 of necessary repairs and adjustments is the exclusive remedy under this warranty or any implied
24 warranty” and mandating that a customer seeking warranty service “take [her] vehicle to an
25 authorized Toyota dealership”). Plaintiffs counter that this requirement is “excused where
26 presentation would be futile because ‘no repair would cure the defect, and no replacement would
27 solve the problem.’” Opp’n at 7 (quoting *Galoski v. Stanley Black & Decker, Inc.*, 2015 WL
28 5093443, at *6 (N.D. Ohio Aug 28, 2015)). While the Court need not decide this issue because it
has dismissed Plaintiffs’ NVLW-based claims without leave to amend, it observes that Plaintiffs’
current allegations likely fail to plead futility given the high bar that this requirement establishes.
See, e.g., In re MyFord Touch Consumer Litig., 46 F. Supp. 3d 936, 970 (N.D. Cal. 2014)
(explaining that, while “futility may, in theory, be a basis for an excuse” to an express warranty’s
presentment requirement, the burden in pleading the exception is a heavy one). Here, Plaintiffs
allege only that Toyota did not recommend any repairs when it first acknowledged the fuel-tank
issue in November 2019, Compl. ¶ 76, and that its subsequent interim fix was acknowledged to be
of potentially limited value, Compl. ¶ 83. These allegations would likely fail to demonstrate that
presenting the Vehicles for repairs would necessarily have been futile.

1 bargain” or a “description of the goods which is made part of the basis of the bargain.” U.C.C.
2 § 2-313(1)(a)-(b).

3 Toyota argues that Plaintiffs’ express warranty claims founded on the Vehicles’ marketing
4 materials and owner’s manual fail for numerous reasons. First, Toyota asserts that statements in
5 the owner’s manual cannot ground an express warranty claim since the manual merely “provides
6 directions for using or operating the Subject Vehicles and descriptions of the vehicles’
7 functions”—it “do[es] not include any ‘promises’ that Plaintiffs could have ‘accepted,’” as
8 required by U.C.C. § 2-313. Mot. at 14. Second, while Toyota concedes that marketing materials
9 can sometimes ground an express warranty claim it argues that Plaintiffs here have failed to
10 “allege—other than in conclusory fashion—that they saw or otherwise relied on these marketing
11 materials in deciding whether to purchase the Subject Vehicles.” Reply at 10. Toyota also argues
12 that claims based on the owner’s manual similarly fail because Plaintiffs have not alleged that they
13 “were aware of the statements in the owner’s manuals . . . before or at the time of purchase.” *Id.* at
14 9. Third, Toyota contends that claims based on EPA mileage estimates are barred (at least under
15 California law) because such estimates, even when reiterated in advertisements, “do[] not
16 constitute an independent warranty that [a] vehicle would achieve the EPA fuel economy
17 estimates or a similar level of fuel economy.” Mot. at 15 (quoting *Paduano v. Am. Honda Motor*
18 *Co., Inc.*, 169 Cal. App. 4th 1453, 1467 (2009)); *see also* Reply at 10 (proffering the same
19 argument).

20 Plaintiffs focus on the plain text of U.C.C. § 2-313 and assert that, because “TMS markets,
21 represents, and warrants on its website and in its video advertisements that the RAV4’s fuel tank is
22 14.5 gallons,” it has repeatedly made an “affirmation of fact or promise . . . which relates to the
23 goods.” Opp’n at 8 (citing Compl. ¶ 47, 56). With regard to statements in the Vehicles’ owner’s
24 manual, Plaintiffs point to caselaw from this District and elsewhere concluding that “promises
25 made after purchase, *such as those contained in product manuals*, constitute an ‘affirmation of fact
26 or promise’ if it can be fairly regarded as part of the contract.” *Id.* at 9 (quoting *Nguyen v.*
27 *Simpson Strong-Tie Co.*, 2020 WL 5371328, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2020)) (emphasis in
28 original); *see also In re Nexus 6P Prods. Liab. Litig.*, 293 F. Supp. 3d 888, 916 (N.D. Cal. 2018)

1 (concluding that California law “focuses on the seller and looks to the promises and affirmations
2 that the seller made”; “The ultimate question is what the seller in essence agreed to sell”) (internal
3 quotation omitted). And while Plaintiffs do not engage with Toyota’s arguments about EPA
4 mileage estimates in their opposition brief, they elsewhere point out that their essential allegation
5 is not that the Vehicles achieved fewer miles per gallon of gasoline than the EPA estimates
6 indicated. Even though Plaintiffs’ claims concern the Vehicles’ “limited fuel tank capacity, which
7 necessarily results in reduced mileage range,” “MPG *variability* is not at issue in the Complaint.”
8 *See* Docket No. 70 at 3 (emphasis in original).

9 Regarding Toyota’s contention that Plaintiffs’ express warranty claims fail to the extent
10 that they are based on the EPA’s MPG calculations, the Court (as it suggested at the motion
11 hearing) is not persuaded. *See* Hearing Tr. at 14-15. As Plaintiffs observe, this case does not turn
12 on the accuracy of EPA mileage estimates but on Toyota’s representations about the capacity of
13 the Vehicles’ fuel tanks. While the Vehicles’ range is, of course, a product of both fuel tank size
14 and MPG estimates, Plaintiffs’ references to mileage range throughout the complaint are merely
15 illustrative, communicating the practical effects of the alleged defect (*i.e.*, more frequent refueling
16 due to the Vehicles’ diminished range). The Court thus finds that Plaintiffs’ express warranty
17 claims are not precluded on the ground that the complaint incidentally refers to MPG estimates in
18 describing the fuel tank defect.

19 The Court also disagrees with Toyota’s argument that statements in an owner’s manual are
20 never actionable under U.C.C. § 2-313 because they do not constitute “promises.” As noted
21 above, that provision applies to any “affirmation of fact . . . made by the seller to the buyer which
22 relates to the goods” or any “description of the goods” so long as such statements also become
23 “part of the basis of the bargain.” U.C.C. § 2-313(1)(a)-(b). While some courts have concluded
24 that “owner’s manuals cannot form an express contractual obligation,” *Tae Hae Lee*, 992 F. Supp.
25 2d at 978, the weight of authority (as cited by the parties) holds that they may, provided that the
26 other requirements of U.C.C. § 2-313 have been satisfied. *See, e.g., McVicar v. Goodman Glob.,*
27 *Inc.*, 1 F. Supp. 3d 1044, 1057 (C.D. Cal. 2014); *Connick v. Suzuki Motor Co., Ltd.*, 656 N.E.2d
28 170, 173, 177 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995), *rev’d in part on other grounds*, 174 Ill.2d 482 (Ill. 1996). The

1 Court therefore rejects Toyota’s attempt to categorically exclude the owner’s manuals from the
2 coverage of U.C.C. § 2-313 and affiliated statutes.

3 However, the owner’s manual is not automatically part of the parties’ contract. The
4 question remains whether statements concerning the Vehicles’ fuel tank capacity in Toyota’s
5 marketing materials and the owner’s manuals in fact formed “part of the basis of the bargain,” as
6 the U.C.C. requires. Toyota argues that they did not because the complaint fails to allege that
7 Plaintiffs “relied” on the statements, or that they ever “saw” or were otherwise made “aware” of
8 them. Reply at 9-10. As to reliance, “states are split on the question whether reliance is
9 necessary” to stating an express warranty claim. *Nexus 6P*, 293 F. Supp. 3d at 914. This Court
10 addressed the issue in *In re MyFord Touch Consumer Litigation*, 46 F. Supp. 3d 936 (N.D. Cal.
11 2014), and concluded that, at least with respect to express *written* warranties, consumers need not
12 plead that they were “aware of and relied on” on the warranty prior to purchasing the defective
13 products. *Id.* at 972-73. The Court drew attention to Comment 3 to U.C.C. § 2-313, which states
14 that “affirmations of fact made by the seller about the goods during a bargain are regarded as part
15 of the description of the goods” and that therefore “no particular reliance on such statements need
16 be shown in order to weave them into the fabric of the agreement.” *Id.* (quoting U.C.C. § 2-313,
17 cmt. 3). The Court also “acknowledge[d] that there are a few lower court cases indicating that
18 reliance is required,” but observed that many of those cases were “distinguishable because they
19 did not involve *written* warranties delivered in connection with a sale.” *Id.* at 973 (emphasis in
20 original). Among other authorities, this Court cited *Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.*, 893 F.2d
21 541, 567 (3d Cir. 1990), *rev’d in part on other grounds*, 505 U.S. 504 (1992), in which the Third
22 Circuit (construing New Jersey law) required a plaintiff to prove “that she read, heard, saw or
23 knew of [an] advertisement containing the affirmation of fact or purpose” to satisfy the basis-of-
24 the-bargain requirement. The Third Circuit declined, however, to impose this burden where a
25 written warranty is delivered to the purchaser at or around the time of sale because, in that
26 scenario, “there is no question that the plaintiff has knowledge that the alleged warranty exists.”
27 *Id.* at 568 n.29.

28 The Central District of California in *Toyota Motor Corp.* similarly distinguished between

1 plaintiffs' express warranty claims based on Toyota's written warranty versus those based on its
2 advertising materials. *See* 754 F. Supp. 2d at 1177, 1182. In discussing the latter, the court held
3 that plaintiffs could not state an express warranty claim founded on statements in Toyota's
4 advertisements "in the absence of allegations that they were exposed to them." *Id.* at 1182. But
5 plaintiffs in that case "allege[d] merely that [Toyota's] statements were made in advertisements, in
6 Toyota's e-brochures, and in uniform statements provided by Toyota to be made by salespeople."
7 *Id.* (internal quotations omitted). Therefore, because plaintiffs failed to allege "that they heard or
8 read these statements or that the statements were otherwise disseminated to them," the statements
9 did not form part of the "basis of the bargain" (at least under California's version of U.C.C. § 2-
10 313). *Id.* at 1182-83. In a footnote, the court further clarified that plaintiffs were "not required to
11 allege reliance" on the advertisements to state an express warranty claim. *Id.* at 1183 n.22 (citing
12 *Weinstat v. Dentsply Intern., Inc.*, 180 Cal. App. 4th 1213, 1227 (2010)). While the court did not
13 elaborate on the difference between adequately pleading exposure versus reliance, it concluded
14 that "California law does not permit Plaintiffs, in the absence of *specific allegations that they were*
15 *aware of the statements* made in a national advertising campaign, to base their express warranty
16 claims on statements in that national advertising campaign." *Id.* at 1183 (emphasis added).

17 While the law on this issue remains somewhat elusive, the Court finds persuasive
18 *Cipollone* and *Toyota Motor Corp.* These cases require that plaintiffs bringing express warranty
19 claims founded on statements in marketing materials and elsewhere outside an express written
20 warranty (*e.g.*, the NVLW) must allege that they at least heard, read, or were otherwise aware of
21 the statements to satisfy the basis-of-the-bargain requirement in U.C.C. § 2-313. The Court finds
22 it logical that documents not formally part of the contract cannot be considered an aspect of the
23 agreement if plaintiffs never saw or had any awareness of them.

24 In the instant case, the complaint adequately alleges that Toyota represents the capacity of
25 the Vehicles' fuel tank to be 14.5 gallons in advertisements and owner's manuals. *See* Compl. ¶¶
26 46-59. Toyota is correct, however, that "Plaintiffs never allege—other than in conclusory
27 fashion—that they saw or otherwise relied on these marketing materials in deciding whether to
28 purchase the Subject Vehicles" or that they "were aware of the statements in the owner's manuals"

1 around the time of the sale. Reply at 9-10. Instead, the complaint contains only the boilerplate
2 assertion that “Plaintiffs believed and relied on statements made by Toyota regarding the RAV4s’
3 fuel tank capacity.” Compl. ¶ 4; *see also id.* ¶¶ 6-39 (stating that each Plaintiff “believed and
4 relied upon Toyota’s representations that the RAV4’s fuel tank capacity was 14.5 gallons”).
5 While the pleading standards of Rule 8 are more forgiving than those of Rule 9 (which the Court
6 addresses below in Part IV.D.1), these allegations are not sufficiently specific to state a plausible
7 claim for breach of contract based on these documents under *Twombly* and *Iqbal*. In the absence
8 of more detailed allegations concerning Plaintiffs’ awareness of the statements made in the
9 Vehicles’ marketing materials and owner’s manuals, Plaintiffs express warranty claims based on
10 such statements cannot proceed.

11 The Court therefore **GRANTS** Toyota’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims for breach of
12 express warranty insofar as they depend on Toyota’s marketing materials or the Vehicle owner’s
13 manuals. Plaintiffs are granted leave to amend as to these materials if they can allege pre-sale
14 awareness of them.¹⁰

15 3. Notice

16 Lastly, while the Court need not reach the question here given its aforementioned
17 resolution of Plaintiffs’ express warranty claims, Toyota argues that Plaintiffs from five states
18 have failed to satisfy the pre-suit notice requirement of state laws modeled on U.C.C. § 2-607.
19 That provision states that, “[w]here a tender has been accepted . . . the buyer must within a
20 reasonable time after he discovers or should have discovered any breach notify the seller of breach
21 or be barred from any remedy.” U.C.C. § 2-607(3)(a). Toyota argues that the claims of Plaintiffs
22 residing in Idaho, Montana, North Dakota, Oregon, and Wisconsin should be dismissed because
23 “Plaintiffs failed to allege that they gave TMS notice of the alleged breach of express warranty.”¹¹

24 _____
25 ¹⁰ Consistent with *Toyota Motor Corp.*, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 1182-83 & 1183 n.22, Plaintiffs need
not plead reliance on (as distinct from awareness of) these documents in entering into the contract.

26 ¹¹ Toyota originally argued that Plaintiffs from fifteen states were barred from bringing express
27 warranty claims by the notice requirement of U.C.C. § 2-607. Mot. at 15. Plaintiffs responded
28 that “[t]he majority of these states . . . recognize that the filing of a complaint satisfies the notice
requirement.” Opp’n at 10. Toyota then withdrew their arguments with respect to Plaintiffs from
ten of these states. Reply at 10.

1 Reply at 10. Plaintiffs counter that, with respect to these states, “individualized notice” was
2 unnecessary because “TMS had actual notice of the RAV4 defect” by at least November 2019.
3 Opp’n at 11.

4 While the state-specific caselaw cited by Plaintiffs in support of their argument is
5 somewhat inconclusive, *see id.*, Comment 4 to U.C.C. § 2-607 provides that notification under
6 that provision “need merely be sufficient to let the seller know that the transaction is still
7 troublesome and must be watched.” U.C.C. § 2-607, cmt. 4. The buyer need not notify the seller
8 of “all the objections that will be relied on” to save “the buyer’s rights under this section,” nor
9 need the buyer notify the seller that he is pursuing “a claim for damages” or “any threatened
10 litigation or other resort to a remedy.” *Id.* Instead, the notification “need only be such as informs
11 the seller that the transaction is claimed to involve a breach.” *Id.*; *see also id.* (stating that “the
12 rule of requiring notification is designed to defeat commercial bad faith, not to deprive a good
13 faith consumer of his remedy”). As will be explained below in greater detail, *infra* Part IV.D.1,
14 the Court finds that Plaintiffs have plausibly pled that Toyota had actual knowledge of the fuel
15 tank defect by early 2019. At a minimum, the complaint alleges (and Toyota does not dispute)
16 that the company issued a “Tech Tip” regarding the defect to service providers in November 2019.
17 Compl. ¶ 76. It is therefore reasonable to infer that Toyota had notice that the Vehicle sales were
18 “troublesome” and needed to “be watched” by the time Plaintiffs’ action was originally filed in
19 January 2020, as Comment 4 to U.C.C. § 2-607 requires. *See In re Rust-Oleum Restore Mktg.,*
20 *Sales Practices and Prods. Liab. Litig.*, 155 F. Supp. 3d 772, 799-800 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (stating that
21 the notice requirement of U.C.C. § 2-607 does not apply “when the seller had actual knowledge of
22 the defect of the particular product” and denying a motion to dismiss express warranty claims
23 where plaintiffs alleged, *inter alia*, that the defendant “had notice of consumer complaints for
24 years”).

25 As a result, to the extent that Toyota moves to dismiss the express warranty claims on the
26 grounds that the Idaho, Montana, North Dakota, Oregon, and Wisconsin Plaintiffs failed to satisfy
27 U.C.C. notice requirements, that aspect of the motion is **DENIED**.

28

1 C. Implied Warranty of Merchantability Claims

2 Plaintiffs bring claims for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability in all states in
3 which they reside. With one exception, all of these claims are based on U.C.C. § 2-314 and that
4 provision’s adaptation in various state statutes.¹² The U.C.C. provides that “a warranty that the
5 goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with
6 respect to goods of that kind” and that, in order to be “merchantable,” goods “must be at least
7 such as . . . are *fit for the ordinary purposes* for which such goods are used.” U.C.C. § 2-314(1),
8 (2)(c) (emphasis added). To state a claim for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability,
9 therefore, a plaintiff must generally plead that “the product did not possess even the most basic
10 degree of fitness for ordinary use.” *Mocek v. Alfa Leisure, Inc.*, 114 Cal. App. 4th 402, 406
11 (2003). The gravamen of Plaintiffs’ claims here is that, because of the fuel tank defect, the
12 Vehicles “were not in merchantable condition” at the time of sale or lease “and are not fit for the
13 ordinary purpose for which vehicles are used.” *See, e.g.*, Compl. ¶¶ 124, 172, 231.

