1	QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART OLIVER & HEDGES, LLP						
2	Claude M. Stern (Bar No. 96737) claudestern@quinnemanuel.com Rachel Herrick Kassabian (Bar No. 191060)						
3	rachelkassabian@quinnemanuel.com 555 Twin Dolphin Drive, Suite 560						
4	Redwood Shores, California 94065 Telephone: (650) 801-5000						
5	Facsimile: (650) 801-5100						
6	David J. Ruderman (Bar No. 245989) davidruderman@quinnemanuel.com						
7	50 California Street, 22nd Floor San Francisco, California 94111-4624						
8	Telephone: (415) 875-6600 Facsimile: (415) 875-6700						
9							
10	Attorneys for Defendant Zynga Game Network, Inc.						
11 12							
13							
14	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT						
15	NORTHERN DISTRICT	OF CALIFORNIA					
16	OAKLAND DIVISION						
17	PSYCHO MONKEY, LLC,	CASE NO. 4:09-cv-0603-SBA					
18	Plaintiff,	DEFENDANT ZYNGA GAME NETWORK, INC.'S NOTICE OF					
19	ZYNGA GAME NETWORK, INC., a	MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS OR, IN THE					
20		ALTERNATIVE, TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF PLAINTIFF'S					
21	Defendants.	AMENDED COMPLAINT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND					
22		AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF					
23		[FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6); FED. R.					
24		CIV. P. 12(f)]					
25		Date: May 12, 2009 Time: 1:00 p.m.					
26		Dept.: Courtroom 3, 3rd Floor Judge: Hon. Saundra Brown Armstrong					
27 28							
40							

NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION

TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS:

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on May 12, 2009 at 1:00 p.m. in Courtroom 3, Third Floor of the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, Oakland Division, 1301 Clay Street, Oakland, California, 94612, the Honorable Saundra Brown Armstrong presiding, defendant Zynga Game Network, Inc. ("Zynga") will, and hereby does, move to dismiss or, in the alternative, to strike portions of the amended complaint of plaintiff Psycho Monkey, LLC ("Psycho Monkey") pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 12(f). This Motion is made on the grounds that: (1) plaintiff's unfair competition claim pursuant to California Business and Professions Code § 17200 is preempted by the federal Copyright Act to the extent it is premised on alleged copyright infringement, and (2) plaintiff fails to state a claim that Zynga acted in a manner that would constitute an "unfair" business practice pursuant to California Business and Professions Code § 17200. Accordingly, these portions of plaintiff's unfair competition claim should be dismissed and/or stricken.

Pursuant to this Court's standing order in civil cases, the parties met and conferred regarding this motion on March 31 and April 1, 2009, but were unable to resolve this matter without motion practice.

This Motion is based on this Notice of Motion and Motion, the attached Memorandum of Points and Authorities, all matters of which the Court may take judicial notice, the pleadings and other papers on file in this action, and such further evidence and argument as may be presented at or before the hearing on this Motion.

DATED: April 2, 2009 QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART OLIVER & HEDGES. LLP

By /s/
Claude M. Stern
Attorneys for Defendant Zynga Game

Attorneys for Defendant Zynga Game Network, Inc.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES (Civ. L. R. 7-4(a)(3))

- 1. Is plaintiff's claim under California Business and Professions Code § 17200 preempted to the extent it relies on alleged violations of the Copyright Act, where the rights plaintiff asserts under California law are equivalent to those protected by the Copyright Act and the copyrighted work falls within the subject matter of the Copyright Act?
- 2. Does plaintiff's California Business and Professions Code § 17200 cause of action fail to state a claim that defendant engaged in "unfair" business practices, where it does not plead that defendant, its alleged direct competitor, threatened an incipient violation of antitrust law?

TABLE OF CONTENTS

2				Page	
3					
4	Preliminary Statement				
5	Factual Background1				
6	Argument2				
7	I.	LEGA	AL STANDARDS	3	
8	II.		CHO MONKEY'S UNFAIR COMPETITION CLAIM IS PREEMPTED BY FEDERAL COPYRIGHT ACT.	3	
9 10 11		A.	The Unfair Competition Claim Asserts Rights Equivalent to Those Protected by the Copyright Act—Specifically, the Right to Reproduce, Prepare Derivative Works of, and Distribute Copies of a Work	4	
12		B.	The Unfair Competition Claim Involves a Work Within the Subject Matter of the Copyright Act—Specifically, a Computer Video Game.	5	
13		C.	Having Met Both Prongs of the Preemption Test, Psycho Monkey's Unfair Competition Claim Is Subject to Dismissal.	6	
14 15	III.	AN IN	CHO MONKEY'S UNFAIR COMPETITION CLAIM FAILS TO ALLEGE NCIPIENT VIOLATION OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS, AS IT MUST TO E A CLAIM	7	
16	Conaly		L A CLANVI.		
17	Concie	181011		9	
18					
19					
20					
21					
22					
23					
24					
25					
26					
27					
28					
)	

51502/2844163.6

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

2	Page	
3	Cogos	
4	<u>Cases</u>	
5	Apple, Inc. v. PsyStar Corp., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1190 (N.D. Cal. 2008)	
6	Apple, Inc. v. PsyStar Corp., 08-03251 WHA, 2009 WL 303046 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2009)	
7 8	Axis Imex, Inc. v. Sunset Bay Rattan, Inc., No. C 08-3931 RS, 2009 WL 55178 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2009)	
9	Blue Nile, Inc. v. Ice.com, Inc., 478 F. Supp. 2d 1240 (W.D. Wash. 2007)	
10 11	Cel-Tech Commc'ns, Inc. v. L.A. Cellular Tel. Co., 20 Cal. 4th 163 (1999)	
12	Del Madera Properties v. Rhodes and Gardner, Inc., 820 F.2d 973 (9th Cir. 1987)	
13		
14	Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517 (1994)	
15	FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316 (1966)	
16 17	Federal Sav. and Loan v. Gemini Mgmt., 921 F.2d 241 (9th Cir. 1990)	
18	Firoozye v. Earthlink Network, 153 F. Supp. 2d 1115 (N.D. Cal. 2001)	
19 20	Garman v. Sterling Publ'g Co., Inc., No. C-91-0882 SBA, 1992 WL 12561293 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 1992)5	
21	Girafa.com v. Alexa Internet, Inc., No. C-08-02745 RMW, 2008 WL 4500858 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 6, 2008)	
22 23	Higher Gear Group, Inc. v. Rockenbach Chevrolet Sales, Inc., 223 F. Supp. 2d 953 (N.D. Ill. 2002)	
24	Kodadek v. MTV Networks, Inc., 152 F.3d 1209 (9th Cir. 1998)	
25		
26	MGA Entertainment, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc., No. CV 05-2727 NM, 2005 WL 5894689 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2005)	
27	McCoy v. Scantlin,	
28	No. CV 04-371-GHK, 2004 WL 5502111 (C.D. Cal. June 1, 2004)6	

51502/2844163.6

1	Parrish v. Nat'l Football League Players Ass'n, 534 F. Supp. 2d 1081 (N.D. Cal. 2007)
2 3	Sybersound Records, Inc. v. UAV Corp., 517 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2008)
4	Sidney-Vinson v. A.H. Robins Co., 697 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1983)
5	SmileCare Dental Group v. Delta Dental Plan of Cal., Inc., 88 F.3d 780 (9th Cir. 1996)
7	Smith & Hawken, Ltd. v. Gardendance, Inc., No. C04-1664 SBA, 2004 WL 2496163 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2004)
8	Townshend v. Rockwell Intern. Corp., No. C99-0400 SBA, 2000 WL 433505 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2000)9
10	
11 12	<u>Statutes</u> 17 U.S.C. § 106
13	17 U.S.C. § 301(a)
14	Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)
15 16	
17	
18	
19	
20 21	
22	
23	
24	
25 26	
27	
28	

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

Preliminary Statement

This is a copyright and trademark infringement case between plaintiff Psycho Monkey, LLC ("Psycho Monkey") and defendant Zynga Game Network, Inc. ("Zynga"), two companies involved in Internet-based social-network gaming. Psycho Monkey's amended complaint alleges that Zynga copied its online mobster game called "Mob Wars" and released a competing game called "Mafia Wars," thereby infringing its copyright and trademark.

