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1
                IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
 2
              FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
 3
                          SAN JOSE DIVISION
 4
 5
                                     C-05-00037-JW
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         "THE APPLE IPOD ITUNES
                                      NOVEMBER 23, 2009
                                   )
         ANTITRUST LITIGATION."
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                                      PAGES 1 - 58
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11
                  THE PROCEEDINGS WERE HELD BEFORE
12
                THE HONORABLE UNITED STATES DISTRICT
13
                          JUDGE JAMES WARE
14
        APPEARANCES:
        FOR THE PLAINTIFFS: COUGHLIN, STOIA, GELLER, RUDMAN
15
                            & ROBBINS
16
                            BY: BONNY SWEENEY
                                 THOMAS R. MERRICK
17
                            655 WEST BROADWAY
                            SUITE 1900
18
                            SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA 92101
19
                            ZELDES & HAEGGOUIST
                            BY: HELEN ZELDES
20
                            625 BROADWAY, SUITE 906
                            SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA 92102
21
        FOR THE DEFENDANTS: JONES DAY
22
                            BY: ROBERT A. MITTELSTAEDT
                                 MICHAEL SCOTT
23
                            555 CALIFORNIA STREET
                            26TH FLOOR
24
                            SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94104
25
        OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER: IRENE RODRIGUEZ, CSR, CRR
                                 CERTIFICATE NUMBER 8074
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2	SAN JOSE, CALIFORNIA NOVEMBER 23, 2009
3	PROCEEDINGS
4	(WHEREUPON, COURT CONVENED AND THE
5	FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS WERE HELD:)
6	THE CLERK: CALLING CASE NUMBER 05-00037,
7	THE APPLE IPOD ITUNES ANTITRUST LITIGATION.
8	ON FOR VARIOUS MOTIONS. FIFTEEN MINUTES
9	EACH SIDE FOR ALL MOTIONS.
10	THE COURT: I'M SURE THAT'S NOT GOING TO
11	BE SUFFICIENT BUT
12	MS. ZELDES: THAT'S OUR FIRST MOTION.
13	THE COURT: YOUR FIRST MOTION IS FOR MORE
14	TIME?
15	FIRST INTRODUCE YOURSELVES TO ME.
16	MS. SWEENEY: GOOD MORNING, YOUR HONOR.
17	BONNIE SWEENEY FOR THE DIRECT PURCHASER PLAINTIFFS.
18	MR. MERRICK: GOOD MORNING, YOUR HONOR.
19	THOMAS MERRICK ALSO FOR THE DIRECT PURCHASER
20	PLAINTIFFS.
21	MS. ZELDES: GOOD MORNING, YOUR HONOR.
22	HELEN ZELDES ON BEHALF OF STACY SOMERS THE INDIRECT
23	PURCHASER PLAINTIFFS.
24	MS. ROACH: GOOD MORNING, YOUR HONOR.
25	PAULA ROACH ON BEHALF OF DIRECT PURCHASER

1	DT 3 T3IET T D D 0
1	PLAINTIFFS.

2 MR. MITTELSTAEDT: AND FOR APPLE, YOUR 3 HONOR, BOB MITTELSTAEDT AND MICHAEL SCOTT.

THE COURT: WELL, AS MS. GARCIA DIRECTLY SUMMARIZED IT, WE HAVE VARIOUS MOTIONS.

WE HAVE A MOTION BY THE DIRECT PURCHASER PLAINTIFFS TO MODIFY THE DEFINITION OF THE CLASS TO INCLUDE ITUNE PURCHASERS.

WE HAVE A MOTION, IT DOESN'T SAY BY WHOM,
BUT A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE 23(B)(2)

CLASS, I BELIEVE THAT'S APPLE'S MOTION; A MOTION

FOR DECERTIFICATION OF THE RULE 23(B)(3) CLASS,

THAT MUST BE APPLE'S MOTION AS WELL; AND THEN I

HAVE A SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION

OF THE RULE 23(B)(2) CLASS.

I ACTUALLY WANTED TO HEAR FROM THE

PLAINTIFFS FIRST BECAUSE I APPROACHED THIS WHOLE

PROBLEM AS ONE OF TRYING TO UNDERSTAND WHAT IS THE

PLAINTIFF'S THEORY AND CLAIM.

AND I ACTUALLY WONDERED WHETHER OR NOT
THE MOTION TO MODIFY THE CLASS WAS AT THE INSTANCE
OF THE PLAINTIFFS THEMSELVES OR WHETHER OR NOT THEY
TOOK THE COURT'S QUESTION AS BEING THE ONLY REASON
FOR THE MODIFICATION.

I KNOW THAT THERE ARE ISSUES OF MOOTNESS

1	AND OTHERS THAT ARE RAISED WITH RESPECT TO WHETHER
2	OR NOT THE COURT SHOULD CHANGE THE DEFINITION, BUT
3	I DID WANT TO HEAR THE MOTIVATIONAL STATEMENT.
4	MR. MERRICK: AGAIN, THOMAS MERRICK FOR
5	THE DIRECT PURCHASER PLAINTIFFS, YOUR HONOR.
6	YES, I WOULD SAY THAT THE COURT'S JULY
7	17TH, ORDER ASKING FOR ADDITIONAL BRIEFING WAS ONE
8	OF OUR PRIMARY MOTIVATING FACTORS.
9	WHAT IT DID IS, I THINK, SHOWED UP
10	RIGHTFULLY SO, WHICH THE COURT IS CORRECT IN
11	SEEING, THAT THERE WAS A GAP IN THE INJUNCTIVE
12	RELIEF CLASS THAT COULD ONLY BE CURED IF WE ALSO
13	INCLUDED ITUNES PURCHASERS.
14	SO I WOULD HOPE THAT ANSWERS YOUR INITIAL
15	QUESTION, BUT THAT WAS OUR MOTIVATING FORCE.
16	THE COURT: WELL, THIS IS ON THE MONOPOLY
17	CLAIM?
18	MR. MERRICK: CORRECT.
19	THE COURT: STATE FOR ME AS CLEARLY AS
20	YOU CAN WHAT IS THE CLAIM THAT WOULD THEN ENCOMPASS
21	THE ITUNE PURCHASERS AS PART OF THAT CLASS.
22	MR. MERRICK: WELL, THE MONOPOLIZATION
23	CLASS, OR CLAIM RATHER, UNLIKE THE TYING CLAIM, IS
24	BASED ON SOME SIMILAR ASPECTS TO THE TYING CLAIM
25	BUT NOT ALL.

1	THE MONOPOLIZATION AND ATTEMPTED
2	MONOPOLIZATION CLAIMS ARE BASED ON APPLE'S
3	MAINTENANCE AND ACQUISITION OF MONOPOLY POWER IN
4	THE MUSIC PLAYER MARKET, THE ON-LINE MUSIC MARKET,
5	AND THE ON-LINE VIDEO MARKET PER THE COMPLAINT.
6	THAT BEING THE CASE, THE (B)(2) CLASS
7	SEEKING INJUNCTIVE RELIEF WOULD BE TRYING TO IS
8	AIMED AT REMEDYING ALL OF THAT CONDUCT, THE
9	MONOPOLIZATION CONDUCT ON ALL THREE OF THOSE
10	FRONTS.
11	THE COURT: I MISSED THE THIRD. THE
12	MONOPOLY IN THE PLAYER MARKET, THE MUSIC MARKET AND
13	THE?
14	MR. MERRICK: VIDEO MARKET.
15	THE COURT: AND THE VIDEO MARKET.
16	MR. MERRICK: THE ON-LINE.
17	THE COURT: AND THIS WAS ACCOMPANIED
18	WITHOUT ANY CHANGES IN THE PLEADINGS. SO I'M TO
19	RELY ON THE CURRENT PLEADINGS FOR THAT PURPOSE?
20	MR. MERRICK: CORRECT, YOUR HONOR. AND
21	THIS IS THE CLASS THAT WE'RE MOVING ON NOW, THAT
22	WE'RE MOVING TO HAVE THE DEFINITION CHANGED TO, IS
23	THE SAME CLASS AS WHAT WAS PLED IN THE COMPLAINT
24	ORIGINALLY.
25	THE COURT: YES. ALL RIGHT.

1	NOW, GOING TO THE MONOPOLY CLAIM, STATE
2	AS CLEARLY AS YOU CAN WHAT THAT CLAIM IS.
3	MR. MERRICK: WELL, APPLE'S OVERALL USE
4	OF INTEROPERABILITY, IF I CAN PUT IT AS SUCCINCTLY
5	AS THAT; THEIR MARKET POWER WITHIN THE MUSIC PLAYER
6	MARKET FOR IPODS; THEIR MARKET POWER WITHIN THE
7	ITUNES MUSIC STORE MARKET WORKING TOGETHER CREATED
8	A MAINTENANCE OF MONOPOLY POWER IN THOSE MARKETS
9	WHICH THEN LED TO A HARM TO COMPETITION, THE LACK
10	OF INTEROPERABILITY, INJURY TO THE CONSUMERS,
11	HIGHER PRICES, SUPPLY AND SELECTION OF COMPETING
12	PRODUCTS WAS DAMPENED DUE TO THE MONOPOLY. THE
13	NUMBER AND EFFECTIVENESS OF COMPETITORS WOULD BE
14	DIMINISHED, AND THAT'S SORT OF A NUTSHELL OF OUR
15	ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT.
16	THE COURT: THE CLARITY OF THAT IS YET TO
17	GET TO ME, AND I'M TRYING TO ASK YOU THESE
18	QUESTIONS BECAUSE IT DOES SEEM TO ME THAT IF I'M
19	GOING TO MODIFY ANYTHING, I NEED TO UNDERSTAND
20	BETTER WHAT IT IS THAT WOULD BE CAPTURED BY IT.
21	I ACTUALLY NEED TO STUDY THIS BETTER
22	BEFORE I'M IN A POSITION TO GRANT THIS
23	MODIFICATION.
24	WHAT I WORRY ABOUT IS THAT THE
25	INTEROPERABILITY IS THE EVIL THAT IS BEING ALLEGED.

1	IN OTHER WORDS, THAT IT'S NOT DRM, WHICH
2	IS SOMETHING THAT PERHAPS IS IMPOSED BY THE OWNER
3	OF THE COPYRIGHT, BUT IT IS WHATEVER IS CALLED
4	INTEROPERABILITY.
5	MR. MERRICK: I CAN ADDRESS THAT I THINK,
6	YOUR HONOR.
7	THE COURT: ALL RIGHT.
8	MR. MERRICK: A COUPLE HEARINGS AGO THE
9	COURT STATED SOMETHING THAT I THOUGHT PUT IT VERY
LO	SUCCINCTLY, WHICH IS THAT THERE IS DRM AND THEN
L1	THERE IS APPLE'S DRM.
L2	APPLE'S DRM MADE IT SO THAT ONLY THE
L3	DOWNLOADS WOULD ONLY WORK WITH AN APPLE AND THAT
L 4	ONLY APPLE IPODS COULD SYNC WITH ITUNES.
L5	THE RECORD LABELS DID WANT DRM. THAT
L 6	PART WE DO AGREE WITH.
L7	HOWEVER, THE RECORD LABELS ALSO WERE IN
L 8	FAVOR OF INTEROPERABILITY WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN
L 9	WHICH IS THE REASON WHY WHICH IS OUR REAL MAJOR
20	COMPLAINT.
21	WE UNDERSTAND THAT THERE NEEDS TO BE SOME
22	COPYRIGHT PROTECTION, BUT THE WAY THAT APPLE WENT
23	ABOUT DOING THAT THROUGH ITS OWN PROPRIETARY DRM
24	A GREATER EXAMPLE IS AN E-MAIL THAT WE FILED UNDER
25	SEAL THAT IS ATTACHED TO A DECLARATION IN THE REPLY

1	BRIEF ON THAT THE MOTION FOR REDEFINING THE
2	CLASS WHERE APPLE INTERNALLY IS TALKING ABOUT ONE
3	OF THE RECORD LABEL'S REACTION TO REAL NETWORKS
4	CHANCE OR I'M SORRY EFFORTS TO MAKE THEIR
5	MUSIC STORE IN A SENSE BE ABLE TO WORK WITH AN
6	IPOD.
7	AND WHAT HAPPENED IS THAT THEY WENT TO
8	THE RECORD LABELS AND SAID WHAT DO YOU THINK? AND
9	IN THE E-MAIL THE RECORD LABELS SAID WE DON'T HAVE
10	A PROBLEM AND OUR CONCERN WOULD BE
11	INTEROPERABILITY. WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE APPLE
12	LICENSE TO REAL AND SO IT WOULD GIVE US MORE
13	OPPORTUNITY TO SELL OUR PRODUCT.
14	AGAIN, WE'RE GETTING INTO EVIDENCE BASED
15	ISSUES AND FACT BASED ISSUES, AND I THINK THAT'S
16	KIND OF AN EXAMPLE OF THE KIND OF ACTIVITY THAT
17	WE'RE ALLEGING.
18	THE COURT: SO THAT THE CLASS NEEDS TO
19	INCLUDE THE PURCHASERS OF MUSIC?
20	AND IS THAT ALL PURCHASERS OF MUSIC?
21	MR. MERRICK: FROM ITUNES, YES. THE
22	REASON IT NEEDS TO INCLUDE PURCHASERS OF MUSIC IS
23	THAT AFTER THERE'S APPLE DID STOP USING DRM IN
24	ITS ITUNES DOWNLOADS IN JANUARY OF 2009, BUT THE