14 In its motion to dismiss, Toyota argues that Plaintiffs’ implied warranty claims fail because
15 “they do not allege facts [showing] that their vehicles are unmerchantable or unfit for their
16 ordinary purpose.”¹³ Mot. at 15-16. Toyota cites to numerous cases involving defective
17 automobiles which conclude that the implied warranty of merchantability requires that vehicles
18 possess only “a minimum level of quality.” *See Tae Hae Lee*, 992 F. Supp. 2d at 979 (quoting
19 *Am. Suzuki Motor Corp. v. Superior Court*, 37 Cal. App. 4th 1291, 1295-96 (1995)). In *Tae Hae*
20 *Lee*, for example, the court rejected claims that Toyota breached the implied warranty of
21 merchantability by failing to “provide effective braking in unavoidable front-end collisions.” *Id.*
22 Holding such allegations insufficient to state a claim, the court asserted that “the basic inquiry” in
23 such cases simply “whether the vehicle was fit for driving.” *Id.* at 980; *see also Carlson v. Gen.*

24 _____
25 ¹² *See, e.g.*, Compl. ¶¶ 175-86 (alleging violations of California’s Song-Beverly Consumer
Warranty Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 1790 *et seq.*).

26 ¹³ Toyota further argues that several Plaintiffs’ implied warranty claims fail for the independent
27 reason that “they lack privity with TMS under applicable state law.” Mot. at 16. The parties also
28 reiterate their positions regarding five Plaintiffs’ satisfaction of the notice requirement under
U.C.C. § 2-607, which they raised in the context of the express warranty claims. *See Reply* at 13;
Opp’n at 14. For the following reasons, the Court need not address these issues.

1 *Motors Corp.*, 883 F.2d 287, 297 (4th Cir. 1989) (stating that “where a car can provide safe,
2 reliable transportation, it is generally considered merchantable”). Even more to the point, the
3 court in *Gertz I* held that “a car which is able to hold 6, 8, or 10 gallons of fuel . . . and which is
4 able to travel, at minimum, 300 miles on a tank of gas” is fit for its ordinary purpose. 2011 WL
5 13142144 at *12; *see also Troup v. Toyota Motor Corp.*, 545 Fed. Appx. 668, 669 (9th Cir. 2013)
6 (affirming the district court’s dismissal of an implied warranty claim in *Gertz II* where “the
7 alleged defect did not compromise the vehicle’s safety, render it inoperable, or drastically reduce
8 its mileage range” but merely “required [plaintiffs] to refuel more often”). Toyota thus presses the
9 straightforward argument that because “Plaintiffs concede that their vehicles travel 330-480 miles
10 on a tank of gas” and do not allege other operability problems, their implied warranty claims must
11 fail. *See Mot.* at 16-17.

12 In their opposition brief, Plaintiffs rely on language from this Court stating that “to be fit
13 for its ordinary purpose a vehicle must be . . . substantially free of defects” and must do more than
14 merely “provide[] transportation from point A to point B.” Opp’n at 11-12 (quoting *MyFord*
15 *Touch*, 291 F. Supp. 3d at 945-46). It is true that in previous defective automobile cases, this
16 Court has allowed implied warranty claims to proceed beyond the pleading stage where there was
17 a factual question regarding a vehicle’s safety. In *MyFord Touch*, where plaintiffs alleged various
18 safety risks associated with a malfunctioning “infotainment” system, the Court noted that “the
19 ordinary purpose of a car is not just to provide transportation but rather safe, reliable
20 transportation.” 46 F. Supp. 3d at 980. There, the Court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss
21 because there was “a question of fact for the jury as to whether the problems with [system] posed
22 enough of a safety risk that the cars” were not merchantable. *Id.* at 980. Similarly, in *Sloan*, 287
23 F. Supp. 3d 840 (N.D. Cal. 2018), the Court rejected the defendant’s argument “that a vehicle is fit
24 for ordinary use so long as it continues to provide transportation, irrespective of safety concerns.”
25 *Id.* at 879. Instead, plaintiffs’ allegations “of engine damage, fouled spark plugs, engine misfires,
26 emission of white smoke, and so” raised “a question of fact for the jury” as to whether plaintiffs’
27 vehicles were fit for their ordinary purpose. *Id.* The Court’s ruling in both cases was therefore
28 tied to material questions of vehicle safety.

1 Here, in contrast, Plaintiffs’ allegations do not raise a serious question of the Vehicles’
2 fitness for reasonably safe and reliable transportation, as they did in *MyFord Touch* and *Sloan*.
3 Plaintiffs ineffectually attempt to distinguish the instant case from *Gertz I*, arguing that the
4 Vehicles’ fuel-tank defect is perpetual whereas the comparable defect in the earlier case
5 “manifested *only* in cold weather.” Opp’n at 12 (emphasis in original); *see also* Hearing Tr. at 11-
6 12 (arguing that this case involves “a pervasive defect” whereas *Gertz I* involved “an intermittent
7 defect”). As Toyota points out, however, the Vehicles’ purportedly diminished mileage range here
8 is superior to that in *Gertz I*: In the earlier case, plaintiffs alleged that they were “able to travel, at
9 minimum, 300 miles on a tank of gas,” 2011 WL 13142144 at *12, whereas in the instant case
10 Plaintiffs acknowledge that they “are able to travel 330-480 miles on a tank of gas,” Mot. at 17.
11 As in *Troup*, the complaint fails to demonstrate that the defect “compromise[s] the vehicle’s
12 safety, render[s] it inoperable, or drastically reduce[s] its mileage range”; “rather, it merely
13 require[s] the [Plaintiffs] to refuel more often.” 545 Fed. Appx. at 669. “Absent more, the
14 complaint fails to state a claim for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability.” *Id.*

15 The Court therefore finds, as it ruled at the motion hearing, that Plaintiffs have failed to
16 state an implied warranty claim. *See* Hearing Tr. at 13-14. Toyota’s motion to dismiss on this
17 basis is **GRANTED**. Because amendment would be futile at this stage, Plaintiffs do not have
18 leave to amend.

19 D. Consumer Protection Claims: General Issues

20 Plaintiffs have brought claims under the consumer protection (and/or unfair competition)
21 statutes of all twenty-eight states in which they reside. They allege that Toyota made affirmative
22 misrepresentations about the Vehicles’ fuel tank capacity and that the company unlawfully failed
23 to disclose the alleged fuel tank defect to consumers. In other words, Plaintiffs’ consumer
24 protection claims are based on both an affirmative misrepresentation and an omission (or duty to
25 disclose) theory of liability. *See* Hearing Tr. at 22. In their briefs, the parties first addressed
26 overarching issues relating to Plaintiffs’ allegations of consumer protection violations; they then
27 discussed issues particular to different states’ statutory requirements. The Court follows the
28 parties’ lead and addresses these issues in turn.

1 In its motion to dismiss, Toyota argues that “Plaintiffs’ fraud and consumer protection
2 theories fail” for three reasons. First, “a claim based on the use of EPA estimates in
3 advertisements and other materials is preempted by federal law.” *Id.* at 20. Second, Plaintiffs’
4 “allegations do not meet Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading standard since “they do not identify any
5 specific advertisement or untruthful representation by TMS that they relied on” in purchasing the
6 Vehicles. *Id.* at 19-20. Third, “Plaintiffs’ allegations of presale knowledge and active
7 concealment” as part of their omission theory are “unsupported by factual allegations” and “belied
8 by Plaintiffs’ own allegations.” *Id.* at 21. Plaintiffs respond that their “allegations regarding
9 TMS’s fraudulent misrepresentations are sufficiently particularized to state a claim for relief”
10 under Rule 9(b), as are their “allegations regarding TMS’s knowledge of the fuel tank defect” at
11 the time the Vehicles were sold. Opp’n at 15-16. Plaintiffs do not specifically address Toyota’s
12 preemption argument in their opposition brief.

13 The Court addresses the preemption and affirmative misrepresentation arguments in the
14 first subsection below, and the omission arguments in a second subsection.

15 1. Affirmative Misrepresentation Theory

16 a. Preemption

17 In arguing that Plaintiffs’ consumer protection claims are barred by preemption principles,
18 Toyota raises a procedural as well as a substantive argument. Toyota contends that Plaintiffs’
19 failure to respond to its preemption argument constitutes waiver, and that “any consumer
20 protection claim based on the MPG estimates used in TMS’s marketing materials should be
21 dismissed.” Reply at 14 (citing, *e.g.*, *Shakur v. Schriro*, 514 F.3d 878, 892 (9th Cir. 2008)).
22 While Plaintiffs declined, for unclear reasons, to address the issue in their opposition brief,
23 Plaintiffs did argue elsewhere (as the Court noted when discussing their express warranty claims
24 in Part IV.B.2) that their “claims for relief are predicated on TMS’s misrepresentations and
25 omissions regarding the RAV4’s 14.5 gallon fuel tank capacity,” not the EPA’s MPG estimates.
26 Docket No. 70 at 3. Plaintiffs therefore asserted that even though the fuel tank defect “necessarily
27 results in [a] reduced mileage range,” “MPG *variability* is not at issue in the Complaint.” *Id.*
28 (emphasis in original). The Court concludes that this argument provides a sufficient basis for

1 resolving the issue.

2 As to the merits of the preemption question, the Court indicated at the motion hearing that
3 it finds Toyota’s argument unconvincing. Hearing tr. at 14-15. Toyota contends that a fraudulent
4 misrepresentation claim “based on the use of EPA estimates in advertisements and other materials
5 is preempted by federal law,” namely “applicable Federal Trade Commission regulations and the
6 Energy Policy and Conservation Act [“EPCA”], 49 U.S.C. § 321901 *et seq.*”¹⁴ Mot. at 20.
7 Toyota cites *Sanchez v. Ford Motor Co.*, 2014 WL 2218278 (D. Colo. May 29, 2014), which
8 explains that federal law requires automobile manufacturers to include EPA mileage estimates
9 (and certain disclaimers) in marketing materials when the manufacturers reference MPG figures.
10 *Id.* at *3-4. The court in that case rejected a plaintiff’s state-law claims that “that the EPA
11 estimates” in an MPG-focused advertising graphic “were inherently deceptive” and “failed to
12 comply with federal regulations” on preemption grounds. *Id.* at *4. There, however, the
13 plaintiff’s claims were based on his vehicle’s alleged failure to “achieve the advertised fuel
14 efficiency.” *Id.* at *2. Here, in contrast, Plaintiffs do not allege that their Vehicles’ failure to
15 obtain Toyota’s advertised mileage range is a function of deceptive MPG estimates but of
16 diminished fuel tank capacity. *Sanchez* is therefore inapposite: Preemption based on allegedly
17 false claims about fuel efficiency (*i.e.*, a vehicle’s MPG rating) simply does not apply to this case,
18 which, as noted above, is not predicated on such claim.

19 Moreover, *In re Ford Fusion and C-Max Fuel Economy Litigation*, 2015 WL 7018369
20 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 2015), the other case that Toyota relies on for its preemption argument, does
21 not stand for the broad principle that “a claim based on the use of EPA estimates in advertisements
22 and other materials is preempted by federal law,” as Toyota suggests. *See* Mot. at 20. The *Ford*
23 *Fusion* court addressed Ford’s argument “that any [state-based] false advertisement claims based
24

25 ¹⁴ The Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution “invalidates state laws that ‘interfere with, or
26 are contrary to,’ federal law.” *Hillsborough Cty. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc.*, 471 U.S. 707,
27 712 (1985); *see also* U.S. Const. art. VI, ¶ 2. “State action may be foreclosed by express language
28 in a congressional enactment, by implication from the depth and breadth of a congressional
scheme that occupies the legislative field, or by implication because of a conflict with a
congressional enactment.” *Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly*, 533 U.S. 525, 531 (2001) (internal
quotations omitted).

1 on advertisements that contain federally-mandated [fuel economy] disclosure language” are
2 preempted by federal law. *Id.* at *24. Plaintiffs countered that state consumer protection laws
3 “are not based on the disclosure of fuel economy or fuel operating costs, but rather are based on
4 the more general duty not to deceive,” which may be violated when manufacturers go “beyond the
5 mere disclosure of EPA estimates.” *Id.* The court agreed with the plaintiffs, observing that “false
6 advertisement claims based on fuel economy are not, in all forms, expressly preempted by” federal
7 laws such as the EPCA. *Id.* at *26. It specifically cited California decisions that it found
8 “particularly persuasive on this point,” and which hold that federal law “cannot be construed to
9 encompass the general duty not to make fraudulent or misleading statements.” *Id.* (quoting
10 *Paduano*, 169 Cal. App. 4th at 1477-78). The *In re Ford Fusion* court thus concluded that “any
11 allegations that go beyond the mere disclosure—with appropriate caveats—of the estimated fuel
12 economy of the Vehicles, go beyond the scope of the EPCA.” *Id.* In the instant case, Plaintiffs
13 argue that Toyota’s advertisements concerning the Vehicles’ mileage ranges are deceptive because
14 they are based on misrepresentations about fuel tank capacity, not MPG calculations. These
15 allegations clearly “go beyond the mere disclosure . . . of the estimated fuel economy of the
16 Vehicles.” *See id.*

17 The Court therefore rejects Toyota’s preemption argument and **DENIES** its motion to
18 dismiss on that ground.

19 b. Rule 9(b) Sufficiency

20 Toyota’s challenge to the sufficiency of Plaintiffs’ affirmative-misrepresentation
21 allegations, however, is more persuasive. The parties do not dispute that because Plaintiffs’
22 consumer protection claims sound in fraud they are governed by the heightened pleading standard
23 of Rule 9(b). *See Mot.* at 19-20, *Opp’n* at 15. That standard, as noted above, requires plaintiffs to
24 “state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b), and specify
25 “the who, what, when, where, and how” of a defendant’s misconduct, *Vess*, 317 F.3d at 1106.
26 Plaintiffs assert that their allegations regarding Toyota’s misrepresentations are “sufficiently
27 particularized to state a claim for relief” under Rule 9(b):

28 Plaintiffs allege (a) the specific *places* that TMS made the false and

1 misleading statements (on its website, in the owner’s manual, and in
2 specifically identified advertisements); (b) the specific *reasons* that
3 the statements were false and misleading (TMS represented that
4 RAV4s had 14.5 gallon fuel tanks, when their true capacity was 8-
5 11 gallons); (c) that TMS’s statements were made at the time of sale
6 or lease of the RAV4s and continue to be made today; and (d) that
7 these statements falsely represented the size of the RAV4 fuel tank
8 and failed to disclose that a defect prevents the tank from filling to
9 capacity.

6 Opp’n at 15 (citing Compl. ¶¶ 47, 50, 56, 62). Toyota counters that, despite Plaintiffs’
7 “allegations about Toyota’s marketing materials . . . and specifications in the owner’s manual,”
8 “they do not identify any specific advertisement or untruthful representation by TMS that they
9 relied on regarding the estimated mileage range of the vehicles.” Mot. at 19-20 (emphasis
10 removed).

11 As the Court stated at the motion hearing, it finds that Plaintiffs’ affirmative
12 misrepresentation claims have not been pled with adequate specificity to survive a motion to
13 dismiss under Rule 9(b). Hearing Tr. at 32. Toyota is correct that “[w]hile Plaintiffs point to
14 advertisements they allege to be misleading, they never allege that [they] actually saw those
15 advertisements, nor do they allege when they saw these advertisements, and which portions of the
16 advertisements they found material.” Reply at 14. As the Court explained with respect to
17 Plaintiffs’ express warranty claims based on Toyota’s marketing materials and the Vehicle
18 owner’s manuals, the complaint simply states that Plaintiffs “believed and relied upon Toyota’s
19 representations that the RAV4s’ fuel tank capacity was 14.5 gallons.” *See, e.g.*, Compl. ¶ 6. This
20 wholly conclusory assertion is insufficient to state a breach of warranty claim under Rule 8 and it
21 is even more deficient for purposes of Rule 9. Plaintiffs conceded at the hearing, moreover, that
22 the complaint lacks any more specific allegations about which advertisements Plaintiffs were
23 exposed to and whether they relied on them in deciding to purchase the Vehicles. Hearing Tr. at
24 21. While the complaint adequately alleges that Toyota’s misleading advertisements *exist* (and
25 Toyota acknowledged that the company lists the Vehicles’ fuel tank capacity as 14.5 gallons in
26 sales brochures and perhaps “in some advertisements,” *id.* at 20), the complaint fails to establish
27 that Plaintiffs saw, heard, or acted on them.

