APPLE'S (PROPOSED) REDACTIONS

EXHIBIT 9 [Filed Under Seal]

| HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - | ATTORNEYS' EYES ONLY |
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| HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL — 1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA SAN JOSE DIVISION THE APPLE IPOD ITUNES Lead Case No. ANTI-TRUST LITIGATION. C-05-00037-JW (HRL) 22222222222222222222222222222222222 | ATTORNEYS' EYES ONLY 1 INDEX OF EXAMINATION 2 3 WITNESS: EDDY CUE 4 EXAMINATION PAGE 5 By Ms. Bernay 8 6 By Mr. Mittelstaedt 221 7 8 9 10 11 12 |
| EDDY CUE ON BEHALF OF APPLE, INC. VOLUME I December 17, 2010 9:22 a.m. | 13 14 15 16 17 18 |
| 1755 Embarcadero Road Palo Alto, California Ana M. Dub, RMR, CRR, CSR 7445 | 20 21 22 23 24 25 |
| APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL For he Plaintiffs: ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP ALEXANDRA S. BERNAY, ESQ. PAULA M. ROACH, ESQ. 655 West Broadway, Suite 1900 San Diego, California 92101 619.231.1058 xanb@rgrdlaw.com proach@rgrdlaw.com For he Defendant Apple, Inc.: JONES DAY ROBERT A. MITTELSTAEDT, ESQ. 555 California Street, 26th Floor San Francisco, California 94104 415.626.3939 ramittelstaedt@jonesday.com Also Present: APPLE, INC. LISA OLLE, SENIOR CORPORATE COUNSEL LITIGATION Infinite Loop, MS 36-35U Cupertino, California 95014 408.862.8888 olle@apple.com APPLE, INC. Infinite Loop, MS 36-MAL Cupertino, California 95014 ABSE-29307 LUGPETINO, California 95014 APPLE, INC. LUGPETINO, California 95014 ABSE-29307 kandeer@apple.com | INDEX TO EXHIBITS |
| 22 kandeer@appie.com 23 24 MATTHEW COPE, VIDEOGRAPHER 25 | To Doug Morris from 24 Steve Jobs, Produc ion Nos. Apple_AllA00319506-07 25 |

HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - ATTORNEYS' EYES ONLY A. I don't know specifically what all of

41 43 A. But it never got to that -- it never got 1 BY MS. BERNAY: 1 2 Q. Okay. But directly transferred only; is any further into specifics because there were two 2 that correct? criterias that we were looking at when they 3 3 A. I --4 certainly asked for interoperability or asked about MR. MITTELSTAEDT: Object; compound, asked 5 it, which was, number one: and answered, ambiguous. 6 We didn't think it was really technically 7 THE WITNESS: Again, it can be transferred 7 feasible in the sense that we were still making a to an iPod or burned to a CD. Those were the two lot of changes to the way that the DRM worked. And 8 8 we were able to do that because we had the device, 9 ways that you could move songs off of iTunes. 9 BY MS. BERNAY: 10 10 the software ourselves and we could make the changes 11 all at the same time. And so we didn't think that 11 Q. Okay. And at some point in time, is it technically it would work very well if it was done. 12 right that Apple had a deal with Motorola to have 12 sort of a music player on certain phones? 13 And in hindsight, I think that was proven 13 14 A. Yes, that's correct. to us in spades by WMA and Microsoft's plays for 14 15 Q. Okay. So is it right that at some point sure, which failed miserably at trying to do that. 15 in time, songs purchased through the iTunes Store In addition to that, when we looked at it, 16 16 could be directly transferred onto iPods and to 17 17 there was no one in the market that was -- either certain Motorola phones that were compat ble with 18 18 had a successful store or a successful device that 19 FairPlay? 19 we felt like, okay, let's go join that and work with 20 A. Over time, songs could be transferred to 20 them to grow the market because they were iPods, other Apple devices that we developed, and 21 successful. 21 the Motorola device and the HP iPod device. So 2.2 So neither of those two scenarios made it 22 there were other devices that were added over time. viable. 23 23 Q. Is it accurate -- just to sort of get an 24 Q. And it's also right that at some point in 24 idea of sort of what the universe was at the launch, 25 time, Apple went what's referred to as DRM-free; is 25 42 44 is it right that at the launch of the iTunes Music 1 1 that right? Store, that songs purchased through the iTunes Store 2 A. That is correct. could only be directly transferred onto iPods at the 3 3 Q. And about when did that occur, that 4 launch? 4 DRM-free project? A. They could either be -- they could only be 5 5 A. Well, it was done in multiple steps. transferred to an iPod or they could be burned to a Originally, it was done with EMI only and the -- and 7 CD. And then any CD could be ripped back to 7 many of the independents. And I don't recall the 8 digital. 8 exact date of that, but I'm sure we can look that So customers always had the capability, if 9 9 up. they really wanted to, to take a song that they And then approximately about a year later, 10 10 purchased on the store and move it to another it was done with the three other majors that were 11 11 player. 12 12 Q. But they could only be directly 13 13 Q. And is it accurate that now everything transferred, isn't that correct, onto an iPod? that can be purchased in the United States, at 14 14 MR. MITTELSTAEDT: Let me just ask a least, through the iTunes Store is sold DRM-free? 15 15 clarification. Are you saying other than playing on MR. MITTELSTAEDT: Music? 16 16 17 the computer? When you say "transfer," you mean --17 MS. BERNAY: Music. Thank you. 18 MS. BERNAY: Yes. I'm talking about 18 THE WITNESS: Yes. All music in the 19 moving music onto an iPod so that songs purchased world, with the exception of Japan, is purchased 19 through the iTunes Store at the launch could only be 20 DRM-free. 20 21 directly transferred onto an iPod. 21 BY MS. BERNAY: MR. MITTELSTAEDT: Object; asked and Q. We talked a little bit at the beginning 22 22 23 answered. 23 about negotiations with the launch of the store, and THE WITNESS: Again, a song could be we'd mentioned independent labels. Do you recall 24 24 transferred to an iPod or burned to a CD. 25 25 that discussion?

