IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 1 2 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 ISIAH LUCAS, JR., No. C 07-1673 CW (PR) 4 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE MEDICAL RECORDS; AND 5 GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR v. SUMMARY JUDGMENT 6 LT. SILVA, et al., (Docket nos. 63, 67) 7 Defendants. 8 9 INTRODUCTION 10 On March 23, 2007, Plaintiff Isiah Lucas, Jr., a state 11 prisoner currently incarcerated at the Richard J. Donovan 12 Correctional Facility, filed this pro se civil rights action 13 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging constitutional violations 14 stemming from his incarceration at the Correctional Training 15 Facility (CTF). On October 29, 2009, the Court found cognizable 16 Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim against Defendants CTF Warden B. 17 Curry, CTF Captain T. Jarvis, CTF Associate Warden D. Silva and CTF 18 Sergeant M. Miranda for deliberate indifference to his serious 19 medical needs. The Court dismissed Plaintiff's claim against 20 Defendant CTF Captain I. Guerra with leave to amend. 21 On November 25, 2009, Plaintiff submitted his amended 22 complaint. On May 6, 2010, the Court found cognizable Plaintiff's 23 claim of deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs 24 against Defendant Guerra. 25 On June 7, 2010, Defendants Curry, Jarvis, Silva and Miranda 26 filed a motion to dismiss for Plaintiff's failure to exhaust. On 27

October 6, 2010, the Court denied the motion to dismiss.

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On October 21, 2010, Plaintiff moved to amend his complaint to
add claims against additional Defendants. On November 12, 2010,
the Court granted Plaintiff's motion to add deliberate indifference
claims against Defendants CTF Sergeant M. Knedler and CTF
Correctional Officers N. McGriff, J. Childers and G. Lopez.

6 Before the Court is the motion for summary judgment filed by 7 Defendants Curry, Jarvis, Guerra, Silva, Miranda, Knedler, McGriff, 8 Lopez and Childers. In support of their motion, Defendants rely on 9 Plaintiff's medical records. Plaintiff has filed an opposition, 10 attaching unauthenticated medical records as exhibits in support of 11 his opposition. Defendants have filed their reply, along with 12 objections to the exhibits attached to Plaintiff's opposition.

13 Also before the Court is Plaintiff's motion to strike the 14 medical records relied upon by Defendants.

Having considered the papers filed by the parties, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's motion to strike and GRANTS Defendants' motion for summary judgment.

## BACKGROUND

Plaintiff has "hyper-extensive (i.e., double jointed) knees" and "a history of complaints about lower back and neck pain," which he attributes to arthritis. (Orr Decl. ¶ 3.) On January 18, 2005, while incarcerated at Pleasant Valley State Prison, Plaintiff received a Comprehensive Accommodation Chrono (chrono) for a "lower bunk/lower tier" in response to his complaints of knee problems and back discomfort. (Grigg Decl., Ex. B.)

26 On April 19, 2006, Plaintiff was transferred to CTF, where he 27 was housed as a "close custody" inmate. (Pl.'s Dep. 75:20-78:8, 28 Dec. 16, 2010.) This custody level requires "more stringent

1 security due to an inmate's crimes and sentences or, more 2 frequently, due to their behavior while in prison." (Miranda Decl. 3 ¶ 4.) For security purposes, prison officials could only house 4 Plaintiff in a facility dedicated to prisoners with that custody 5 level. (Pl.'s Dep. 74:5-15.)

Plaintiff notified CTF medical personnel of his chrono upon 6 7 arrival. However, at that time there was "a significant shortage of available lower bunk housing" in CTF "closed custody wings." 8 9 (Silva Decl. ¶ 4-6.) Only inmates with "documented seizure (Id.) Plaintiff was informed disorders" were given lower bunks. 10 11 he would be "temporar[ily]" assigned to an upper bunk "until a bottom bunk was found." (Compl. at 5.) Plaintiff alleges that 12 "almost everyday" he addressed CTF staff regarding his "medical 13 condition and need for a lower bunk/lower tier." (Id. at 5 n.1.) 14 15 In his motion to add claims against additional Defendants, Plaintiff identifies the particular members of CTF staff he 16 approached as Defendants Knedler and McGriff. (Mot. to Add Defs. 17 18 at 2.) Plaintiff alleges "no resolution was ever manifested." 19 (Compl. at 5 n.1.)