28 Toyota’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ consumer protection claims based on an affirmative

1 misrepresentation theory is therefore **GRANTED** insofar as (1) the applicable statutes require that
 2 plaintiffs knew of and/or relied on the alleged misrepresentations and (2) the complaint fails to
 3 identify those misrepresentations known to and/or relied on by plaintiffs with any specificity.
 4 Since the parties have not briefed the issue of the statutes’ reliance requirements, the Court
 5 declines to rule on Plaintiffs’ claims on a state-by-state basis at this time.¹⁵

6 2. Omission Theory

7 Toyota next argues that Plaintiffs’ omission-based consumer protection claims generally
 8 fail because they have not established that Toyota had knowledge of the fuel tank defect at the
 9 time the Vehicles were sold. *See, e.g., Sloan*, 287 F. Supp. 3d at 865 (“To be liable for a failure to
 10 disclose, a defendant must have pre-sale knowledge of the defect.”). “Plaintiffs claim that TMS
 11 knew of the alleged fuel tank defect before they purchased their vehicles, and either had a duty to
 12 disclose or actively concealed the defect from them.” Mot. at 21. Toyota argues, however, that
 13 Plaintiffs’ allegations of TMS’s knowledge of the defect are either too conclusory to satisfy Rule
 14 9(b) or speciously rely on undated consumer complaints to establish such knowledge. *Id.* at 21-
 15 22. As Toyota points out, Plaintiffs specifically allege only that Toyota became aware of the
 16 defect in November 2019, which “post-dates the purchase or lease of the vehicle[s]” for twenty-six
 17 of the thirty-six total Plaintiffs. *Id.* at 22-23 (emphasis removed). Alternatively, Toyota argues
 18 that, assuming it knew of the defect prior to November 2019, Plaintiffs nevertheless fail to show
 19 “that there was any period of time that TMS both knew of the alleged defect *and* had exclusive
 20 knowledge of it.” *Id.* at 24. And because exclusive knowledge is typically an element of a
 21 consumer protection claim based on a duty to disclose, Toyota contends, Plaintiffs cannot ground
 22 such claims on a breach of that duty absent specific allegations directed thereto. *See id.* Finally,
 23 Toyota asserts that Plaintiffs “fail to identify a single act of concealment”—another common
 24 foundation for establishing a duty to disclose in consumer protection statutes. *Id.* Any claims
 25 asserted by Plaintiffs that require a showing of active concealment should therefore be dismissed,
 26

27 ¹⁵ *See In re Chrysler-Dodge-Jeep Ecodiesel Mktg., Sales Practices, and Prods. Liab. Litig.*, 295 F.
 28 Supp. 3d 927, 1015 n.21 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (collecting cases indicating that reliance is not required
 under numerous states’ consumer protection statutes).

1 according to Toyota.

2 Plaintiffs respond that omission-based claims, although formally governed by Rule 9(b),
3 do not require “the same level of specificity required by a normal fraud claim” because a “plaintiff
4 cannot point out the specific moment when the defendant failed to act.” Opp’n at 15 (quoting
5 *Corson v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc.*, 2013 WL 10068136, at *5 (C.D. Cal. July 18, 2013)).
6 Plaintiffs therefore argue that their allegations that Toyota fraudulently “omitted that the RAV4s
7 contain a defect which prevents the fuel tank from filling to the advertised capacity” are
8 adequately pled. *Id.* at 16. As to the question of Toyota’s presale knowledge, Plaintiffs point to
9 “a number of specific facts establishing TMS’s knowledge of the defect,” starting with Toyota’s
10 November 2019 “Tech Tip” to its service providers and continuing with the company’s
11 acknowledgment of the defect to a Dallas-area television station in February 2020. *Id.* at 16
12 (citing, *e.g.*, Compl. ¶¶ 62-83). Plaintiffs also refer to the 200-plus (undated) NHTSA complaints
13 mentioned and excerpted in the complaint. *Id.* (citing Compl. ¶¶ 65-69). And while Plaintiffs
14 acknowledge that “some of [them] purchased or leased their vehicles prior to the Tech Tip,” they
15 argue that the bulletin’s dissemination “suggests that TMS was aware of the fuel tank issue for at
16 least some period of time prior to its issuance.” *Id.* at 17. “At the very least, TMS’s arguments
17 about when it had knowledge of the defect raise questions of fact” that should be resolved in
18 Plaintiffs’ favor on a motion to dismiss. *Id.*

19 Regarding the sufficiency of the allegations, Plaintiffs have satisfied the (somewhat
20 relaxed) Rule 9(b) standard for establishing Toyota’s exclusive knowledge of the fuel tank defect
21 as part of their omission-based claims. As noted above, the pleading standard for omission-based
22 claims differs from the stringent test governing affirmative-misrepresentation claims. *See* Part
23 III.C, *supra*. And unlike Plaintiffs’ affirmative misrepresentation claims, which depended on
24 boilerplate allegations that they believed and relied on Toyota’s deceptive marketing materials,
25 Plaintiffs point to numerous specific indications that Toyota knew of the defect prior to the filing
26 of the original complaint in January 2020. These include the November 2019 technical service
27 bulletin and the December 2019 report in *Automotive News* in which Toyota confirmed the
28 defect’s existence. *See* Compl. ¶¶ 75-80. Plaintiffs’ omission-based claims are therefore pled

1 with the requisite specificity.

2 The question of whether Plaintiffs' have adequately alleged that Toyota had *presale*
3 knowledge of the defect presents a closer question. As the authorities cited by the parties indicate,
4 this type of inquiry is case-specific, and courts have come to different conclusions in broadly
5 similar circumstances. *Compare, e.g., Wilson v. Hewlett-Packard Co.*, 668 F.3d 1136, 1147 (9th
6 Cir. 2012) (holding that a district court did not err in finding that plaintiffs failed to plead presale
7 knowledge of a product defect by relying on fourteen customer complaints, twelve of which were
8 undated and two of which were made more than two years after the products were purchased) *with*
9 *MacDonald v. Ford Motor Co.*, 37 F. Supp. 3d 1087, 1093-94 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (finding that
10 plaintiffs' plausibly pled that Ford knew about defective car components at the time of sale where
11 it issued technical service bulletins "five and nine months after the last relevant purchase in th[e]
12 case, and less than two years after the first purchase"). This Court has twice addressed
13 comparable issues and ruled against dismissal where plaintiffs raised a reasonable inference that
14 car manufacturers had the requisite presale knowledge to state a consumer protection claim. In
15 *MyFord Touch*, the Court found it plausible that Ford's issuance of a service bulletin "only a few
16 months after the rollout" of vehicles with an allegedly defective feature demonstrated its
17 knowledge of the defect at the time of purchase, a finding that was further substantiated by
18 consumers' NHTSA complaints beginning several months after the rollout. *See* 46 F. Supp. 3d at
19 958. In *Sloan*, the Court likewise found that two service bulletins "issued relatively early in the
20 Class Period in mid-2010 and early-2011" made it reasonable to infer that GM had presale
21 knowledge of an alleged defect as to all 2010 vehicle purchasers. *See* 287 F. Supp. 3d at 866.

22 Similarly, Plaintiffs' allegations here are sufficient to raise the reasonable inference that
23 Toyota had presale knowledge of the fuel tank defect. The majority of Plaintiffs purchased or
24 leased their Vehicles in mid-2019, with the earliest dated purchases or leases occurring in early
25 April 2019. *See* Opp'n at 4-6 (citing Compl. ¶ 16). This means that, for Plaintiffs to plead presale
26 knowledge, Toyota must have been aware of the fuel-tank defect approximately seven months
27 before issuing the November 2019 bulletin. While the Court may harbor "some doubts whether
28 Plaintiffs will actually be able to prove [as much], that does not mean Plaintiffs' case is

1 implausible.” *MyFord Touch*, 46 F. Supp. 3d at 958. Further, the conclusion that Toyota knew of
2 the defect at or around the time of sale finds support in the “more than 200 complaints [that] ha[d]
3 been filed” with NHTSA and posted to other websites as of September 2020, when the amended
4 class action complaint was filed. *See* Compl. ¶¶ 65-69. While these customer protests are undated,
5 and so of limited value in demonstrating Toyota’s knowledge of the defect in early 2019, it is at
6 least plausible that many of them were submitted in early 2019 and that Toyota was aware of
7 them.

8 Moreover, because presale knowledge will be possessed, almost by definition, only by the
9 seller and not the consumer, it is also plausible that Toyota had *exclusive* knowledge of the fuel
10 tank defect at or around the time Plaintiffs purchased their Vehicles. *See MyFord Touch*, 46 F.
11 Supp. 3d at 960 (noting that “the presence of information online does not automatically defeat
12 exclusive knowledge” and that “exclusivity is analyzed in part by determining whether the
13 defendant has superior knowledge”). Again, although Rule 9(b) imposes a higher pleading
14 standard than Rule 8, it specifically provides that “intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a
15 person’s mind may be alleged generally.” *See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). This relaxed standard allows
16 Plaintiffs to plead exclusive knowledge through the somewhat generalized allegations in the
17 complaint.

18 The Court therefore finds that Plaintiffs have adequately alleged Toyota’s exclusive
19 knowledge of the defect at the time of sale as part of their omission-based consumer protection
20 claims. To the extent that Toyota’s motion to dismiss is based on applicable statutes’ requirement
21 of such exclusive knowledge, the motion is **DENIED**.

22 Toyota is correct, however, that the complaint fails to allege that the company engaged in
23 active concealment with respect to the fuel tank defect. *See* Reply at 14-15. While the complaint
24 repeats the language of each state’s consumer protection statute in stating, for example, that
25 Toyota “engaged in unlawful trade practices by employing deception, deceptive acts or practices,
26 fraud, misrepresentations, or concealment, [or] suppression or omission of any material fact with
27 intent that others rely upon such concealment,” Compl. ¶ 98, it fails to allege facts that would
28 plausibly support such boilerplate assertions.

1 Plaintiffs’ omission-based consumer protection claims are therefore barred insofar as they
2 require a showing of active concealment. Toyota’s motion to dismiss is **GRANTED** on this
3 ground.

4 E. Consumer Protection Claims: State-Specific Issues

5 Toyota next argues that, in addition to the global issues it identifies regarding Plaintiffs’
6 consumer protection claims, the complaint “fail[s] to sufficiently plead additional elements
7 required to sustain their state-specific claims.” Opp’n at 24. The parties have grouped these
8 narrower issues into thirteen categories. The Court addresses each in turn.

9 1. California (Duty to Disclose)

10 The California Plaintiffs bring claims under the state’s Consumer Legal Remedies Act
11 (“CLRA”), Cal. Civ. Code § 1750 *et seq.* (Count 4), Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), Cal. Bus.
12 & Prof. Code § 17200 *et seq.* (Count 9), and False Advertising Law (“FAL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof.
13 Code § 17500 *et seq.* (Count 5).

14 The CLRA forbids “unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices
15 undertaken by any person in a transaction intended to result or which results in the sale or lease of
16 goods or services to any consumer.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1770(a). The CLRA prohibits twenty-four
17 enumerated acts, including “[r]epresenting that goods or services have . . . characteristics . . . or
18 qualities which they do not have” and “[r]epresenting that goods or services are of a particular
19 standard, quality, or grade . . . if they are of another.” *Id.* § 1770(a)(5), (7).

20 The UCL prohibits “unlawful, unfair[,] or fraudulent business act[s] or practice[s],” as well
21 as “unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. “A
22 plaintiff may pursue a UCL claim under any or all of three theories: the ‘unlawfulness,’
23 ‘fraudulent,’ or ‘unfairness’ prongs.” *Toyota Motor Corp.*, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 1175. The unlawful
24 prong bars “practices that are forbidden by any [other] law.” *Id.* The fraudulent prong bars
25 practices that are “likely to deceive the public.” *Id.* The unfair prong bars conduct
26 that “significantly threatens or harms competition.” *Id.* (internal quotation omitted).

27 The FAL prohibits “any statement” that is “untrue or misleading” and made “with the
28 intent directly or indirectly to dispose of” property or services. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17500.

1 “To state a claim for an FAL violation, Plaintiffs must allege that ‘members of the public are
2 likely to be deceived.’” *Toyota Motor Corp.* 754 F. Supp. 2d at 1176 (quoting *In re Tobacco II*
3 *Cases*, 46 Cal.4th 298, 312 (2009)).

4 As this brief summary suggests, the statutory scheme of California’s consumer protection
5 laws is complex. While the CLRA, UCL, and FAL proscribe much of the same conduct, the
6 statutes sometimes have distinct requirements. *Compare, e.g., Khan v. Medical Bd.*, 12 Cal. App.
7 4th 1834, 1846 (1993) (holding that the FAL “can be violated through negligence”) *with Comm.*
8 *on Children’s Television, Inc. v. Gen. Foods Corp.*, 35 Cal.3d 197, 211 (1983) (indicating that,
9 under the fraudulent prong, the UCL requires only a showing “that members of the public are
10 likely to be deceived” and so does not entail a scienter requirement). The parties, however, have
11 not addressed such potentially disparate elements as scienter, reliance, or damages, or the remedies
12 available under each statute. Instead, they have devoted a significant amount of space to, for
13 example, describing the “three possible tests for defining ‘unfair’ practices” under the unfairness
14 prong of the UCL. *See* Mot. at 26, Opp’n at 19-21. Even here, though, the parties do not provide
15 clear explanations about which test should apply or why. Given the parties’ piecemeal analysis of
16 these and other issues regarding the California Plaintiffs’ consumer protection claims, the Court
17 focuses here on the question the parties addressed at greatest length in their briefs and at the
18 motion hearing—namely, whether Toyota had a duty to disclose the fuel tank defect, as Plaintiffs’
19 omission-based claims require.

20 Plaintiffs are correct that caselaw on the scope of a defendant’s duty to disclose in
21 omission-based consumer protection cases is marked by “general disarray.” *See id.* at 17; *see also*
22 *Hearing Tr.* at 24-26 (discussing doctrinal confusion on the duty to disclose in these cases).
23 California appellate courts have held that “a claim may be stated” under the CLRA, UCL, and
24 FLA “in terms constituting fraudulent omissions” so long as the omission is “contrary to a
25 representation actually made by the defendant” or the omission is “of a fact the defendant was
26 obliged to disclose.” *Daugherty v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc.*, 144 Cal. App. 4th 824, 835
27 (2006). In other words, an omission-based consumer protection claim may be based either on a
28 defendant’s partial misrepresentation or pure omission. *See Hodson v. Mars, Inc.*, 891 F.3d 857,

1 860-64 (9th Cir. 2018) (distinguishing between “pure omission cases,” on the one hand,” and
2 “partial misrepresentation case[s],” on the other).

3 Courts have not agreed, however, on a single test that encompasses the entire universe of
4 omission-based claims. In *LiMandri v. Judkins*, 52 Cal. App. 4th 326 (1997), the California court
5 of appeals stated that

6 There are four circumstances in which nondisclosure or concealment
7 may constitute actionable fraud: (1) when the defendant is in a
8 fiduciary relationship with the plaintiff; (2) when the defendant had
9 exclusive knowledge of material facts not known to the plaintiff; (3)
when the defendant actively conceals a material fact from the
plaintiff; and (4) when the defendant makes partial representations
but also suppresses some material facts.

10 *Id.* at 336 (internal quotation omitted). This passage is sometimes taken to delineate the full range
11 of scenarios in which a seller’s duty to disclose arises. *See, e.g., Falk*, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 1094-95;
12 *see also* Mot. at 25, Opp’n at 18 (agreeing that *LiMandri* governs whether Toyota had a duty to
13 disclose in this case).

14 More recent cases have concluded, however, that sellers also have a duty to disclose
15 physical product defects in pure-omission cases where those defects create a safety hazard or
16 affect the product’s central functionality. In *Wilson*, the Ninth Circuit held that for an omission
17 relating to a product defect to be actionable (*i.e.*, “material”) under the CLRA and UCL it had to
18 “cause[] an unreasonable safety hazard.” 668 F.3d at 1142-43. The *Wilson* court thus interpreted
19 the *LiMandri* test’s materiality standard as requiring that a defective product “pose safety
20 concerns,” at least in pure omission cases. In *Hodson*, however, plaintiffs asked the Ninth Circuit
21 to reconsider *Wilson*’s holding in light of intervening state-court decisions in *Collins v.*
22 *eMachines, Inc.*, 202 Cal. App. 4th 249 (2011), and *Rutledge v. Hewlett-Packard Co.*, 238 Cal.
23 App. 4th 1164 (2015). *See Hodson*, 891 F.3d at 861-62. The *Hodson* court concluded that *Collins*
24 and *Rutledge* had “cast doubt on whether *Wilson*’s safety-hazard requirement applies in all
25 circumstances”; the court nevertheless decided the case “without either relying on or overruling
26 *Wilson*.” *Id.* In doing so, it interpreted *Collins* and *Rutledge* as sanctioning an omission-based
27 consumer protection claim where “the allegedly concealed *physical* defect [is] *central* to the
28 product’s function.” *Id.* at 864 (emphasis in original).

1 Notably, the *Hodson* court left the relationship between *LiMandri* and the Ninth Circuit’s
2 decisions in *Wilson* and *Hodson* somewhat ambiguous. Specifically, the court did not make clear
3 whether it construed *Collins* and *Rutledge* (1) as requiring plaintiffs to “allege one of the four
4 *LiMandri* factors” *in addition to* a safety hazard or an effect on central product functionality to
5 state a pure-omission claim, or (2) as permitting plaintiffs to plead an actionable omission on the
6 basis of *either* one of the *LiMandri* factors *or* by alleging a safety hazard or defect to central
7 product functionality. *See id.* at 863. In other words, the *Hodson* court left unclear whether the
8 safety hazard and central functionality tests should be understood as ways of defining materiality
9 for purposes of *LiMandri* or whether these tests represent independent means of pleading an
10 omission, separate from *LiMandri*. The *Hodson* court did suggest, however, that the safety hazard
11 and central functionality tests might not apply to partial-misrepresentation (rather than pure-
12 omission) cases. The court cited *Gutierrez v. CarMax Auto Superstores California*, 19 Cal. App.
13 5th 1234 (2018), which held that a car dealership had a duty to disclose a material fact
14 (specifically, the existence of a safety recall for a car part) where the dealership “made partial
15 representations about [a] vehicle[] . . . and those representations were likely to mislead.”
16 *Gutierrez*, 19 Cal. App. 5th at 1262-63; *see also Hodson*, 891 F.3d at 863-64 n.3 (discussing
17 *Gutierrez*).

