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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MANLEY GOUGH, et al., Plaintiffs,

٧.

MICHAEL A. TENNYSON, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 17-cv-2215-PJH

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS

Defendants' motion to dismiss the first amended complaint ("FAC") came on for hearing before this court on August 9, 2017. Plaintiffs appeared by their counsel Dan Feinberg, and defendants appeared by their counsel Joseph Faucher. Having read the parties' papers and carefully considered their arguments and the relevant legal authority, the court hereby DENIES the motion.

BACKGROUND

This is an ERISA case, filed as a proposed class action. Plaintiffs Manley Gough, John Gouveia, and Curtis Bryant are former employees of defendant Tennyson Electric, Inc. ("Tennyson"), a California corporation headquartered in Livermore, California. FAC $\P\P$ 6, 10-11. Plaintiffs are/were participants in the Tennyson Electric, Inc. Employee Stock Ownership Plan ("Tennyson ESOP"), an employee benefit plan as defined by ERISA § 3(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3), and an "employee stock ownership plan" within the meaning of ERISA § 407(d)(6), 29 U.S.C. § 1107(d)(6). FAC ¶¶ 2, 6.

Defendants Michael A. Tennyson, President and Secretary of Tennyson, and Cathleen W. Tennyson, Vice President of Tennyson, are members of defendant Plan Northern District of California

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Committee of the Tennyson ESOP ("Plan Committee"), and are Trustees and fiduciaries of the ESOP. FAC ¶¶ 7-10. Tennyson is the sponsor and Administrator of the ESOP, and allegedly delegated its duties as Plan Administrator to the Plan Committee. FAC ¶ 10.

From 2005 to 2015, Tennyson was owned 100% by the Tennyson ESOP, which had purchased it from Michael and Cathleen Tennyson for \$7.425 million in a 100% leveraged transaction. FAC ¶¶ 12-13. Plaintiffs allege that although the ESOP owned Tennyson from 2005 to 2015, Michael and Cathleen Tennyson continued to exercise "complete control" over the company during that time. FAC ¶ 14.

Tennyson experienced a downturn in work as a result of the 2008 recession. FAC ¶ 15. According to Tennyson's Form 5500s filed with the IRS, the value of the ESOP's company stock declined from \$2.1 million in 2008 to \$1.355 million in 2009, to \$300,000 in 2010, but then rebounded to \$2.637 million in 2012. FAC ¶¶ 15-16.

In 2014, Michael Tennyson decided to buy out the ESOP, and plaintiffs allege that "[d]efendants manipulated the value of the Tennyson stock to lower the share price to their advantage." FAC ¶ 17. Plaintiffs assert that while Tennyson's business remains strong, the ESOP valuation reported on the Plan's 2014 Form 5500 stated that the company stock was worth only \$100,000. FAC ¶ 17.

In 2015, Michael and Cathleen Tennyson, or "an entity controlled by them," purchased the ESOP's company stock for \$100,000, and distributed the proceeds to the ESOP participants. FAC ¶ 18. Plaintiffs claim that the valuation used for this transaction included "improper discounts, including a minority interest discount even though the ESOP owned 100% of the company." FAC ¶ 19. They allege that Michael and Cathleen Tennyson also caused Tennyson to engage in "numerous transactions with related parties, i.e., other companies owned by Michael and Cathleen Tennyson[,]" and that these "related party" transactions were not in the best interests of Tennyson or the ESOP. FAC ¶ 20.

Plaintiffs claim that defendants did not provide pension benefit statements or

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summary annual reports to plaintiffs in the years 2011-2014 as required by ERISA. FAC ¶¶ 21-23. Thus, plaintiffs assert, they were unaware of any valuation of the ESOP's company stock after 2010. FAC ¶ 21. Plaintiffs allege that Michael Tennyson told them he would provide the statements, which had been delayed by accounting issues and needed to be revised, and asked plaintiffs to "trust him." FAC ¶ 22-23.

Plaintiffs allege that in fact, the Plan's third-party administrator had prepared pension benefit statements for ESOP participants, including plaintiffs, and provided them to defendants in a timely manner, but defendants withheld the pension statements from Plan participants in order to conceal their manipulation of the value of Tennyson stock owned by the ESOP, and other fiduciary violations. FAC ¶¶ 24-26. Plaintiffs claim that they were unaware of the true state of facts until after they finally received the pension benefit statements in November 2015. FAC ¶ 27. Plaintiffs also assert that Michael and Cathleen Tennyson "ignored provisions in Plan documents and the stock purchase agreement requiring the appointment of independent directors and/or ESOP trustees." FAC ¶ 29.

Plaintiffs allege that they have been deprived of retirement benefits as a result of violations of ERISA's fiduciary duty rules by the fiduciaries entrusted with overseeing the Plan. FAC ¶ 1. Plaintiffs filed the complaint in the present action on April 20, 2017, and filed the FAC on May 12, 2017. Plaintiffs seek to represent a class of approximately 35 participants in the ESOP during the proposed class period, and an equal number of beneficiaries. FAC ¶ 31.