800 POUND GORILLA, THE ELEPHANT IN THE ROOM AS IT

1	WERE WOULD STILL BE 5 BILLION LOCKED SONGS THAT ARE
2	STILL IN EXISTENCE. AND THAT'S AFTER THE DRM IS NO
3	LONGER BEING USED. THAT'S WHAT THE FOCUS OF THE
4	(B)(2) CLASS WOULD BE AND ALSO THE VIDEO, THE VIDEO
5	STILL HAS DRM IN IT AS WELL.
6	THE COURT: WHEN IT STOPPED DRM, IT
7	STOPPED ITS DRM OR IS IT ALL DRM'S?
8	MR. MERRICK: ALL.
9	THE COURT: ALL HAS BEEN STOPPED. SO IF
LO	YOU BUY THE MUSIC, YOU'RE THEN ABLE TO DUPLICATE IT
11	MULTIPLE TIMES, YOU CAN TRANSFER IT MULTIPLE TIMES.
L2	THE COPYRIGHT OWNER HAS LOST ANY CONTROL OVER ITS
L3	DISTRIBUTION.
L 4	MR. MERRICK: HOW MUCH CONTROL THEY LOST
L5	I'M NOT SURE BUT THEY DON'T HAVE THE DRM ON IT NOW,
L 6	BUT, AGAIN, YOU STILL HAVE FIVE BILLION LOCKED
L7	SONGS.
L 8	THE COURT: AND SO THE FOCUS WOULD BE ON
L 9	THE PURCHASERS OF ITUNES WHO REMAIN HAVING DRM,
20	APPLE DRM PROTECTED MUSIC?
21	MR. MERRICK: CORRECT.
22	THE COURT: AND ONLY THOSE?
23	MR. MERRICK: WELL, THE CLASS WOULD
24	CONSIST AS PLED, WOULD CONSIST OF BOTH IPOD BUYERS
25	AND THE ITUNES BECAUSE, AGAIN, THE MONOPOLIZATION

1	IS LARGER THAN JUST THE LOCKED SONGS LEFT IN IT.
2	IT HAS TO DO WITH THE LACK OF INTEROPERABILITY.
3	THE COURT: AND WHAT IS THE HARM TO
4	COMPETITION WITH RESPECT TO THE IPOD PURCHASERS?
5	THEY'RE ABLE TO DOWNLOAD THE APPLE DRM PROTECTED
6	MUSIC?
7	MR. MERRICK: THEY ARE, BUT THE IDEA
8	THERE IS THAT HAVING THE DRM ON IT AT THE TIME
9	IMPACTED WHETHER THEY COULD USE COMPETING SOURCES
LO	AND WHETHER COMPETING SOURCES COULD USE THEIR,
11	COULD USE ITUNES. SO IT'S BOTH.
_2	THE COURT: WELL, WHY WOULD THE
L3	PURCHASERS I SEE, SO THE PURCHASER OF THE IPOD,
L 4	IT'S NOT SO MUCH WHAT IS ENCODED INTO THE MUSIC, IT
L5	IS WHAT IS ENCODED INTO THE PLAYER SO THAT IT IS
L 6	NOT ABLE TO PLAY OTHER MUSIC.
L7	MR. MERRICK: THAT'S PART OF IT, TOO,
L 8	YOU'RE RIGHT.
L 9	THE COURT: PART OF IT, TOO? THAT'S THE
20	WHOLE POINT OF THE DRM PART OF THE CLASS WITH
21	RESPECT TO THE PLAYER; RIGHT?
22	MR. MERRICK: RIGHT.
23	THE COURT: THAT THE PLAYER ITSELF WON'T
24	DECODE OTHER MUSIC.
25	MR. MERRICK: AND IF THEY HAVE DOWNLOADED

1	ANY MUSIC INTO THEIR IPOD, THAT MEANS THAT IT'S
2	TIED INTO ONLY AN IPOD AND THEY COULDN'T BUY A
3	COMPETING PLAYER.
4	THE COURT: VERY WELL. LET ME TAKE THAT
5	AS THE EXPLANATION OF THE WHY. NOW LET'S GO TO THE
6	WHY NOT?
7	MR. MITTELSTAEDT: FIRST OF ALL, YOUR
8	HONOR, ON THE SECTION 2 CLAIM AND WHAT IT IS,
9	ACCORDING TO THE COMPLAINT THEY ARE SIMPLY
10	REALIZING AND INCORPORATING BY REFERENCE ALL OF THE
11	PREVIOUS ALLEGATIONS, THE ALLEGATIONS THAT DEALT
12	WITH TYING.
13	AS I READ THE COMPLAINT, YOUR HONOR,
14	THEIR SECTION 2 CLAIM IS THE SAME THING AS THEIR
15	TYING CLAIM.
16	THE COURT: I AGREE WITH YOU. AS I
17	UNDERSTAND IT, ALTHOUGH THE TECHNOLOGICAL TIE
18	DOESN'T WORK, AS FAR AS THE COURT IS CONCERNED, AS
19	A STRICT TYING CLAIM, THEY ARE REALLEGING IT AS A
20	SECTION 2 CLAIM.
21	MR. MITTELSTAEDT: YES. AND AT THE
22	APPROPRIATE TIME, AND I THINK IT DOES BEAR ON WHAT
23	WE'RE TALKING ABOUT THIS MORNING, OUR POSITION IS
24	GOING TO BE THAT UNDER FOREMOST PRO, THE NINTH
25	CIRCUIT CASE YOUR HONOR HAS RELIED ON, BECAUSE THE

1	TYING CLAIM, THE CONDUCT UNDERLYING THE TYING CLAIM
2	IS NOT ANTICOMPETITIVE IT, IN THE WORDS OF THE
3	NINTH CIRCUIT IN <u>FOREMOST PRO</u> , QUOTE, "IS OF NO
4	ASSISTANCE TO THE PLAINTIFF'S EFFORTS TO STATE A
5	CLAIM FOR RELIEF FOR MONOPOLIZATION AND ATTEMPTED
6	MONOPOLIZATION, BOTH OF WHICH REQUIRE AT LEAST SOME
7	ALLEGATION OF ANTICOMPETITIVE CONDUCT."
8	THE
9	THE COURT: WELL, WAS FOREMOST PRO A
10	SECTION 2 CASE?
11	MR. MITTELSTAEDT: IT WAS BOTH A TYING
12	CASE AND A SECTION 2 CASE AFTER FINDING THAT THE
13	INTRODUCTION OF TECHNOLOGICALLY RELATED PROJECTS
14	ALONE WAS NOT AN ANTICOMPETITIVE ACT, EVEN IF, AS
15	THE NINTH CIRCUIT SAID, THE PRODUCTS WERE
16	INCOMPATIBLE WITH PRODUCTS OFFERED BY COMPETITORS.
17	AFTER THE COURT FOUND THAT AND THROUGHOUT
18	THE SECTION 1 TYING CLAIM, THE COURT WENT ON TO
19	FIND THAT THAT SAME CONDUCT WAS OF NO ASSISTANCE TO
20	THE PLAINTIFF IN TRYING TO ESTABLISH A SECTION 2
21	CLAIM.
22	SO I THINK THAT THAT BEARS ON WHETHER THE
23	PLAINTIFF SHOULD GET A CLASS CERTIFIED HERE.
24	THE OTHER ASPECT OF THEIR CLAIM, YOUR
25	HONOR, AT BOTTOM, AS YOUR HONOR HAS RECOGNIZED

BEFORE, IS THEY ARE SAYING THAT APPLE SHOULD HAVE
USED MICROSOFT'S DRM OR IT SHOULD HAVE LICENSED
FAIR PLAY TO COMPETITORS.

OUR POSITION IS THAT THERE IS SIMPLY NO ANTITRUST DUTY ON AN INNOVATIVE COMPANY TO DO EITHER OF THOSE THINGS.

THE IDEA THAT MICROSOFT COULD COME INTO
THIS COURT, FOR EXAMPLE, AND SUE APPLE FOR NOT
USING MICROSOFT SOFTWARE, AND THAT MICROSOFT, IF
THEY CAN'T DO THAT, CONSUMERS SHOULD NOT BE ABLE TO
DO THAT STANDING IN THE SHOES OF MICROSOFT.

THE COURT: WELL, LET ME SEE IF I CAN

STATE THE CLAIM AS I HAVE ARTICULATED IT TO MYSELF,

AND THIS IS JUST A SUMMARY. IT'S NOT NECESSARILY

WHAT THE PLAINTIFF WOULD AGREE TO BE THEIR CLAIM.

AS I HAVE ARTICULATED IT TO MYSELF, THE PLAINTIFFS ARE CLAIMING THAT APPLE HAS MONOPOLY POWER IN MUSIC AND THAT USING ITS MONOPOLY POWER IN MUSIC, IT LEVERAGES THAT MARKET PLAYER TO EXTRACT A PREMIUM WITH RESPECT TO PLAYERS BY TECHNOLOGICAL TYING BETWEEN THE MUSIC AND THE PLAYER SUCH THAT IF YOU WANT TO ENJOY THIS 60, 70 PERCENT -- I'VE SEEN DIFFERENT NUMBERS WITH RESPECT TO THE POWERS IN MUSIC -- IF YOU WANT TO ENJOY THE BENEFIT OF THAT MUSIC, YOU HAVE TO BUY A PLAYER.

1	AND SO IT LEVERAGES ITS MARKET POWER IN
2	MUSIC TO EXTRACT A PREMIUM FROM THE MARKET IN
3	PLAYERS.
4	NOW, I HAVEN'T QUITE SORTED OUT YET, AS
5	I'M STRUGGLING WITH THIS CASE, WHAT THAT DOES IN
6	TERMS OF WHO SHOULD BE IN THE CLASS, BUT THAT
7	AND THEN I HAVE ALSO SEEN IN THE PLAINTIFF'S
8	COMPLAINT THAT APPLE HAS AN 80 PERCENT MARKET SHARE
9	IN PLAYERS, BUT IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THIS CASE
10	STARTED OUT WITH BOTH TECHNOLOGIES, THE MUSIC AND
11	THE PLAYERS IN THE BALANCE. AND WE'RE TRYING TO
12	WORK OUR WAY THROUGH EXACTLY WHAT IS THE THEORY AND
13	WHAT SHOULD BE THE CLASS GIVEN THAT THEORY AND THE
14	RELIEF THAT IS BEING SOUGHT.
15	MR. MITTELSTAEDT: UNDERSTOOD. AND I'M
16	FOCUSSING ON THE FIRST PART, YOU KNOW, WHAT IS
17	THEIR CLAIM AND THEN I'LL GET QUICKLY TO THE SECOND
18	PART WHAT DOES THAT IMPLY FOR THE CLASS ISSUE.
19	BUT ON THE WAY THAT YOUR HONOR STATED
20	THEIR CLAIM, I AGREE, I THINK, THAT THAT'S THE WAY
21	THEY STATE IT. BUT THERE ARE TWO THINGS WRONG WITH
22	THAT.
23	FIRST OF ALL, AS YOUR HONOR HAS FOUND,
24	IT'S NOT A MATTER IT'S NOT ACCURATE THAT ITUNES
25	MUSIC CANNOT PLAY ON AN IPOD, ON AN IPOD

1	COMPETITOR.
2	AS YOUR HONOR FOUND IN THE LAST ORDER,
3	IT'S JUST A MATTER OF USING ANOTHER STEP OR TWO IN
4	ORDER TO PLAY THAT MUSIC ON COMPETING PLAYERS.
5	SO THE ABSOLUTE NATURE OF THAT THE
6	PLAINTIFF'S STATEMENT OF THEIR CASE IS JUST
7	CONTRARY TO THE FACTS.
8	THE OTHER POINT, THOUGH, AND THIS IS MORE
9	IMPORTANT, IS WHAT THE PLAINTIFFS ARE DOING IS
10	DESCRIBING THEIR CLAIM IN A FAIRLY GENERIC HIGH
11	LEVEL WAY.
12	BUT WHEN YOU UNRAVEL THAT, WHAT THE CLAIM
13	AMOUNTS TO IS THAT APPLE WAS REQUIRED TO USE SOME
14	TYPE OF ANTI-PIRACY DRM. APPLE HAD A CHOICE OF
15	USING MICROSOFT'S, AT LEAST THEORETICALLY, OR
16	DEVELOPING ITS OWN. AND IT CHOSE TO USE ITS OWN.
17	AND THE PLAINTIFFS HAVE NOT COME UP WITH
18	ANY COHERENT THEORY ABOUT WHY THAT IS AGAINST THE
19	ANTITRUST LAWS.
20	THE COURT: WELL, AS I UNDERSTAND THE
21	THEORY AND I AM ONLY DOING IT THIS WAY AS
22	OPPOSED TO HAVE THE PLAINTIFF DOING IS TO KEEP YOU
23	TALKING.
24	IS THAT THE REASON THEY DEVELOPED THEIR

IS THAT THE REASON THEY DEVELOPED THEIR
OWN IS TO SELL PLAYERS AT A PREMIUM. IN OTHER

25

1	WORDS,	ΤТ	SAW	Δ	MARKET	THAT	ΤТ	COIII.D	DEVELOP.
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IT COULD HAVE DEVELOPED ITS OWN IN A FASHION THAT WOULD NOT HAVE RESTRICTED THE MUSIC TO OTHER PLAYERS, BUT IT CHOSE TO RESTRICT THE MUSIC TO ITS PLAYER AS PART OF ITS DEVELOPMENT EFFORT.

