1		
2		
3		
4	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT	
5	NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA	
6		
7	CADENCE DESIGN SYSTEMS, INC.,	Case No. 17-cv-04732-PJH
8	Plaintiff,	
9	V.	
10	POUNCE CONSULTING, INC., et al.,	TO DISCOVERY ORDER
		Re: Dkt. No. 172, 173
11	Defendants.	
12		
13	The court is in receipt of plaintiff's objection to part of Magistrate Judge Laporte's	
14	August 14, 2018 discovery order. In that order, inter alia, Judge Laporte "denie[d]	

United States District Court Northern District of California

15 Plaintiff's request to compel Pounce USA to provide emails sent by [Roger] Viera that Pounce USA does not have in its possession, custody, or control." Dkt. 167 at 2 16 (emphasis in original). Plaintiff objects to that part of the order because "as an officer and 17 majority owner of Pounce USA, Viera's documents are necessarily within Pounce USA's 18 possession, custody or control." That is true, according to plaintiff, regardless of whether 19 Viera's emails are stored within Pounce USA's email account or Pounce Mexico's email 20 account. Dkt. 173-1 at 1. Without ruling on the merits of that argument, the court 21 overrules plaintiff's objection for the following reasons. 22

Magistrate judges' rulings on nondispositive motions may be set aside or modified by the district court only if found to be "clearly erroneous" or "contrary to law." FRCP 72(a). The "clearly erroneous" standard applies only to the magistrate judge's findings of fact. A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if the court has a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. <u>Burdick v. Commissioner</u>, 979 F.2d 1369, 1370 (9th Cir.1992). The magistrate judge's legal conclusions are freely reviewable de novo to

28

23

24

25

26

27

determine whether they are contrary to law. See United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1200-01 (9th Cir.1984).

Plaintiff has not shown that Judge Laporte's order was clearly erroneous or contrary to law. Indeed, it is unclear exactly what part of Judge Laporte's order plaintiff contends would meet that standard. Judge Laporte merely "denie[d] Plaintiff's request to compel Pounce USA to provide emails sent by Viera that Pounce USA does not have in its possession, custody, or control." Dkt. 167 at 2 (emphasis in original). In other words, Judge Laporte's order confirmed the unremarkable proposition that Pounce USA is only obligated to produce documents within its custody, possession, or control. Plaintiff's objection to that order is really a request for this court to define in the first instance whether "custody, possession, or control" in Judge Laporte's order required Pounce USA to produce responsive Viera documents. While this court finds it unlikely that a corporation can refuse to produce an officer's responsive documents simply because those documents are technically on another company's email account, Judge Laporte has not had the opportunity to definitively resolve that issue. Tellingly, plaintiff's joint letter brief that precipitated Judge Laporte's order did not raise the present argument or cite any of the same cases cited in plaintiff's present objection.

18 In short, Judge Laporte's order requiring Pounce USA to produce documents 19 within its custody, possession or control, is not clearly erroneous or contrary to law and 20 the court declines plaintiff's invitation to define the scope of that order in the first instance. The request is better raised with Judge Laporte as a motion for clarification. Accordingly, 22 plaintiff's objection to Judge Laporte's order is OVERRULED. Good cause appearing, 23 plaintiff's motion to seal is GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 6, 2018

PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON United States District Judge

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

21

24

25

26

27

28