20 On May 2, 2006, Plaintiff filed a CDC 1824 Reasonable 21 Modification or Accommodation Request, identified as appeal log no. 06-01425, in which he requested single cell status or 22 23 administrative segregation due to his "phobia and paranoia with 24 cell-mates." (Grigg Decl., Ex. D.) On May 26, 2006, appeal log 25 no. 06-01425 was "partially granted" at the first level of review in that Defendant Miranda interviewed Plaintiff, instructed him to 26 27 "fill out and submit a request for a cell change form" and also 28 informed him he would "be placed on the C-Wing lower bunk waiting

1 list." (Id.) The partial grant was approved by Defendant Jarvis. 2 On June 5, 2006, Plaintiff was moved to an upper bunk on the 3 "3rd tier" in "D-Wing," and told by Defendant Knedler that he would be "the only black inmate on the waiting list . . . for a bottom 4 5 bunk." (Compl. at 6.)

On June 7, 2006, Plaintiff told Defendants Childers and Lopez 6 he "was suffering from being assigned to the top bunk, and . . . he 7 8 couldn't take the pain/agony much longer." (Id. at 6.) Although 9 Defendants Childers and Lopez told Plaintiff they would "see what they could do," they did not ever assign him to a lower bunk. 10 (Id. 11 at 6-7.)

12 On June 14, 2006, Plaintiff submitted appeal log no. 06-01425 to the second level of review. 13

14 On June 25, 2006, Plaintiff submitted written correspondence 15 to Defendant Curry, the Office of the Inspector General, the Prison Law Office and the Rosen, Bien & Asaro law firm. Plaintiff 16 17 requested that they "intervene in a manner to bring a resolution" 18 to his bunking assignment, because sixty-eight days had passed 19 without prison staff "comply[ing] with medical orders . . . ." 20 (Id. at 7.) Defendant Guerra responded to Plaintiff's letter on 21 Defendant Curry's behalf. (Pl.'s Dep. 113:24-114:6.)

On June 26, 2006, Defendant Silva interviewed Plaintiff in 22 23 connection with the second level of review for appeal log no. 24 06-01425. (Silva Decl. ¶ 8.) Defendant Silva "said he would see what he could do about the matter." (Compl. at 8.) 25 26

On June 27, 2006, 1 Defendant Silva again interviewed Plaintiff

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Plaintiff has written the date of his second interview with 28 Defendant Silva as "6/27/07." (Compl. at 8.) The Court assu Plaintiff mistakenly wrote "07" instead of "06" for the year. The Court assumes

1 regarding the "bottom bunk matter." (Id.) Defendant Silva "said 2 they were working on the matter and said to give them a little 3 longer." (Id.) On July 2, 2006, when Plaintiff saw Defendant 4 Silva in the corridor, he "not only expressed the continuous need 5 for a bottom bunk," but also "a need to get out of cell 307 6 altogether." (Id.) Defendant Silva "threw his hands up and said 7 that there was nothing he could do at that time." (Id.)

8 On July 8, 2006, Plaintiff was "no longer able/willing to deal 9 with the pain and suffering from being assigned to a top 10 bunk . . . " (Id.) He placed his property outside his cell and 11 refused to re-enter. CTF Correctional Officer LaVelle intervened, 12 and Plaintiff was transferred to administrative segregation for 13 "Battery on a Peace Officer."<sup>2</sup> (Id. at 9.)

14 On July 10, 2006, appeal log no. 06-01425 was partially 15 granted at the second level of review, in that Plaintiff was informed there was "a severe shortage of lower bunks available," 16 and that "[d]uring this housing crunch, inmates with Lower Bunk 17 18 Chronos will be housed in upper bunks, except for those inmates 19 with documented seizure disorders." (Id.) The response also 20 informed Plaintiff that he was "on the priority place for any lower 21 bunk that becomes available in the Close Custody Wings." (Id.) The partial grant was approved by Defendants Curry and Guerra. 22

In sum, Plaintiff claims he was not assigned to a lower bunk for a total of eighty-one days, until his transfer to administrative segregation. Plaintiff was housed in administrative segregation from July 8, 2006 to February 28, 2007. The Court

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Plaintiff claims he was "wrongfully" found guilty of Battery on a Peace Officer. (Compl. at 9.)

assumes Plaintiff was transferred out of CTF soon after being
released from administrative segregation because on March 18, 2007,
when Plaintiff signed his complaint, he states that he was being
housed at California State Prison - Corcoran.