Psycho Monkey also tacks on a cause of action under California's unfair competition law, pursuant to California Business and Professions Code § 17200 *et seq.* ("Section 17200"). More specifically, Psycho Monkey's Section 17200 claim has three components: (1) allegations that Zynga's conduct was "unfair" because it was immoral, unethical, injurious to consumers, and constituted an incipient violation of copyright law; (2) allegations that Zynga's conduct was "fraudulent" because it was likely to mislead and confuse consumers; and (3) allegations that Zynga's conduct was "unlawful" because it violated the federal copyright and trademark statutes. This claim is legally infirm for two reasons.

First, to the extent Psycho Monkey's Section 17200 claim is premised on allegations of copyright infringement, it is completely preempted by the federal Copyright Act. Second, Psycho Monkey's claim that Zynga's conduct constitutes an "unfair" business practice is not cognizable because it fails to allege an incipient violation of antitrust law—as it must to state a claim between alleged competitors. Lacking any viable legal claim in these respects, Psycho Monkey's Section 17200 cause of action should be dismissed and/or stricken.

Factual Background

Allegations Regarding Mob Wars. Psycho Monkey alleges that its principal, David Maestri, created an online game called "Mob Wars" that is played on the social networking website Facebook, in which players assume the role of a mobster and interact with other players. First Amended Complaint for Damages and Injunctive Relief (Docket No. 4) ("FAC") ¶¶ 9-10. Per Psycho Monkey, Mob Wars was first published in February 2008 and was later registered with the United States Copyright Office in July 2008. *Id.* ¶¶ 14, 16.

51502/2844163.6

Allegations Regarding Zynga's Conduct. Psycho Monkey alleges that after discussions concerning Zynga's potential acquisition of the intellectual property rights to Mob Wars fell through, Zynga copied Mob Wars and released a competing on-line mobster game called "Mafia Wars." *Id.* ¶ 16. More specifically, Mafia Wars allegedly copied the physical and operational aspects of Mob Wars, including the "layout and arrangement, visual presentation, sequence and flow, scoring system, and . . . overall look." *Id.* ¶ 19.

Psycho Monkey's Causes of Action. Based on the above-referenced allegations, Psycho Monkey pleads three causes of action: (1) copyright infringement, 17 U.S.C. § 101 *et seq.* (*id.* ¶¶ 18-29), (2) unfair competition/false designation of origin under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) *et seq.* ("trademark infringement claim") (*id.* ¶¶ 30-40), and (3) unfair competition under California Business and Professions Code § 17200 *et seq.* ("Section 17200 claim" or "unfair competition claim") (*id.* ¶¶ 41-48). The Section 17200 claim has three components.

First, Psycho Monkey alleges that Zynga violated the "unfair" prong of Section 17200 because "(a) the utility of [Zynga's] actions is outweighed by the gravity of the harm they cause to Psycho Monkey, (b) such actions are immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, and substantially injurious to consumers, and (c) such actions constitute incipient violations of state and federal copyright laws." *Id.* ¶ 43.

Second, Psycho Monkey alleges that Zynga violated the "fraudulent" prong of Section 17200 because its conduct is "likely to mislead and confuse a statistically significant percentage of reasonable consumers." *Id.* ¶ 44.

