1 pl
2 an
3 F
4 A
5 "6
6 S
7 cc
8 W
9 dc

plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." *Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted). A complaint must proffer "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." *Id.* at 570. The United States Supreme Court has explained the "plausible on its face" standard of *Twombly*: "While legal conclusions can provide the complaint's framework, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. *See West v. Atkins*, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

A supervisor may be liable under § 1983 upon a showing of personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation or a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor's wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation. *Redman v. County of San Diego*, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (citation omitted). A supervisor therefore generally "is only liable for constitutional violations of his subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them." *Taylor v. List*, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). This includes evidence that a supervisor implemented "a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights and is the moving force of the constitutional violation." *Redman*, 942 F.2d at 1446; *see Jeffers v. Gomez*, 267 F.3d 895, 917 (9th Cir. 2001).

II. Exhaustion

A question which must be answered before Plaintiff can proceed with his claims is whether he has exhausted available administrative remedies with respect to each claim.

The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) ("PLRA"), amended 42 U.S.C. § 1997e to provide that "[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Under this section, an action must be dismissed unless the prisoner exhausted his available administrative remedies before he filed suit, even if the prisoner fully exhausts while the suit is pending. See McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1199 (9th Cir. 2002). "[T]he PLRA's exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong." Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). Exhaustion of all "available" remedies is mandatory; those remedies need not meet federal standards, nor must they be "plain, speedy and effective." *Id.* at 524; *Booth v. Churner*, 532 U.S. 731, 739-40 & n.5 (2001). Even when the prisoner seeks relief not available in grievance proceedings, notably money damages, exhaustion is a prerequisite to suit. *Id.* at 741. The purposes of the exhaustion requirement include allowing the prison to take responsive action, filtering out frivolous cases and creating an administrative record. *See Porter*, 534 U.S. at 525.

A prisoner's concession to nonexhaustion is a valid ground for dismissal, so long as no exception to exhaustion applies. *Wyatt v. Terhune*, 315 F.3d 1108, 1120 (9th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 540 U.S. 810 (2003). Accordingly, a claim may be dismissed without prejudice if it is clear from the record that the prisoner has conceded that he did not exhaust administrative remedies. *Id.*

The State of California provides its inmates and parolees the right to appeal administratively "any departmental decision, action, condition or policy perceived by those individuals as adversely affecting their welfare." *See* Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.1(a). It also provides its inmates the right to file administrative appeals alleging misconduct by correctional officers. *See id.* § 3084.1(e). In order to exhaust available administrative remedies within this system, a prisoner must proceed through several levels of appeal: (1) informal resolution, (2) formal written appeal on a CDC 602 inmate appeal form, (3) second level appeal to the institution head or designee, and (4) third level appeal to the Director of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. *See id.*

§ 3084.5; *Barry v. Ratelle*, 985 F. Supp. 1235, 1237 (S.D. Cal. 1997). This satisfies the administrative remedies exhaustion requirement under § 1997e(a). *See id.* at 1237-38.

Here, the record is unclear whether Plaintiff exhausted his claims to the Director's level before filing his federal complaint. Plaintiff did not use the Court's civil rights complaint form; therefore, he lacks information relating to exhaustion of his administrative remedies. Plaintiff contends that he had "utilized" the prison's appeals process "at each requisit[e] ava[ila]ble level of review"; however, he claims that it was an "exercise in futility." (Compl. at 39.) Plaintiff's allegations are conclusory because he does not support them with additional information relating to these appeals, i.e., the dates they were submitted or the specific claims that he attempted to exhaust. It thus appears Plaintiff has not exhausted his administrative remedies as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).

Accordingly, it appears that Plaintiff's claims are unexhausted and subject to dismissal. Therefore, Plaintiff's complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend his complaint to prove that he exhausted all of his claims against each Defendant *before* he filed this action. If Plaintiff did exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to any or all of those claims before filing this action, he may amend his complaint to so allege, as set forth below.

III. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20

As explained above, Plaintiff complaint was not submitted on the Court's civil rights complaint form. Instead, it is a type-written complaint that is forty-three pages long. It contains multiple legal claims and names fifteen Defendants. The complaint is broad, and appears to touch upon multiple acts by Defendants that Plaintiff found objectionable between April 2010 through January 2011.

The complaint alleges several claims that are not properly joined under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20(a) concerning joinder of claims and defendants. Rule 20(a) provides that all persons "may be joined in one action as defendants if there is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative, any right to relief in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action." As described above, Plaintiff's claims cover a broad array of different incidents

by different individuals over the course of approximately nine months. In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff may only allege claims that (a) arise out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and (b) present questions of law or fact common to all defendants named therein. Plaintiff may not include in a single complaint everything that has happened to him over a nine-month period that he finds objectionable. He must choose what claims he wants to pursue that meet the joinder requirements; if he asserts improperly joined claims in his Amended Complaint, they will be dismissed.

