## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Plaintiff(s),

v.

AVERY LIEBERMAN, et al.,

Defendant(s).

SLEEP SCIENCE PARTNERS INC.,)

No. C09-4200 CW (BZ)

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL

Before me is plaintiff's motion to compel (Docket No. 63). The only remaining issue is whether defendants have waived the attorney-client privilege for certain documents identified in their privilege log. I find no need for a hearing. For the reasons explained below, plaintiff's motion to compel is DENIED, and defendants are not required to produce any of the privileged documents at issue.

Plaintiff initially argued that defendants waived the attorney-client privilege by asserting an advice of counsel defense and by sharing the communications with third-parties.

The documents plaintiff seeks are mainly communications between defendants and their attorneys regarding the legality of plaintiff's former CEO working for defendants.

According to defendants, however, they are not asserting an advice of counsel defense, and plaintiff's reply accepts this position. Therefore, I only consider the waiver issue.

Plaintiff's waiver challenge is evaluated under the "shared burden" approach. <u>U.S. v. Chevron Corp.</u>, 1996 WL 444597 at \*10-11 (N.D. Cal. 1996). This means that the party asserting the privilege bears the initial burden to establish the communication is privileged. <u>Id.</u> If a party claims there has been a waiver, it bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case of waiver. <u>Id.</u> Once this occurs, the party asserting the privilege bears the ultimate burden of proving that the privilege has not been waived. <u>Id.</u>

Here, defendants complied with their initial burden requirement by showing that the documents were between defendants and their attorneys and contained legal advice about whether plaintiff's former CEO could work for defendants. To meet its prima facie burden of showing waiver, plaintiff contends that defendants had multiple conversations with their investors and plaintiff's former CEO regarding the legal implications of working with the former CEO. Motion to Compel at 8. According to the plaintiff, these conversations with third-parties constitute waiver.

Plaintiff's contention, however, does not result in defendants waiving their attorney-client privilege. Merely disclosing the fact that there were communications or that certain subjects were discussed with attorneys does not constitute waiver. <u>U.S. v. O'Malley</u>, 786 F.2d 786, 796 (7th Cir. 1986); <u>Quiksilver</u>, Inc. v. Kymsta Corp., 247 F.R.D. 579,

584 (C.D. Cal. 2007). Rather, the content of the privileged communication with the attorneys must be shared for there to be waiver. Quiksilver, 247 F.R.D. at 584 ("There is a significant difference between indicating the fact or topic of a confidential [communication] with an attorney and revealing its content. The latter effects a waiver of the attorneyclient privilege, while the former does not.") (citations Thus, for plaintiff to meet its prima facie burden it would have to show that defendants shared the actual content of the legal advice they received from their attorneys with third-parties like the investors or plaintiff's former CEO. Plaintiff has not done this. At most, plaintiff shows that defendants disclosed that they had obtained legal advice. Because there is no showing that the content of this legal advice was shared, plaintiff has not met its prima facie burden.

Nor is plaintiff's prima facie showing not supported by any declarations or affidavits. See Local Rule 7-5 (factual contentions must be supported by a declaration).<sup>2</sup> This is particularly troubling because plaintiff argues in its reply that defendants have not satisfied their ultimate burden because they have not submitted any declarations or evidence

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<sup>24</sup> Perhaps plaintiff did not feel it was necessary to submit a declaration in support of its allegations because the communications that allegedly constituted waiver were marked as confidential. See Motion to Compel at 8, fn. 1.
26 Plaintiff, however, does not explain why a motion to seal would not have alleviated its confidentiality concerns.

Moreover, even if plaintiff decided to not submit the confidential communications, plaintiff was still required to submit a declaration to support the factual allegations it was

to show that communications were not waived. Reply at 3. If I accept this argument from plaintiff — which I would have to if I was to rule in its favor — then I must also apply it to plaintiff. Plaintiff's lack of evidentiary support therefore results in plaintiff not being able to establish its prima facie burden that there was waiver. Without this prima facie showing, the ultimate burden does not shift back to defendants and they do not need to establish there was no waiver.

In its reply, plaintiff raises one new argument that was not discussed in its moving papers. Plaintiff contends that defendants' privilege log is deficient and certain documents are not privileged. While it may be that some documents are not privileged, plaintiff should have raised this challenge it in its moving papers. By first raising it in its reply, plaintiffs improperly deprived defendants of the opportunity to respond. See U.S. v. Romm, 455 F.3d 990, 997 (9th Cir. 2005) ("arguments not raised by a party in its opening brief are deemed waived").4

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff's motion to compel

For instance, defendants' designation of an e-mail from plaintiff's former CEO to defendants was identified as privileged even though there were no attorney senders or recipients. Declaration of Alice A. Kelly: Ex. G, Bate Stamp SW04331.

For the same reason, I do not consider plaintiff's submission in its reply of the investor's deposition. Reply at 3. This submission, once again made without a declaration, comes too late since plaintiff is required to make its prima facie showing in its moving papers (so that the ultimate burden may shift to defendants in the opposition). In any event, excerpts from the deposition only show that defendants obtained legal advice and not that the actual content of the legal advice was disclosed.

is DENIED. Both parties also seek an award of attorneys' fees incurred in this discovery dispute. These requests are improper because they do not comply with Local Rules 7-8(a) and 37-3 which require motions for sanctions to be filed separately and the expenses requested to be itemized. 5 As such, the requests for sanctions are DENIED. Dated: October 25, 2010

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United States Magistrate Judge

Plaintiff is also not entitled to attorneys' fees because its motion is denied.