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8	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA			
9	OAKLAND DIVISION			
10				
11	PETROLIAM NASIONAL BERHAD ("PETRONAS")) Case No.: C09-5939 PJH		
12	Plaintiff,) SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL IN) OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DIMISS		
13	vs.) FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT ¹		
14	GO DADDY.COM, INC.,) Date: March 9, 2011		
15	Defendant.) Time: 9:00 a.m.) Courtroom 3)) Judge: Hon. Phyllis J. Hamilton 		
16				
17	In addition to the reasons set forth in 1	Plaintiff's Opposition to GoDaddy's motion to		
18		enied because GoDaddy does not acknowledge		

dismiss, GoDaddy's motion also should be denied because GoDaddy does not acknowledge much less dispute—that the Complaint pleads facts establishing GoDaddy's "bad faith intent to profit from [the] registration or maintenance of the domain name[s]" at issue in this case and, as a result, the so-called safe harbor provision of the Anticybersquatting Protection Act ("ACPA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1114(2)(D)(iii), does not apply.

¹ This Supplementary Material is filed before Defendant has filed its reply and in compliance with Civil L.R. 7-2(d) ("[O]nce a reply brief is filed, no additional memoranda, papers, or letters may be filed without prior Court approval.").

Specifically, GoDaddy moves to dismiss based on "the ACPA safe harbor" set forth in 15

U.S.C. § 1114(2)(D)(iii):

A domain name registrar, a domain name registry, or other domain name registration authority shall not be liable for damages under this section for the registration or maintenance of a domain name for another *absent a showing of bad faith intent to profit from such domain name registration*.

(emphasis added).

Nowhere in its motion does GoDaddy mention, much less allege, that the Complaint fails to plead facts about GoDaddy's actions and each domain name registration that are insufficient to establish such a "showing of bad faith intent to profit from such registration." GoDaddy's motion does allege—incorrectly—that Count I of the Complaint for direct cybersquatting against GoDaddy should be dismissed because the Complaint does not sufficiently plead facts regarding GoDaddy's "bad faith intent to profit *from that mark*" pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A)(i). Mtn. at 12-13 (emphasis added). But nowhere does GoDaddy's motion make any suggestion that the Complaint fails to establish GoDaddy's "bad faith intent to profit *from [the] domain name registration*" at issue in this case pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1114(2)(D)(iii) (emphasis added). Because the "safe harbor" in ACPA 15 U.S.C. § 1114(2)(D)(iii) would only apply "absent" such a showing of bad faith, and GoDaddy does not contend that the Complaint fails to sufficiently plead facts to make such a showing in the context of a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion, GoDaddy's motion to dismiss should be denied to the extent it is based on 15 U.S.C. § 1114(2)(D)(iii).

 $\begin{array}{c|c} 19 \\ 20 \end{array} \middle| Da$

Dated: February 18, 2011

Respectfully Submitted, Law Offices of Perry R. Clark

/S/

Perry R. Clark

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5	⁵ <i>Guichard v. Universal City Studios, L.L.L.P.</i> , No. C-06-06392 JSW, 2008 WL 2220434		
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	OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AND FOR FEES AND COSTS		
24	Case No.: C09-5939 PJH ii		

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I.

INTRODUCTION

No Rule 8 regarding complaint—entire motion premised that no set of facts, including those identified in support of plaintiff's opposition to the motion for judgment on the pleadings would support a finding in plaintiff's favor. This is the basis for their contention no leave to amend should be granted because any amendment would be futile.

6 Safe harbor for registrars who perform the "act of registering"—if nothing else,
7 defendant's motion must fail because the question of what defendant <u>did</u> is a question of fact. Is
8 it

9 Also, leg history shows that congress never intend the "registering and maintaining" to
10 mean that Registrars should not work with trademark holders. To the contrary, intended that
11 they would.

The statutory scheme also shows that registering and maintaining only to the narrow act of registering the domain name and the acts of keeping it registered (collecting fees).

GoDaddy itself refers to "domain name forwarding" as an "extra feature.

ICANN defines what registrar can charge for (defines registering?)

All cases and treatises and cases refer to act of registering – Lockheed, others, registering defined.

Website same – see chronology – if GoDaddy doing only act of registering when first
transferred, it is disingenuous to argue that "domain name forwarding" started two weeks after
registration was transferred is also just acting as a passive registrant.

BUST – no language in complaint show "GoDaddy not a passive registrar" – see complaint.

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MAINTENANCE?? Means?—act of registering?

BUST on quote on page 3:12-16 to *Lockheed* with info from DC case technology BUST – *Size, Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc.*, 255 F. Supp. 2d 568, (E.D. Va. 2003) (Plaintiff "has not alleged that alleged that it attempted to comply with NSI's [defendant's] established domain name dispute procedures.") ALSO good stuff flea market and Lockheed. Others:

What is "registering"?

"The registrar of Internet domain names, Network Solutions, Inc. ("NSI"), n1 maintains a database of registrations and translates entered domain-name combinations into Internet protocol addresses." *Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton*, 189 F.3d 868, 872 (9th Cir. Cal. 1999).

Licenses – Lockheed accepts:

"In an attempt to fit under Fonovisa's umbrella, Lockheed characterizes NSI's service as a licensing arrangement with alleged third-party infringers. Although we accept Lockheed's argument that NSI licenses its routing service to domain-name registrants, the routing service is just that - a service. In Fonovisa and Hard Rock, by contrast, the defendants licensed real estate, with the consequent direct control over the activity that the third-party alleged infringers engaged in on the premises. Hard Rock, 955 F.2d at 1149; see Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 265." *Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc.*, 194 F.3d 980, 985 (9th Cir. Cal. 1999)

|| OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AND FOR FEES AND COSTS Case No.: C09-5939 PJH