DISCUSSION

## 6 I. Legal Standard

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Summary judgment is properly granted when no genuine and disputed issues of material fact remain, and when, viewing the evidence most favorably to the non-moving party, the movant is clearly entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; <u>Celotex Corp. v. Catrett</u>, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); <u>Eisenberg v. Ins. Co. of N. Am.</u>, 815 F.2d 1285, 1288-89 (9th Cir. 1987).

14 The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no 15 material factual dispute; therefore, the Court must regard as true 16 the opposing party's evidence, if it is supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Eisenberg, 17 18 815 F.2d at 1289. The Court must draw all reasonable inferences in 19 favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought. 20 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 21 587 (1986); Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 952 F.2d 1551, 1558 (9th Cir. 1991). 22

Material facts which would preclude entry of summary judgment are those which, under applicable substantive law, may affect the outcome of the case. The substantive law will identify which facts are material. <u>Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.</u>, 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

Where the moving party does not bear the burden of proof on an

1 issue at trial, the moving party may discharge its burden of 2 production by either of two methods:

The moving party may produce evidence negating an essential element of the nonmoving party's case, or, after suitable discovery, the moving party may show that the nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an essential element of its claim or defense to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion at trial.

7 <u>Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd., v. Fritz Cos., Inc.</u>, 210 F.3d 8 1099, 1106 (9th Cir. 2000).

9 If the moving party discharges its burden by showing an absence of evidence to support an essential element of a claim or 10 11 defense, it is not required to produce evidence showing the absence of a material fact on such issues, or to support its motion with 12 13 evidence negating the non-moving party's claim. Nissan, 210 F.3d 14 at 1106; see also Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 885 15 (1990); Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1409 (9th Cir. 16 1991). If the moving party shows an absence of evidence to support 17 the non-moving party's case, the burden then shifts to the non-18 moving party to produce "specific evidence, through affidavits or 19 admissible discovery material, to show that the dispute exists." 20 Bhan, 929 F.2d at 1409.

If the moving party discharges its burden by negating an essential element of the non-moving party's claim or defense, it must produce affirmative evidence of such negation. <u>Nissan</u>, 210 F.3d at 1105. If the moving party produces such evidence, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to produce specific evidence to show that a dispute of material fact exists. <u>Id.</u>

27 If the moving party does not meet its initial burden of 28 production by either method, the non-moving party is under no

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1 obligation to offer any evidence in support of its opposition. Id. 2 This is true even though the non-moving party bears the ultimate 3 burden of persuasion at trial. Id. at 1107.

II. Evidence Considered

A district court may only consider admissible evidence in ruling on a motion for summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6 56(e); Orr v. Bank of America, 285 F.3d 764, 773 (9th Cir. 2002).

8 In support of Defendants' motion for summary judgment, 9 affidavits have been filed by Dr. Orr, Attorney M. Grigg and 10 Defendants Silva, Miranda, Childers, McGriff, Lopez and Knedler.

11 Plaintiff verified his complaint filed on March 23, 2007 by 12 signing it under penalty of perjury. Also in the record are 13 Plaintiff's amended complaint, his motion to add Defendants, and his opposition, none of which is signed under penalty of perjury. 14 15 Therefore, for the purposes of this Order, the Court will treat Plaintiff's original complaint filed on March 23, 2007 as an 16 17 affidavit in opposition to Defendants' motion for summary judgment 18 under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See 19 Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 460 & nn.10-11 (9th Cir. 1995).

20 In his motion to strike, Plaintiff moves to (1) rule 21 inadmissible any of his "medical records that Defendant [sic] has obtained"; (2) compel Defendants to "return the medical 22 23 records/documents . . . obtained from CSP-Solano;" (3) compel 24 Defendants to "disclose the party that ordered the release of 25 Plaintiff's medical records; " and (4) compel Defendants to "abide by law in the future in obtaining medical records/files." 26 (Mot. to 27 Strike at 3.) Plaintiff argues his medical records are 28 inadmissible because he has "a constitutional right to privacy in

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that of his medical records/diagnoses/information." (<u>Id.</u> at 1.)
Defendants did not respond to Plaintiff's motion to strike.