Third, Psycho Monkey alleges that Zynga violated the "unlawful" prong of Section 17200 because its conduct "constitute[s] violations of the state and federal statutes set forth above"—*i.e.*, the federal copyright and trademark statutes. *Id.* ¶ 45. Although Psycho Monkey does allege that Zynga is its direct competitor (*id.* ¶ 6), nowhere in its amended complaint does Psycho Monkey contend that Zynga's conduct threatens an incipient violation of the antitrust laws.

Argument

Psycho Monkey's unfair competition claim is uncognizable in two respects. First, to the extent it is predicated upon Zynga's alleged copying of Psycho Monkey's copyrighted Mob Wars

game, it is completely preempted by the Copyright Act. Second, Psycho Monkey fails to state a claim for unfair competition based on "unfair" conduct because it fails to plead an incipient violation of antitrust law—as it must to state such a claim against an alleged direct competitor like Zynga. Accordingly, these claims should be dismissed and/or stricken.

I. LEGAL STANDARDS.

A complaint may be dismissed as a matter of law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

A complaint may be dismissed as a matter of law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for one of two reasons: "(1) lack of a cognizable legal theory or (2) insufficient facts under a cognizable legal claim." *SmileCare Dental Group v. Delta Dental Plan of Cal., Inc.*, 88 F.3d 780, 783 (9th Cir. 1996); *see also Axis Imex, Inc. v. Sunset Bay Rattan, Inc.*, No. C 08-3931 RS, 2009 WL 55178, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2009) (same); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f), a court "may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). Rule 12(f) gives the court discretion to strike a pleading or portions thereof. *MGA Entertainment, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc.*, No. CV 05-2727 NM, 2005 WL 5894689, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2005) (citing *Federal Sav. and Loan v. Gemini Mgmt.*, 921 F.2d 241, 243 (9th Cir. 1990)). "[T]he function of a Rule 12(f) motion to strike is to avoid the expenditure of time and money that must arise from litigating spurious issues by dispensing with those issues prior to trial" *Sidney-Vinson v. A.H. Robins Co.*, 697 F.2d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 1983).

II. PSYCHO MONKEY'S UNFAIR COMPETITION CLAIM IS PREEMPTED BY THE FEDERAL COPYRIGHT ACT.

The portions of Psycho Monkey's unfair competition claim that are premised on allegations of copyright infringement are completely preempted by the federal Copyright Act. The Copyright Act contains a preemption provision that nullifies "all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright." 17 U.S.C.

§ 301(a). State law claims are preempted

if two elements are present. First, the rights that a plaintiff asserts under state law must be "rights that are equivalent" to those protected by the Copyright Act. . . . Second, the work involved must fall within the "subject matter" of the Copyright Act as set forth in 17 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103.

51502/2844163.6

Kodadek v. MTV Networks, Inc., 152 F.3d 1209, 1212 (9th Cir. 1998). Courts routinely find that unfair competition claims grounded in allegations of copyright infringement meet this test and are thus preempted. See, e.g., id. (upholding Copyright Act preemption of Section 17200 claim where claim was premised on defendants' unauthorized release of cartoons and merchandise "derived from [plaintiff's] drawings"); see also Sybersound Records, Inc. v. UAV Corp., 517 F.3d 1137, 1152 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding § 17200 claim preempted to the extent it relied on violations of the Copyright Act where plaintiff lacked standing to bring copyright claims directly); Del Madera Properties v. Rhodes and Gardner, Inc., 820 F.2d 973, 976-77 (9th Cir. 1987), overruled on other grounds in Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517 (1994) (unfair competition claims were preempted by the Copyright Act where premised on the misappropriation and copying of a real estate development map).

Psycho Monkey's unfair competition claim fares no better here, as both requirements for preemption are met.

A. The Unfair Competition Claim Asserts Rights Equivalent to Those Protected by the Copyright Act—Specifically, the Right to Reproduce, Prepare Derivative Works of, and Distribute Copies of a Work.

