UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LISA BRABOY,

Plaintiff,

No. C 09-4534 PJH

V.

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

STAPLES, INC., et al.,

Defendants.

Defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings came on for hearing on August 4, 2010 before this court. Plaintiff Lisa Braboy ("plaintiff") appeared through her counsel, Linda Whitehead and Peter Hart. Defendants Staples Inc. ("Staples") and Staples Contract and Commercial, Inc. ("SCCI") (collectively "defendants") appeared through their counsel, Rod Fliegel and Elizabeth Wilson. Having read all the papers submitted and carefully considered the relevant legal authority, the court hereby GRANTS the motion for judgment on the pleadings, as stated at the hearing, and summarized as follows.

- 1. As a preliminary matter, the parties have agreed that plaintiff does not plead, as part of her sixth claim for relief, a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation/omissions under Cal Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. Thus, the only issue that remains for the court's resolution here is whether plaintiff, a former employee of defendant(s), lacks standing to pursue classwide injunctive relief as alleged in her sixth claim for relief.
- 2. Plaintiff's third amended complaint seeks injunctive relief as a remedy for defendants' allegedly wrongful actions in having misclassified/misrepresented documents, agreements, and communications with its employees the misrepresentation being a failure to adequately state which defendant is the employees' employer. See TAC, ¶¶

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67(f), 70-72. However, as a former employee, plaintiff lacks standing to sue for injunctive relief affecting the documents, agreements, and communications between defendants and their employees either now or in the future. See Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 623 (9th Cir. 2010) ("those putative class members who were no longer Wal-Mart employees at the time [p]laintiffs' complaint was filed do not have standing to pursue injunctive or declaratory relief")(citing Walsh v. Nev. Dep't of Human Res., 471 F.3d 1033, 1037 (9th Cir.2006) (recognizing that former employees lack standing to seek injunctive relief because they "would not stand to benefit from an injunction requiring the anti-discriminatory policies [to cease] at [their] former place of work").

To the extent that plaintiff furthermore argues that she seeks injunctive relief on behalf of all employees who may need to accurately state their employer in connection with current or future employment, plaintiff's third amended complaint fails to include any allegations to this effect. Moreover, plaintiff's argument is premised on alleged future injuries that are entirely speculative. As such, plaintiff cannot establish a likelihood of substantial and immediate irreparable injury, such that she has standing to seek injunctive relief. See Hodgers-Durgin v. de la Vina, 199 F.3d 1037, 1042 (9th Cir. 1999)("The equitable remedy is unavailable absent a showing of irreparable injury, a requirement that cannot be met where there is no showing of any real or immediate threat that the plaintiff[s] will be wronged again - a 'likelihood of substantial and immediate irreparable injury").

Accordingly, defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED, with respect to plaintiff's claim for prospective injunctive relief, as a remedy for unfair and/or unlawful conduct as alleged in paragraph 67(f). No leave to amend is granted, as plaintiff was unable to articulate the existence of any allegations that could conceivably cure the foregoing deficiencies.

3. To the extent defendants request early resolution of an additional legal issue purportedly going to the scope of future discovery and class certification – i.e., the 'retail entity' issue – the parties shall raise this issue in connection with briefing on the threshold

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'employer' issue. The parties' motions on these threshold issues shall be limited as follows: neither the opening briefs, nor the opposition briefs, may exceed 15 pages in length. The reply briefs shall not exceed 10 pages in length. The motions will be heard on December 15, 2010.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 6, 2010

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PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON United States District Judge