3 The Court finds unavailing Plaintiff's arguments for striking 4 the medical records. He claims that the medical records Defendants 5 rely on in support of their motion are inadmissible based on his "right to privacy." (Id.) Plaintiff fails to argue that 6 7 Defendants relied on these particular medical records for reasons 8 other than in response to the lawsuit. Nor does Plaintiff argue 9 that any of the medical records Defendants rely on are irrelevant to his deliberate indifference claim. The record shows that 10 11 (1) Defendants have relied on Plaintiff's lower bunk chrono and his 12 related medical records in support of their motion for summary 13 judgment; and (2) Plaintiff has submitted similarly relevant 14 medical records in support of his opposition. Therefore, Plaintiff's motion to strike his medical records is DENIED, because 15 16 there is no evidence that Defendants relied on any irrelevant 17 medical records in support of their motion for summary judgment.<sup>3</sup> III. Deliberate Indifference Claim 18

19 Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs violates the 20 Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual 21 punishment. <u>Estelle v. Gamble</u>, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). The 22 analysis of a claim of deliberate indifference to serious medical 23 needs involves an examination of two elements: (1) a prisoner's

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Plaintiff has mooted his motion to strike by submitting his own copies of similar medical records in support of his opposition. As mentioned above, Defendants object to the exhibits attached to Plaintiff's opposition -- including his medical records -- as unauthenticated. However, because the Court relies in its analysis below on Plaintiff's verified complaint and not on the exhibits attached to his opposition, it need not address Defendants' objection.

1 serious medical needs and (2) a deliberately indifferent response 2 by the defendants to those needs. <u>McGuckin v. Smith</u>, 974 F.2d 3 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), <u>overruled on other grounds by WMX</u> 4 <u>Technologies, Inc. v. Miller</u>, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) 5 (en banc).

A serious medical need exists if the failure to treat a 6 7 prisoner's condition could result in further significant injury or 8 the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." McGuckin, 974 9 F.2d at 1059 (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104). Examples of indications that a prisoner has a serious need for medical 10 11 treatment are the existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor 12 or patient would find important and worthy of comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an 13 14 individual's daily activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain. Id. at 1059-60 (citing Wood v. Housewright, 900 15 16 F.2d 1332, 1337-41 (9th Cir. 1990)).

The plaintiff must also show that the defendant knew the 17 18 plaintiff faced "substantial risk of serious harm" yet failed to 19 take reasonable steps to abate it. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 20 825, 837 (1994). A prison official "who act[s] reasonably cannot 21 be found liable under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause." 22 Id. at 845. Further, a prison official must not only "be aware of 23 facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial 24 risk of serious harm exists," but "must also draw the inference." 25 Id.

Therefore, in order to establish deliberate indifference, there must be a purposeful act or failure to act on the part of the defendant and resulting harm. <u>McGuckin</u>, 974 F.2d at 1060; <u>Shapley</u> <u>v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm'rs</u>, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985). A defendant's actions need not be "egregious" nor need they result in "significant injury" in order to establish a violation of the prisoner's federal constitutional rights, <u>McGuckin</u>, 974 F.2d at 1059; however, the existence of serious harm tends to support an inmate's deliberate indifference claim. <u>Jett v. Penner</u>, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006).

8 In order to establish deliberate indifference, Plaintiff must 9 show he had serious medical needs. Plaintiff alleges that while he 10 was assigned to an "upper tier/upper bunk," his back and knee pain 11 amounted to serious medical needs. Defendants allege, in contrast, 12 that Plaintiff did not have any serious medical needs because he 13 was not exposed "to a societally intolerable risk of harm." (Mot. 14 for Summ. J. at 8.) If Plaintiff's assignment "actually had 15 caused, or posed a genuine risk of, such harm," Defendants contend, 16 "Plaintiff could simply have put his mattress on the floor and 17 slept there." (Id.) Defendants also argue Plaintiff "tacitly 18 confirmed the absence of a 'societally intolerable risk' by 19 admitting he never even asked his cellmate to switch bunks." (Id.) 20 Finally, Defendants argue that Plaintiff "confirmed his claim's 21 untenability through his inability to articulate what ostensibly 22 significant problem his upper bunk assignment supposedly caused or 23 could have caused." (Id. (citing Pl.'s Dep., 29:7-9; 30:22-24; 24 41:20-21).) Rather, Plaintiff "repeatedly alluded to mere 25 'stiffness.'" (Id.)

The Court must construe the evidence and the inferences to be drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the non-moving party.