THE ANTICOMPETITIVE MOTIVATION WAS NOT TO PROTECT THE COPYRIGHT OWNER BUT IT WAS TO MAKE -TO HARM COMPETITION AND PLAYERS THAT COULD PLAY THE MUSIC.

MR. MITTELSTAEDT: BUT, YOUR HONOR, WHEN A COMPANY IS DECIDING ON DESIGNING A PRODUCT OR LAUNCHING A NEW PRODUCT, IT'S MOTIVATION TO TRY AND SELL MORE COMPLEMENTARY PRODUCTS, TO TRY AND GET AN ADVANTAGE OVER COMPETITORS. THAT MOTIVATION IS NOT ENOUGH TO STATE A SECTION 2 VIOLATION.

I MEAN, THE ISSUE IS DOES A COMPANY

DEVELOPING A NEW PRODUCT HAVE ANY ANTITRUST DUTY TO

MAKE THAT PRODUCT INTEROPERABLE WITH COMPETITOR'S

PRODUCTS.

AND THE ANTITRUST CASES ARE LEGION THAT SAY THAT A COMPANY DOES NOT HAVE TO DO ANYTHING TO HELP COMPETITION.

SO -- AND I THINK THAT THAT PRINCIPLE IS ENCAPSULATED WELL IN SAYING THIS, YOUR HONOR, THE PLAINTIFFS, ONE OF THEIR THEORIES IS THAT APPLE

1	SHOULD HAVE USED MICROSOFT'S DRM INSTEAD OF
2	DEVELOPING ITS OWN.
3	THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN ONE AT LEAST
4	THEORETICAL WAY TO HAVE MORE INTEROPERABILITY. BUT
5	THERE'S JUST NOTHING IN THE ANTITRUST LAWS THAT
6	SAYS THAT APPLE WAS REQUIRED TO DO THAT.
7	SO, YOU KNOW, THAT, I MEAN, THAT IS, I
8	THINK, HORNBOOK ANTITRUST LAW. NO DUTY TO HELP
9	COMPETITORS. NO DUTY TO DESIGN YOUR PRODUCTS IN A
LO	WAY THAT MAKE THEM INOPERABLE.
L1	YOU THINK ABOUT THE RAMIFICATIONS OF
L2	THEIR THEORY. APPLE COULD NOT HAVE LEGALLY UNDER
L3	THEIR THEORY BROUGHT THE IPOD TO MARKET OR THE
L 4	ITUNES MUSIC STORE TO MARKET UNLESS IT INVESTED
L5	ENOUGH MONEY TO MAKE THOSE THINGS INTEROPERABLE
L 6	WITH COMPETITOR'S PRODUCTS.
L7	THAT WOULD THWART INNOVATION, AND THAT'S
L 8	WHAT THE NINTH CIRCUIT SAID IN FOREMOST PRO. YOU
L 9	SIMPLY DON'T HAVE TO MAKE YOUR PRODUCTS
20	INTEROPERABLE WITH OTHERS. THAT WOULD STOP THE
21	INNOVATION, AND THAT'S WHY THERE'S NO ANTITRUST
22	DUTY TO DO THAT.
23	THE COURT: I KNOW THIS IS EVIDENTIARY IN
24	NATURE, BUT MY MIND IS DRAWN TO A CIRCUMSTANCE THAT

I HAVE HEARD AT SOME POINT ALONG THE WAY IN THIS

LITIGATION WHERE THAT EVEN THOUGH IT HAD DEVELOPED ITS OWN VERSION OF DRM, WHEN A COMPETITIVE PRODUCT THAT CAME ALONG THAT COULD USE IT, APPLE DID SOMETHING TO CHANGE ITS VERSION OF DRM TO MAINTAIN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE MUSIC AND THE DIRECT DOWNLOAD TO THE IPOD. I AGREE WITH YOU THERE ARE INDIRECT WAYS TO DO IT.

AND SO SHOULDN'T THE COURT AT LEAST ALLOW
THIS TO PROCEED TO THE POINT WHERE I CAN LEARN MORE
ABOUT THAT THROUGH DISCOVERY? I DON'T KNOW IF
CHANGING THE CLASS DEFINITION IS THE WAY -- THE
ROUTE TO THAT BUT WHY SHOULDN'T I PAY ATTENTION TO
THAT?

MR. MITTELSTAEDT: THE ALLEGATION IS THAT A YEAR AND A HALF AFTER THE ITUNES MUSIC STORE WAS LAUNCHED, SO NOW WE'RE UP TO OCTOBER OF 2004, REAL NETWORKS DEVELOPED SOME TYPE OF DRM THAT MIMICKED FAIR PLAY.

AND SO WHEN REAL NETWORKS SOLD MUSIC ON THEIR MUSIC STORE, IT WAS INTERPRETED BY THE IPOD AS APPLE'S FAIR PLAY DRM PROTECTED MUSIC.

THE WAY THEY DID THAT, AND THIS IS

ALLEGED IN THE COMPLAINT, IS REAL NETWORKS WAS ABLE

TO, IN THE WORDS OF THE COMPLAINT, DISCERN PART OF

APPLE'S SOFTWARE CODE, PART OF THEIR CODE FOR THE

1	
1	I DRM

APPLE IS UNDER A STRICT CONTRACT WITH THE LABELS, WAS AT THE TIME, TO MAINTAIN THE SECURITY OF ITS DRM FOR OBVIOUS REASONS.

AND SO THIS WAS AN INSTANCE WHERE THE

COMPETITOR HAD BEEN ABLE TO, WHETHER BY HACKING,

REVERSE ENGINEERING, OR OTHERWISE, FIGURE OUT PART

OF THE SOFTWARE CODE.

APPLE, LIKE ALL SOFTWARE MANUFACTURERS,
PERIODICALLY UPDATES ITS SOFTWARE FOR A VARIETY OF
REASONS, FIXING BUGS, STAYING A STEP OR TWO AHEAD
OF HACKERS OR WHATEVER.

AND AS THE EVIDENCE WILL SHOW THAT APPLE
WAS PLANNING A SOFTWARE UPGRADE AND WENT AHEAD AND
INSTITUTED THAT. THE EFFECT OF THAT SOFTWARE
UPDATE WAS TO BLOCK THIS HACK.

REAL COULD COME BACK AND TRY TO REHACK AROUND THE SOFTWARE UPDATE.

WE ARE PROVIDING DISCOVERY TO THE
PLAINTIFFS ON THAT INCIDENT. THE PLAINTIFFS HAVE
ASKED FOR A 30(B)(6) DEPOSITION, AND WE'RE WORKING
OUT THE DETAILS WITH THEM.

AND I'M CONFIDENT THAT AFTER THAT

DEPOSITION IS TAKEN AND WHEN WE FINISH COMPLETING

PRODUCING DOCUMENTS ON THAT, THAT ISSUE SHOULD GO

1	AWAY JUST LIKE THE ISSUE OF CHIP DISABLING AS I
2	THINK HAS GONE AWAY.
3	THERE'S ANOTHER ALLEGATION IN THE
4	COMPLAINT THAT APPLE DISABLES THE PROCESSOR CHIP IN
5	THE IPOD SO THAT IT WON'T PLAY MICROSOFT'S DRM.
6	THAT'S SIMPLY UNTRUE.
7	THE PLAINTIFF'S EXPERTS HAVE SAID THAT
8	THEY KNOW NOTHING ABOUT THAT, AND I THINK THAT WILL
9	GO AWAY.
10	IF IT DOESN'T GO AWAY VOLUNTARILY, WE'LL
11	DISPROVE THAT AS WELL.
12	FOR PURPOSES OF THE CLASS DISCUSSION
13	THOUGH, YOUR HONOR, IF THE PLAINTIFFS EVENTUALLY
14	END UP FOCUSSING ON THIS REAL NETWORK HACK IN LATE
15	2004, THAT HAS IMPLICATIONS, I THINK VERY SERIOUS
16	IMPLICATIONS ON WHETHER THEY GET A CLASS AND WHAT
17	KIND OF SCOPE OF THE CLASS WOULD BE IF ANY.
18	BECAUSE THE ISSUE OF WHO, IF ANYONE WAS
19	HARMED BY APPLE ISSUING A REGULARLY PERIODIC
20	SOFTWARE UPDATE IS SOMETHING THAT HASN'T BEEN
21	ADDRESSED BY THE PLAINTIFFS AND IT IS COMPLICATED
22	AND IT WOULDN'T GO BACK, YOU KNOW, TO THE START OF
23	THE MUSIC STORE.
24	THE COURT: YOU DO NOT HAVE CURRENTLY
25	BEFORE THE COURT A MOTION TO DISMISS THE SECTION 2

1	CLAIM FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM; CORRECT?
2	MR. MITTELSTAEDT: NO. WE TRIED TO DO
3	THIS IN A FAIRLY SYSTEMATIC WAY AND I THINK NOW
4	THAT THE TYING CLAIMS ARE GONE, I THINK THAT'S THE
5	NEXT STEP.
6	THE COURT: THAT WOULD PUT THE ISSUE
7	BEFORE THE COURT IN A DIFFERENT LIGHT. I'M NOT
8	DISPOSED TO GRANT YOUR MOTION TO MODIFY I'M NOT
9	DISPOSED TO DENY THE MOTION TO MODIFY THE CLASS ON
10	MOOTNESS GROUNDS.
11	AS COUNSEL POINTS OUT EVEN THOUGH THERE
12	HAS BEEN A CHANGE IN THE TECHNOLOGY, THERE ARE
13	STILL A GROUP OF PEOPLE WHO ARE STILL AFFECTED BY
14	THE OLD TECHNOLOGY, AND AS I UNDERSTAND IT THERE IS
15	MONEY ASSOCIATED WITH THE CURRENT CHANGE.
16	IS THERE ANYTHING ELSE TO SAY OTHER THAN
17	WHAT I HEAR AS A POTENTIAL 12(B)(6) REASON NOT TO
18	MODIFY THE CLASS?
19	MR. MITTELSTAEDT: YES. WHEN THE
20	PLAINTIFFS MOVED TO CERTIFY THE CLASS, THIS

MR. MITTELSTAEDT: YES. WHEN THE PLAINTIFFS MOVED TO CERTIFY THE CLASS, THIS INJUNCTIVE RELIEF CLASS, THEIR POINT, THEIR MAIN POINT WAS THAT APPLE WAS CONTINUING TO USE THIS DRM AT THE MUSIC STORE AND YOUR HONOR CERTIFIED THE (B)(2) CLASS FOR THE DIRECT PURCHASERS ON THAT BASIS.

1	AND THEN IN JULY OF THIS YEAR WHEN IT WAS
2	BROUGHT TO YOUR HONOR'S ATTENTION THAT APPLE HAD
3	STOPPED DOING THAT AND APPLE HAD STOPPED DOING THAT
4	BECAUSE THE RECORD LABELS WITHDREW THAT
5	REQUIREMENT. APPLE NEVER WANTED TO USE DRM IN THE
6	FIRST PLACE. THAT'S IN THE RECORD.
7	APPLE USED DRM ONLY BECAUSE THE LABELS
8	REQUIRED IT AND WHEN THE LABELS WITHDREW THAT
9	REQUIREMENT, APPLE WAS VERY QUICK TO STOP USING DRM
10	IN ITS MUSIC STORE.
11	SO THAT RELIEF, THE RELIEF IT WAS SEEKING
12	WAS LITERALLY MOOT AND THAT'S WHY YOU INVITED APPLE
13	TO DECERTIFY THE (B)(2) CLASS.
14	NOW, IN RESPONSE TO THAT ONE, THEY
15	QUESTION WHETHER APPLE REALLY IS INTENT ON NOT
16	USING DRM IN THE FUTURE.
17	WE HAVE SUBMITTED A DECLARATION FROM
18	EDDIE CUE, WHO IS THE HEAD OF THE MUSIC STORE, WHO
19	HAS SAID AND THIS IS DOCUMENT 256, MR. CUE,
20	WHICH IS C-U-E HAS SAID, "WELL BEFORE THE LABELS
21	AGREED TO DO SO APPLE PUBLICALLY EXPRESSED ITS
22	DESIRE TO SELL DRM FREE MUSIC.
23	"NOW THAT THE LABELS HAVE AGREED THAT
24	APPLE MAY SELL MUSIC THEY PROVIDE TO APPLE WITHOUT
25	USE OF DRM, APPLE SELLS ONLY DRM FREE MUSIC.