18 At the motion hearing, the parties agreed that the *Wilson* and *Hodson* tests, on the one
19 hand, and the *LiMandri* test, on the other, represent *alternative* means of pleading a pure-omission
20 claim. *See* Hearing Tr. at 25-26 (detailing Toyota’s view that plaintiffs can establish a duty to
21 disclose if the product defect presents “a safety issue,” if the defect “go[es] to the central function
22 of the product,” *or* if plaintiffs “satisf[y] one of the *LiMandri* factors”). The Court concludes that
23 the parties are correct, for a number of reasons.

24 First, this approach accords with *Hodson*, which left the relationship between *LiMandri*
25 materiality and safety hazard/central functionality defects unsettled but did not affirmatively
26 require plaintiffs to plead both to state an omission-based consumer protection claim. *See* 891
27 F.3d at 863-64 (noting, *e.g.*, that *Rutledge* “did not apply the *LiMandri* factors” in ruling that
28 defendants had a duty to disclose a defect to central functionality). Second, the California

1 Supreme Court has held that a misrepresentation is “material” where “a reasonable man would
2 attach importance to its existence or nonexistence in determining his choice of action in the
3 transaction in question.” *Engalla v. Permanente Med. Grp., Inc.*, 15 Cal.4th 951, 977 (1997)
4 (internal quotation omitted); *see also Collins*, 202 Cal. App. 4th at 256 (“In the CLRA context, a
5 fact is deemed ‘material’ . . . if a ‘reasonable [consumer]’ would deem it important in determining
6 how to act in the transaction at issue.”). This standard is more forgiving to plaintiffs than the
7 Ninth Circuit’s safety hazard or central functionality tests (as will be explained below), which
8 suggests that the latter two should not be read as proxies for the first. And because “material
9 facts” are at issue in *LiMandri*, 52 Cal. App. 4th at 336, the California Supreme Court’s definition
10 of “material,” rather than the Ninth Circuit’s formulations of safety hazards or central
11 functionality, is more germane to the *LiMandri* factors. Finally, the more lenient materiality
12 standard of the *LiMandri* test is rational insofar as that test also imposes additional pleading
13 requirements on plaintiffs to establish a defendant’s duty to disclose. In mandating that a
14 defendant have “exclusive knowledge of material facts not known to [a] plaintiff,” for example,
15 the second *LiMandri* factor deems the materiality of a misrepresentation insufficient, on its own,
16 to create liability for a defendant. *See id.* This outcome makes sense from a policy perspective
17 insofar as a “material” misrepresentation does not necessarily rise to the level of a safety hazard or
18 a central functionality defect, as defined in *Wilson* and *Hodson*. By the same logic, safety hazards
19 and central functionality defects arguably need not be accompanied by the defendant’s knowing
20 decision to sell a faulty product (per *LiMandri*’s second prong) if those defects are considered
21 sufficiently harmful to consumer wellbeing to create liability by themselves. As indicated below,
22 the instant case in fact presents a telling example of a product defect that is material (*i.e.*,
23 important to consumer choice) but that does not amount to a safety hazard or affect the product’s
24 central functionality.

25 The Court therefore analyzes the sufficiency of the California Plaintiffs’ omission-based
26 claims under all three theories of liability.

27 As to the *Wilson* test, Toyota is correct that the complaint nowhere alleges that the fuel
28 tank defect poses an “unreasonable safety hazard” to consumers. *See* 668 F.3d at 1143; *see also*

1 Mot. at 6 (observing that “none of the Plaintiffs allege . . . that they have been unable to drive their
2 [Vehicles],” “that they have run out of gas,” or that they have suffered “any physical injury” as a
3 result of the defect). Plaintiffs therefore fail to state an omission claim on the basis of a safety
4 hazard.

5 Regarding the *Hodson* test, Toyota argues that an “alleged defect must go to the heart of
6 the product’s functionality and effectively render it incapable of use” to satisfy the central
7 functionality requirement. Opp’n at 23. Indeed, the California authorities cited in *Hodson* appear
8 to set a high bar. In *Collins*, “plaintiffs complained that a floppy disk controller defect . . . caused
9 critical data corruption of [computers’] hard drive[s].” *Hodson*, 891 F.3d at 862 (citing *Collins*,
10 202 Cal. App. 4th at 253). Similarly, plaintiffs in *Rutledge* alleged that “laptops contained
11 defective inverters that would cause the screens to dim and darken during the warranty period.”
12 *Id.* at 862-63 (citing *Rutledge*, 238 Cal. App. 4th at 1171). These allegations went to the products’
13 central functionality because “[a] computer chip that corrupts the hard drive, or a laptop screen
14 that goes dark, renders those products *incapable of use by any consumer.*” *Id.* at 864 (emphasis
15 added). As Toyota observes, “allegations that the fuel tank does not fill to its advertised capacity,
16 but still can achieve 330-480 miles on a single tank of [gas], do not plead a defect” rendering the
17 Vehicles incapable of use in any meaningful sense. Opp’n at 23. Plaintiffs thus fail to state an
18 omission claim under the central functionality test of *Hodson*, *Collins*, and *Rutledge*.¹⁶

19 That leaves the California Plaintiffs reliant on *LiMandri*. Plaintiffs argue that they state
20 omission-based claims under the second, third, and fourth *LiMandri* prongs. Opp’n at 19. As to
21 the third *LiMandri* scenario, which applies “when the defendant actively conceals a material fact
22 from the plaintiff,” 52 Cal. App. 4th at 336, the complaint does not contain any factual allegations
23 raising a reasonable inference that Toyota actively concealed the fuel tank defect from consumers.
24 *See* Part IV.D.2, *supra*.

25
26 ¹⁶ The case cited by Plaintiffs at the motion hearing in support of their central functionality
27 argument, *Stockinger v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc.*, 2017 WL 10574372 (C.D. Cal. July 7,
28 2017), is inapposite. The court there did not address central functionality; rather, it held that
plaintiffs pled an unreasonable safety hazard where they alleged that they were “exposed to mold
blown into the passenger compartments of their vehicles by [a] defective HVAC system.” *Id.* at
*20.

1 As previously explained, however, the Court finds that the complaint plausibly alleges
2 Toyota’s “exclusive knowledge” of the defect at the time the Vehicles were sold, as the second
3 *LiMandri* prong requires. *See* 52 Cal. App. 4th at 336. The only remaining question under
4 *LiMandri* is whether the defect was “material.” “In order for non-disclosed information to be
5 material, a plaintiff must show that ‘had the omitted information been disclosed, one would have
6 been aware of it and behaved differently.’” *Falk*, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 1095 (quoting *Mirkin v.*
7 *Wasserman*, 5 Cal.4th 1082, 1093 (1993)). As the Court indicated at the motion hearing,
8 Plaintiffs’ assertion that the Vehicles’ purported fuel tank capacity was material information is
9 plausible, as it is reasonable for a consumer to consider a vehicle’s mileage range in deciding
10 whether to purchase it and how much to pay. *See* Hearing Tr. at 14. The California Plaintiffs
11 have therefore stated an omission claim under the second prong of *LiMandri*.

12 As to the fourth *LiMandri* prong, it is reasonable to infer, based on Plaintiffs’ allegations,
13 that Toyota made “partial representations but also suppress[ed] some material facts” in stating that
14 the Vehicles had a fuel tank capacity of 14.5 gallons. *See* 52 Cal. App. 4th at 336. Plaintiffs
15 clarified at the motion hearing that their partial misrepresentation theory is based on the allegation
16 that “Toyota is representing what the size of the fuel tank is and what the estimated mileage range
17 is without providing . . . the important . . . caveat information” that the tanks only achieve 8-11
18 gallons of fuel storage. *See* Hearing Tr. at 23. In reaching this conclusion, the Court presumes
19 that “suppresses” in the fourth *LiMandri* prong requires a lesser showing of wrongdoing than
20 “actively conceals” in the third prong—hence the distinction between the third and fourth
21 *LiMandri* prongs. Given that the Court credits Plaintiffs’ allegation that Toyota had presale
22 knowledge of the fuel tank defect, it is plausible that the company’s subsequent partial
23 misrepresentations about fuel tank capacity entailed the “suppression” of material information that
24 the tank could not fill to capacity. Plaintiffs’ omission claim under the fourth *LiMandri* prong is
25 therefore adequately pled.

26 Toyota’s motion to dismiss California Plaintiffs’ omission-based consumer protection
27 claims on the ground that Plaintiffs fail to establish a duty to disclose is thus **DENIED** on the
28 grounds stated herein.

1 2. Colorado, Iowa, Oregon, and Virginia (Intent)

2 Toyota argues that Plaintiffs’ claims under the Colorado Consumer Protection Act (Count
3 10), Iowa Consumer Frauds Act (Count 25), Oregon Unfair Trade Practices Act (Count 75), and
4 Virginia Consumer Protection Act (Count 84) should be dismissed because Plaintiffs “failed to
5 plausibly plead that violations of the respective acts were committed willfully or intentionally.”
6 Opp’n at 26-27. The Court disagrees. As it previously explained, Plaintiffs have adequately
7 alleged that Toyota had presale knowledge of the fuel tank defect and failed to disclose it. This
8 allegation suffices, at the pleading stage, to establish Toyota’s knowledge of its wrongdoing and
9 its intent to deceive consumers.

10 Further, while a willfulness element in these states’ consumer protection statutes could
11 conceivably demand allegations of more culpable misconduct than those offered in the complaint,
12 the authorities cited by Toyota do not require a showing of willfulness (in the sense of a specific
13 intent to violate the law) to state a claim under any of the aforementioned statutes. The Colorado
14 Act requires “that the defendant engaged in an unfair or deceptive trade practice,” namely a false
15 representation “made either with knowledge of [the statement’s] untruth, or recklessly and
16 willfully made without regard to its consequences, and with an intent to mislead and deceive the
17 plaintiff.” *Rhino Linings USA, Inc. v. Rocky Mountain Rhino Lining, Inc.*, 62 P.3d 142, 137 (Colo.
18 2003) (internal quotations omitted). This statement suggests that the statute may be satisfied on a
19 showing of either knowledge or recklessness as to the representation’s falsity. As the Court
20 indicated above, Plaintiffs have adequately pled Toyota’s knowledge of the fuel tank defect.

21 Regarding the Iowa Act, Toyota quotes statutory language providing that
22 misrepresentations and other unfair practices are actionable when done with “the intent that others
23 rely on upon the unfair practice.” Mot. at 27 (quoting Iowa Code § 714H.3(1)). As this Court has
24 previously observed—and as the plain terms of the statute indicate—“the only intent required by
25 the statute is that the defendant act ‘with the intent *that others rely*’ upon his omissions.” *In re*
26 *Chrysler-Dodge-Jeep Ecodiesel Mktg., Sales Practices, and Prods. Liab. Litig.*, 295 F. Supp. 3d
27 927, 1019 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (quoting *State ex rel. Miller v. Pace*, 677 N.W.2d 761, 771 (Iowa
28 2004)) (emphasis in original). As Plaintiffs’ allegations here raise a reasonable inference that

1 Toyota intended consumers to rely on the company’s misrepresentations concerning the Vehicles’
2 fuel tank capacity, the Iowa Plaintiffs’ claims are not barred by the Act’s intent requirement.

3 Toyota also argues that the Oregon Act “requires ‘willfulness’ for a viable claim” and that
4 “the plain language of the statute requires either a knowing or willful violation.” Reply at 17
5 (quoting Or. Rev. Stat. § 646.605(10)). It is true that “[t]o state a claim under the [Act] Plaintiff
6 must allege . . . willfulness by Defendant.” *Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Stabenow*, 2017 WL 1538156,
7 at *5 (D. Or. Apr. 25, 2017). But a “willful” violation of the Act is one that “occurs when the
8 person committing the violation knew *or should have known* that the conduct of the person was a
9 violation.” Or. Rev. Stat. § 646.605(10) (emphasis added). As a result, a plaintiff need only
10 allege facts “from which the Court could infer Defendant knew or should have known [its
11 conduct] was a violation of the UTPA.” *Bank of N.Y. Mellon*, 2017 WL 1538156, at *5 (internal
12 quotation omitted) (brackets in original). “In other words, the term ‘willful,’” for purposes of the
13 Act, “requires no more than proof of ordinary negligence by a defendant in not knowing, when it
14 should have known, that a representation made by him was not true.” *State ex rel. Redden v.*
15 *Discount Fabrics, Inc.*, 615 P.2d 1034, 1039 (Or. 1980). Plaintiffs’ allegations easily satisfy the
16 Oregon Act’s negligence requirement.

17 As to the Virginia Act, Toyota appears to be correct that, where plaintiffs bring a claim
18 under the Act sounding in fraud, they must allege “a false representation, of material fact, made
19 intentionally and knowingly, with intent to mislead, reliance by the party misled, and resulting
20 damage.” *Galloway v. Priority Imports Richmond, LLC*, 426 F. Supp. 3d 236, 244 (E.D. Va.
21 2019) (internal quotation omitted); *see also Lambert v. Downtown Garage, Inc.*, 262 Va. 707
22 (2001) (stating that a plaintiff’s fraud-based action required him to plead the aforementioned
23 elements in “his claim for common law fraud . . . and the claim for a violation of the Consumer
24 Protection Act”). Plaintiffs cite *Owens v. DRS Automotive Fantomworks, Inc.*, 288 Va. 489
25 (2014), for the proposition that a consumer need not necessarily plead an intentional violation of
26 the Act to state a viable claim. The Supreme Court of Virginia in that case agreed with plaintiffs
27 that the Act’s scope extends beyond common-law fraud, and that the Act “does not require the
28 consumer to prove in every case that misrepresentations were made knowingly or with the intent

1 to deceive” but only in cases where plaintiffs seek treble damages for “willful” violations of the
2 Act. *Id.* at 497. But the Court declined to identify the mental state that *would* be required to state
3 a non-willfulness claim under the Act or, indeed, whether such a claim could ever succeed where
4 it sounds in fraud. In any event, even under *Galloway*, Plaintiffs have plausibly pled knowledge
5 and intent on Toyota’s part such that their claims are not precluded on the basis of the Virginia
6 Act’s intent requirement.

7 Toyota’s motion to dismiss the Colorado, Iowa, Oregon, and Virginia consumer protection
8 claims on the basis of inadequately pled knowledge or intent is therefore **DENIED**.

9 3. Connecticut and North Dakota (Damages)

10 Toyota contends that Plaintiffs fail to state a claim under the Connecticut Unfair Trade
11 Practices Act (Count 13) or the North Dakota Consumer Fraud Act (Count 65) “because they fail
12 to sufficiently allege damages.” Opp’n at 27. With respect to the Connecticut Act, Toyota cites to
13 *Web Press Services Corp. v. New London Motors, Inc.*, 533 A.2d 1211 (Conn. 1987), to support
14 its argument that the Act requires an alleged injury to be “substantial.” In that case, the Supreme
15 Court of Connecticut held that a plaintiff had not suffered a “substantial injury” within the
16 meaning of the Act where an automobile defect was valued at “3.7% of the cost of the vehicle.”
17 *Id.* at 1214. But as Plaintiffs point out, the Supreme Court has adopted a multi-factor balancing
18 test “for determining whether a trade practice is ‘unfair or deceptive’” under the Act. Opp’n at 23.
19 The factors include: “(1) Whether the practice . . . offends public policy as it has been established
20 by statutes, the common law, or otherwise . . . ; (2) whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or
21 unscrupulous; and (3) whether it causes substantial injury to consumers, competitors, or other
22 businessmen.” *Harris v. Bradley Mem’l Hosp. and Health Ctr., Inc.*, 994 A.2d 153, 173 (Conn.
23 2010). “All three criteria do not need to be established to support a finding of unfairness.” *Id.* As
24 Toyota’s motion to dismiss is premised only on the third of these factors and fails to address the
25 first two, it has not demonstrated that the Connecticut Plaintiff’s consumer protection claim is
26 implausible as a matter of law. And whether the consumer’s injury is sufficiently substantial or
27 material is generally a question of fact for the jury.

28 Regarding the North Dakota Act, Toyota relies on *Ziegelmann v. DaimlerChrysler Corp.*,

1 649 N.W.2d 556 (N.D. 2002), for the proposition that plaintiffs’ allegations of damages are
2 impermissibly speculative where they are “based on alleged diminution in value” and do not
3 involve, for example, “a sale of the vehicle at a diminished value or any incurred costs to repair
4 the vehicle.” Mot. at 28; *see also Ziegelmann*, 649 N.W.2d at 559 (“In this jurisdiction, the torts
5 of negligence, fraud and deceit require proof of actual damages as an essential element of a
6 plaintiff’s case. . . .”). But this argument is effectively a rehash of Toyota’s unpersuasive
7 contention that Plaintiffs have not suffered an injury-in-fact. *See* Part IV.A. As with the standing
8 issue, Toyota’s cited authority is distinguishable from the facts of the instant case. In *Ziegelmann*,
9 the plaintiff claimed that the vehicle he purchased lacked a braking mechanism it should have had,
10 but the vehicle’s manufacturer never represented that the vehicle was equipped with the
11 mechanism and the safety hazard the plaintiff was concerned about never materialized. 649
12 N.W.2d at 564, 561. Here, in contrast, Plaintiffs allege that Toyota falsely advertised the
13 Vehicles’ fuel tank capacity and that the defect actually and currently exists. As a result,
14 Plaintiffs’ allegations that they have suffered damages is plausible for purposes of the motion to
15 dismiss.