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1 T.W. Elec. Serv. Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 2 626, 631 (9th Cir. 1987). Plaintiff's allegations could support an 3 inference and conclusion that the failure to assign him to a "lower bunk/lower tier" pursuant to his lower bunk chrono resulted in the 4 5 "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." McGuckin, 974 F.2d at Therefore, the Court assumes without deciding that Plaintiff 6 1059. 7 had serious medical needs.

In order to establish deliberate indifference, Plaintiff also must show that Defendants acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. Therefore, the Court will consider his claims against each specific group of Defendants as follows: the 12 prison officials and the appeal reviewers.

> Prison Officials: Defendants Knedler, McGriff, Childers, Α. Lopez, Miranda and Silva

Plaintiff alleges Defendants Knedler, McGriff, Childers, Lopez, Miranda and Silva were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs because, although he informed these prison officials of his need for a "lower bunk/lower tier" due to his back and neck pain, they did not assign him to a lower bunk. (Compl. at 5 n.1, 6, 8.)

Defendants Knedler, McGriff, Childers and Lopez allege that, 22 although they do not specifically remember Plaintiff, they never 23 consciously disregarded any substantial risk or serious harm that 24 Plaintiff may have faced. (Knedler Decl.  $\P$  6; McGriff Decl.  $\P$  2; 25 Childers Decl.  $\P$  2; Lopez Decl.  $\P$  2.) They further allege that if 26 an inmate complained that his "lower bunk/lower tier" chrono was 27 not being recognized, it would generally not signal the inmate 28

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2 issued to enhance inmate comfort. (Knedler Decl. ¶ 8; McGriff Decl. ¶ 8; Childers Decl. ¶ 8; Lopez Decl. ¶ 5.) Defendants Knedler, McGriff, Lopez and Childers also claim they "could not have circumvented" the order that "lower bunks were only to be provided to inmates with documented seizure disorders until other lower bunks opened up." (Miranda Decl. ¶ 13.) If a particular inmate, who -- like Plaintiff -- did not have a documented seizure disorder, complained about the upper bunk assignment, Defendants Knedler, McGriff, Childers and Lopez had no other recourse but to explain that there existed a lower bunk shortage and to provide that inmate with the proper appeal or request forms.<sup>4</sup> (Knedler Decl. ¶ 7; McGriff Decl. ¶ 6-7; Childers Decl. ¶ 4-6; Lopez Decl.  $\P$  4.) Also, they claim that "it would have been impossible for the officers to fulfill [Plaintiff's] demands" to move to a lower bunk/lower tier "because correctional officers do not have the authority to arrange for cell transfers." (Id.) If an inmate complained that the upper bunk assignment caused him significant 19 problems, then Defendants Knedler, McGriff, Childers and Lopez 20 claim they would have alerted their supervisors or medical staff. 21 (Knedler Decl. ¶ 6; McGriff Decl. ¶ 5; Childers Decl. ¶ 4; Lopez Decl. ¶ 5.) 22

faced a serious risk of harm, because such chronos were commonly

23 Defendants Miranda and Silva likewise allege they did not 24 believe that keeping Plaintiff temporarily assigned to an upper

<sup>26</sup> <sup>4</sup> Defendant Lopez also explains that, as "security door officer," he had "very limited contact with inmates," which "makes 27 it very unlikely that [he] would have had any sort of extended conversation with Inmate Lucas." (<u>Id.</u>  $\P$  6.) 28

1 bunk would cause him anything more than discomfort. (Silva Decl. 2 ¶ 9; Miranda Decl. ¶ 11.) Defendant Miranda alleges he had no 3 authority to grant Plaintiff's appeal because of the lower bunk shortage, stating "placing Inmate Lucas on the waiting list was all 4 5 that [he] was authorized to do." (Miranda Decl.  $\P$  8.) Defendant Miranda claims he "had no ability to provide Inmate Lucas with a 6 7 lower bunk while those with more severe medical issues required 8 them." (Id. ¶ 11.) Defendant Silva alleges he "placed Mr. Lucas 9 on the priority wait list," then "sent the appeal response to 10 Captain Guerra and Warden Curry for approval." (Silva Decl. ¶ 9.) 11 Defendant Silva further claims, "I lacked the ability and authority 12 to move another inmate or make the type of medical determination 13 that such an act would require." (Id.  $\P$  12.)