Psycho Monkey's unfair competition claim meets the first prong of the preemption test because the rights Psycho Monkey asserts thereby are equivalent to—and indeed identical to—rights enunciated in § 106 of the Copyright Act. *See* 17 U.S.C. § 106 (granting copyright holder exclusive right to "reproduce the copyrighted work . . . to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work . . . [and] to distribute copies . . . of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership").

Here, Psycho Monkey alleges that Zynga copied the Mob Wars game and distributed these unauthorized copies to the public on various social networking websites. FAC ¶ 16. More specifically, the amended complaint alleges that Maestri "created an interactive, online game, 'Mob Wars'" (*id.* ¶ 9), which was first published in February of 2008 (*id.* ¶ 16). The amended complaint further alleges that Zynga "cloned Mobs Wars, dubbing its game 'Mafia Wars.'" *Id.* Zynga then allegedly "posted 'Mafia Wars' on www.myspace.com, Facebook, and other social networks." *Id.* According to Psycho Monkey, Zynga "copied Mob Wars' layout and

arrangement, visual presentation, sequence and flow, scoring system, and Mob Wars' overall look." *Id.* ¶ 19. Psycho Monkey's unfair competition claim directly incorporates the above allegations. *Id.* ¶ 41. Going even further, Psycho Monkey expressly confirms that its unfair competition claim is based upon allegedly "unfair" conduct that constitutes "violations of state and federal copyright laws," and allegedly "unlawful" conduct that constitutes "violations of the state and federal statutes set forth above"—which includes the Copyright Act. *Id.* ¶¶ 43, 45.

These allegations—that Zynga copied Psycho Monkey's game and used it to develop and distribute Zynga's own game—fall squarely within the rights governed exclusively by § 106 of the Copyright Act, mandating preemption. See 17 U.S.C. § 106; Smith & Hawken, Ltd. v. Gardendance, Inc., No. C04-1664 SBA, 2004 WL 2496163, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2004) (Armstrong, J.) (finding California unfair competition counterclaim was "based solely on rights equivalent to those protected by" copyright where infringer allegedly "wrongfully misappropriated, sold and distributed unauthorized duplications" of work); Garman v. Sterling Publ'g Co., Inc., No. C-91-0882 SBA, 1992 WL 12561293, at *7-8 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 1992) (Armstrong, J.) (finding plaintiff's state unfair competition claim preempted by Copyright Act where complaint alleged "defendants published, sold, or distributed the infringing works"); Blue Nile, Inc. v. Ice.com, Inc., 478 F. Supp. 2d 1240, 1247-48, 1250 (W.D. Wash. 2007) (dismissing as preempted by the Copyright Act state law claims for unfair competition and unjust enrichment based on alleged copying of the "look and feel" of plaintiff's website); Higher Gear Group, Inc. v. Rockenbach Chevrolet Sales, Inc., 223 F. Supp. 2d 953, 959 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (holding that the Copyright Act preempted Illinois state law unfair competition claims, because "[t]he crux of the claim [is that defendants] made unauthorized copies of Higher Gear's software, which is the same conduct necessary to support a copyright infringement claim.").

B. The Unfair Competition Claim Involves a Work Within the Subject Matter of the Copyright Act—Specifically, a Computer Video Game.

Likewise, Psycho Monkey's unfair competition claim meets the second prong of the preemption test, because the work in which Psycho Monkey's rights are asserted is a copyrighted computer software program. *See* FAC ¶¶ 9, 10, 14 ("Psycho Monkey registered its work, 'Mob

