Petronas's motion to strike should be granted for all eleven of the affirmative defenses in GoDaddy's Answer to Amended Complaint ("Answer"). (Doc. No. 89, filed May 19, 2011).

With respect to its third through eleventh affirmative defenses, GoDaddy does not dispute that those affirmative defenses—as-pled in its Answer—are "[b]are statements reciting mere legal conclusions [that] do not provide a plaintiff with fair notice of the defense asserted, as required by Wyshak [v. City National Bank, 607 F.2d 824, 827 (9th Cir. 1979)]" and Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. CTF Dev., Inc. v. Penta Hospitality, LLC, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99538 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2009). Instead, GoDaddy argues that Petronas's motion to strike is "moot" because "GoDaddy has submitted a motion for leave to amend its answer to, among other things, provide in the pleading the very factual statements Petronas claims are lacking." Opp. at 1:20-23. The fact that GoDaddy has filed a motion to amend its third through eleventh affirmative defenses, however, does not change the fact that those affirmative defenses as-pled its Answer are defective for the reasons set forth in Petronas's motion to strike. And rather than render Petronas's motion "moot," GoDaddy's motion to amend all but concedes the merits of Petronas's motion. As such, and because GoDaddy fails to offer any argument against striking its third through eleventh affirmative defenses as they have been pled in its Answer, Petronas's motion to strike should be granted as to them.

For its first and second affirmative defenses which, unlike its other affirmative defenses, are not addressed by its motion to amend, GoDaddy makes a different argument—namely, that Petronas has been given "ample notice" of those defenses by virtue of GoDaddy's pleadings other than its Answer. According to GoDaddy, its first and second affirmative defenses, which

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¹ This is only partially accurate: GoDaddy's motion to amend deals with GoDaddy's third through eleventh affirmative defenses. It does not seek to make any changes with respect to GoDaddy's first and second affirmative defenses.

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1	allege that the complaint "fails to state a claim" and is barred "by the Lanham Act safe harbor for
2	domain name registrars," should not be stricken because they have "been explained
3	exhaustively" and "set forth in detail" in "GoDaddy's motion for judgment on the pleadings and
4	its motion to dismiss." Opp. at 2:4-24.
5	But by conceding that its first and second affirmative defenses represent nothing more
6	than the arguments it made in its motions for judgment on the pleadings and to dismiss,
7	GoDaddy is conceding that they are, in fact, not affirmative defenses at all. It is well settled that,
8	unlike GoDaddy's first and second 'affirmative defenses,' "[a]n affirmative defense is an
9	assertion raising new facts and arguments that, if true, will defeat plaintiff's claim, even if all the
10	allegations in the complaint are true." E.E.O.C. v. California Psychiatric Transitions, Inc., 725
11	F. Supp. 2d 1100, 1118 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (citing See Saks v. Franklin Covey Co., 316 F.3d 337,
12	350 (2nd Cir. 2003)). As one treatise has observed, "[s]ome lawyers routinely plead as
13	'affirmative defenses' that: 'plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be
14	granted,' [s]uch routine allegations are <i>not</i> recommended [and] are <i>unnecessary</i> because
15	these matters are never waived (FRCP 12(h)(2))." Schwarzer, et al., Federal Civil Procedure
16	Before Trial ¶ 8:1058 (Rutter 2010). As such, GoDaddy's only argument against striking its first
17	and second affirmative defenses establishes merely that they are not 'affirmative defenses' at all
18	and are, in any event, unnecessary.
19	Accordingly, Petronas's motion to strike should be granted in its entirety.
20	Dated: July 19, 2011 LAW OFFICES OF PERRY R. CLARK
21	
22	By:/s/ Perry R. Clark
23	Perry R. Clark Attorney for Plaintiff
24	PETROLIAM NASIONAL BERHAD
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