14 Defendants Knedler, McGriff, Childers, Lopez, Miranda and 15 Silva do not refute Plaintiff's allegation that, although he 16 complained of back and neck pain resulting from his upper bunk 17 assignment, they did not ever assign him to a lower bunk. 18 Defendants also do not allege they in fact alerted their 19 supervisors or medical staff that Plaintiff faced a serious risk of 20 harm. Taking the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, 21 he has shown these Defendants acted with a sufficiently culpable 22 state of mind by ignoring or failing to respond to his pain or 23 serious medical needs. See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060. Therefore, 24 the Court finds that the evidence produced by Plaintiff raises a 25 material factual dispute about whether these Defendants acted with 26 deliberate indifference toward his serious medical needs when they 27 failed to remedy his complaints of back and neck pain from the 28

upper bunk assignment. Accordingly, Defendants Knedler, McGriff,
Lopez, Childers, Miranda and Silva are not entitled to summary
judgment as to the deliberate indifference claim.

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B. Appeal Reviewers: Defendants Jarvis, Guerra and Curry

Plaintiff alleges Defendants Jarvis, Guerra and Curry were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs because they approved the partial grant for appeal log no. 06-01425 at either the first or second level of review. Plaintiff also sues Defendant Curry in his supervisory capacity. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Curry did not "intervene" to resolve Plaintiff's "lower bunk/lower tier" situation, despite the fact that Plaintiff sent him a letter. (Compl. at 7.)

Plaintiff claims that Defendants Jarvis and Guerra, as the 14 appeal reviewers, and Defendant Curry, as a supervisor, were aware 15 of Plaintiff's "lower bunk/lower tier" situation through reading 16 his appeal and his letter, respectively. These Defendants do not 17 refute Plaintiff's allegation that, although he alerted them of his 18 back and neck pain resulting from his upper bunk assignment, they 19 did not ever assign him to a lower bunk. Taking the facts in the 20 light most favorable to Plaintiff, he has shown these Defendants 21 acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind by failing to 22 intervene to resolve Plaintiff's "lower bunk/lower tier" situation, 23 despite the fact that Plaintiff alerted them of his pain or serious 24 medical needs. <u>See McGuckin</u>, 974 F.2d at 1060. Therefore, the 25 Court finds that the evidence produced by Plaintiff raises a 26 material factual dispute about whether these Defendants acted with 27 deliberate indifference toward his serious medical needs when they 28 failed to remedy his complaints of back and neck pain from the

United States District Court For the Northern District of California upper bunk assignment. Accordingly, Defendants Jarvis, Guerra and
Curry are not entitled to summary judgment as to the deliberate
indifference claim.

IV. Qualified Immunity

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In the alternative, Defendants Knedler, McGriff, Lopez, Childers, Miranda, Silva, Jarvis, Guerra and Curry argue that summary judgment is warranted because, as government officials, they are entitled to qualified immunity from Plaintiff's deliberate indifference claim. They contend that "it would not have been 'clear' to other reasonable people in the defendant's [sic] positions that their conduct was unconstitutional." (Mot. for Summ. J. at 12.)

The defense of qualified immunity protects "government 14 officials performing discretionary functions . . . from liability 15 for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly 16 established statutory or constitutional rights of which a 17 reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 18 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). A court considering a claim of qualified 19 immunity must determine (1) whether the plaintiff has alleged the 20 deprivation of an actual constitutional right and (2) whether such 21 right was clearly established such that it would be clear to a 22 reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation 23 See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 129 S. Ct. he confronted. 24 808, 818 (2009) (citing <u>Saucier v. Katz</u>, 533 U.S. 194 (2001)). The 25 court may exercise its discretion in deciding which prong to 26 address first, in light of the particular circumstances of each 27 case. Id. 28

1 Regarding the first prong, the threshold question must be: 2 taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the 3 injury, do the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right? Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. Regarding the 4 5 second prong, the inquiry as to whether a constitutional right was clearly established must be undertaken in light of the specific 6 7 context of the case, not as a broad general proposition. Id. at 8 202. The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a 9 right is clearly established is "whether it would be clear to a 10 reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation 11 he confronted." Id. If the law "did not put the officer on notice 12 that his conduct would be clearly unlawful, summary judgment based 13 on qualified immunity is appropriate." Id. Defendants can have a 14 reasonable, but mistaken, belief about the facts or about what the 15 law requires in any given situation. Id. (quoting Malley v. 16 Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)).