2728

23

24

25

Where, as here, a state law claim is preempted by the Copyright Act, it is subject to dismissal without more. *See Sybersound Records*, 517 F.3d at 1152 ("[T]o the extent the improper business act complained of is based on copyright infringement, the claim was properly dismissed because it is preempted."); *Smith & Hawken*, 2004 WL 2496163, at *4-5 (Armstrong, J.) (dismissing California statutory and common law unfair competition claims where "based on rights equivalent to those protected by the Copyright Act"); *McCoy v. Scantlin*, No. CV 04-371-GHK, 2004 WL 5502111, at *3-4 (C.D. Cal. June 1, 2004) (dismissing state law claims, including claims for unfair business practices, as preempted by the Copyright Act); *Firoozye*, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 1132 (dismissing certain of plaintiff's state law claims, including unfair competition claims, as preempted by the Copyright Act). Accordingly, Psycho Monkey's unfair competition claim should be dismissed on preemption grounds.¹

¹ That Psycho Monkey's unfair competition claim has pleaded other conduct besides alleged copyright infringement is of no consequence—this Court may still dismiss those portions of the claim that are preempted. *See Sybersound Records*, 517 F.3d at 1152 (finding that "[t]o the extent the improper business act complained of [in a Section 17200 claim] is based on copyright infringement, the claim was properly dismissed because it is preempted"); *Firoozye*, 153 F. Supp. at 1131 (dismissing Section 17200 claim to the extent it relies on preempted conversion claim, but denying motion to dismiss Section 17200 to the extent it relies on claims that are not preempted).

III. PSYCHO MONKEY'S UNFAIR COMPETITION CLAIM FAILS TO ALLEGE AN INCIPIENT VIOLATION OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS, AS IT MUST TO STATE A CLAIM.

Psycho Monkey alleges no facts suggesting that Zynga's conduct threatens an incipient violation of an antitrust law, as it must to state a claim under the "unfair" prong of a Section 17200 claim brought against a competitor.

In actions between direct competitors, "the word 'unfair' in [Section 17200] means conduct that threatens an incipient violation of an antitrust law, or violates the policy or spirit of one of those laws because its effects are comparable to or the same as a violation of the law, or otherwise significantly threatens or harms competition." *Cel-Tech Commc'ns, Inc. v. L.A.*Cellular Tel. Co., 20 Cal. 4th 163, 187 (1999). This requires "some actual or threatened impact on competition," not just harm to a competitor. *Id.* at 186-87.

To determine whether the challenged conduct threatens competition, Section 17200 borrows from the standards in § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act ("FTC Act"). *Id.* at 186. The FTC Act "can prohibit practices 'which conflict with the basic policies of the Sherman and Clayton Acts even though such practices may not actually violate these laws." *Parrish v. Nat'l Football League Players Ass'n*, 534 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1092 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (quoting *FTC v. Brown Shoe Co.*, 384 U.S. 316, 321 (1966)). Accordingly, a plaintiff cannot survive a motion to dismiss its Section 17200 claim unless it adequately pleads that the defendant's conduct "threaten[s] significant harm to competition because of a violation of a recognized policy of antitrust law." *Id.* (citing *Cel-Tech*, 20 Cal. 4th at 186-87). This Psycho Monkey has failed to do.

Psycho Monkey's allegations under the "unfair" prong of Section 17200 are set forth in Paragraph 43 of its amended complaint:

Defendants' actions as alleged above violate the 'unfair' prong of the UCL because (a) the utility of such actions is outweighed by the gravity of the harm they cause to Psycho Monkey, (b) such actions are immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, and substantially injurious to consumers, and (c) such actions constitute incipient violations of state and federal copyright laws.

FAC $\P 43.^2$ These allegations are patently insufficient for two reasons.

First, as discussed in Part II, *supra*, the portion of Psycho Monkey's Section 17200 claim that is based on alleged violations of the Copyright Act (*see id.* \P 43(c)) is completely preempted.