16 Toyota’s motion to dismiss the Connecticut and North Dakota consumer protection claims
17 on the basis of inadequately pled damages is therefore **DENIED**.

18 4. Florida (Demand Letter)

19 Toyota next argues that Florida’s Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (Count 16)
20 “requires consumers to serve a demand letter at least 30 days before suing a motor vehicle dealer
21 or its ‘employees, agents, principals, sureties, and insurers.’” Mot. at 28 (quoting Fla. Stat. §
22 501.98(1)). Because Plaintiff Tran does not allege that he served a demand letter on Toyota, the
23 company asserts, he failed to comply with this statutory requirement. But, as Plaintiffs point out,
24 this requirement expressly “applies only to a motor vehicle *dealer*” or its “employees, agents,
25 principals, sureties, and insurers.” Opp’n at 24 (quoting Fla. Stat. § 501.98(1)) (emphasis in
26 original). According to Plaintiffs, “[n]o court has ever applied this demand requirement to a
27 vehicle *manufacturer*,” and Toyota does not cite any countervailing authority. *See id.* (emphasis
28 in original). Moreover, the Florida Act’s demand-letter requirement “does not apply to any action

1 brought as a class action”—or at least to one “that is ultimately certified as a class action.” Fla.
2 Stat. § 501.98(7). Plaintiffs thus argue that Plaintiff Tran need not serve a demand letter on
3 Toyota at this juncture. Opp’n at 24. Tellingly, Toyota fails to respond to these arguments in its
4 reply brief, suggesting that it has abandoned the motion as to this aspect of the Florida Act.

5 Toyota’s motion to dismiss the Florida consumer protection claim on the basis of the
6 demand-letter requirement is therefore **DENIED**.

7 5. Idaho and Kentucky (Privity)

8 Toyota asserts that Plaintiffs’ claims under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act (Count 19)
9 and the Kentucky Consumer Protection Act (Count 28) must be dismissed because both statutes
10 “require the plaintiff to be in a contractual relationship with the allegedly deceptive party,” and
11 Plaintiffs here lack privity with Toyota. *See* Mot. at 28. This Court addressed the same issue in
12 *Chrysler-Dodge-Jeep*, where the defendants argued “that privity of contract is required to state a
13 claim under the Idaho and Kentucky consumer protection statutes.” 295 F. Supp. 3d at 1021.
14 With respect to Idaho, the Court there acknowledged caselaw stating that “[i]n order to have
15 standing under the ICPA, the aggrieved party must have been in a contractual relationship with the
16 party alleged to have acted unfairly or deceptively.” *Id.* (quoting *Taylor v. McNichols*, 243 P.3d
17 642, 662 (Idaho 2010)).¹⁷ But that caselaw does not make clear that “a direct contract between the
18 plaintiff and defendant (immediate privity)” is required to state a claim under the Idaho Act. *Id.*
19 Instead, the authorities cited by the Idaho Supreme Court in *Taylor* “simply reflect that a
20 plaintiff’s claim must ultimately be founded on a contract.” *Id.* at 1022 (emphasis added). The
21 Court thus permitted plaintiffs’ claims in *Chrysler-Dodge-Jeep* to proceed since they “appear[ed]
22 to have contracts with, *e.g.*, dealers that resulted in the Class Vehicles being purchased.” *Id.*
23 Toyota suggests that *Chrysler-Dodge-Jeep* is distinguishable because Plaintiffs here fail to
24 specifically allege, as plaintiffs in the earlier case did, “that the dealers with whom they entered
25 into direct contractual relationships . . . acted as agents of the manufacturer.” Reply at 19. But
26 this Court’s analysis in *Chrysler-Dodge-Jeep* turned on the fact that plaintiffs adequately alleged

27 _____
28 ¹⁷ Toyota here relies on the same passage from *Taylor*, as quoted in *Duspiva v. Fillmore*, 293 P.3d
651, 660 (Idaho 2013). *See* Mot. at 28.

1 that they were in privity with the dealers, not that the dealers were agents of the manufacturers.
 2 See 295 F. Supp. 3d at 1022. The Idaho Plaintiff here likewise alleges that he purchased his
 3 Vehicle from a dealership, with whom he was presumably in a direct contractual relationship. See
 4 Compl. ¶ 14 (stating that “Plaintiff Jedediah Clawson . . . purchased a 2019 Toyota RAV4
 5 Hybrid . . . from Peterson Toyota located [in] Boise, Idaho”). The Court therefore rejects Toyota’s
 6 argument that the Idaho Act requires immediate privity between plaintiff and defendant.

7 As to the Kentucky Act, this Court in *Chrysler-Jeep-Dodge* concluded that it “require[s]
 8 that plaintiffs have a direct contractual relationship with the defendant.” 295 F. Supp. 3d at 1022
 9 (citing, e.g., *Keaton v. G.C. Williams Funeral Home, Inc.*, 436 S.W.3d 538, 546 (Ky. Ct. App.
 10 2013)). Plaintiffs also concede that the Kentucky Act “contains a privity requirement.” Opp’n at
 11 25; see also *Skilcraft Sheetmetal, Inc. v. Ky. Mach., Inc.*, 836 S.W.2d 907, 909 (Ky. Ct. App.
 12 1992) (stating that the Act “plainly contemplates an action by a purchaser against his immediate
 13 seller”). Plaintiffs argue, however, that “courts applying the statute recognize an exception where
 14 [a] plaintiff also alleges breach of an express warranty.” *Id.* (citing *Bosch v. Bayer Healthcare*
 15 *Pharm., Inc.*, 13 F. Supp. 3d 730, 750 (W.D. Ky. 2014), which states that “there is an exception to
 16 the privity requirement when express representations are alleged”). In *Skilcraft Sheetmetal*, a case
 17 relied on by Toyota, see Mot. at 28, the Kentucky appellate court concluded that “a subsequent
 18 purchaser may not maintain an action against a seller with whom he did not deal *or who made no*
 19 *warranty for the benefit of the subsequent purchaser.*” 836 S.W.2d at 909 (emphasis added). In
 20 holding “that privity of contract” must generally “exist between the parties in a suit alleging a
 21 violation of the Consumer Protection Act,” the court specifically distinguished between the typical
 22 case and one in which a defendant “provides warranties to the ultimate purchaser to repair the item
 23 purchased.” *Id.* (citing *Ford Motor Co. v. Mayes*, 575 S.W.2d 480, 485-86 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978)).

24 Federal courts have applied the warranty-based exception to privity discussed in *Skilcraft*
 25 *Sheetmetal*. In *Naiser v. Unilever U.S., Inc.*, 975 F. Supp. 2d 727 (W.D. Ky. 2013), plaintiffs
 26 argued that the exception was relevant to their consumer protection claim against the manufacturer
 27 of a defective haircare product where they purchased the product at various Kentucky retail stores.
 28 See *id.* at 731, 743. The *Naiser* court agreed, finding that “Plaintiffs ha[d] sufficiently alleged that

1 [the defendant] made valid express warranties for Plaintiffs’ benefit.” *Id.* at 743. In that case, the
2 court also found that plaintiffs had stated a claim for breach of express warranty against the
3 defendant at the pleading stage. *Id.* at 740. The court did not clarify, however, whether its ruling
4 on the consumer protection claim was dependent on the *viability* of plaintiffs’ express warranty
5 claim. *See id.* at 743. Additionally, in *Bosch* the same court followed *Naiser* in applying the
6 *Skilcraft Sheetmetal* exception to an analogous set of facts. The court there characterized *Naiser*
7 as standing for the principle that plaintiffs can maintain a claim under the Act where they “allege[]
8 that the manufacturer made valid express warranties for Plaintiffs’ benefit.” 13 F. Supp. 3d at 751.
9 The court thus refused to dismiss plaintiffs’ consumer protection claim where, *inter alia*, they also
10 stated an express warranty claim against the defendant. *Id.* at 749. As in *Naiser*, the court
11 declined to condition its upholding of the consumer protection claim on the viability of plaintiffs’
12 related express warranty claim. *Id.* at 751.

13 As noted above, Plaintiffs here contend that the *Skilcraft Sheetmetal* exception applies
14 whenever plaintiffs bringing a claim under the Kentucky Act also *allege* (rather than prove) breach
15 of an express warranty by the defendant. *See* Opp’n at 25. Toyota responds that the exception is
16 inapplicable where, as here, “the warranty does not cover the alleged . . . defect.” Reply at 19.
17 The issue is a close one. On the one hand, there is logic to predicating an exception to the privity
18 requirement on a claim that is actually *covered* by an express warranty. In a sense, the warranty
19 provides privity between the parties. On the other hand, it can be argued that the express warranty
20 establishes a contractual relationship between the parties, and that this fact alone should allow for
21 a consumer protection claim even if that claim is not based precisely on the warranty. In any
22 event, courts addressing this question have stated that the privity requirement does not apply
23 where the defendant “made [a] warranty for the benefit of the subsequent purchaser” or, in other
24 words, where the defendant “provide[d] warranties to the ultimate purchaser to repair the item
25 purchased.” *Skilcraft Sheetmetal*, 836 S.W.2d at 909. These formulations require only that the
26 warranty be made for the consumer’s benefit or, at most, that it covers “the item purchased”; they
27 do not require that the warranty cover the *specific defect* alleged as part of a plaintiff’s consumer
28 protection claim. Moreover, in *Mayer*—the decision that formed the basis for the *Skilcraft*

1 *Sheetmetal* exception—the Kentucky appellate court affirmed a jury verdict for plaintiffs who
2 sued Ford under the Consumer Protection Act for “conduct relating to” the company’s express
3 limited warranty. *See* 575 S.W.2d at 481-82. Absent clear caselaw to the contrary, the Court at
4 this juncture will not dismiss the Kentucky Plaintiffs’ consumer protection claim on the basis of a
5 lack of privity.

6 Toyota’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Idaho and Kentucky consumer protection claims due
7 to lack of privity is therefore **DENIED**, but may be subject to reconsideration as this case
8 advances.

9 6. Michigan, Nebraska, and Oklahoma (Exempt Conduct)

10 Toyota asserts that Plaintiffs’ claims pursuant to the Michigan Consumer Protection Act
11 (Count 33), Nebraska Consumer Protection Act (Count 46), and Oklahoma Consumer Protection
12 Act (Count 72) are barred “because the alleged conduct at issue is exempt.” Opp’n at 29.
13 Specifically, Toyota contends that “[a]dvertising of motor vehicles (including as to fuel mileage)
14 is regulated by federal and state regulatory bodies, and cannot form the basis for liability” under
15 the aforementioned statutes. *Id.*

16 Regarding the Michigan Act, Plaintiffs acknowledge that the statute “exempts any
17 ‘transaction or conduct specifically authorized under laws administered by a regulatory board or
18 officer acting under statutory authority of this state or the United States.’” Opp’n at 26 (quoting
19 Mich. Comp. Laws § 445.904(1)(a)). “The Michigan Supreme Court construes this exemption
20 broadly, finding that ‘the relevant inquiry is whether the general transaction is specifically
21 authorized by law, regardless of whether the specific misconduct alleged is prohibited.’” *Matanky*
22 *v. Gen. Motors LLC*, 370 F. Supp. 3d 772, 799 (E.D. Mich. 2019) (quoting *Liss v. Lewiston-*
23 *Richards, Inc.*, 732 N.W.2d 514, 518 (Mich. 2007)). *Matanky* involved allegations that GM
24 falsely advertised a certain vehicle as being suitable “for use on both public roadways and
25 specialized closed race tracks” even though the vehicle contained a design defect that rendered it
26 unfit for track use. 370 F. Supp. 3d at 781-82. The *Matanky* court concluded that the general
27 transaction in that case—whether construed as “the sale of a new car by a licensed dealer” or
28 automobile advertising by “car wholesalers like Toyota”—is “specifically authorized and

1 regulated by law” and thus “exempt from the MCPA.” *Id.* at 800; *see also Rosenbaum v. Toyota*
2 *Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc.*, 2016 WL 9775018, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 21, 2016) (finding that
3 “Michigan regulates how car wholesalers like Toyota advertise automobiles . . . and it regulates
4 the content of general automobile advertisements”); *but see Hoff v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC*,
5 2005 WL 3723201, at *8 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Dec. 30, 2005) (finding “that although automobile
6 dealers must be licensed, the specific act of selling an automobile or manufacturing an automobile
7 is not regulated and therefore that act is not excluded from the CPA”).

8 In light of the caselaw cited by the parties, it appears that Toyota could claim that its
9 marketing of the Vehicles (specifically with respect to fuel tank capacity) is conduct generally
10 authorized and regulated by state law beyond the Michigan Consumer Protect Act, and is therefore
11 exempt under the Act. However, Toyota fails to identify any specific law or statutory authority
12 applicable here. As the Act places “[t]he burden of proving an exemption . . . upon the person
13 claiming the exemption,” Mich. Comp. Laws § 445.904(4), the Court concludes that Toyota has
14 failed to demonstrate that its conduct is exempt from the Act, at least at this juncture.

15 Toyota is on more solid ground, however, with respect to the Nebraska and Oklahoma
16 Acts. These statutes once again exempt conduct elsewhere governed by federal or state law. *See*
17 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 59-1617(1) (“[T]he Consumer Protection Act shall not apply to actions or
18 transactions otherwise permitted, prohibited, or regulated . . . under statutory authority of this state
19 or the United States.”), Okla. Stat. tit. 15, § 754 (“Nothing in the Oklahoma Consumer Protection
20 Act shall apply to . . . [a]ctions or transactions regulated under laws administered by the
21 Corporation Commission or any other regulatory body or officer acting under statutory authority
22 of this state of the United States.”). Toyota argues that the Nebraska Motor Vehicle Industry
23 Regulation Act and Oklahoma Motor Vehicle Commission are “the proper governing regulations
24 and agency,” respectively, “to regulate the advertising of motor vehicles” in these states. Reply at
25 20.

26 Toyota’s reasoning is persuasive. Chapter 60 of the Nebraska Revised Statutes governs
27 motor vehicles and makes it unlawful “[t]o advertise or to make any statement, declaration, or
28 representation in any advertisement that cannot be substantiated in fact.” Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-

1 1411.03(23). The plain terms of the statute strongly suggest that the false advertising of
2 automobiles is covered by this provision and that such conduct is therefore exempt under the
3 Nebraska Consumer Protection Act. Similarly, Chapter 15 of the Oklahoma Motor Vehicle
4 Commission’s administrative code governs advertising and provides that “[a] licensee”—*i.e.*, “any
5 entity or person required to obtain a license from the Oklahoma Motor Vehicle Commission”—
6 “shall not use false or misleading advertising.” Okla. Admin. Code §§ 465:15-3-1 and 465:15-1-
7 2. Again, the regulatory language indicates that misrepresentations in the advertising of motor
8 vehicles are governed by this provision and are thus exempt from the Oklahoma Consumer
9 Protection Act. While Plaintiffs observe that Toyota “fails to identify *any* case law exempting
10 vehicle manufacturers from liability” under the states’ consumer protection statutes, Opp’n at 26
11 (emphasis in original), Plaintiffs’ cited authorities do not contradict the plain meaning of
12 aforementioned provisions. For example, the court in *In re General Motors Corp. “Piston Slap”*
13 *Products Liability Litigation*, 2005 WL 1924335 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 8, 2005), found only that the
14 Oklahoma Motor Vehicle Commission’s authority did not extend to the conduct at issue in that
15 case, namely “the regulation of allegedly defective products”; such conduct was therefore not
16 exempt from the Oklahoma Act. *Id.* at *3. But, as Toyota points out, Plaintiffs’ consumer
17 protection claims here do not focus on “whether the [Vehicles] contained a design defect, but how
18 TMS allegedly advertised and represented [their] fuel tank capacity.” Reply at 20.

19 As a result, Toyota’s motion to dismiss the Michigan Plaintiff’s consumer protection claim
20 on the ground that Toyota’s conduct is exempt from the Michigan Consumer Protection Act is
21 **DENIED**. Toyota’s motion to dismiss the Nebraska and Oklahoma Plaintiffs’ consumer
22 protection claims on the same ground, however, is **GRANTED**.