1	"APPLE IS NOT AWARE THAT THE RECORD
2	LABELS HAVE ANY PLAN TO REINSTITUTE A DRM
3	REQUIREMENT AND APPLE HAS NO INTENTION OF OPERATING
4	A MUSIC STORE THAT SELLS DRM MUSIC IN THE FUTURE."
5	THAT'S MR. CUE'S DECLARATION. THAT MOOTS
6	THIS ISSUE. IT MAKES NO SENSE FOR THE PLAINTIFFS
7	TO, TO BRING THIS CASE AND PURSUE A CLASS TO ESTOP
8	APPLE FROM DOING SOMETHING THAT IT NEVER WANTED TO
9	DO IN THE FIRST PLACE AND THAT IT STOPPED DOING AS
10	SOON AS ITS CONTRACTS WITH THE RECORD LABELS WOULD
11	PERMIT.
12	THE COURT: LET ME THIS IS PERHAPS
13	BEYOND THE MOTION, BUT DO I UNDERSTAND THAT
14	ALTHOUGH THE MUSIC IS DRM FREE, IS IT
15	INTEROPERABILITY LIMITED FREE?
16	IN OTHER WORDS, CAN YOU NOW DOWNLOAD
17	MUSIC FROM THE STORE AND PLAY IT DIRECTLY ON TO A
18	PLAYER OTHER THAN AN IPOD?
18 19	PLAYER OTHER THAN AN IPOD? MR. MITTELSTAEDT: YES.
19	MR. MITTELSTAEDT: YES.
19 20	MR. MITTELSTAEDT: YES. THE COURT: SO THAT THAT INTEROPERABILITY
19 20 21	MR. MITTELSTAEDT: YES. THE COURT: SO THAT THAT INTEROPERABILITY LIMITATION HAS ALSO BEEN REMOVED?
19 20 21 22	MR. MITTELSTAEDT: YES. THE COURT: SO THAT THAT INTEROPERABILITY LIMITATION HAS ALSO BEEN REMOVED? MR. MITTELSTAEDT: YES. IN RESPONSE TO

1	CLASS IN THE FIRST PLACE IS MOOT.
2	SO THEIR FALLBACK POSITION IS, WELL,
3	THERE'S ALL THAT MUSIC OUT THERE THAT PEOPLE BOUGHT
4	BEFORE THAT STILL HAS DRM ON IT.
5	SO IT'S ON THAT BASIS THAT THEY WANT TO
6	CERTIFY THIS CLASS AND THEY WANT TO BROADEN THE
7	CLASS.
8	THE COURT: WHAT IS WRONG WITH THAT?
9	MR. MITTELSTAEDT: SEVERAL THINGS. THE
LO	MAIN ONES ARE THIS: AS YOUR HONOR NOTED, TO HAVE
L1	AN IPOD CLASS WHERE THE INJUNCTIVE RELIEF RELATES
L2	TO WHAT IS GOING ON WITH THE MUSIC LOOKS LIKE IT'S
L3	A DISCONNECT.
L 4	AND THE PLAINTIFFS HAVE NEVER ANSWERED, I
L 5	DON'T THINK SATISFACTORILY, YOUR HONOR'S QUESTION
L 6	ABOUT HOW YOU CONNECT THAT KIND OF RELIEF REMOVING
L7	THE DRM WITH THE IPOD CLASS.
L 8	WHAT THEY DID INSTEAD WAS SAY, WELL,
L 9	WE'LL BROADEN THE CLASS. WE'LL ADD NEW PEOPLE.
20	WE'LL ADD ITUNES MUSIC PURCHASERS WHO DON'T HAVE
21	IPODS.
22	THAT DOESN'T SOLVE THE PROBLEM THAT THEY
23	HAVE WITH RESPECT TO THE IPOD PURCHASERS AND IT
24	JUST CREATES MORE PROBLEMS FOR THE MUSIC
> 5	PURCHASERS

1	AND LET ME EXPLAIN WHY.
2	WHAT THEY HAVE TO SHOW IS THAT WELL,
3	LET ME START WITH, WITH THE PRACTICAL ISSUE.
4	THEY SAY THAT IT'S A COSTLESS AND
5	EFFORTLESS FOR APPLE TO REMOVE DRM FROM ALL OF
6	THESE SONGS THAT HAVE BEEN PREVIOUSLY DOWNLOADED.
7	WE HAVE SUBMITTED ANOTHER DECLARATION
8	FROM MR. CUE, THIS ONE AUGUST 31, 2009 WHERE HE
9	DESCRIBES THE TECHNICAL REASON WHY THAT IS NOT
10	TRUE.
11	AND WHAT HE EXPLAINS IS THAT, AND I'M
12	GOING TO QUOTE THIS, "WHEN A CUSTOMER BUYS DRM FREE
13	VERSIONS OF PREVIOUSLY PURCHASED MUSIC, APPLE DOES
14	NOT SIMPLY," QUOTE, "'REMOVE' THE DRM FROM THE
15	PREVIOUSLY PURCHASED FILES."
16	MR. CUE GOES ON TO EXPLAIN THAT WHAT
17	APPLE DOES INSTEAD IS PROVIDE A NEW FILE OF HIGHER
18	AUDIO QUALITY WHICH IS THEN DOWNLOADED BY THE
19	CUSTOMER.
20	AND THE RECORD LABELS UNDER THE CONTRACT
21	WITH APPLE TREAT EACH OF THESE NEW DOWNLOADS AS A
22	NEW TRANSACTION.
23	AND SO TO PROVIDE CUSTOMERS WITH DRM FREE
24	VERSIONS OF MUSIC THEY PREVIOUSLY BOUGHT, APPLE IS
25	REQUIRED TO PAY THE LABELS A CERTAIN AMOUNT PER

1	DOWNLOAD, AND THAT AMOUNT IS IN THE RECORD UNDER
2	SEAL, AND APPLE ALSO INCURS CREDIT CARD FEES AND
3	LICENSING UPGRADES AND SO FORTH.
4	SO FOR STARTERS, THIS IDEA THAT APPLE CAN
5	MAGICALLY REMOVE DRM IS NOT TRUE. IT'S A SEPARATE
6	TRANSACTION THAT COSTS APPLE MONEY, AND THAT'S WHY
7	APPLE CHARGES CUSTOMERS.
8	THE COURT: AND IF YOU'RE ABLE TO GET
9	OVER THE PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT ABOUT IMPOSING IT IN
LO	THE FIRST PLACE, THEN THAT WOULD BE LEGITIMATE. IF
11	YOU'RE NOT, THEN THAT IS THAT'S A REMEDY.
L2	MR. MITTELSTAEDT: WELL, LET'S GET TO
L3	THAT POINT. IS IT A REMEDY AND FOR WHOM?
L 4	THERE ARE MANY ITUNES MUSIC PURCHASERS
L5	WHO AS FAR AS THIS RECORD SHOWS, YOUR HONOR, AND AS
L 6	FAR AS COMMON SENSE TAKES US, ARE PERFECTLY
L7	CONTENT.
L8	THEY BOUGHT THEIR MUSIC. THEY KNEW ABOUT
L 9	THE LIMITATIONS, AND THEY PAID 99 CENTS FOR THE
20	SONG.
21	AND NOW THEY'RE PLAYING THAT MUSIC ON

AND NOW THEY'RE PLAYING THAT MUSIC ON
THEIR HOME COMPUTERS, YOU KNOW, THROUGH HEADPHONES,
OR THEY HAVE BURNED THAT MUSIC TO CD'S AND THEY'RE
USING CD'S JUST LIKE THEY WOULD USE CD'S BOUGHT AT
A STORE, MEANING THAT THEY PLAY THEM ON A CAR

1	CHEDEO	\cap D	ширтр	$II \cap MI$	CHEDEO
1	SIEREU	UK	IHLIK	HOME	STEREO.

OR THEY, AFTER BURNING, THEY RIPPED IT

BACK TO THEIR COMPUTER AND NOW THEY'RE PLAYING IT

ON IPOD COMPETITORS BECAUSE THE PROCESS OF BURNING

DESTROYS THE DRM.

OR ITUNES PURCHASERS, IF THEY HAVE BOUGHT MUSIC SINCE EARLY 2007 AND THEY BOUGHT EMI, ONE OF THE LABEL'S MUSIC, THAT WAS ALL DRM FREE FROM EARLY 2007.

SO THERE ARE A LOT OF MUSIC PURCHASERS
OUT THERE WHO ARE NOT HARMED IN THE SLIGHTEST BY
PLAINTIFF'S THEORY OF LACK OF INTEROPERABILITY.

THE CLASS THAT THEY WANT YOUR HONOR TO

ADD, ITUNES MUSIC PURCHASERS, THEY HAVE GOT TO SHOW

A COUPLE OF THINGS. ONE, THEY HAVE TO SHOW THAT

IT'S THE PRIMARY RELIEF THAT THEY'RE SEEKING FOR

THESE PEOPLE.

IN ORDER TO CERTIFY A (B)(2) CLASS THE PLAINTIFFS HAVE TO SHOW THE INJUNCTIVE RELIEF IS THE PREDOMINANT RELIEF THAT THEY'RE SEEKING.

BUT IF PROVIDING DRM FREE MUSIC TO THESE
PEOPLE WOULD NOT GIVE THEM ANY BENEFIT, IT'S PEOPLE
WHO ARE PERFECTLY HAPPY, MAYBE PEOPLE WHO DON'T
EVEN KNOW THERE IS DRM ON THEIR MUSIC.

IF THOSE PEOPLE WOULDN'T BE BENEFITTED BY

GIVING THEM THIS FREE UPGRADE, IT'S IMPOSSIBLE FOR
THE PLAINTIFFS TO SAY THAT THIS RELIEF THAT THEY'RE
SEEKING ON BEHALF OF ALL OF THESE PEOPLE IS THE
PRIMARY -- THE PREDOMINANT REASON FOR THIS CASE.

IT WOULD BE GIVING RELIEF TO PEOPLE WHO DON'T NEED IT, WHO WOULDN'T BENEFIT FROM IT, WHO WOULDN'T DO ANYTHING WITH IT IF THEY GOT IT.

AT THE SAME TIME, YOUR HONOR, IT WOULD

IMPOSE AN ENORMOUS COST ON APPLE. THE RECORD SHOWS

THE AMOUNT THAT APPLE PAYS TO THE LABELS PER

UPGRADE PER NEW FILE AND YOU MULTIPLY THAT TIMES

THE FOUR BILLION SONGS THAT APPLE HAS SOLD AND IT'S

AN ENORMOUS AMOUNT OF MONEY, AN ENORMOUS AMOUNT OF

MONEY THAT WOULD NOT BENEFIT, MOST, IF ANY OF THE

PEOPLE THAT THEY ALLEGE AS THE CLASS.

SO THAT APPLIES BOTH TO THE IPOD

PURCHASERS AND IT APPLIES TO THIS, THIS NEW GROUP.

IT JUST WOULDN'T BENEFIT THE IPOD CLASS IN A

DIFFERENT WAY. THE IPOD CLASS ALREADY HAS THEIR

IPODS BY DEFINITION.

AND SO NOW GOING TO THOSE IPOD PURCHASERS
AND SAYING, HERE, WE'RE GOING TO GIVE YOU DRM FREE
MUSIC FOR FREE, THERE'S NO SHOWING IN THE RECORD
THAT THAT WOULD BENEFIT A SUBSTANTIAL PORTION OF
THE CLASS OR BENEFIT ANYBODY.

	THE	COURT:	YC	U'RE		I DO	REAL	ΙΖΕ	THAT
GIVEN THE	COMP	LEXITY	OF	THIS	THE	TIME	THA	T I	HAVE
ALLOWED IS	S NOT	GOING	TO	BE S	UFFI	CIENT	TO	HANI	OLE
EVERYTHING	Ĵ.								

SO LET ME TURN TO YOUR OPPONENT.

IT DOES SEEM TO ME THAT ONE POSSIBILITY
THAT SHOULD BE BEFORE THE COURT AND IT'S THE ONE
THAT I RAISED AND THAT IS TAKE NO ACTION WITH
RESPECT TO MODIFYING THE CLASSES UNTIL THE COURT
HAS DEFINITIVELY RULED WITH RESPECT TO WHETHER OR
NOT GIVEN THE COURT'S RULINGS ON THIS TYING CLAIM
THERE IS A VIABLE SECTION 2 CLAIM THAT CAN BE
STATED. AND THAT I HAVE NOT GIVEN SEPARATE
CONSIDERATION TO BECAUSE THAT WILL AFFECT THE
QUESTIONS BEFORE THE COURT.