Second, the remaining allegations of "unfair" conduct do not include any facts suggesting that Zynga's alleged conduct constitutes an antitrust violation. See Sybersound Records, 517 F.3d at 1153 (affirming dismissal of Section 17200 claim where plaintiff failed to plead incipient violation of antitrust law). Nor does Psycho Monkey identify a relevant market or market share. See Apple, Inc. v. PsyStar Corp., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1198, 1204 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (dismissing Section 17200 claim where plaintiff failed to allege a relevant market since "a manufacturer's own products do not themselves comprise a relevant product market") (quoting Green Country Food Market, Inc. v. Bottling Group, 371 F.3d 1275, 1282 (10th Cir. 2004)). Nor does the amended complaint allege a contract or agreement in restraint of trade, unfair pricing, or a prima facie case of monopolization or attempted monopolization. See Apple, Inc. v. PsyStar Corp., No. C 08-03251 WHA, 2009 WL 303046, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2009) (denying leave to amend to assert Section 17200 claim based on copyright misuse because plaintiff failed to explain how tying allegations harm competition absent monopolization); Girafa.com v. Alexa Internet, Inc., No. C-08-02745 RMW, 2008 WL 4500858, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 6, 2008) (dismissing Section 17200 claim where plaintiff's failure to "establish a prima facie case of monopolization or attempted monopolization" meant it has not alleged "an incipient violation of antitrust law"). Psycho Monkey's amended complaint also fails to allege how Zynga's purported conduct could harm competition. See Parrish, 534 F. Supp. 2d at 1092-93 (dismissing unfair business practices claim

24

25

26

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

²³

² Psycho Monkey's first two unfair competition allegations are plainly modeled on the pre-Cel-Tech tests articulated by the California Court of Appeal. However, because Psycho Monkey has alleged that Zynga is its direct competitor (see FAC ¶ 6), the pre-Cel-Tech tests are inapplicable. Cel-Tech, 20 Cal. 4th at 187 (finding tests (1) where the court "weigh[s] the utility of the defendant's conduct against the gravity of the harm alleged," and (2) where the practice is "immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous or substantially injurious to consumers" are "too amorphous and provide too little guidance to courts and businesses"). Accordingly, Psycho Monkey's "unfair" allegations do not present a cognizable legal theory and are otherwise immaterial and impertinent. See FAC ¶ 43(a)-(b). They should be dismissed or stricken.

1	where plaintiff did not allege harm to competition in relevant market for licensing retired football
2	players' images).
3	At best, Psycho Monkey alleges that, by posting Mafia Wars on various social network
4	websites, Zynga "wrongfully diverted business away from Psycho Monkey." FAC ¶ 42. This
5	allegation is legally insufficient, however, because Zynga's alleged diversion of business
6	"threatens its <i>competitor</i> [Psycho Monkey], but that is not the same as threatening <i>competition</i> ."
7	Girafa.com, 2008 WL 4500858, at *2 (citing Cel-Tech, 20 Cal. 4th at 186); see also Townshend v.
8	Rockwell Intern. Corp., No. C99-0400 SBA, 2000 WL 433505, at *15 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2000)
9	(Armstrong, J.) (dismissing Section 17200 claim where counterclaimant did "not alleged any
10	injury to competition resulting from [counter-defendants'] conduct").
11	Accordingly, the portion of Psycho Monkey's Section 17200 claim that relies on a
12	violation of the "unfair" prong should be dismissed under Cel-Tech and its progeny.
13	Alternatively, the "unfair" allegations in paragraph 43 of the amended complaint should be
14	stricken as immaterial and impertinent. See Fed R Civ. P. 12(f).
15	<u>Conclusion</u>
16	For the reasons set forth above, Zynga respectfully requests that this Court (1) dismiss with
17	prejudice Psycho Monkey's Section 17200 claim to the extent it is based on alleged violations of
18	the Copyright Act, and (2) dismiss with prejudice Psycho Monkey's Section 17200 claim that
19	Zynga's conduct constitutes an "unfair" business practice or, in the alternative, strike paragraph 43
20	of the amended complaint.
21	DATED: April 2, 2009 QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART OLIVER & HEDGES, LLP
22	HEDGES, LLF
23	By/s/
24	Claude M. Stern Attorneys for Defendant Zynga Game
25	Network, Inc.
26	
27	
28	