KING, HOLMES, PATERNO & BERLINER LLP 2914.060\52664.1

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE RE COMBINED OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES

Evidence 201, the Court take judicial notice of the following facts:

- 1. That the Order Granting Motion for Reconsideration and Denying Request for Attorney's Fees, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit A, was entered on February 11, 2005 in the action entitled Perfect 10, Inc. v. CWIE, LLC, et al., United States District Court, Central District of California, No. CV 02-7624 LGB (SHx) (the "February 11 Order"); and,
- 2. The opinion and ruling set forth in the February 11 Order.

The Court may take judicial notice of another court's orders. See Mullis v. United States Bank. Ct. (9th Cir. 1987) 828 F.2d 1385, 1388 fn. 9; FRE 201.

The February 11 Order is a recent California District Court opinion concerning attorneys' fees awards under the Copyright Act, including certain issues relevant to Defendants' pending Motions for Attorneys' Fees.

DATED: March 15, 2005

KING, HOLMES, PATERNO & BERLINER, LLP

By: \s/

SETH MILLER Attorneys for Plaintiff PERFECT 10, INC.

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
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**EXHIBIT "A"** 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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Plaintiff,

v.

CWIE, LLC et al.

Defendant.

CV 02-7624 LGB (SHx)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND DENYING REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES

> THIS CONSTITUTES NOTICE OF ENTRY AS REQUIRED BY FRCP, RULE 77(d).

#### I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Perfect 10, Inc. ("Perfect 10") brought this action against Cavecreek Whole Sale Internet Exchange ("CWIE") and CCBill, LLC (CCBill) and other defendants on September 30, 2002. On June 22, 2004 this Court granted summary judgment on copyright claims in favor of CWIE and CCBill ("Defendants"). On November 9, 2004 Court granted Plaintiff's motion to dismiss its remaining claims without prejudice. The Court issued a final

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and also issued two minute orders that stated no attorney's fees would be awarded. Defendants now bring motions to alter or amend the judgment and add attorney's fees or reconsider the order that denied attorney's fees.

judgment in the case that did not include an attorney's fee award

#### II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On November 9, 2004 the Court granted Plaintiff's motion to dismiss its claims and at that time denied the Defendants' request for attorney's fees. The Court discussed why it did not grant attorney's fees as a condition of the voluntary dismissal but did not address awarding attorney's fees under the Copyright Act. (Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Order to Dismiss under FRCP Rule 41, Nov. 9, 2004 at 6-8.) On December 14, 2004 Defendants moved for reconsideration of the attorney's fee award or to alter the judgment and award attorney's fees. Defendants also brought an application to tax costs. The motions have been fully briefed.

### III. LEGAL STANDARD

Local Rule 7-18 allows a party to move for reconsideration in one of the following situations: (a) a material difference in fact or law from that presented to the court at the time of decision that could not have been known to the moving party at the time of the decision; or (b) the emergence of new material facts or a change of law occurring after the time of the decision; or (c) a manifest showing of a failure to consider material facts presented to the Court before the decision. L.R.

7-18. Reconsideration is appropriate where the district court failed to "fully address" an issue which was important to the court's earlier decision. <a href="Pegasus Satellite Television">Pegasus Satellite Television</a>, Inc. v. <a href="DirectV. Inc.">DirectV. Inc.</a>, 318 F.Supp.2d 968, 979 (C.D. Cal. 2004).

## IV. ANALYSIS

# A. Motion for Reconsideration

Under the Copyright Act, the Court has the discretion to grant a prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees. 17 U.S.C. § 505. In considering whether to award attorney's fees, the Court must seek to promote the Copyright Act's objectives of encouraging the production of original literary, artistic, and musical expression for the good of the public. Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 524 (1994); Magnuson v. Video Yesteryear, 85 F.3d 1424, 1431 (9th Cir. 1996). The Court's prior orders did not address the Copyright Act's objectives. Although the basis cited for this motion is not one of the three set out in Local Rule 7-18, the Court did not fully address its analysis underlying its denial of attorney's fees and, on that basis, the Court shall reconsider.

# B. Attorney's Fees and Costs Under 17 U.S.C. § 505

The Court has discretion to grant attorney's fees to a prevailing party in a copyright action. 17 U.S.C. § 505. To determine whether to grant a prevailing defendant attorney's fees, the district court must determine whether the successful defense of the action furthered the purposes of the Copyright Act. Mattel Inc., v. Walking Mountain Productions, 353 F.3d 792,

816 (9th Cir. 2003). The primary objective of the Copyright Act is to encourage the production of original literary, artistic, and musical expression for the good of the public. Fogerty v: Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 524 (1994). With that objective in mind, the Court considers the following factors: (1) the degree of success obtained; (2) frivolousness; (3) motivation; (4) objective unreasonableness; and (5) the need in particular circumstances to advance considerations of compensation and deterrence. Magnuson, 85 F.3d at 1432.