NOW, I DON'T EXPECT YOU TO BE IN A

POSITION TO RESPOND TO THE MERITS OF THAT, BUT WHY

DOESN'T THAT MAKE SENSE?

MR. MERRICK: WELL, I CAN RESPOND TO THE MERITS A LITTLE BIT. ONE IS THAT IT IS NOT UNUSUAL FOR A COURT TO FIND THAT THERE IS NO TYING CLAIM AND YET FIND THAT THERE IS A MONOPOLIZATION CLAIM BASED ON SOME OF THE SAME FACTUAL ARGUMENTS THAT PLAINTIFFS HAVE SAID WOULD SUPPORT A TYING CLAIM.

A GOOD EXAMPLE OF THAT MOST RECENTLY IS,

1	AND IT'S IN THE PAPERS, THE <u>TELLIS ATLAS</u> CASE WHICH
2	IS 2008 WESTLAW 44911230 NORTHERN DISTRICT FROM
3	NOVEMBER OF LAST YEAR.
4	AND THERE THE DEFENDANTS SUCCESSFULLY
5	MOVED FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE TYING CLAIM, AND
6	IT WAS GRANTED.
7	THE PLAINTIFFS THEN THEY SAID THAT THE
8	PLAINTIFFS WERE PRECLUDED FROM BRINGING EVIDENCE
9	THAT WOULD HAVE SUPPORTED THE TYING CLAIM IN
10	SUPPORT OF THEIR MONOPOLIZATION CLAIM.
11	THE COURT SAID, NO, THAT ISN'T THE WAY
12	THAT IT WORKS. QUOTE, THIS IS FROM STAR PAGE 2,
13	"TELLIS ATLAS'S FAILURE TO PROVE THAT NAVTEQ,"
14	WHICH IS N-A-V-T-E-Q, "ALLEGED TYING CONDUCT WAS
15	UNLAWFUL, DOES NOT AUTOMATICALLY REQUIRE THAT SUCH
16	CONDUCT BE REMOVED FROM THE SCOPE OF THE SECTION 2
17	INQUIRY."
18	I DON'T THINK THE COURT HAS RULED
19	DEFINITIVELY THAT APPLE HAS BEEN GUILTY OF NO
20	ANTICOMPETITIVE CONDUCT. THAT ISSUE WASN'T BEFORE
21	THE COURT.
22	THE COURT'S RULING ON THE TYING CLAIM WAS
23	BASED ON THE NATURE OF A SECTION 1 CLAIM WHICH IS
24	NOT THE SAME AS A SECTION 2 CLAIM.

THE COURT: WHAT I HEAR YOU SAYING IS

1	THAT ULTIMATELY I WOULD FIND IN YOUR FAVOR ON IT.
2	THE QUESTION THAT I ASKED IS WHY SHOULDN'T I DO
3	THAT FIRST BEFORE MODIFYING THE CLASS DEFINITION
4	BECAUSE IT WOULD PROVIDE ME WITH AN OPPORTUNITY TO
5	HAVE THE PLAINTIFF ARTICULATE ITS REMAINING CLAIM
6	DEVOID OF THE TYING CLAIM BECAUSE MOST OF WHAT
7	HAPPENS IN THIS COMPLAINT IS IT IS ALLEGED IN GREAT
8	DETAIL AS A TYING CLAIM AND THEN ALL OF THAT IS
9	INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE INTO A VERY SHORT
10	STATEMENT OF THE SECTION 2 CLAIM.
11	SO IT'S IT REALLY CHALLENGES THE
12	COURT, AS I HAVE STARTED OUT TO START TO UNDERSTAND
13	A LITTLE BIT ABOUT THE PLAINTIFF'S CASE, AND I
14	HAVEN'T WORKED MY WAY THROUGH IT YET.
15	MR. MERRICK: I DO BELIEVE, YOUR HONOR
16	I'M SORRY.
17	THE COURT: THIS MOTION DOES ASK ME TO
18	ARTICULATE THE CLASS IN A WAY THAT, FIRST OF ALL, I
19	WOULD HAVE TO MAKE SURE THAT THE TIME LIMITATIONS
20	INVOLVED IN ALL OF THESE CHANGES ARE RESPECTED, IF
21	INDEED THESE CHANGES ARE.
22	DO YOU AGREE THAT THE DRM FREEDOM FROM
23	DRM, THE APPLE DRM HAS ALSO ELIMINATED THE
24	INTEROPERABILITY CLAIM?
25	MR. MERRICK: AS FAR AS I AM AWARE. I'M

1	NOT FAMILIAR ENOUGH WITH THE TECHNOLOGY BEHIND IT
2	TO GIVE A DEFINITIVE ANSWER, BUT I DO BELIEVE THAT
3	THEY ARE ALL INTEROPERABLE, YES.
4	THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. AND PART OF THE
5	CERTIFICATION AND DEFINITION OF A NEW CLASS HAS TO
6	BE WHAT RELIEF IS DO YOU STILL HAVE A (B)(3)
7	CLASS HERE AS WELL AS A (B)(2) CLASS?
8	MR. MERRICK: YES.
9	THE COURT: UNDERSTANDING THAT
10	RELATIONSHIP IS IMPORTANT. I KNOW I HAVEN'T GOTTEN
11	TO THE INDIRECT PURCHASERS WHO ALSO HAVE A CLAIM,
12	AND I DO WANT TO RESERVE SOME TIME TO HEAR FROM
13	THEM AS WELL.
14	BUT TALK ME OUT OF WAITING.
15	MR. MERRICK: WELL, I DON'T THINK THERE'S
16	ANY REASON TO.
17	AS THE COURT IN DECEMBER IN GRANTING THE
18	(B)(2) CLASS IN THE FIRST PLACE NOTED, AND IT'S
19	DOCUMENT 196, "PLAINTIFFS SEEK TO ENJOIN DEFENDANT
20	FROM MAINTAINING ITS RESTRICTIVE TECHNOLOGY
21	PRACTICES IN THE FUTURE," WHICH I GUESS YOU COULD
22	SAY MAYBE HAS RESOLVED, ASSUMING THAT WE CAN TAKE
23	MR. CUE AT HIS WORD. BUT WE DON'T HAVE ANY
24	DISCOVERY ON ANY OF THAT INFORMATION, BUT "AND
25	SEEK TO COMPEL DEFENDANT TO," QUOTE-UNQUOTE,

1	"UNLOCK MEDIA ALREADY PURCHASED FROM ITMS SO IT MAY
2	BE PLAYED ON NON-IPOD DIGITAL MEDIA PLAYERS."
3	THAT HAS NOT OCCURRED ON A BACKWARDS
4	LOOKING BASIS, AND WE'RE TALKING ABOUT, AGAIN, IT'S
5	NOT AN INCONSIDERABLE BURDEN. WE'RE TALKING ABOUT
6	FIVE BILLION SONGS. APPLE IS THE 800 POUND GORILLA
7	IN THE SONG DOWNLOAD MARKET.
8	THE COURT: BUT YOU AGREE HERE THAT THE
9	BURDEN WOULD ONLY BE IMPOSED ON APPLE WITH RESPECT
10	TO THOSE CONSUMERS WHO WOULD HAVE A NON-IPOD PLAYER
11	AND WOULD WISH TO RECONFIGURE THE MUSIC SO IT COULD
12	PLAY ON THOSE?
13	MR. MERRICK: I WOULDN'T AGREE WITH THAT.
14	I WE OBVIOUSLY IT'S A FACT BASED
15	ANALYSIS AS TO INJURY, BUT THE POINT WE'RE MAKING
16	IS THAT THE FACT THAT THERE ARE FIVE BILLION LOCKED
17	SONGS STILL OUT THERE IS IN AND OF ITSELF IS A FORM
18	OF INJURY.
19	THE COURT: WHY, WHY IF IT'S WHY IS IT
20	A FORM OF INJURY IF YOU HAVE AN IPOD?
21	MR. MERRICK: WELL, SOMEBODY IS GOING TO
22	EVENTUALLY HAVE TO MAKE A DECISION AS TO BUYING A
23	NEW MUSIC PLAYER. THESE THINGS DO NOT LAST
24	FOREVER. TECHNOLOGY IMPROVES WITH CHANGES.
25	AT SOME POINT SOMEBODY IS GOING TO HAVE

TO	DEA	L W	ITH 1	MAKING	A DE	CISI	ON.	ΙF	THA	T DE	ECISIO	N
IS	IN	ANY	WAY	WHATS	DEVER	RINF	LUE	NCED	ВҮ	THE	FACT	
THA	T T	HEY	HAVI	E BLOCE	KED S	SONGS	ON	THE	IR I	POD	THAT	IS
STI	LL	AN .	ANTI	COMPET	ITIVE		OR 2	AN AI	NTIT:	RUSI	INJU	JRY

AS FAR AS THE COST TO APPLE, THE ISSUE

HERE FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION PURPOSES FOR THE

(B) (2) CLASS IS WHETHER OR NOT THAT TRANSLATES ITS

CLAIM INTO DAMAGES. AND IT DOESN'T.

THE FACT THAT APPLE MAY HAVE TO PAY A

LICENSING FEE TO A THIRD PARTY DOESN'T MAKE THE

COST OF THEM COMPLYING WITH AN INJUNCTIVE -- WITH

THE EQUITABLE RELIEF DAMAGES TO THE CLASS. THERE'S

A DISCONNECT FUNDAMENTALLY THERE.

AND AS FAR AS HOW MUCH MONEY IT WOULD

COST APPLE, IT WOULD BE VERY EXPENSIVE. IT'S VERY

EXPENSIVE BECAUSE APPLE AGAIN IS THE 800 POUND

GORILLA.

THERE'S THE <u>DUKES VERSUS WALMART</u> CASE

THAT IS CITED IN THE MATERIALS THAT WHERE THEY

TALKED ABOUT WHAT AN ENORMOUS AMOUNT OF MONEY IT

WAS GOING TO COST WALMART.

WELL, THAT'S ENTIRELY BASED BECAUSE

WALMART IS THE 800 POUND GORILLA RETAILER. AND IT

WOULD COST APPLE BECAUSE APPLE IS THE 800 POUND

GORILLA IN THE MUSIC DOWNLOAD SALES.

1	THE COURT: YOU KNOW, THE ONE PROBLEM I
2	HAVE AS I KEEP GOING BACK AND FORTH IN MY MIND AS
3	TO WHETHER OR NOT THIS IS A CONSUMER LEGAL REMEDIES
4	CASE OR ANTITRUST CASE I HAVE TO PAY ATTENTION TO
5	WHAT IS IT THAT IS GOING ON HERE. THE HARM HAS TO
6	BE TO COMPETITION, THOSE WHO WOULD BE IN THE
7	BUSINESS OF MAKING PLAYERS AND MUSIC I GUESS.
8	AND THE CONSUMERS, I GUESS, WOULD BENEFIT
9	FROM THIS REMEDY, BUT I'D HAVE TO COME UP WITH A
LO	REMEDY THAT SPEAKS TO THE WORLD OF COMPETITION AS
11	OPPOSED TO THE WORLD OF ULTIMATE CONSUMERS, DON'T
12	I?
L3	MR. MERRICK: YES, AND THAT'S WHAT WE'RE
L 4	SAYING. THAT'S WHY UNLOCKING THE FILES IS STILL
L 5	IMPORTANT TO THE COMPETITIVE MARKET BECAUSE OF THE
L 6	FIVE BILLION SONG BACKLOG OF ANTICOMPETITIVE
L7	BEHAVIOR.
L8	THE COURT: THANK YOU.
L 9	BEFORE I GO BACK OVER HERE I WANTED TO
20	GIVE THE INDIRECT PURCHASER COUNSEL AN OPPORTUNITY
21	TO SPEAK, AND I'LL LET YOU RESPOND TO THAT.
22	MS. ZELDES: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR.
23	HELEN ZELDES AGAIN FOR THE SOMERS CLASS.
24	RESPONDING TO THE COURT'S REQUEST FOR
25	CLARIFICATION OF HOW THE CASES OVERLAP AND HOW OUR
	1

1	CLAIMS ARE TIED TO THE RELIEF REQUESTED, THE
2	INDIRECT PURCHASERS AND THE DIRECT PURCHASERS
3	INJUNCTIVE RELIEF CLASSES OVERLAP ALMOST
4	COMPLETELY.
5	YOU ASKED US TO CLARIFY THAT, AND WE BOTH
6	SEEK TO HAVE THE RESTRICTIONS REMOVED FROM THE ITMS
7	FILES.
8	HOWEVER, THE INDIRECT PURCHASERS CLASS IS
9	BROADER. WE SEEK TO REPRESENT FOLKS WHO HAVE ALSO
LO	PAID, ALREADY PAID TO CONVERT THEIR MUSIC TO DRM
L1	FREE FILES. THEY HAVE ALREADY PAID THIS 30 PERCENT
L2	CONVERSION FEE AND SO THAT'S HOW OUR CLASSES ARE
13	DIFFERENT.
L 4	THE COURT: AND THE DIRECT PURCHASER
L5	CLASS WOULD NOT INCLUDE THOSE?
L 6	MS. ZELDES: THEY HAVE NOT INCLUDED THOSE
L7	PEOPLE, THAT'S CORRECT, YOUR HONOR.
L8	THEY INCLUDE PEOPLE WHO ALREADY HAVE A
L 9	LIBRARY, AND THEY'RE ASKING LIKE WE ARE, APPLE TO
20	CONVERT THOSE FILES FOR FREE AT NO COST TO THE
21	CONSUMER, BUT THERE'S A GROUP OF PEOPLE, A
22	SUBSTANTIAL GROUP OF FOLKS WHO HAVE ALREADY PAID
23	THIS HEFTY 30 PERCENT CONVERSION CHARGE AND WE'RE

SAYING UNDER OUR (B)(2) CLASS WE WOULD BE ENTITLED

TO DISGORGEMENT OF THAT 30 PERCENT FEE.