The FAC alleges three causes of action – (1) a claim of breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA §§ 502(a)(2) and 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(a)(2) and 1132(a)(3), arising from defendants' valuation of Tennyson ESOP stock and the implementation of defendants' decision to terminate the Plan; (2) a claim of engaging in a prohibited transaction forbidden by ERISA § 406(a)-(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)-(b), arising from the 2015 transactions whereby Michael and Cathleen Tennyson regained ownership of Tennyson through Tennyson's purchase of the ESOP participants' stock for \$100,000,

plan and a party in interest" or a party "whose interests are adverse to the interests of the
plan or the interests of its participants;" and (3) a claim for statutory penalties under
ERISA § 502(c)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c)(1)(A), based on defendants' alleged failure to
provide pension benefit statements for 2011-2014 until November 2015.

Defendants now seek an order dismissing the FAC for failure to state a claim.

DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests for the legal sufficiency of the claims alleged in the complaint. <u>Ileto v. Glock</u>, 349 F.3d 1191, 1199-1200 (9th Cir. 2003). A complaint may be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) if the plaintiff fails to state a cognizable legal theory, or has not alleged sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory. <u>Somers v. Apple, Inc.</u>, 729 F.3d 953, 959 (9th Cir. 2013).

asserting that the transactions constituted "a direct or indirect exchange . . . between the

While the court is to accept as true all the factual allegations in the complaint, legally conclusory statements, not supported by actual factual allegations, need not be accepted. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009); see also In re Gilead Scis.

Secs. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008). The complaint must proffer sufficient facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 558-59 (2007) (citations and quotations omitted).

A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79. Where dismissal is warranted, it is generally without prejudice, unless it is clear the complaint cannot be saved by any amendment. Sparling v. Daou, 411 F.3d 1006, 1013 (9th Cir. 2005).

Review is generally limited to the contents of the complaint, although the court can also consider a document on which the complaint relies if the document is central to the claims asserted in the complaint, and no party questions its authenticity. See Sanders v. Brown, 504 F.3d 903, 910 (9th Cir. 2007). That is, the court may consider matters that

are properly the subject of judicial notice, <u>Knievel v. ESPN</u>, 393 F.3d 1068, 1076 (9th Cir. 2005); <u>Lee v. City of L.A.</u>, 250 F.3d 668, 688-89 (9th Cir. 2001), and may also consider exhibits attached to the complaint, <u>see Hal Roach Studios</u>, <u>Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co.</u>, <u>Inc.</u>, 896 F.2d 1542, 1555 n.19 (9th Cir. 1989), and documents referenced in the complaint that form the basis of a the plaintiff's claims. <u>See No. 84 Emp'r-Teamster Jt.</u> <u>Counsel Pension Tr. Fund v. Am. W. Holding Corp.</u>, 320 F.3d 920, 925 n.2 (9th Cir. 2003).

B. Defendants' Motion

Defendants argue that the first two causes of action should be dismissed because the facts as pled do not state a claim under ERISA. They assert that contrary to the description of the structure of the ESOP's termination in the FAC, the governing plan documents for the ESOP show that the ESOP was first terminated, and that the shares were then distributed from the ESOP to Plan Participants. Thus, they assert, at the time of the sale of the shares, the shares were no longer ERISA Plan assets, and that their fiduciary role ended with the termination of the ESOP.

Defendants argue that because the shares were no longer Plan assets at the time of the sale, it was the Internal Revenue Code ("IRC") – not ERISA – which supplied the applicable law. They argue that pursuant to IRC § 409(h)(2), the participants' shares could immediately be repurchased under a "fair valuation" formula. They argue further that while the IRC is similar to ERISA in that it sets forth requirements for employee benefit plans, the IRC does not provide for a private right of action, and thus, plaintiffs cannot bring a claim to enforce the IRC's "fair valuation" requirement.

Defendants contend that the second cause of action (claim of "prohibited transactions") should be dismissed for the further reason that there are no facts pled that satisfy the requirements of § 406(a) and/or § 406(b). Specifically, defendants argue, there are no facts pled showing any sale or exchange of property between the ESOP and a "party in interest," nor showing that any fiduciary dealt with any assets of the Plan in his or her own interest or for his or her own account.

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The court finds that the first and second causes of action raise factual issues that cannot be resolved in the absence of a fully developed record. For example, plaintiffs are in essence challenging the methods used in valuing the company and its shares. Assuming ERISA does apply, rather than the IRC – which is not clear at this stage of the litigation – the court has no ability to resolve the dispute without an evidentiary record.

As for the third cause of action, defendants contend that Tennyson is the only proper defendant, and as Plan Administrator can be liable for the relief provided under ERISA § 502(c)(a)(A). In addition, they argue that this claim should be dismissed to the extent it is based on alleged failures to timely distribute pension benefit statements for the years 2010 through 2013, on statute of limitations grounds. They concede that the claim as to the 2014 statements is not time-barred.

The court finds either that the claims are timely, or that plaintiffs have pled the conditions necessary for the application of equitable estoppel, at least for purposes of the present motion. As for defendants' argument that this cause of action can be asserted only against Tennyson, this issue cannot be decided on a motion to dismiss because factual issues remain with regard to the identity of the Plan Administrator during the relevant period, and with regard to the Plan Administrator's alleged delegation of duties to the Plan Committee and its members.

The motion is DENIED. The court finds that plaintiffs' claims raise factual issues that cannot be resolved in the absence of a fully-developed record.

CONCLUSION

In accordance with the foregoing, defendants' motion to dismiss the FAC for failure to state a claim is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 28, 2017

PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON