

21 Circuit assumed the appeal involves an administrative decision to deny parole. That,

Monette was in prison at the time that he committed the crime giving rise to the conviction at issue in the instant habeas petition. While the underlying circumstances and conduct described in the habeas petition also gave rise to a prison rules violation and to adverse action by the parole board, it was actually his conviction on one count of being in possession of a controlled substance in prison in the Monterey County Superior Court that Monette challenged in his habeas petition. The underlying facts are set forth in detail in the

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however, is not the case.

court noted that Monette's petition raises two claims for federal habeas relief: (1) that he
received ineffective assistance of counsel and would not have entered into his plea
agreement had he received competent advice; and (2) that his plea agreement violated his
right to due process. The court, however, did not reach the merits of Monette's petition but
instead granted respondent's motion and dismissed the petition as untimely.
To obtain a COA, Monette must make "a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). If the district court denied the "habeas petition

constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). If the district court denied the "habeas petition
on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner's underlying constitutional claim," the
prisoner must, in order to obtain a COA, demonstrate "that jurists of reason would find it
debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and
that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its
procedural ruling." *Slack v. McDaniel*, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).

court's April 28, 2009 order granting respondent's motion to dismiss. In that order, the

Section 2253(c)(3) requires a court granting a COA to indicate which issues satisfy the
COA standard. Here, the court finds that one issue meets the above standard and
accordingly GRANTS the COA as to that issue. See generally Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537
U.S. 322 (2003).

That issue is:

(1) whether AEDPA's statute of limitations in Monette's case was tolled under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D) because Monette was unable to determine the factual predicate of his claims until the parole board's decision became final on July 6, 2006.

Accordingly, the clerk shall forward the file, including a copy of this order, to the Court of Appeals. See Fed. R. App. P. 22(b); *United States v. Asrar*, 116 F.3d 1268, 1270 (9th Cir. 1997).

- IT IS SO ORDERED.
- 25 Dated: May, 2010

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PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON United States District Judge

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