24

1	THE COURT: WELL, YOU SEE, I'M CONFUSED
2	BECAUSE I DID NOT UNDERSTAND THE INDIRECT
3	PURCHASERS TO HAVE ANYTHING TO DO WITH ITUNES AS
4	MUCH AS INDIRECT PURCHASERS OF THE PLAYER, THE
5	IPOD.
6	BECAUSE THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS
7	INDIRECT PURCHASERS OF ITUNES.
8	MS. ZELDES: YOU'RE CORRECT, YOUR HONOR.
9	THE COURT: SO WHY WOULDN'T I FIND THAT
10	IF I'M GOING TO ADD ITUNES PURCHASERS TO THE CLASS,
11	THAT THAT WOULD THERE WOULD BE A DUPLICATION
12	BETWEEN THE INDIRECT PURCHASER CLASS AND THE DIRECT
13	PURCHASER'S CLASS?
14	MS. ZELDES: THAT IS CORRECT, THE CLASSES
15	OVERLAP TO THE EXTENT THAT WE'RE BOTH SEEKING THE
16	FIRST TWO PRONGS OF THE INJUNCTIVE RELIEF WHICH IS
17	TO REMOVE THE DRM GOING FORWARD ON CONSUMER'S FILES
18	AND TO CONVERT THE FILES THAT THE FOLKS ALREADY
19	HAVE, BUT THERE'S A GROUP OF FOLKS THAT ARE NOT
20	REPRESENTED.
21	AND YOU'RE RIGHT, FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
22	THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE. EVERYBODY BUYS THE MUSIC
23	DIRECTLY FROM APPLE.
24	SO WE'RE NOT INDIRECT PURCHASERS FOR THE
25	PURPOSES OF THAT PART OF THE INDIRECT THE

1 INJUNCTIVE RELIEF CLASS.

BUT THERE'S NOBODY SEEKING THAT RELIEF.

SO THE FOLKS WHO HAVE ALREADY PAID THAT 30 PERCENT,

WHICH IS A SUBSTANTIAL CONVERSION FEE. THAT'S NOT

AN INSUBSTANTIAL RESTRAINT. THERE'S NO RELIEF

BEING SOUGHT. SO THAT IS A CLASS THAT IS DIFFERENT

FROM THE, QUOTE-UNQUOTE, "DIRECT PURCHASERS."

AND APPLE'S MAIN BEEF WITH THAT IS THAT YOU CAN'T ASK FOR DISGORGEMENT TO GET A (B)(2)

CLASS. THEY'RE EITHER SAYING THE MONETARY RELIEF PREDOMINATES OR YOU CAN'T GET IT. AND THAT'S NOT THE STANDARD.

THE STANDARD IS IF IT'S INCIDENTAL TO THE INJUNCTIVE RELIEF, YOU CAN HAVE MONETARY DAMAGES AS PART OF A (B)(2) CLASS AND THE NINTH CIRCUIT IS CLEAR ON THAT THAT EVEN IN CASES WHERE THE PLAINTIFFS HAVE SOUGHT THINGS LIKE BACKPAY IN AN EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASE, THE COURT HAS AWARDED OR CERTIFIED A (B)(2) CLASS.

SIMILARLY PARTICULARLY IN PROBE VERSUS

STATE TEACHERS' RETIREMENT SYSTEM, THERE WAS A

GENDER BASED MORTALITY TABLES BEING USED AND THE

PLAINTIFFS SOUGHT MONETARY DAMAGES THERE AND THE

NINTH CIRCUIT AGAIN CERTIFIED A (B)(2) CLASS

BECAUSE THEY FOUND THAT THE INJUNCTIVE RELIEF WAS

1	THE PRIMARY RELIEF SOUGHT.
2	AND HERE THE MONETARY RELIEF IS CLEARLY A
3	SUBSET OF THE OVERALL INJUNCTIVE RELIEF THAT BOTH
4	PARTIES ARE SEEKING AND BOTH PARTIES ARE SEEKING.
5	THE COURT: SO YOUR CLASS WOULD BE A
6	(B)(3) CLASS FOR THE MONETARY RELIEF OF THE PAST
7	BECAUSE IT WOULD START TO OVERLAP WITH THE (B)(2)
8	CLASS OF THE DIRECT PURCHASERS WITH RESPECT TO THE
9	FUTURE?
LO	MS. ZELDES: IT COULD BE EITHER A (B)(2)
11	OR (B)(3).
L2	IT COULD BE A SEPARATE DAMAGES CLASS IF
L3	YOUR HONOR WANTED TO CERTIFY THAT, OR IT COULD ALSO
L 4	BE A PART OF A (B)(2) CLASS.
L 5	THE INJUNCTIVE RELIEF IS REMOVING THE DRM
L 6	FROM ALL OF THE FILES. THIS IS A SMALL SUBSET OF
L7	ALL OF THE FIVE BILLION FILES OUT THERE. THIS IS
L 8	SOMEBODY WHO ALREADY PAID APPLE TO CONVERT THEM.
L 9	SO IT IS A SUBSET.
20	IT IS INCIDENTAL TO FLOWS FROM THE
21	INJUNCTIVE RELIEF. AS SUCH YOU COULD CERTIFY IT
22	UNDER (B)(2), IN THE ALTERNATIVE, YES, YOU COULD
23	CERTIFY.
24	THE COURT: WHAT IS THIS SYNCING ISSUE?
25	MS. ZELDES: WELL, YOU KNOW, THEY WERE

1	TALKING ABOUT THERE'S NO INTEROPERABILITY ISSUES
2	ANYMORE. THERE WAS AN ISSUE THIS LAST YEAR THAT
3	APPLE ACTUALLY TOOK NO AFFIRMATIVE ACTION FROM PALM
4	3, FOR EXAMPLE, FROM SYNCING WITH THE ITUNES I WANT
5	TO SAY LIBRARY, AND SO THAT'S WHAT THAT ISSUE IS.
6	THAT'S NOT A PRIMARY PART OF THE
7	INJUNCTIVE RELIEF WE'RE SEEKING, BUT IT GOES TO THE
8	ANTICOMPETITIVE PRODUCT THAT APPLE IS TAKING
9	AFFIRMATIVE STEPS TO STOP OTHER PLAYERS THAT COULD
10	OTHERWISE SYNC UP WITH THEIR PLAYER.
11	THE COURT: THANK YOU.
12	FINAL WORDS.
13	MR. MITTELSTAEDT: YOUR HONOR, IN
14	DOCUMENT 86 IN THE SOMERS CASE WE RESPOND TO THEIR
15	ARGUMENT TO SAY IT IN A WORD.
16	WHEN THEY'RE ASKING FOR REIMBURSEMENT OF
17	THE 30 CENTS THAT CONSUMERS PAID TO GET DRM FREE
18	MUSIC, COPIES OF THE MUSIC THAT THEY HAD PREVIOUSLY
19	DOWNLOADED, THAT IS NOT INCIDENTAL RELIEF THAT
20	FLOWS FROM THE INJUNCTIVE RELIEF THAT THEY'RE
21	SEEKING. THAT IS THE RELIEF THAT THEY'RE SEEKING.
22	AND AS YOUR HONOR POINTED OUT, THAT'S
23	DAMAGES. IT'S NOT INJUNCTIVE RELIEF. CALLING IT
24	DISGORGEMENT DOESN'T CHANGE IT FROM DAMAGES TO

25

INJUNCTIVE RELIEF.

1	THE INDIRECT PLAINTIFFS HAD BEEN DENIED
2	(B)(3) CLASS. THEY DIDN'T MAKE THIS ARGUMENT.
3	IT'S NOT A GOOD ARGUMENT, BUT IF THEY WANT TO MAKE
4	THAT ARGUMENT, THEY SHOULD MAKE IT SO WE CAN
5	RESPOND TO IT.
6	THE THING THAT SHE MENTIONED AT THE END
7	HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH DRM. IT IS UNRELATED TO
8	THIS CASE. IT'S NOT ALLEGED IN THE COMPLAINT.
9	THEY HAVEN'T SOUGHT TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT TO
10	ALLEGE IT, AND IT HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH DRM.
11	THEY STILL HAVE NOT SAID, YOUR HONOR, AND
12	THIS IS THE KEY POINT, HOW EITHER THE EXISTING IPOD
13	CLASS OR A NEW CLASS OF PEOPLE WHO DON'T HAVE IPODS
14	WOULD BENEFIT FROM GETTING FREE DRM FREE MUSIC.
15	THEY KEEP SAYING, WELL, IT WOULD UNLOCK,
16	IT WOULD UNLOCK, IT WOULD UNLOCK, BUT THEY DON'T
17	SAY HOW THAT WOULD BENEFIT THE VAST MAJORITY OF
18	PEOPLE WHO, AS I SAY, ARE PERFECTLY CONTENT HAVING
19	APPLE MUSIC THAT THEY BOUGHT FOR 99 CENTS KNOWING
20	HOW IT COULD BE USED AND PEOPLE WHO WERE PERFECTLY
21	HAPPY USING THAT.
22	THEY STILL HAVEN'T IDENTIFIED ANY BENEFIT
23	EXCEPT FOR ONE THING, THEY SAY, HOW ABOUT IF
24	SOMEBODY WHO HAS AN IPOD WHO MIGHT WANT TO BUY AN
25	IPOD IN THE FUTURE?

1	WELL, NUMBER ONE, THE CLASS THEY WANT TO
2	REPRESENT IS MUCH BROADER THAN THAT. THEY HAVE NOT
3	LIMITED IT.
4	THE COURT: I THOUGHT IT WAS THOSE WHO
5	HAD ITUNES WHO WISHED TO BUY A DIFFERENT PLAYER IN
6	THE FUTURE EVEN IF THEY HAD AN IPOD NOW.
7	MR. MITTELSTAEDT: YES, BUT AS TO THOSE
8	PEOPLE, THAT IF THERE IS ANYBODY LIKE THAT, IT'S
9	ONLY A VERY SMALL PORTION OF THEIR PROPOSED CLASSES
10	WHICH CONSIST OF ALL IPOD OWNERS AND ALL ITUNES
11	MUSIC OWNERS.
12	AND SO POINT NUMBER ONE IS IT'S REALLY
13	OVERBROAD. THE CLASS THAT THEY'RE ASKING IS REALLY
14	OVERBROAD COMPARED TO THE VERY SMALL BENEFIT THAT
15	THEY HAVE THEORETICALLY IDENTIFIED.
16	NUMBER TWO, IF THEY SAY, OKAY, WELL, JUST
17	GIVE FREE UPGRADES TO THE PEOPLE WHO WANT TO
18	REPLACE THEIR IPOD WITH A COMPETITOR, HOW ARE THEY
19	EVER GOING TO IDENTIFY THOSE PEOPLE? THAT'S A VERY
20	SUBJECTIVE INDIVIDUALISTIC KIND OF ANALYSIS.
21	AND IT DOES NOT WARRANT EITHER CERTIFYING
22	A CLASS, LET ALONE GIVING FREE UPGRADES TO
23	EVERYBODY WHO HAS AN IPOD WHO EVER BOUGHT ANY
24	MUSIC.
25	AND THAT'S IMPORTANT FOR TWO REASONS, ONE

IS BASED ON THE CASES WE HAVE CITED. THEY HAVE TO SHOW THAT THE INJUNCTIVE RELIEF THAT THEY'RE SEEKING WOULD SUBSTANTIALLY BENEFIT OR WOULD BENEFIT SUBSTANTIALLY ALL OF THE CLASS AND THEY HAVEN'T BEEN ABLE TO SHOW THAT AND COMMON SENSE TELLS YOU THAT'S NOT THE CASE.

BUT THE OTHER THING IS THAT THEY HAVE TO SHOW THAT THIS FALLBACK RELIEF THEY'RE SEEKING NOW IS THE PRIMARY REASON FOR BRINGING THIS LAWSUIT.