# 1. The Degree of Success Obtained

The Defendants were completely successful in their defense on the copyright claims based on the safe harbor provisions of the DMCA. (Order Granting in Part and Denying in Party Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment, June 22, 2004 at 36-42.) This factor weighs in support of granting the Defendants attorney's fees.

### 2. Frivolousness

In the Summary Judgment on copyright the Court considered whether Defendants were protected by the safe harbor provisions and whether Plaintiff's notices of infringing materials to CWIE were sufficient to take the Defendants out of the safe harbor provisions. (See Order Granting in Part and Denying in Party Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment, June 22, 2004 at 36-42.) These were novel issues of law, where no binding precedent controlled this Court. See id. As Defendants point out, Plaintiff had successfully obtained a preliminary injunction in

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the similar case, Perfect 10 v. Cybernet Venture, 213 F. Supp. 2nd 1146, 1170-82 (C.D. Cal. 2002), which indicated that it might succeed in this similar action. (Motion at 2.) Plaintiff presented novel legal issues, had a reasonable basis for bringing the suit, and had an interest in protecting its copyrights. was not a frivolous suit and this factor weighs against granting attorney's fees. See Garnier v. Andin Intern'l, 884 F. Supp. 58, 61-62 (D. R.I. 1995).

#### Motivation 3.

The Parties dispute the Plaintiff's motivation in bringing this suit. According to the Defendants, the Plaintiff used this litigation as a means for profit, not to protect its photographic images. (See Motion at 18, 6 Fn. 2.) To support this position, Defendants provide financial records and an explanation of Perfect 10's financial earnings from a previous case that indicate Perfect 10's primary source of income comes from litigation. Id.; (see also Logan Decl. ¶ 15, Exhibits 8-11,14-15); Perfect 10 v. Cybernet Ventures, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 1156-67. Plaintiff counters this position with the declaration of Perfect 10's president, Norman Zadeh, stating that Perfect 10 loses money on copyright litigation and that Perfect 10's motivation is to stop infringement of its images. (See Zadeh Decl. ¶ 14, 7.) The Court cannot determine with any certainty the motivations involved in this suit. This factor weighs neither in support of awarding nor denying attorney's fees.

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In the summary judgment on the copyright claims, Plaintiff took the position that CCBill and CWIE did not qualify for safe harbor protection because CCBill was not transmitting infringing material and CWIE had received notice of its infringement and received direct financial benefit from the infringement. (Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment, June 22, 2004 at 37-42.) Defendants took the positions that they were protected under the language of the safe harbor provisions, and that they had not received adequate notice of infringing materials to take them out of that protection. at 37 - 42. This was a case involving new law with little or no legal precedent such that both parties' positions were reasonable. See Garnier v. Andin Internat'l, 884 F. Supp. 58, 62 (D. R.I. 1995) (attorney's fees not awarded to party litigating a very debatable aspect of the copyright law); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F.Supp.2d 294, 345 (S.D. N.Y. 2000) (inappropriate to award attorney's fees in DMCA test case). Therefore, this factor weighs in favor of not awarding attorney's fees.

5. Need to Advance Considerations of Compensation and Deterrence

The Court's finding on attorney's fees can be informed by considerations of compensation and deterrence, the relative financial strength of the parties, and whether the amount requested is excessive in light of the losing party's resources.

See Garnier v. Andin Internat'l, 884 F. Supp. 58, 63 (D. R.I. 1995). In defending the suit successfully, the Defendants have

benefitted by protecting themselves from being subject to similar suits. Awarding attorney's fees would also punish the Plaintiff for advancing a theory in an unclear area of copyright law.

Furthermore, upon losing this portion of its case, the Plaintiff dismissed its other claims which saved both parties from incurring additional attorney's fees. Given this balance of interests, and the lack of any other circumstances in the record that require compensation and deterrence, this case does not present circumstances that indicate that the Court should award attorney's fees.

# 6. Primary Objective of the Copyright Act

All of the above factors must be considered in light of the primary objective of the Copyright Act: to encourage the production of original literary, artistic, and musical expression for the good of the public. Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 527, 534 (1994). Defendants in this case raised the safe harbor defenses in the DMCA at a time in which the Act was largely untested. The parties advocated their positions diligently, resulting in the furtherance of the analysis of this new law. The Court does not lose sight of the fact that plaintiff had a legitimate claim of infringement and the safe harbor defenses in the DMCA had not been developed at the time of the filing of the claim. After consideration of the factors set out in Fogerty and Magnuson in light of the primary objective of the Copyright Act, the court in its equitable discretion denies attorney fees and costs to Defendants.

## VI. CONCLUSION

Defendants request for attorney's fees and costs is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: Thurry 10, 2005

LOURDES G. BAIRD
United States District Judge

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