IV. Defendants

Plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to show that the remaining named Defendants' actions rise to the level of constitutional violations. As mentioned above, he is attempting to hold fifteen named Defendants liable for the claims in his complaint; therefore, he must allege facts showing what each defendant did that violated his constitutional rights. *See Leer v. Murphy*, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988) (sweeping conclusory allegations will not suffice; the plaintiff must instead set forth specific facts as to each individual defendant's actions which violated his or her rights). In addition, if Plaintiff claims that any of the named Defendants are liable as supervisors, he must allege that these Defendants "participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them." *Taylor*, 880 F.2d at 1045. In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff must link all of the named Defendants to his claims, and no claim for damages can proceed unless Plaintiff does so.

In sum, the Court will allow Plaintiff leave to prepare a proper Amended Complaint that is consistent with federal pleading standards. Plaintiff is advised that for each claim, he must, to the best of his ability, specifically identify each Defendant, and specify what constitutional right he believes each Defendant has violated. Importantly, Plaintiff must allege facts regarding the conduct of each Defendant that he asserts gives rise to that Defendant's liability. A person deprives another of a constitutional right within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §1983 if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative act or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do, that causes the deprivation of which the plaintiff complains. *Leer*, 844 F.2d at 633. There can be no liability under § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or connection between a defendant's

actions and the claimed deprivation. *Rizzo v. Goode*, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); *May v. Enomoto*, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); *Johnson v. Duffy*, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir.1978).

Plaintiff is reminded that his claims must be set forth in short and plain terms, simply, concisely and directly pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 or risk dismissal. *See McHenry v. Renne*, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177, 1177-78 (9th Cir. 1996) (affirming Rule 8 dismissal of complaint that was "argumentative, prolix, replete with redundancy, and largely irrelevant"). To facilitate this, the Court directs Plaintiff to limit his Amended Complaint to **forty (40) pages**. In addition, Plaintiff must use the Court's civil rights complaint form, which will be provided to him. If Plaintiff fails to comply with these straightforward pleading requirements, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff's proposed Amended Complaint. *See id*.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court orders as follows:

- 1. Plaintiff's complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend in order to give him the opportunity to file a **simple, concise and direct** Amended Complaint which:
- a. States clearly and simply each claim he seeks to bring in federal court as required under Rule 8, and he should:
 - i. Set forth **each claim** in a separate numbered paragraph;
 - ii. Identify **each Defendant** and the **specific action or actions each Defendant took, or failed to take,** that allegedly caused the deprivation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights; and
 - iii. Identify the injury resulting **from each claim**;
- b. Explains how he has exhausted his administrative remedies **as to each claim** as against **each Defendant** *before* he filed this action;
- c. Only alleges those claims that are properly joined under Rule 20(a) (concerning joinder of claims and Defendants) or, stated differently, because Plaintiff may not list everything that has happened to him over a nine-month period in prison that he finds objectionable, the Amended Complaint may only allege claims that:
 - i. Arise out of the **same** transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and

1

- through their actions;
- 6 7

5

9 10

8

- 11 12
- 13 14
- 15 16
- 17
- 18 19
- 20
- 22

23

21

- 24
- 25 26
- 27

- d. **Does not** make conclusory allegations linking each Defendant by listing them as having "direct involvement" to his claims without specifying how each Defendant was linked
- Does not name any Defendant who did not act but is linked solely in his or e. her respondent superior capacity or against whom Plaintiff cannot allege facts that would establish supervisorial liability; and
- 3. Within twenty-eight (28) days from the date of this Order, Plaintiff shall file his Amended Complaint as set forth above. Plaintiff must use the attached civil rights form, write the case number for this action -- Case No. C 12-6163 YGR (PR) -- on the form, clearly label the complaint "Amended Complaint," and complete all sections of the form. Because the Amended Complaint completely replaces the original complaint, Plaintiff must include in it all the claims he wishes to present. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 915 (1992). He may not incorporate material from the original complaint by reference. If Plaintiff wishes to attach any additional pages to the civil rights form, he shall maintain the same format as the form, i.e., answer only the questions asked in the "Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies" section without including a narrative explanation of each grievance filed. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint shall not exceed forty (40) pages in length. Plaintiff's failure to file his Amended Complaint by the twenty-eight-day deadline or to correct the aforementioned deficiencies outlined above will result in the dismissal of this action without prejudice.
- 4. It is Plaintiff's responsibility to prosecute this case. Plaintiff must keep the Court informed of any change of address and must comply with the Court's orders in a timely fashion. Pursuant to Northern District Local Rule 3-11 a party proceeding pro se whose address changes while an action is pending must promptly file a notice of change of address specifying the new address. See L.R. 3-11(a). The Court may dismiss without prejudice a complaint when: (1) mail directed to the pro se party by the Court has been returned to the Court as not deliverable, and

(2) the Court fails to receive within sixty days of this return a written communication from the pro se party indicating a current address. See L.R. 3-11(b). 5. Extensions of time are not favored, though reasonable extensions will be granted. Any motion for an extension of time must be filed no later than fourteen (14) days prior to the deadline sought to be extended. The Clerk of the Court shall send Plaintiff a blank civil rights form along with a copy 6. of this Order. IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED: <u>May 1, 2014</u> UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE P:\PRO-SE\YGR\CR.12\Warner6163.DWLA.wpd