AND, YOU KNOW, TO ME IT DEFIES

BELIEVABILITY FOR THEM TO SAY EARLIER THAT THE MAIN

REASON INVOLVED GETTING APPLE TO STOP USING DRM IN

ITS STORE ON AN ONGOING BASIS AND NOW THE PRIMARY

REASON IS, IS JUST TO GET THE DRM REMOVED, IN THE

FACE OF THEIR CLAIM FOR TREBLED DAMAGES.

I MEAN, THE TREBLED DAMAGES ARE THE MAIN REASON FOR BRINGING THIS CASE, AND THIS FALLBACK RELIEF THAT WOULD BENEFIT, YOU KNOW, ONLY A SMALL PORTION OF THE PROPOSED CLASS, IF IT WOULD BENEFIT ANYBODY, JUST CANNOT BE CONSIDERED THE MAIN RELIEF.

TWO OTHER POINTS QUICKLY. AT PAGE 9 OF OUR MOTION TO RECONSIDER THE (B)(2) CLASS WE CITE A NUMBER OF CASES THAT STAND FOR THE PROPOSITION THAT WHERE MOST OF THE CLASS WOULD NOT BENEFIT FROM AN INJUNCTION, A (B)(2) CLASS IS INAPPROPRIATE.

1 THAT'S THE SEPULVEDA CASE.

AND THEN WE CITE JAMES AND OTHER CASES IN

FOOTNOTE 7 THAT STANDS FOR THE PROPOSITION THAT

WHEN THE CLAIM BY THE PLAINTIFF IS FOR SUBSTITUTE

PRODUCTS OR SUBSTITUTE HOUSING, THAT'S A CLAIM FOR

DAMAGES. IT'S NOT A CLAIM FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF.

AND I THINK <u>JAMES</u>, YOUR HONOR, PAGE 9,
FOOTNOTE 7 OF OUR MOTION TO RECONSIDER THE (B)(2)
CLASS IS DIRECTLY ON POINT AND SHOWS WHAT THEY'RE
TRYING TO DO IS TO COME UP WITH SOME INJUNCTIVE -SOMETHING THEY COULD PASS OFF AS INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
BUT IT'S NOT. IT'S DAMAGES.

FINAL POINT. THE DIRECT PLAINTIFFS SAY

THAT THEY ARE NOT ASSERTING ANY MONETARY DAMAGES,

NO MONETARY DAMAGE CLAIMS BASED ON ITUNES MUSIC

STORE PURCHASERS, AND THEY CITE THEIR COMPLAINT

WHICH SAYS THAT THE DAMAGE CLASS IS LIMITED TO IPOD

PURCHASERS.

SO THEY CONCEDE, I THINK, THAT IT'S NOT ENOUGH FOR SOMEBODY TO HAVE BOUGHT ITUNES MUSIC.

THEY HAVE NOT SUFFERED AN ANTITRUST INJURY. THEY HAVE NOT SUFFERED DAMAGES. IF THEY HAD, THESE PLAINTIFFS WOULD HAVE BEEN SUING FOR THAT.

ONE YEAR AGO THE PLAINTIFFS AGREED TO EXCLUDE ITUNES MUSIC PURCHASERS WHO DIDN'T HAVE

Τ	I PODS FROM THE CLASS. THEY ABANDONED THAT PART OF
2	THE GROUP.
3	NOW, WHEN YOUR HONOR ASKED THE QUESTION,
4	WHY DID YOU LIMIT IT TO IPOD PURCHASERS, INSTEAD OF
5	ANSWERING THAT QUESTION, THEY TRY AND EVADE THE
6	QUESTION BY EXPANDING THE CLASS, EXPANDING THE
7	CLASS TO INCLUDE PEOPLE FOR WHOM THEY ARE NOT
8	SEEKING MONEY DAMAGES.
9	THE COURT: NOW SLOW DOWN. WHAT IS THIS
10	CONCESSION THAT YOU'RE TELLING ME ABOUT? WHEN DID
11	IT HAPPEN AND HOW DID IT HAPPEN?
12	MR. MITTELSTAEDT: WHEN YOUR HONOR
13	CERTIFIED THE DIRECT (B)(3) CLASS.
14	THE COURT: AND HOW WAS THEIR CONCESSION
15	MANIFESTED? WAS THERE A STIPULATION OR WAS IT JUST
16	MY DEFINITION?
17	MR. MITTELSTAEDT: IF YOUR HONOR RECALLS,
18	THEIR ORIGINAL COMPLAINT ALLEGED A CLASS OF ITUNES
19	PURCHASERS AND IPOD PURCHASERS.
20	WHEN THEY MOVED TO CERTIFY, THEY LIMITED
21	THE MOTION TO ONLY TO IPOD PURCHASERS.
22	WHEN YOUR HONOR CERTIFIED THE CLASS, YOU
23	WENT BACK AND CERTIFIED THE CLASS AS PLED IN THE
24	COMPLAINT.
25	WE MOVED FOR RECONSIDERATION OR FOR

CLARIFICATION. THE PLAINTIFFS DID NOT OPPOSE THAT.

THEY DID NOT DISPUTE THAT THE CLASS SHOULD BE

LIMITED AS THEY HAD MOVED, WHICH WAS ONLY IPOD

PURCHASERS AND EXCLUDED THE ITUNES PURCHASERS WHICH

THEY HAD ALLEGED IN THE COMPLAINT. AND SO YOUR

HONOR MODIFIED THE (B)(3) CLASS DEFINITION TO

INCLUDE ONLY IPOD PURCHASERS AND TO EXCLUDE ITUNES

PURCHASERS WHO DIDN'T HAVE IPODS.

AND THEN WHEN YOUR HONOR LAST JULY ASKED THE QUESTION, WHY DID YOU DIRECT PURCHASERS LIMIT YOUR CLASS TO IPOD PURCHASERS, EVEN THOUGH THE INJUNCTIVE RELIEF YOU'RE SEEKING HAS TO DO WITH MUSIC, INSTEAD OF ANSWERING THAT QUESTION, THEY REVERTED TO WHAT THEY HAD ALLEGED IN THE COMPLAINT AND TRIED TO REACTIVATE THIS CLASS OF PEOPLE THAT THEY HAD ABANDONED.

I THINK THAT, TOO, BEARS ON THE QUESTION

OF WHETHER THIS RELIEF THAT THEY'RE SEEKING FOR

THIS NEW CLASS IS THE PRIMARY REASON FOR THIS CASE.

THE COURT: I'LL LOOK AT THAT HISTORY. I

GUESS THAT'S WHY THE MOTION, BUT I DON'T HEAR YOU

SAYING THAT THAT OPERATES AS SOME KIND OF A

JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL. IT'S SIMPLY A CHANGE IN

POSITION. THE QUESTION IS WHETHER I SHOULD PERMIT

IT.

1	MR. MITTELSTAEDT: I THINK IT GOES TO
2	WHETHER IT'S THE PRIMARY PURPOSE FOR BRING THIS.
3	THEY HAD A GOOD REASON FOR NOT SEEKING
4	THE CLASS ORIGINALLY.
5	WHEN THEY'RE NOT SEEKING DAMAGES BASED ON
6	ITUNES MUSIC PURCHASES, AND THEY HAVE EXPLICITLY
7	SAID IN THE BRIEFING ON THIS MOTION, DOCUMENT 236,
8	PAGE 5, THAT THEY ARE NOT ASSERTING MONETARY
9	DAMAGES BASED ON MUSIC STORE PURCHASES, AND THAT'S
10	BECAUSE THERE'S NO ANTITRUST INJURY.
11	IT'S THE QUESTION YOUR HONOR ASKED, WHAT
12	IS THE HARM TO SOMEBODY WHO BUYS A MUSIC FILE WITH
13	DRM FOR 99 CENTS AND USES THAT IN THE WAYS THAT IT
14	CAN BE USED?
15	YOU KNOW, WHAT IS THE HARM THERE? AND IF
16	THERE'S NO HARM, HOW IS THAT GROUP ENTITLED TO
17	INJUNCTIVE RELIEF?
18	AND FOR THEM TO SAY, WELL, APPLE OUGHT TO
19	REMOVE THE DRM FROM ALL OF THESE SONGS. WELL,
20	PRESUMABLY THE PEOPLE KNEW THEY WERE BUYING SONGS
21	WITH DRM AND THAT'S WHY IT COST 99 CENTS.
22	THE COURT: I UNDERSTAND YOUR POSITION.
23	DID YOU STAND BECAUSE YOU HAD A FINAL WORD?
24	MR. MERRICK: I DID MAINLY BECAUSE I WANT
25	TO GO THROUGH I INVITE THE COURT TO READ THE

JAMES CASE.

THE COURT: I'M GOING TO GO BACK AND READ THAT AND FOREMOST PRO AND THERE WERE A LOT OF CASES THAT I STARTED THE FIRST TIME AROUND BUT MAINLY FOR THE TYING ISSUES BUT COUNSEL'S ARGUMENT INVITES ME TO GO BACK AND SEE WHAT THOSE CASES SAY ABOUT THE SECTION 2 CLAIMS.

MR. MERRICK: BUT ON THE (B)(2) CLASS IN

JAMES -- OKAY. THE CASE INVOLVED A CLASS ACTION OF

AMERICANS WHO HAD HOUSES THAT WERE DEMOLISHED BY

THE CITY AND THE CITY HAD -- THERE WERE LIENS

AGAINST THE PROPERTY THAT WERE DEMOLISHED FOR THE

COST OF THE DEMOLITION.

THE SUBSTITUTE HOUSING ASPECT THAT APPLE
LIKES TO KEY IN ON WERE ONE OF MANY DIFFERENT KINDS
OF EQUITABLE RELIEF. THERE WERE SEVERAL OTHER
FORMS OF EQUITABLE RELIEF THAT THE COURT DID FIND
SUPPORTED A (B)(2) CLASS, INCLUDING CANCELLING THE
DEBT OF THE DEMOLITION COSTS, RELEASING THE LIENS
AND INSURING THEIR TITLE AND WHICH I WOULD SUGGEST
IS A LITTLE CLOSER TO WHAT WE HAVE HERE WHICH IS
THAT WE'RE ASKING FOR APPLE TO IN A SENSE REMOVE
THE LIEN AND GIVE THE PEOPLE CLEAR TITLE TO THE
MUSIC THAT THEY BOUGHT IN THE FIRST PLACE.

BUT WITH THAT I'LL LET MS. ZELDES HAVE

1	THE LAST WORD.
2	MS. ZELDES: I THINK IT'S A BIT
3	DISINGENUOUS, WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, TO SAY THAT WE
4	JUST CAME UP WITH THIS INJUNCTIVE RELIEF NOW.
5	WE HAVE ALWAYS PLED THAT PLAINTIFFS IN
6	BOTH CASES ARE LOCKED INTO THESE LIBRARIES. THIS
7	COURT FOUND LAST DECEMBER THAT INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
8	PREDOMINANT IN A DIRECT PURCHASER CASE.
9	OUR SUBCLASS OF FOLKS WHO ARE SEEKING THE
10	DISGORGEMENT OF CONVERSION FEES IS CLEARLY A SUBSET
11	OF THE OVERALL INJUNCTIVE RELIEF WE'RE SEEKING. IT
12	MAY OVERLAP WITH THE DIRECT PURCHASERS, BUT IT IS A
13	SUBSET AND NOT THE PREDOMINANT RELIEF SOUGHT.
14	AND THAT FOLKS ARE PAYING THIS TREMENDOUS
15	PREMIUM TO UNLOCK THEIR MUSIC SHOWS WHAT A
16	RESTRAINT THAT IS. THAT IS A TREMENDOUS RESTRAINT.
17	IF IT WAS INSIGNIFICANT, HOW COULD APPLE GET A 30
18	PERCENT MARGIN ON THAT?
19	THE COURT: WELL, I WON'T GO INTO WHAT
20	PART OF THAT APPLE KEEPS. THAT HAS TO DO WITH
21	WHETHER IT INCURS EXPENSES ASSOCIATED WITH
22	TRANSFERRING.
23	MS. ZELDES: AND THERE IS NO DISCOVERY ON
24	THAT AT THIS POINT, YOUR HONOR. IT IS AN ISSUE
25	THAT HAS NOT.