23 7. Arizona, Illinois, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, Nevada, Texas, and Wisconsin
24 (Loss Causation)

25 Toyota contends that Plaintiffs’ claims under the Arizona Consumer Fraud Act (Count 1),
26 Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (Count 22), Minnesota Consumer
27 Fraud Act (Count 36), Missouri Merchandising Practices Act (Count 40), Nevada Deceptive Trade
28 Practices Act (Count 49), New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act (Count 55), Texas Deceptive Trade

1 Practices Act (Count 81), and the Wisconsin Deceptive Trade Practices Act (Count 87) should be
 2 dismissed because Plaintiffs fail to adequately allege “that their alleged losses were caused by a
 3 violation of these acts.” Mot. at 30. In particular, Toyota argues that Plaintiffs’ losses are
 4 predicated on the “diminished value” of their Vehicles, and that such diminution of value results
 5 solely from the defectively designed fuel tank—not from any “deceptive, unfair, or fraudulent
 6 conduct” on Toyota’s part, which is what the consumer protection statutes proscribe. *See id.* “As
 7 such, Plaintiffs have failed to plead a sufficient causal connection between their alleged losses and
 8 the alleged violative conduct.” *Id.* at 31. Plaintiffs respond that “[t]his argument defies both
 9 common sense and the plain text of the Complaint,” which alleges that Plaintiffs “purchased or
 10 leased defective vehicles that they otherwise would not have and overpaid for those vehicles” as a
 11 “direct and proximate result of TMS’s unfair and deceptive advertising.” Opp’n at 27. Plaintiffs
 12 conclude that “[t]his is a sufficient causal connection to state a claim for relief.” *Id.*

13 The Court agrees with Toyota insofar as the complaint fails to allege, with adequate
 14 specificity, that Plaintiffs were aware of, and relied on, Toyota’s alleged misrepresentations about
 15 fuel tank capacity in the company’s marketing materials. *See* Part IV.D.1. Thus, to the extent that
 16 these states identify loss causation with reliance, Plaintiffs’ claims are dismissed. If Plaintiffs are
 17 able to plead conduct violative of the applicable statute(s), they have established causation
 18 between Toyota’s allegedly deceptive conduct and Plaintiffs’ injuries of paying more than what
 19 the vehicles are actually worth. The caselaw cited by the parties does not contravene the Court’s
 20 conclusion. *See, e.g., Grp. Health Plan, Inc. v. Philip Morris, Inc.*, 621 N.W.2d 2, 14 (Minn.
 21 2001) (stating that, under the Minnesota Act, “there must be some ‘legal nexus’ between the injury
 22 and the defendants’ wrongful conduct”); *Streber v. Hunter*, 221 F.3d 701, 729 (5th Cir. 2000)
 23 (stating that, under the Texas Act, a “producing cause is a substantial factor which brings about the
 24 injury and without which the injury would not have occurred”).

25 Toyota’s motion to dismiss the Arizona, Illinois, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New
 26 Jersey, Texas, and Wisconsin Plaintiffs’ consumer protection claims on the ground that Plaintiffs
 27 fail to plead loss causation is therefore **GRANTED** insofar as these statutes equate loss causation
 28 with reliance. As stated above, Plaintiffs are granted leave to amend their complaint.

1 8. New Hampshire (Territorial Limitation)

2 Next, Toyota argues that “Plaintiff McPhie’s claims under the New Hampshire Consumer
3 Protection Act . . . (Count 52) exceed the territorial reach of the law.” Mot. at 31. The Act makes
4 it unlawful “for any person to use any unfair method of competition or any unfair or deceptive act
5 or practice in the conduct of any trade or commerce *within this state*.” N.H. Rev. Stat. § 358-A:2
6 (emphasis added). Toyota asserts that the Act’s territorial limitation requires Plaintiff McPhie to
7 “show that the deceptive transaction or offending conduct occurred in the state,” and that his
8 failure to allege that Toyota’s misrepresentations “*originate[d]* in New Hampshire” therefore
9 dooms his claim. Mot. at 31 (emphasis in original). Plaintiffs counter that the territorial limitation
10 is satisfied where a plaintiff alleges that he *received* misrepresentations in New Hampshire, and
11 that Toyota’s “attempt[] to add an additional requirement that the misrepresentation must
12 *originate* in New Hampshire” is without foundation in the caselaw. Opp’n at 28 (emphasis in
13 original).

14 Plaintiffs are correct. They need only allege that Toyota’s misrepresentations were
15 *received* in New Hampshire to state a claim under the state’s Consumer Protection Act. “[A]
16 misrepresentation is made ‘within-this-state’ when New Hampshire is the locus of the offending
17 conduct, or, put differently, *whenever a person receives a misrepresentation* in the State of New
18 Hampshire.” *Ortiz v. Sig Sauer, Inc.*, 448 F. Supp. 3d 89, 107 (D.N.H. 2020) (internal quotation
19 omitted) (emphasis added). *See also Environamics Corp. v. Ferguson Enters., Inc.*, 2001 WL
20 1134727, at *4 (D.N.H. Sept. 24, 2001) (holding that New Hampshire was the locus of a
21 misrepresentation where the plaintiff received deceptive documentation inside the state). In *Ortiz*,
22 the court thus dismissed the plaintiff’s consumer protection claim where the alleged
23 misrepresentations “*originat[ed]* from a place of business in New Hampshire” but were received in
24 another state. 448 F. Supp. 3d at 107-08. Because the plaintiff failed to show “that he received
25 any alleged misrepresentations in New Hampshire or was injured by undisclosed information in
26 the state,” he failed to plead a violation of the Act. *Id.* at 108. Toyota’s reliance on *PreCourt v.*
27 *Fairbank Reconstruction Corp.*, 856 F. Supp. 2d 327 (D.N.H.), moreover, is misplaced. The court
28 there dismissed a plaintiff’s consumer protection claim where she failed to allege that the

1 defendant “shipped anything to New Hampshire *or made any representations to anyone in New*
2 *Hampshire.*” *Id.* at 344 (emphasis added).

3 Nevertheless, Plaintiffs are incorrect in arguing that Mr. McPhie “alleges that he and
4 members of the New Hampshire class received misrepresentations regarding the RAV4s in New
5 Hampshire.” Opp’n at 28. As explained above, the complaint states only that “Plaintiff McPhie
6 believed and relied upon Toyota’s representations that the RAV4’s fuel tank capacity was 14.5
7 gallons.” Compl. ¶ 24. Mr. McPhie does not specifically allege “that he received any alleged
8 misrepresentations in New Hampshire or was injured by undisclosed information in the state.”
9 *See Ortiz*, 448 F. Supp. 3d at 108. Toyota’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff McPhie’s consumer
10 protection claim on the ground that the deceptive conduct did not occur within the state is
11 therefore **GRANTED**. Plaintiffs are granted leave to amend the complaint.

12 9. Minnesota (Basis for Relief)

13 Toyota contends that Plaintiff Klinkhammer’s claim under the Minnesota Uniform
14 Deceptive Trade Practices Act (Count 37) must be dismissed because he “seeks actual damages as
15 well as attorney’s fees” even though “the sole statutory remedy for deceptive trade practices is
16 injunctive relief.” Mot. at 32 (quoting *Superior Edge, Inc. v. Monsanto Co.*, 964 F. Supp. 2d
17 1017, 1041 (D. Minn. 2013)). In response, Plaintiffs concede that, pursuant to the Act, “the
18 remedy for deceptive trade practices is injunctive relief.” Opp’n at 29; *see also* Minn. Stat.
19 § 325D.45 (providing that injunctive relief, costs, and attorney fees are the remedies available
20 under the Act). Mr. Klinkhammer has therefore not pled a permissible claim for “actual damages”
21 under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act. *See* Compl. ¶ 525. And while Mr. Klinkhammer also
22 requests “any other just and proper relie[f] available under the Minnesota DTPA,” *id.*, for the
23 reasons the Court provides below in Part IV.G he does not have Article III standing to pursue
24 injunctive relief.

25 Toyota’s motion to dismiss Mr. Klinkhammer’s claim under the Deceptive Trade Practices
26 Act is therefore **GRANTED**. Plaintiffs are again granted leave to amend the complaint.

27 10. Montana (Class Action Prohibition)

28 Toyota asserts that Plaintiff Martin’s claim under the Montana Unfair Trade Practices and

1 Consumer Protection Act (Count 43) should be dismissed because the Montana Act “expressly
2 prohibits class actions and only permits individual claims.” Mot. at 32 (citing Mont. Code Ann.
3 § 30-14-133(1)). Plaintiffs respond that while the Act purports to preclude class actions, the bar
4 “does not apply in federal court where Rule 23 controls.” Opp’n at 29. As the parties recognize,
5 the issue here is very similar to the one that the Supreme Court addressed in *Shady Grove*
6 *Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co.*, 559 U.S. 393 (2010), namely the
7 relationship between state-law limitations on the class action device and federal courts’ application
8 of the *Erie* doctrine.

9 *Shady Grove* concerned a New York law that prohibited suits seeking to recover statutorily
10 prescribed civil penalties from proceeding as class actions. *Id.* at 397. A four-Justice plurality
11 applied the two-part *Erie* test articulated in *Hanna v. Plumer*, 380 U.S. 460 (1965), asking first
12 whether the relevant federal rule “answers the question in dispute”; if it does, then “it governs . . .
13 unless it exceeds statutory authorization or Congress’s rulemaking power.” 559 U.S. at 398
14 (citing, *e.g.*, *Hanna*, 380 U.S. at 463-64). The plurality concluded that the “question in dispute
15 [was] whether Shady Grove’s suit [could] proceed as a class action” and that “Rule 23 provide[d]
16 an answer” in the affirmative. *Id.* In doing so, it held that applying Rule 23 to state-law claims
17 does not run afoul of the Rules Enabling Act, which permits the Supreme Court to promulgate
18 procedural rules for federal courts so long as they “do not abridge, enlarge or modify any
19 substantive right.” *Id.* at 406-07 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b)). Rule 23, the plurality reasoned,
20 “merely enables a federal court to adjudicate claims of multiple parties at once, instead of in
21 separate suits,” and thus “leaves the parties’ legal rights and duties intact and the rules of decision
22 unchanged.” *Id.* at 408. A four-Justice dissent argued that, at step one of the *Erie* analysis, there
23 was no direct conflict between Rule 23 and the New York law, *id.* at 446, and that the question
24 was therefore “whether application of the [state] rule would have so important an effect upon the
25 fortunes of one or both of the litigants that failure to [apply] it would be likely to cause a plaintiff
26 to choose the federal court,” *id.* at 452 (quoting *Hanna*, 380 U.S. at 468 n.9). Because the answer
27
28

1 was “yes,” the dissenters concluded that the state law should apply.¹⁸ *See id.* at 456-57.

2 Justice Stevens, meanwhile, concurred with the plurality’s formulation of the two-step
3 framework as well as its ultimate holding that Rule 23 governed the case rather than state law. *Id.*
4 at 416, 429-30. He deviated from the plurality’s analysis at step two, however, stating that a
5 federal rule “cannot govern a particular case in which the rule would displace a state law that is
6 procedural in the ordinary sense of the term but is so intertwined with a state right or remedy that
7 it functions to define the scope of the state-created right.” *Id.* at 423. Justice Stevens nevertheless
8 concluded that the state law did not “serve[] the function of defining New York’s rights or
9 remedies” since, *inter alia*, it applied “to claims based on federal law or the law of any other
10 State” in addition to those based on New York law. *Id.* at 432.

11 Lower courts have disagreed about how to apply *Shady Grove* in similar cases and
12 frequently diverge over whether the Court’s controlling opinion belongs to the plurality or Justice
13 Stevens. Toyota here relies principally on *In re Target Corp. Data Security Breach Litigation*, 66
14 F. Supp. 3d 1154 (D. Minn. 2014), which noted that “[m]ost courts that have evaluated state
15 consumer-protection laws that conflict with Rule 23 have determined that Rule 23 cannot be
16 applied to otherwise prohibited class actions, because the class-action prohibition defines the
17 scope of the state-created right.” *Id.* at 1165; *see also* Reply at 21-22. Plaintiffs, in contrast, rely
18 on two cases from the District of Montana holding that Rule 23 supersedes the class-action
19 limitation in that state’s Consumer Protection Act. In *Wittman v. CBI, Inc.*, 2016 WL 3093427
20 (D. Mont. June 1, 2016), the court chose to “look only to the part of [the plurality] opinion to
21 which five Justices joined” and concluded that Rule 23 governed in federal court over the
22 Montana Act because Rule 23 “affects only the process of enforcing the litigants’ rights.” *Id.* at
23 *6. The same court revisited this issue in *Hill v. LLR, Inc.*, 2019 WL 3024896 (D. Mont. July 11,
24 2019), and, after providing a thorough analysis of *Shady Grove*, decided to follow its earlier
25 holding in *Wittman*. *Id.* at *5. Thus, the District of Montana “appl[ies] Rule 23, instead of the
26 MCPA, to determine whether a MCPA claim may be brought as a class action.” *Id.*

27 _____
28 ¹⁸ *See* 559 U.S. at 457 (“[F]orum shopping will undoubtedly result if a plaintiff need only file in federal instead of state court to seek a massive monetary award explicitly barred by state law.”).

1 The rulings of the District of Montana are consistent with decisions from this district
2 addressing similar issues. *See, e.g., Los Gatos Mercantile, Inc. v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours and*
3 *Co.*, 2015 WL 4755335, at *21 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2015) (applying Rule 23 to claims under
4 South Carolina’s consumer protection law, which bars class actions in state court); *In re Optical*
5 *Disk Drive Antitrust Litig.*, 2012 WL 1366718, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2012) (same).

6 Plaintiff Martin may therefore pursue his MCPA claim as a representative of the Montana
7 Subclass under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. Toyota’s motion to dismiss this claim on the
8 ground that the Act prohibits class actions is **DENIED**.

9 11. North Carolina (Breach of Contract)

10 Toyota argues that Plaintiff Hakes’s claim pursuant to the North Carolina Unfair and
11 Deceptive Trade Practices Act (Count 62) “should be dismissed because it is based on breach of
12 contract”—*i.e.*, the express written warranty—“which does not rise to the level of [an] unfair
13 practice.” Reply at 22. Toyota cites the Fourth Circuit’s decision in *Broussard v. Meineke*
14 *Discount Muffler Shops, Inc.*, 155 F.3d 331 (1998), for the proposition that, under North Carolina
15 law, “a mere breach of contract, even if intentional, is not sufficiently unfair or deceptive to
16 sustain an action under [the Act].” *Id.* at 347; *see also* Mot. at 32-33 (quoting this passage).
17 Rather, “North Carolina law requires a showing of substantial aggravating circumstances to
18 support a claim under the [Act]” where it is based on a contractual breach. *Broussard*, 155 F.3d at
19 347 (internal quotation omitted).

20 As Plaintiffs respond, however, *Broussard* is largely inapposite here. The Fourth Circuit
21 in that case “ruled that plaintiffs[’] NCU DTPA claim was barred because the dispute concerned
22 the parties’ rights and obligations under certain [contracts] that governed ‘every aspect of their
23 relationship.’” Opp’n at 30 (quoting *Broussard*, 155 F.3d at 345). While plaintiffs sued the
24 defendant for various common-law torts and violations of the Act, the *Broussard* court concluded
25 that the case represented “a straightforward contract dispute” and that plaintiffs’ tort and statutory
26 consumer protection claims merely “parallel[ed]” or “piggyback[ed] on” their breach of contract
27 claims. 155 F.3d at 346-47. The Fourth Circuit thus chided the district court for failing to
28 “differentiate between contract and deceptive trade practice claims, and [to] relegate claims

1 regarding the existence of an agreement, the terms contained in an agreement, and the
2 interpretation of an agreement to the arena of contract law.” *Id.* at 347.

3 Plaintiff Hakes’s consumer protection claim, in contrast, is “predicated on TMS’s
4 misrepresentations and omissions” and is therefore “separate and distinct” from his express
5 warranty claim. Opp’n at 30. As discussed above in Part IV.B, Plaintiffs’ claims for breach of the
6 NVLW and other express warranties (*e.g.*, Toyota’s advertisements and the owner’s manual) turn
7 on such issues as “the existence of an agreement, the terms contained in an agreement, and the
8 interpretation of an agreement”—all of which *Broussard* aptly characterizes as within “the arena
9 of contract law.” *See* 155 F.3d at 347. Plaintiffs’ claims under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act,
10 in contrast, concern Toyota’s allegedly knowing misrepresentations about the fuel tank defect in
11 an effort to induce consumers to purchase the Vehicles. Contrary to Toyota’s protestations,
12 therefore, Plaintiff Hakes’s consumer protection claim is not based merely “on a breach of
13 contract,” nor are the “core allegations of Hakes’s express warranty claim and NCUDDPA
14 claim . . . the same.” *See* Reply at 22.

15 This conclusion is informed by this Court’s analysis of the related issue of whether North
16 Carolina law recognizes the economic loss rule (*i.e.*, whether the state bars claims under the
17 Deceptive Trade Practices Act where plaintiffs have a contractual remedy for their losses) in
18 *MyFord Touch*. *See* 46 F. Supp. 3d at 966-67. After surveying split authority on the question, the
19 Court ruled that the Act “gives rise to a duty independent of [a] contract and therefore should not
20 be barred by the economic loss rule.” *Id.* at 967. The Middle District of North Carolina, in *Jones*
21 *v. BMW of North America, LLC*, 2020 WL 5752808 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 25, 2020), recently agreed,
22 holding that the economic loss rule did not bar a plaintiff’s claims where he “plausibly claimed
23 that BMW violated a duty separate from those owed to him by [vehicle] warranties—specifically a
24 duty not to provide false information, or fraudulently remain silent, to induce execution of [a]
25 contract.” *Id.* at *10. *Cf. Ellis v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp.*, 2011 WL 5402878, at *2 (W.D.N.C.
26 Nov. 8, 2011) (holding that a plaintiff’s consumer protection claim was barred by the economic
27 loss rule where “the damage incurred by the plaintiff [was] not separate and apart from the damage
28 arising out of a breach of warranty claim”).