A memorandum issued by CTF Chief Deputy Warden P. Barker on 18 December 15, 2005 and addressed to all CTF staff stated, "Central 19 Facility is currently experiencing a severe shortage of housing for 20 inmates with Lower Bunk Chronos." (Grigg Decl., Ex. C.) "During 21 this temporary housing crunch, inmates with Lower Bunk Chronos will 22 be housed in race-appropriate upper bunks, except for those inmates 23 with documented seizure disorders." (Id. (emphasis in original)) 24 The three wings dedicated to close custody inmates were C, D and E 25 wings. (Silva Decl. ¶ 4.) "Sending inmates whose chronos could not 26 be immediately accommodated to non-close custody wings was not an 27 option of the security level that close custody inmates required." 28 (<u>Id.</u> ¶ 5.) As mentioned above, Plaintiff was a level two, close

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custody inmate. (<u>Id.</u> ¶ 6.)

2 Defendants Knedler, McGriff, Lopez, Childers, Miranda, Silva, Jarvis and Guerra, who were all CTF staff members, were required to 4 abide by Chief Deputy Warden Barker's memorandum. Specifically, 5 these Defendants did not have the authority to provide Plaintiff 6 with a lower bunk because of the lower bunk shortage and strict 7 limitations set out in this memorandum. (Miranda Decl. ¶ 8, 13; 8 Silva Decl. ¶ 12.) Furthermore, these Defendants had legitimate 9 penological reasons for not assigning Plaintiff to a lower bunk in 10 non-close custody wings due to the "security level that close 11 custody inmates required." (Silva Decl. ¶ 5.) It would not have 12 been clear to a reasonable officer that following housing protocols 13 outlined in Chief Deputy Warden Barker's memorandum would have 14 violated Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment rights. Because a reasonable 15 officer in the positions of Defendants Knedler, McGriff, Lopez, 16 Childers, Miranda, Silva, Jarvis and Guerra could have thought his 17 conduct was lawful, they are entitled to qualified immunity on the 18 deliberate indifference claim. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202. 19 Therefore, their motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

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Defendant Curry was an administrator and, as CTF Warden, he did not have any direct involvement in Plaintiff's bunking assignment. As mentioned above, Plaintiff claims Defendant Curry received a letter from Plaintiff requesting he "intervene" to resolve Plaintiff's "lower bunk/lower tier" situation. However, as Defendants argue, there is no evidence that Defendant Curry was aware of any constitutional violations and failed to act to prevent them, because Plaintiff has "no idea" whether Defendant Curry received his letter. (Mot. for Summ. J. at 11 (quoting Pl.'s Dep.

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1 113:24-114:6).) While Plaintiff claims he sent a letter to 2 Defendant Curry about "the matter at hand," (compl. at 7), he does 3 not include a copy of this letter. Thus, the Court cannot assess 4 whether Defendant Curry was informed that Plaintiff experienced 5 neck and back pain due to his upper bunk assignment. Furthermore, 6 it was Defendant Guerra who responded to Plaintiff's letter by 7 attaching the memorandum regarding the lower bunk shortage.

8 Nevertheless, the Court has assumed above that Defendant Curry 9 was aware of Plaintiff's back and neck pain resulting from his 10 upper bunk assignment, and it has found a constitutional violation 11 because Defendant Curry did not intervene when his subordinates 12 failed to assign Plaintiff to a lower bunk. However, it would not 13 have been clear to a reasonable person in Defendant Curry's 14 position that failing to intervene when his subordinates ignored 15 Plaintiff's pain by following the housing protocols outlined in 16 Chief Deputy Warden Barker's memorandum would violate Plaintiff's 17 Eighth Amendment rights, especially in light of the fact that 18 inmates with documented seizure disorders had priority over the 19 other inmates with lower bunk chronos. Accordingly, Defendant 20 Curry is also entitled to qualified immunity on the deliberate 21 indifference claim; therefore, his motion for summary judgment is 22 GRANTED.

## CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons,

Plaintiff's motion to strike the medical records relied
upon by Defendants (docket no. 63) is DENIED.

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
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2. Defendants' motion for summary judgment (docket no. 67)

1 is GRANTED.

3. The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment in favor of Defendants in accordance with this Order, terminate all pending motions, and close the case. Each party shall bear his own costs. 4. This Order terminates Docket nos. 63 and 67. IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: 3/30/2011 CLAUDIA WILKEN United States District Judge 

United States District Court For the Northern District of California



For the Northern District of California **United States District Court**