EDDY CUE December 17, 2010



HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - ATTORNEYS' EYES ONLY 53 55 myself. (Cellular telephone rings.) MS. BERNAY: He comes in. Look at that. 15 (Mr. Andeer leaves the proceedings.) 16 17 BY MS. BERNAY: 18 Q. Were there any music stores that you're 19 aware of that sold online digital music at the time 20 that the iTunes Store launched that sold their music DRM-free? 21 A. No, there were none that I was aware of. 22 23 Q. What about later, you know, in the months 24 or years after the iTunes Music Store launched? Were you aware of any stores that sold online 54 56 content DRM-free? 1 2 A. Yes. Q. And what are you -- what stores are you 3 4 aware of? 5 A. Amazon, Wal-Mart. There were many others. Q. What about eMusic? Is that an online 6 7 store that you're familiar with? 8 A. Yes, I am. Q. And what kind of music -- or what do they 9 offer to consumers? 10 A. They offered DRM-free music, but they did 11 not have any of the major labels, and only 12 13 independent music and not all of it. So they offered a subset of music that, I believe, was 14 DRM-free. 15 Q. And do you know whether eMusic existed at 16 the time that the iTunes Store launched in 2003? 17 A. I don't recall. I don't believe so, but I 18 don't recall. 19 20 Q. Do you know whether or not the iTunes 21 Store sold some of the same music that was also available through eMusic? 22


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A. Again, depending on the time frame, but when they were both -- when they were both there,

I'm sure that there were songs that we had that were



labels, did you have any communications with other

people inside of Apple regarding RealNetworks'

24

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
with the attorneys.