1 Toyota’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff Hakes’s consumer protection claim on the ground that
2 it merely duplicates his claim for breach of express warranty is therefore **DENIED**.

3 12. Ohio (Standing)

4 Toyota raises three issues with respect to the Ohio Plaintiffs’ claims under the state’s
5 Deceptive Trade Practices Act (Count 69) and Consumer Sales Practices Act (Count 68). First,
6 Toyota argues that Plaintiffs lack standing to bring a Deceptive Trade Practices Act claim because
7 the Act “is not available to consumers.” Mot. at 33. Second, Toyota contends that “Plaintiffs
8 have not sufficiently pleaded that TMS is a ‘supplier’ within the meaning of the Ohio Consumer
9 Sales Practices Act,” a statute that “only provides a remedy to consumers who are subject to unfair
10 or deceptive practices by suppliers.” *Id.* (emphasis removed). Third, Toyota asserts that
11 “Plaintiffs’ failure to give TMS notice of alleged deceptive or unconscionable conduct also bars
12 their class allegations” since they “must allege that TMS had *prior notice* that its conduct was
13 allegedly ‘deceptive or unconscionable.’” *Id.* at 34 n.16 (quoting *Pattie v. Coach, Inc.*, 29 F.
14 Supp. 3d 1051, 1055 (N.D. Ohio 2014)) (emphasis in original).

15 The Ohio Deceptive Trade Practices Act enumerates several types of proscribed conduct
16 and provides a cause of action for any “person” who is injured by such conduct. *See* Ohio Rev.
17 Code §§ 4165.02 and 4165.03(A)(2). The Act defines a “person” as “an individual, corporation,
18 government, governmental subdivision or agency . . . , or any other legal or commercial entity.”
19 *Id.* § 4165.01. “Although the plain text of the law is broad enough to cover actions by
20 consumers,” Plaintiffs acknowledge that “[c]ourts are split on whether consumers have standing to
21 sue under ODTPA.” Opp’n at 31.

22 In *Phillips v. Philip Morris Companies, Inc.*, 290 F.R.D. 476 (N.D. Ohio 2013), the district
23 court stated that “[t]he vast majority of federal courts and all lower state courts to address the issue
24 have concluded that relief under the DPTA is not available to consumers.” *Id.* at 482. These
25 courts focus on the statutory language “or any other legal or commercial entity,” which they
26 believe “qualif[ies] the entire laundry list of entities that may bring suit” and “implies that the
27 individual must be involved in commercial activity.” *Id.* at 482-83 (citing *Chamberlain v. Am.*
28 *Tobacco Co., Inc.*, 1999 WL 33994451, at *18 n.12 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 19, 1999)). They also

1 emphasize that the Act parallels the federal Lanham Act, which likewise “allows for suit by ‘any
2 *person* who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by [a deceptive] act,’” but which
3 has been construed by the federal courts of appeals to bar claims by consumers (in contrast to
4 commercial entities). *Id.* at 483 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B)) (emphasis in original); *see*
5 *also Michelson v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft*, 99 N.E.3d 475, 479-80 (Ohio Ct. App. 2018)
6 (dismissing a consumer’s claim under the ODTPA because “individual consumers are barred from
7 bringing actions under the Lanham Act . . . and under Ohio’s Deceptive Trade Practices Act”).

8 Plaintiffs, however, point to two decisions from the Southern District of Ohio holding that
9 the “plain language” of the Act does not support denying standing to consumers. Opp’n at 31. In
10 *Bower v. IBM, Inc.*, 495 F. Supp. 2d 837 (S.D. Ohio 2007), the court noted that the statute is
11 “silent on the issue of consumers” and that its definition of “person” did not expressly place any
12 “limits on the type of individuals who can pursue a claim” under the Act. *Id.* at 843. The same
13 court followed this line of reasoning in *Schumacher v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co.*, 47 F. Supp. 3d
14 618 (S.D. Ohio 2014), rhetorically asking why the Ohio legislature would have included the
15 unqualified term “individual” in the Act’s definition of “person” if did not intend “to give
16 individual consumers the standing to sue.” *Id.* at 632. At least one post-*Bower* case from the
17 Southern District of Ohio, however, concluded that intervening state-court authority required
18 dismissal of a consumer’s claim under the Act. *See In re Porsche Cars N. Am.*, 880 F. Supp. 2d
19 801, 874-75 (S.D. Ohio 2012) (adopting the reasoning of *Dawson v. Blockbuster, Inc.*, 2006 WL
20 1061769, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 16, 2006)).

21 Granting this split of authority, the Court agrees with Toyota that the Deceptive Trade
22 Practices Act does not confer standing on consumers. While Plaintiffs are correct that “the plain
23 text of the law is broad enough to cover actions by consumers,” the weight of authority—
24 including all state caselaw cited by the parties—is clearly on Toyota’s side. This conclusion also
25 matches that of another court in this District that considered the same issue. *See Nexus 6P*, 293 F.
26 Supp. 3d at 932-33 (emphasizing that “the Ohio Court of Appeals has held that the ODTPA
27 affords no relief to consumers because the statute is designed to protect commercial actors against
28 objectionable commercial conduct”). Toyota’s motion to dismiss Ohio Plaintiffs’ claim under the

1 Deceptive Trade Practices Act is therefore **GRANTED**.

2 Toyota next argues that Ohio Plaintiffs’ claims under the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices
3 Act “are barred because TMS is not a supplier.” Reply at 23. The OCSPA provides that “[n]o
4 supplier shall commit an unfair or deceptive act or practice in connection with a consumer
5 transaction,” and defines “supplier” as a “seller, lessor, assignor, franchisor, or other person
6 engaged in the business of effecting or soliciting consumer transactions, whether or not the person
7 deals directly with the consumer.” Ohio Rev. Code § 1345.01-02 (emphasis added). A “person,”
8 moreover, “includes an individual, corporation, government . . . , or other legal entity.” *Id.*
9 § 1345.01(B).

10 Toyota relies on *Michelson* to support its contention that it is not a “supplier” within the
11 meaning of the Act. In that case, the plaintiff argued—as Plaintiffs do here—that “car
12 manufacturers may be liable under the CSPA when breach of contract or warranty is established.”
13 99 N.E.3d at 479; *see also* Opp’n at 32. In *Michelson*, the court found that the plaintiff failed to
14 establish that her defective vehicle was “covered under warranty, and [that she] made no
15 allegation that Volkswagen failed to repair it.” 99 N.E.3d at 479. The court thus held that her
16 “claim is not the type envisioned under the CSPA.” *Id.* In contrast, in *Boyle v. Daimler Chrysler*
17 *Corp.*, 2002 WL 1881157 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002), the vehicle manufacturer was held liable under
18 the Act because, *inter alia*, “an alleged defect was covered under the terms of [the plaintiff’s]
19 warranty” and the manufacturer “failed to repair the vehicle, thereby diminishing its value.” *Id.* at
20 *7.

21 As the foregoing discussion suggests, the caselaw cited by the parties does not clearly
22 articulate what a plaintiff must plead to state a claim under the OCSPA. Under the plain terms of
23 the statute, however, Toyota would appear to be a supplier, as it is a corporation (*i.e.*, a “person”)
24 “engaged in the business of effecting or soliciting consumer transactions.” Ohio Rev. Code
25 § 1345.01(B)-(C). Moreover, the fact that Toyota does not necessarily “deal[] directly with the
26 consumer” is not a bar to liability under the Act. *Id.* § 1345.01(C). And the authority relied on by
27 Toyota suggests that, even if an automobile defect is not covered under a valid warranty at the
28 time of suit, plaintiffs may still plead a violation of the Act if they allege that the manufacturer

1 “failed to repair” the defect. *See Michelson*, 99 N.E.3d at 479. Plaintiffs have done so here. *See*,
2 *e.g.*, Compl. ¶ 31 (“Plaintiff Muccillo reported his fuel tank issue to Kings Toyota in October
3 2019[;] Toyota has not offered to repair or replace Plaintiff Muccillo’s RAV4, or otherwise
4 offered any refund or other remedy.”). Further, in *Temple v. Fleetwood Enterprises, Inc.*, 133 Fed.
5 Appx. 254 (6th Cir. 2005), the Sixth Circuit stated that, “in order to make out a CSPA claim,
6 [plaintiffs] ha[ve] to present evidence that, in relation to a consumer transaction, [defendants]
7 engaged in deceptive behavior *or* failed to comply with a warranty.” *Id.* at 266 (citing, *e.g.*, *Boyle*,
8 2002 WL 1881157, at *7) (emphasis added). As explained above, Plaintiffs have adequately
9 alleged that Toyota “engaged in deceptive behavior” in misrepresenting the Vehicles’ fuel tank
10 capacity. The Ohio Plaintiffs have stated a claim under the Act.

11 Toyota’s motion to dismiss Ohio Plaintiffs’ claim under the Ohio Consumer Sales
12 Practices Act on the ground that Toyota is not a “supplier” is therefore **DENIED**.

13 As to Toyota’s contention that “Plaintiffs’ failure to give TMS notice of alleged deceptive
14 or unconscionable conduct also bars their class allegations,” Mot. at 34 n.16, it is inadequately
15 presented. Toyota offers the argument in a footnote of its motion and does not address the issue in
16 its reply brief. Plaintiffs, in any event, point out that “[a]llegations that an Ohio state court has
17 found the specific practice at issue either unconscionable or deceptive in a decision open to public
18 inspection are sufficient to satisfy the OCSPA notice requirement.” Opp’n at 33 (citing *Pattie v.*
19 *Coach, Inc.*, 29 F. Supp. 3d 1051, 1055 (N.D. Ohio 2014)). Plaintiffs have included such
20 allegations in the complaint, *see* Compl. ¶ 904, which raises a reasonable inference that they have
21 satisfied the Act’s notice requirement.

22 Toyota’s motion to dismiss Ohio Plaintiffs’ claim under the Ohio Consumer Sales
23 Practices Act on the ground that they failed to provide adequate notice of their class allegations is
24 therefore **DENIED**.

25 13. Pennsylvania (Economic Loss Doctrine)

26 Finally, Toyota assert that Pennsylvania Plaintiffs’ claim under the state’s Unfair Trade
27 Practices and Consumer Protection Law (Count 78) must be dismissed because “the law of
28 contract provides an adequate remedy for their claim” and it is therefore “barred by the economic

1 loss doctrine.” Mot. at 34. Toyota relies on *Werwinski v. Ford Motor Co.*, 286 F.3d 661 (3d Cir.
2 2002), in which the Third Circuit held that, under Pennsylvania law, the economic loss doctrine
3 prevents “plaintiffs from recovering in tort economic losses to which their entitlement flows only
4 from a contract.” *Id.* at 671; *see* Mot. at 34, Reply at 23-24. Plaintiffs counter that, after
5 *Werwinski*, “Pennsylvania appellate courts have spoken and rejected its holding” that the
6 economic loss doctrine bars a plaintiff’s claim under the Consumer Protection Law. *See* Opp’n at
7 33.

8 In March 2021, the Third Circuit decided *Earl v. NVR, Inc.*, 990 F.3d 310 (3d Cir. 2021).
9 There, the court, noting more recent Pennsylvania appellate-court decisions in *Knight v.*
10 *Springfield Hyundai*, 81 A.3d 940, 951-52 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013), and *Dixon v. Northwestern*
11 *Mutual*, 146 A.3d 780 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2016), overruled *Werwinski* and held “that the economic
12 loss doctrine no longer may serve as a bar to UTPCPL claims.” 990 F.3d at 314.

13 Thus, although “[t]he Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not weighed in directly on the
14 applicability of the economic loss doctrine to the UTPCPL,” Pennsylvania’s appellate courts and
15 the Third Circuit now agree that the economic loss doctrine does not preclude UTPCPL claims.
16 Toyota’s motion to dismiss the Pennsylvania Plaintiffs’ consumer protection claim on the basis of
17 the economic loss doctrine is therefore **DENIED**.

18 F. Unjust Enrichment

19 Plaintiffs assert a claim for unjust enrichment under the common law of California, but
20 they contend that “the claim would be nearly identical under the laws of any other state.” Opp’n
21 at 34 & n.12. In its motion to dismiss, Toyota argues that unjust enrichment in California “is not a
22 cause of action, but a theory of recovery and California courts routinely dismiss such ‘claims.’”
23 Reply at 24. Toyota also implies that California law should not apply to the putative nationwide
24 class (or any other states’ subclasses) because, contrary to Plaintiffs’ representations, “the law of
25 unjust enrichment varies across states in material ways.” Mot. at 35. Toyota points to such
26 purported discrepancies as some states’ recognition of unjust enrichment claims only “when no
27 possible legal remedy is available” and others’ requirement that plaintiffs allege conferral of a
28 direct benefit on defendants. *Id.* at 34-35.

1 As an initial matter, Toyota’s argument that California does not recognize unjust
2 enrichment as a standalone cause of action has been foreclosed by *Astiana v. Hain Celestial*
3 *Group, Inc.*, 783 F.3d 753 (9th Cir. 2015). In *Astiana*, the Ninth Circuit explained that, under
4 California law, an unjust enrichment claim may be construed as “as a quasi-contract claim seeking
5 restitution.” *Id.* at 762 (quoting *Rutherford Holdings, LLC v. Plaza Del Rey*, 223 Cal. App. 4th
6 221, 231 (2014)). Consequently, the “Supreme Court of California and California Courts of
7 Appeal have recognized actions for relief under the equitable doctrine of unjust enrichment.”
8 *Naoko Ohno v. Yuko Yasuma*, 723 F.3d 984, 1006 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing *Ghirardo v. Antonioli*, 14
9 Cal.4th 39 (1996)). “The doctrine applies where plaintiffs, while having no enforceable contract,
10 nonetheless have conferred a benefit on defendant which defendant has knowingly accepted under
11 circumstances that make it inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit without paying for its
12 value.” *Hernandez v. Lopez*, 180 Cal. App. 4th 932, 938 (2009); *see also Swearingen v. Late July*
13 *Snacks LLC*, 2017 WL 1806483, at *8 (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2017) (delineating the doctrine on this
14 issue).

15 “[Toyota] is therefore incorrect that the unjust enrichment claim should be dismissed
16 solely on the ground that no such claim is cognizable under California law.” *See Swearingen*,
17 2017 WL 1806483, at *8. The California Plaintiffs’ allegations concerning Toyota’s presale
18 knowledge of the fuel tank defect adequately state a claim for unjust enrichment on the theory that
19 Plaintiffs “have conferred a benefit” on Toyota, which the company “has knowingly accepted
20 under circumstances that make it inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit without paying
21 its value.” *See Hernandez*, 180 Cal. App. 4th at 938. Toyota’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ unjust
22 enrichment claim is **DENIED** with respect to the California Plaintiffs.

23 The question nevertheless remains whether California’s unjust enrichment law should
24 apply to all members of a putative nationwide class under the state’s choice-of-law rules. Toyota
25 argues that it cannot because, *inter alia*, a claim for “unjust enrichment is not recognized in many
26 states” and, “where recognized[,] Plaintiffs would be required to plead that they conferred a
27 benefit directly on TMS, which they have not” done. Reply at 24. Plaintiffs counter that because
28 “[t]his is an action brought in federal district court under diversity jurisdiction,” “the substantive

1 law of California, the forum state, applies.” Opp’n at 34.

2 The Ninth Circuit’s decision in *Mazza*, 666 F.3d 581 (9th Cir. 2012), is on point. There,
 3 the court reversed a district court’s certification of a nationwide class of Honda purchasers and
 4 lessees who brought claims under California’s CLRA, UCL, and FLA, as well as a claim for
 5 unjust enrichment. *See id.* at 585. *Mazza* began its analysis by noting that a “federal court sitting
 6 in diversity must look to the forum state’s choice of law rules to determine the controlling
 7 substantive law.” *Id.* at 589 (quoting *Zinser v. Accufix Research Inst., Inc.*, 253 F.3d 1180, 1187
 8 (9th Cir. 2001)). The court then explained that, under California law, “the class action proponent
 9 bears the initial burden to show that California has ‘significant contact or significant aggregation
 10 of contacts’ to the claims of each class member”; “[s]uch a showing is necessary to ensure that
 11 application of California law is constitutional.” *Id.* at 589-90 (internal quotations omitted). Once
 12 that threshold showing has been made, “the burden shifts to the other side to demonstrate ‘that
 13 foreign law, rather than California law, should apply to the class claims.’” *Id.* at 590 (quoting
 14 *Wash. Mut. Bank v. Superior Court*, 24 Cal.4th 906, 921 (Cal. 2001)). To determine whether the
 15 interests of other states outweighed California’s interest, courts are to apply “a three-step
 16 governmental interest test” asking: (1) whether there is a difference between “the relevant law[s]
 17 of each of the potentially affected jurisdictions with regard to the particular issue in question”; (2)
 18 if there is a difference, “whether a true conflict exists” between “each jurisdiction’s interest in the
 19 application of its own law under the circumstances of the particular case”; and (3) if there is a
 20 conflict, “which state’s interest would be more impaired if its policy were subordinated to the
 21 policy of the other state.” *Id.* (quoting *McCann v. Foster Wheeler LLC*, 48 Cal.4th 68, 81-82 (Cal.
 22 2010)). Having completed this analysis, a court “applies the law of the state whose interest would
 23 be more impaired if its law were not applied.” *Id.* (internal quotation omitted).