1	THE COURT: CAN I BRING THIS TO A CLOSE?
2	MR. MITTELSTAEDT: YOUR HONOR, COULD I
3	ADD ONE HOUSEKEEPING POINT? THERE ARE THREE
4	MOTIONS ON TODAY.
5	THE COURT: YES.
6	MR. MITTELSTAEDT: WE HAVE SPENT MOST OF
7	THE TIME ON WHETHER
8	THE COURT: I HAD FOUR ACTUALLY BUT GO
9	AHEAD.
10	MR. MITTELSTAEDT: WE SPENT A LOT OF TIME
11	ON WHETHER THE (B)(2) CLASS SHOULD BE EXPANDED TO
12	INCLUDE ITUNES STORE PURCHASERS.
13	WE HAVE SPENT LESS TIME ON WHETHER, AS
14	THE COURT INVITED, THAT (B)(2) CLASS FOR INJUNCTIVE
15	RELIEF SHOULD BE DECERTIFIED. THAT'S BEEN FULLY
16	BRIEFED.
17	OUR BASIC ARGUMENT IS, AS I SAID, WITH
18	RESPECT TO THE ITUNES MUSIC STORE ALLEGED NEW
19	CLASS. THE MAIN RELIEF THEY SOUGHT IS MOOTED AS
20	DEMONSTRATED BY MR. CUE'S DECLARATION. AND THIS
21	FALLBACK RELIEF IS NOT THE PRIMARY PURPOSE AND IT
22	WOULDN'T BENEFIT MOST, IF ANY, OF THE CLASS.
23	SO WE HAVE BRIEFED THAT ISSUE AND I I
24	MEAN, WHAT WE HAVE SUGGESTED TO THE COURT IS THAT
25	BECAUSE THE PRIMARY INJUNCTIVE RELIEF THEY SOUGHT

CHANGING THE MUSIC STORE SO IT DOESN'T, YOU KNOW,
HAVE DRM ON THE MUSIC ON AN GOING BASIS, BECAUSE
THAT IS MOOT, THAT (B)(2) CLASS SHOULD BE
DECERTIFIED AS SET FORTH IN THE MOTION THAT YOUR
HONOR INVITED IN JULY.

THE COURT: WELL, IN THE NAME OF
HOUSEKEEPING, IT SOUNDS LIKE WE'RE STILL AT THE
SAME PLACE BUT WHAT I'M PERSUADED TO DO, I'LL GIVE
IT CONSIDERATION, IS TO INVITE A MOTION WHICH
CONFIRMS THAT IN LIGHT OF THE DISMISSAL OF THE
TYING CLAIM THERE IS A VIABLE MONOPOLY CLAIM AND TO
HAVE THE TWO SIDES FOCUS ME ON WHAT IT IS, IS THE
ESSENCE OF THAT CLAIM INDEPENDENT OF THE TYING.

I KNOW IT'S A TECHNOLOGICAL RELATIONSHIP

AS I HAVE CHARACTERIZED IT, AND I WANT TO

UNDERSTAND THAT BETTER. ALL OF THESE CHANGES IN

THE TECHNOLOGY DO SEEM TO ME TO OFFER THE NEED FOR

SOME KIND OF CUTOFF, AND I WANT TO UNDERSTAND THAT

BETTER.

SO I'LL INVITE THOSE MOTIONS. THE FACT
THAT I DON'T TAKE ANY ACTION ON THESE CURRENT
MOTIONS IS NOT AN INDICATION THAT I DON'T CONSIDER
IT APPROPRIATE FOR THE PLAINTIFF TO REDEFINE THE
CLASS TO INCLUDE ITUNES PURCHASERS. IT'S JUST THAT
I'M A LITTLE CONFUSED AT THIS POINT AS TO WHAT

1	RELIEF	IS E	BEING	3 5	SOUGHT	AND	WHE	ETF	HER	THAT	'S
2	INDEPEN	IDENI	OF	А	PURCHA	ASER	OF	А	MAC	CHINE	

AND THAT IS A SOURCE OF SOME CONFUSION

THAT I CAN GET CLARIFIED IN THE CONTEXT OF AN

INVITED MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A

CLAIM ON THE SECTION 2 FOR MONOPOLY.

MS. SWEENEY: YOUR HONOR, IF I COULD,

BONNIE SWEENEY FOR THE DIRECT PURCHASERS. I HEARD

MR. MITTELSTAEDT SAY HE WANTED TO ADDRESS SOME

HOUSEKEEPING ISSUES SO I WANTED TO CHIME IN HERE.

IN YOUR DISCUSSION JUST NOW, YOUR HONOR,
AND YOUR INVITATION TO DEFENDANT TO FILE YET
ANOTHER MOTION TO DISMISS I WANTED TO RAISE
SOMETHING THAT DURING THE TIME PERIOD THAT THIS
CASE HAS BEEN LITIGATED BEFORE MR. MERRICK JOINED
THE CASE APPLE FILED TWO MOTIONS TO DISMISS.

AND IF YOUR HONOR RECALLS BOTH OF THOSE MOTIONS WERE DENIED. AND I THINK IF YOU GO BACK AND LOOK AT YOUR HONOR'S OPINIONS, THERE WAS AN OPINION ISSUED IN THE SLATTERY CASE AS WELL AS AN OPINION ISSUED IN THE TUCKER CASE AND THOSE OPINIONS LAY OUT VERY CLEARLY THAT PLAINTIFFS ALLEGE A VERY SEPARATE STAND-ALONE MONOPOLIZATION CLAIM. THOSE ALLEGATIONS ARE NOT DEPENDENT UPON THE TYING CLAIM THAT YOUR HONOR HAS DISMISSED.

AND THE COURT'S DECISION ON THE
MONOPOLIZATION CLAIMS AND ATTEMPTED DON'T FORGET
WE HAVE AN ATTEMPTED MONOPOLIZATION CLAIM AS WELL,
ON THOSE CLAIMS MADE VERY CLEAR THAT UNDER THE LAW,
AND THERE WAS GREAT DISCUSSION IN THE BRIEFS, IN
ORAL ARGUMENT, IN YOUR HONOR'S OPINIONS AS TO THE
EFFECT OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT'S TRINKO
DECISION, A SECTION 2 MONOPOLIZATION CASE, NOTHING
TO DO WITH TYING.
SO I THINK THAT THE PROPER THE

SO I THINK THAT THE PROPER -- THE

JUNCTURE WE'RE AT HERE, YOUR HONOR. THE FIRST CASE

WAS FILED IN 2005. THE <u>TUCKER</u> CASE WAS FILED IN

2006.

WE'RE NOW IN 2009, AND MR. MITTELSTAEDT SEEKS TO KEEP RELITIGATING OVER AND OVER AND OVER AGAIN MOTIONS TO DISMISS, MOTIONS FOR CLASS, ET CETERA.

I THINK THE APPROPRIATE WAY TO RESOLVE

THIS IS REALLY TO ALLOW PLAINTIFFS TO COMPLETE

DISCOVERY, SET A SCHEDULE AND THEN MR. MITTELSTAEDT

CAN BRING HIS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

AS YOU KNOW, YOU HAVE PROBABLY SEEN IN

THE PAPERS WE HAVE HAD DIFFICULTIES IN GETTING WHAT

WE NEED FROM APPLE IN DISCOVERY, AND I KNOW THAT'S

NOT YOUR HONOR'S PROBLEM. WE HAVE A MAGISTRATE

1 ASSIGNED TO THIS CASE.

BUT ONCE WE RESOLVE THOSE PROBLEMS AND

GET THROUGH DISCOVERY APPLE IS CERTAINLY ENTITLED

TO MAKE A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND I THINK

THAT WOULD BE THE MOST FAIR AND EFFICIENT WAY TO

PROCEED GIVEN ALL OF THE DELAYS THAT COUNSEL HAS

ENCOUNTERED SINCE FILING THIS CASE.

THE COURT: WELL, THAT'S FAIR. I'LL TAKE
THAT INTO CONSIDERATION. THAT WOULD DELAY IT.

THE REASON I'M INVITING IT AS A 12(B)(6)

MOTION IS THAT IT WOULD HELP ME, FIRST OF ALL, TO

ON THESE MOTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE DEFINITION OF

THE CLASS, BECAUSE RIGHT NOW THE COMPLAINT IS BASED

ON TYING. AND IT WOULD HELP ME TO SEE THE CASE ON

MONOPOLIZATION AND SEE WHAT IS THE APPROPRIATE

CLASS.

BUT I THINK YOU'RE RIGHT, I WOULD

UNCOUPLE THE QUESTION OF DISCOVERY. THIS IS NOT A

SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM ACT CASE WHERE YOU

CAN'T GO AHEAD WITH DISCOVERY WHILE THESE THINGS

ARE GOING ON AND AS FAR AS I'M CONCERNED DISCOVERY

IS OPEN AND IF YOU NEED HELP FROM THE COURT GETTING

THE INFORMATION THAT YOU NEED, RESORT TO THAT

PROCESS.

MR. MITTELSTAEDT: WE HAVE PRODUCED A LOT

1	OF DOCUMENTS. WE HAVE A LOT OF LAWYERS WORKING AND
2	REVIEWING DOCUMENTS.
3	THE COURT: WHEN WOULD YOU BE IN A
4	POSITION TO BRING THIS ARGUMENT THAT YOU'VE MADE
5	SEVERAL TIMES AND THE ONLY REASON I'M ASKING FOR
6	CONSIDERATION IS THAT THINGS HAVE CHANGED IN TERMS
7	OF MY OWN UNDERSTANDING OF THE CASE AND IT JUST
8	HELPS ME IF I'M GOING TO DENY IT, YOU BENEFIT
9	BECAUSE IF I DENY IT, IT'S DONE IN LIGHT OF THE
10	CLAIMS DISMISSED.
11	IF I'M GOING TO GRANT IT, YOU WOULD
12	BENEFIT. SO IT SEEMS TO ME THAT IT WOULD BENEFIT
13	BOTH SIDES TO HAVE A GOOD CLEAR DETERMINATION AS TO
14	WHAT THE CLAIM IS AND TO SAY THAT THAT CLAIM IS
15	COGNIZABLE UNDER THE ANTITRUST LAWS.
16	HOW LONG?
17	MR. MITTELSTAEDT: I WOULD THINK, YOUR
18	HONOR, A MATTER OF WEEKS.
19	THE COURT: WEEKS.
20	MS. SWEENEY: CAN I RESPOND TO THAT, YOUR
21	HONOR? SO ARE YOU SAYING THAT YOU WOULD FILE A
22	MOTION TO DISMISS IN TWO WEEKS OR A MOTION FOR
23	SUMMARY JUDGMENT? I MISUNDERSTOOD.
24	THE COURT: HE'S SUGGESTING TO FOLLOW THE
25	COURT'S DETERMINATION OF THE 12(B)(6).

1	MS. SWEENEY: THANK YOU.
2	THE COURT: I WON'T BE AVAILABLE IN A
3	MATTER OF WEEKS.
4	MS. GARCIA, SUGGEST A DATE FOR A
5	SPECIALLY SET MOTION THAT IS CONSISTENT WITH OUR
6	LAW AND MOTION CALENDAR.
7	(PAUSE IN PROCEEDINGS.)
8	THE COURT: SO WE WOULD HAVE TO INTERRUPT
9	OUR SCHEDULE AND PUT YOU IN SOME TIME IN LATE
10	JANUARY OR EARLY FEBRUARY. AT THIS POINT WE CAN'T
11	HEAR YOU SO THE 25TH, 1ST, 8TH OR THE 22ND.
12	MR. MITTELSTAEDT: WHY DON'T WE TAKE THE
13	8TH.
14	THE COURT: FEBRUARY 8TH.
15	MS. SWEENEY: YOUR HONOR, APOLOGIZE. I
16	DON'T HAVE MY CALENDAR WITH ME. I THINK THAT DATE
17	IS OKAY.
18	THE COURT: SAY AGAIN.
19	MS. SWEENEY: I THINK THAT DATE IS OKAY.
20	I APOLOGIZE. I DIDN'T BRING MY CALENDAR.
21	THE COURT: WELL, THAT WOULD BE YOUR
22	TARGET DATE FOR SETTING UP YOUR BRIEFING SCHEDULE
23	AND IF YOU HAVE PROBLEMS ON THAT PARTICULAR DATE,
24	LET US KNOW AND WE CAN MOVE YOU TO ANOTHER DAY
25	DURING THE WEEK.

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1	MR. MITTELSTAEDT: I KNOW THE ANSWER TO
2	THIS QUESTION BUT THERE WAS ANOTHER IMPORTANT
3	MOTION SET FOR TODAY AND THAT WAS OUR MOTION TO
4	DECERTIFY THE (B)(3) CLASS BASED ON YOUR HONOR'S
5	RULING IN THE INDIRECT PURCHASER CASE.
6	THE COURT: AND WHAT DO YOU THINK THE
7	ANSWER IS?
8	MR. MITTELSTAEDT: YOU POSSIBLY HAVE A
9	COURTROOM FULL OF LAWYERS AND YOU DON'T WANT TO
10	HEAR ANY ARGUMENT ON THAT.
11	THE COURT: I DON'T WANT TO HEAR ANY
12	ARGUMENT ON THAT.
13	MR. MITTELSTAEDT: THANK YOU VERY MUCH.
14	THE COURT: THANK YOU VERY MUCH. MATTER
15	IS UNDER SUBMISSION.
16	MS. SWEENEY: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR.
17	(WHEREUPON, THE PROCEEDINGS IN THIS MATTER
18	WERE CONCLUDED.)
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