24 At the threshold stage of the analysis, the Ninth Circuit held that there were significant
 25 California contacts to the claims of each class member because, *inter alia*, Honda’s corporate
 26 headquarters and one-fifth of the proposed class members were located in California. *Id.* The
 27 court then proceeded to the three-step governmental interest test. At step one, Honda identified
 28 several material differences in the consumer protection laws of the potentially affected

1 jurisdictions, such as variations among states’ scienter and reliance requirements and the range of
2 potential remedies. *See id.* at 590-91. The court likewise concluded that “[t]he elements
3 necessary to establish a claim for unjust enrichment *also vary materially* from state to state.” *Id.*
4 at 591 (emphasis added). At step two, the court held that each state had an interest in applying its
5 own laws to its residents such that the application of California law to all class members would
6 create a “true conflict.” *Id.* at 591-92. Notably, the court found that the potentially enhanced
7 protections for consumers afforded by California law was not dispositive because other states also
8 had valid interests in shielding businesses from what those states might consider excessive
9 liability. *Id.* at 592. At step three, the court posited that each “jurisdiction ordinarily has the
10 predominant interest in regulating conduct that occurs within its borders,” *id.* at 592 (internal
11 quotation omitted), and that “California’s interest in applying its law to residents of foreign states
12 is attenuated,” *id.* at 594. The court again stressed that “each foreign state has an interest in
13 applying its law to transactions within its borders and that, if California law were applied to the
14 entire class, foreign states would be impaired in their ability to calibrate liability to foster
15 commerce.” *Id.* at 593. And while it found that California maintained “an interest in regulating
16 those who do business within its state boundaries,” that interest did not outweigh those of foreign
17 states applying “*their* laws to transactions between *their* citizens and corporations doing business
18 within *their* state.” *Id.* at 594 (emphasis added).

19 The Ninth Circuit thus held “that each class member’s consumer protection claim should
20 be governed by the consumer protection laws of the jurisdiction in which the transaction took
21 place.” *Id.* In doing so, the *Mazza* court did not explicitly include plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment
22 claims in its holding. But the court’s reasoning prescribes the same result.

23 In light of *Mazza*, the Court finds that Plaintiffs cannot assert a nationwide claim for unjust
24 enrichment under California law. *See* Hearing Tr. at 35-36. While Plaintiffs have likely satisfied
25 the threshold requirement of a significant aggregation of contacts—Toyota and approximately
26 11% (or four out of thirty-six) of the named plaintiffs are citizens of California, *see* Compl. ¶¶ 7-9,
27 33, 40—*Mazza* expressly concluded, at step one of the governmental interest test, that “[t]he
28 elements necessary to establish a claim for unjust enrichment . . . vary materially from state to

1 state.” 666 F.3d at 591. Additionally, as Toyota argues (and Plaintiffs do not dispute), eight of
 2 the twenty-eight states in which Plaintiffs reside “either do not recognize a claim for unjust
 3 enrichment, or only recognize it as an equitable remedy when no possible legal remedy is
 4 available.” Mot. at 34, Opp’n at 34. These differences appear to reflect the sorts of policy
 5 disagreements in states’ balancing of consumer and business interests that the *Mazza* court insisted
 6 were to be respected as part of California’s choice of law analysis. *See* 666 F.3d at 592.
 7 Following *Mazza*, therefore, this Court is left to conclude that “California’s interest in applying its
 8 law to residents of foreign states is attenuated” and that “each class member’s [unjust enrichment]
 9 claim should be governed by the [unjust enrichment] laws of the jurisdiction in which the
 10 transaction took place.” *See id.* at 594. *See also Julian v. TTE Tech., Inc.*, 2020 WL 6743912, at
 11 *8-10 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2020) (accord).

12 The Court therefore **DENIES** Toyota’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment
 13 claims as to the California Plaintiffs. It **GRANTS** the motion with respect to the non-California
 14 Plaintiffs without leave to amend.

15 G. Standing for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief

16 Plaintiffs also seek injunctive and declaratory relief requiring Defendants to cease and
 17 desist from representing that the Vehicles have a fuel-tank capacity of 14.5 gallons. *See, e.g.*,
 18 Compl. ¶ 472. Toyota contends that Plaintiffs lack standing to seek such relief because they fail to
 19 allege that they are “likely to purchase another Subject Vehicle,” Mot. at 36, and they repeatedly
 20 state that they would not have purchased the products, or would have paid less for them, had they
 21 known that the Vehicles’ fuel tanks could only hold 8-11 gallons, *see, e.g.*, Compl. ¶ 6.

22 “[A] plaintiff must demonstrate standing separately for each form of relief sought.”
 23 *Mayfield v. United States*, 599 F.3d 964, 969 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting *Friends of the Earth, Inc. v.*
 24 *Laidlaw Envtl. Serv., Inc.*, 528 U.S. 167, 185 (2000)). “Thus, a plaintiff who has standing to seek
 25 damages for a past injury . . . does not necessarily have standing to seek prospective relief” such as
 26 an injunction. *See id.* “Once a plaintiff has been wronged, he is entitled to injunctive relief only if
 27 he can show that he faces a ‘real or immediate threat . . . that he will again be wronged in a similar
 28 way.’” *Id.* at 970 (quoting *City of Los Angeles v. Lyons*, 461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983)). In the context

1 of misrepresentation claims, the Ninth Circuit has held “that a previously deceived consumer may
 2 have standing to seek an injunction against false advertising or labeling, even though the consumer
 3 now knows or suspects that the advertising was false at the time of the original purchase.”
 4 *Davidson v. Kimberly-Clark Corp.*, 889 F.3d 956, 969 (9th Cir. 2018). Consumers can plead a
 5 cognizable threat of future harm where they allege, for example, “that [they] will be unable to rely
 6 on the product’s advertising or labeling in the future, and so will not purchase the product
 7 although [they] would like to do so,” or “that [they] might purchase the product in the future,
 8 despite the fact it was once marred by false advertising or labeling, as [they] may reasonably, but
 9 incorrectly, assume the product was improved.” *Id.* at 970. While the Ninth Circuit “thus gives a
 10 plaintiff in a mislabeling case the opportunity to seek injunctive relief, the plaintiff is still required
 11 to allege that she would like to purchase the defendant’s product in the future.” *Julian*, 2020 WL
 12 6743912, at *8.

13 As the Court stated at the motion hearing, it finds that Plaintiffs have failed to plead
 14 standing for injunctive or declaratory relief. Hearing Tr. at 33. Although courts have found
 15 standing in circumstances broadly similar to those here, *see, e.g., Koehler v. Litehouse, Inc.*, 2012
 16 WL 6217635, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2012); *Ries v. Ariz. Beverages USA LLC*, 287 F.R.D. 523,
 17 533 (N.D. Cal. 2012), in most of these cases plaintiffs specifically alleged an interest in
 18 purchasing defendants’ products in the future. *See, e.g., Ries*, 287 F.R.D. at 527 (holding that
 19 plaintiffs had standing to pursue injunctive relief where, *inter alia*, they asserted their intent to
 20 purchase the contested product in the future); *Weidenhamer v. Expedia, Inc.*, 2015 WL 1292978,
 21 at *5 (W.D. Wash Mar. 23, 2015) (reaching the same conclusion where, *inter alia*, the plaintiff
 22 adequately alleged that he “hoped to remain [the defendant’s] customer”). As such, their injury
 23 was ongoing; absent injunctive relief, “they could not rely on [defendants’] representation[s] with
 24 any confidence.” *See Ries*, 287 F.R.D. at 533. Indeed, this Court has previously held that “to
 25 establish standing” in a consumer product-liability case “the plaintiff must allege that he intends to
 26 purchase the products at issue in the future.” *Swearingen*, 2016 WL 4382544, at *13; *see also*
 27 *Lyons*, 461 U.S. at 102 (holding that “[p]ast exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a
 28 present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief . . . if unaccompanied by any continuing,

1 present adverse effects”).

2 At the motion hearing, Plaintiffs acknowledged deficiencies in the operative complaint
3 regarding injunctive relief but suggested that Plaintiffs “do have standing for injunctive relief for
4 purposes of seeking to repair their vehicles.” Hearing Tr. at 33. Plaintiffs conveyed that their
5 interest in pursuing this form of relief was contingent on the success of Toyota’s “purported
6 repair” for the Vehicles’ fuel-tank defect. *See id.* While the Court declines to rule on this issue
7 here, as such relief was not requested in the complaint, it tentatively agrees that Plaintiffs would
8 likely have standing to seek this type of injunction if Toyota’s ongoing repair efforts prove
9 unsatisfactory. But such relief is different from that presently sought.

10 Because Plaintiffs fail to allege that they either plan or are likely to purchase another
11 Vehicle, they do not presently have Article III standing to pursue injunctive or declaratory relief as
12 sought in the complaint. The Court therefore **GRANTS** Toyota’s motion to dismiss as to these
13 claims but grants Plaintiffs leave to amend.

14 H. Nationwide Class Allegations

15 Finally, Toyota argues that Plaintiffs’ attempt to represent a nationwide class is untenable
16 because Plaintiffs include citizens of only twenty-eight states. Toyota contends that Plaintiffs
17 cannot assert claims on behalf of those who purchased or leased Vehicles in twenty-two other
18 states. *See Mot.* at 36-37. While Toyota acknowledges that “class allegations ‘typically are
19 tested’ at the class certification stage,” *id.* at 36 (quoting *Swearingen*, 2017 WL 1806483 at *9), it
20 urges that “claims arising under the laws of states in which no named plaintiff resides should be
21 dismissed for lack of standing at the motion to dismiss stage,” *id.* at 37 (quoting *Sponchiado v.*
22 *Apple Inc.*, 2019 WL 6117482, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2019)). Toyota further argues that
23 Plaintiffs should not be permitted to circumvent this purported standing deficiency by applying the
24 laws of their home states to residents of other states. *Id.* at 37. In making this argument, Toyota
25 emphasizes the general “presumption against extraterritorial application of state law.” *Id.*; *see*
26 *also Swearingen*, 2017 WL 1806483, at *9 (dismissing nationwide class allegations where
27 plaintiffs offered “no allegations supporting a nexus between California law and any out of state
28 purchases, and in light of the presumption against extraterritorial application” of California’s

1 consumer protection laws).

2 Plaintiffs respond that “TMS seeks premature resolution of the class allegations at least
3 with respect to a nationwide class, denying Plaintiffs the opportunity to make the case for
4 certification based on appropriate discovery.” Opp’n at 36. They emphasize that “[t]he
5 overwhelming majority of case law holds that it is inappropriate to determine class certification
6 issues, such as choice of law, at the pleading stage.” *Id.* (collecting several cases from this
7 district). Plaintiffs also argue that Ninth Circuit law requires “a detailed and fact-intensive
8 inquiry . . . to determine the substantive law applicable to class members’ claims” and that
9 Toyota’s challenge to the nationwide class allegations is therefore “better suited for class
10 certification, when the parties—and the Court—can evaluate the nationwide claims on a complete
11 record.” *Id.* at 37.

12 Toyota’s motion to dismiss thus raises the question of “whether it is appropriate to
13 evaluate the named plaintiffs’ standing on behalf of the putative nationwide class at the pleadings
14 (rather than at the class certification) stage, and if so, whether the named plaintiffs have standing
15 to bring state law claims on behalf of a class that includes citizens of unrepresented states.”
16 *Johnson*, 272 F. Supp. 3d at 1174.

17 As to the first (procedural) question, the *Johnson* court observed that “[t]here is no hard
18 and fast rule to apply” when addressing these issues. *Id.* at 1175. It relied, however, on this
19 Court’s extensive analysis in *In re Carrier IQ, Inc.*, 78 F. Supp. 3d 1051 (N.D. Cal. 2015), which
20 concluded “that district courts ‘ha[ve] the discretion to defer questions of standing until after class
21 certification,’ but may nonetheless ‘opt[, as a matter of case management,’ to address standing in
22 advance of class certification.” *Id.* (quoting *Carrier IQ*, 78 F. Supp. 3d at 1074). In reaching this
23 decision, the *Carrier IQ* court reasoned that “a strict categorical requirement that the standing
24 analysis must precede class certification is unwarranted” even though courts in this district and
25 beyond have treated standing “as a threshold matter that should be addressed at the pleading
26 stage.” 78 F. Supp. 3d at 1069-70; *see also id.* at 1071-73 (observing that “the Supreme Court has
27 expressly recognized that, in at least some cases, courts may address class certification prior to
28 resolving standing questions” and concluding that “decid[ing] class certification before

1 determining standing to pursue claims of unnamed class members is consistent with Article III”).

2 As to the second (substantive) question, the *Carrier IQ* court ultimately chose not to
3 exercise its asserted discretion to defer the standing inquiry until after class certification, finding
4 that the named plaintiffs did “not have standing to assert claims from states in which they d[id] not
5 reside or did not purchase” the contested products. *Id.* at 1075. It thus “require[d] that plaintiffs
6 present named class representatives who possess individual standing to assert each state law’s
7 claims against Defendants.” *Id.* at 1074. The court emphasized that plaintiffs in that case resided
8 in thirteen different states but were attempting to bring claims on behalf of consumers in thirty-
9 five additional states, as well; the unnamed class members’ claims were therefore “vast relative to
10 the claims to which the named Plaintiffs ha[d] standing.” *Id.* It also noted that, “given the breadth
11 of the proposed class and the number of state law claims asserted on behalf of the class, there
12 [wa]s a meaningful risk that the requirements of class certification under Rule 23 [would] not be
13 met.” *Id.* Cases involving a smaller number of named plaintiffs have been resolved at the
14 pleading stage on similar grounds. *See, e.g., Johnson*, 272 F. Supp. 3d at 1175-76 (dismissing
15 nationwide class allegations where there were only “two named representatives in two states”). In
16 other instances, however, courts have declined to decide standing for a putative nationwide class
17 prior to class certification where named plaintiffs resided in close to fifty states. *See In re Target*
18 *Corp. Data Sec. Breach Litig.*, 66 F. Supp. 3d 1154, 1160 (D. Minn. 2014) (permitting class
19 certification to proceed in a case with “114 named Plaintiffs who reside in every state in the union
20 save four and the District of Columbia”).

21 As the Court stated at the motion hearing, it intends to exercise its discretion to defer ruling
22 on Plaintiffs’ nationwide class allegations until a later stage of the proceedings. Hearing Tr. at 34.
23 The Court explained that the viability of the allegations, and the most appropriate time to address
24 Plaintiffs’ standing to assert them, would turn, at least in part, on which claims survived the
25 pleading stage. *See id.* The Court indicated that the outcome of a standing analysis might well
26 depend, for example, on the degree of variation among the state laws under which Plaintiffs
27 ultimately state claims. *Id.* at 34-35. The Court also reiterated its reluctance to apply California
28 law extraterritorially, for the reasons previously given in Part IV.F. *See id.* at 35-36. And in

1 response to the parties’ reassertion of the substantive arguments for and against unnamed class
2 members’ standing that they also raised in their briefs, the Court concluded that the issue would be
3 better addressed a later juncture, such as at class certification. *Id.* at 38. It nevertheless
4 “reserve[d] the ability to rule on some aspect” of the standing question earlier than the certification
5 stage, as the Court achieves greater clarity on the ultimate scope of Plaintiffs’ claims.

6 The Court therefore **DENIES** Toyota’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ nationwide class
7 allegations at this time. It reserves the right to revisit the issue at its discretion as the litigation
8 progresses.

9 **V. CONCLUSION**

10 For the reasons given above, Toyota’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ consolidated class
11 action complaint is:

- 12 • **DENIED** as to Plaintiffs’ standing to assert claims for damages;
- 13 • **GRANTED** as to Plaintiffs’ express warranty claims under the NVLW (without
14 leave to amend);
- 15 • **GRANTED** as to Plaintiffs’ express warranty claims under Toyota’s marketing
16 materials and Vehicle owner’s manuals (with leave to amend);
- 17 • **GRANTED** as to Plaintiffs’ implied warranty of merchantability claims (without
18 leave to amend);
- 19 • **GRANTED** as to Plaintiffs’ affirmative misrepresentation claims under certain
20 state consumer protection laws (with leave to amend);
- 21 • **DENIED** as to Plaintiffs’ fraudulent omission claims under certain state consumer
22 protection statutes;
- 23 • **GRANTED in part and DENIED in part** as to Plaintiffs’ consumer protection
24 claims on various state-specific grounds;
- 25 • **DENIED** as to California Plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment claim;
- 26 • **GRANTED** as to non-California Plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment claims (without
27 leave to amend);
- 28 • **GRANTED** as to Plaintiffs’ standing to assert claims for injunctive and declaratory

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relief (**with leave to amend**);

- **DENIED** as to Plaintiffs' nationwide class allegations.

Plaintiffs shall file their amended complaint **by June 9, 2021, and Defendant shall file its response by July 23, 2021.**

This order disposes of Docket No. 66.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 16, 2021



EDWARD M. CHEN
United States District Judge