let's strike that. Don't tak about conversations

HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - ATTORNEYS' EYES ONLY 121 123 1 THE WITNESS: Okay. Q. It was a technology that would strip the BY MS. BERNAY: DRM protection from protected songs. Is that an 2 2 Q. And going back to RealNetworks now, is accurate description? 3 3 that something that stripped the DRM protection off 4 4 A. I would describe it as a hack to remove 5 of a song? the DRM. A. No, it does not. It tried to put a DRM Q. Okay. And what about --6 7 to, again, hack to look at -- make it look like it 7 A. Which was illegal. Q. Which was illegal? 8 was a FairPlay DRM song. 8 A. Yes. 9 Q. And would that be something that was 9 illegal, in your view? 10 Q. And what are you basing that statement on, 10 MR. MITTELSTAEDT: Objection; calls for a 11 that it was illegal? 11 A. Two things. Number one, the terms of 12 legal conclusion. 12 THE WITNESS: Again, I don't know. I did 13 service that we gave to consumers certainly said 13 not have -- don't know the answer to the question. that when you buy the songs, these are the rights 14 BY MS. BERNAY: 15 that you gain by it and what you can do with it. 15 Q. Do you know whether JHymn actually And secondly, we had the DRM protection on 16 16 affected iTunes as opposed to the iPod? 17 17 there. And my understanding is there's some laws 18 A. What do you mean by "affected"? 18 around DMCA and things about stripping the 19 Q. Just whether or not the way that it protection away that made it illegal. 19 20 functioned was at the software level of iTunes as Q. You said DMCA. What's that? 20 21 opposed to working on the firmware of the iPod. 21 A. I don't -- again --MR. MITTELSTAEDT: Objection; compound. 22 Q. I just mean, do you know what the acronym 22 BY MS. BERNAY: 23 23 is? 24 Q. If you know. 24 A. I don't know what the acronym is. 25 A. I don't know the answer to the question. 25 Q. You just know that it's some --122 124 A. My attorneys have told me there's some Q. Do you know whether Apple ever sent any 1 1 laws around stripping DRMs that are illegal. cease and desist letters regarding JHymn? 2 Q. Okay. And what about something called 3 3 A. I don't recall. 4 PyMusique? What is that? 4 Q. Do you know whether Apple sent any cease 5 A. It's a similar thing. Again, there are 5 and desist letters regarding any hacks that it was many, many hacks that have been done over the years concerned about? 7 to try to rip music off from iTunes. 7 A. I don't know what our legal team did. 8 Q. To rip music off from iTunes? Is that 8 Q. That's not something that you followed up what you said? 9 9 on? Or followed, rather? A. Well, we followed the hacks very closely. 10 A. That's correct. 10 Q. And is PyMusique a hack? But again, how legal responded is not 11 11 12 A. It is also. something that I -- most of these were done with 12 Q. And it's something that strips the DRM 13 13 either people that were anonymous or people that protection from a song? were in countries that -- were not in the U.S. and 14 14 A. I believe so. I can't recall every single other things to that nature that made it harder. So 15 15 one of them, so . . . 16 I don't know how legal responded or what they did. 16 17 Q. Sure. And is that something that is 17 Q. Okay. And do you have any information illegal, this PyMusique, in your view? regarding any cease and desist letters that may have 18 18 MR. MITTELSTAEDT: Objection; calls for a 19 been sent by Apple to any other companies that 19 legal conclusion. 20 either stripped the DRM or provided their own 20 21 THE WITNESS: Again, that's certainly what 21 version of DRM? my attorneys have represented. A. Again, I don't recall any. I don't know. 22 22 23 MR. MITTELSTAEDT: Actually, don't --23 Q. Apart from any communications with the


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EDDY CUE December 17, 2010

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APPLE'S (PROPOSED) REDACTIONS

EXHIBIT 10 [Filed Under Seal]

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| UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA SAN JOSE DIVISION THE APPLE IPOD ITUNES Lead Case N ANTI-TRUST LITIGATION. C-05-00037- VIDEOTAPED 30(B)(6) DEPOSITION OF APPLE COMPUTER, INC. BY DESIGNEE: JEFFREY L. ROBBIN VOLUME I December 3, 2010 9:23 a.m. 1755 Embarcadero Road Palo Alto, California Ana M. Dub, RMR, CRR, CSR 7445 | 5 By Ms. Bernay 8 6 By Mr. Mittelstaedt 200 |
| 2 1 APPEARÁNCES OF COUNSEL 2 For the Plaintiffs 4 ROBB NS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP ALEXANDRA S BERNAY ESQ 5 PAULA M ROACH ESQ 655 West Broadway Suite 1900 6 San Diego California 92101 619 231 1058 7 xanb@rgrdlaw com proach@rgrdlaw com 8 and 9 BONNETT FA RBOURN FR EDMAN & BAL NT TODD D CARPENTER ESQ 2901 N Central Avenue Suite #1000 Phoenix Arizona 85012 (619) 756 6978 tcarpenter@bffb com 13 For the Detendant Apple Computer nc JONES DAY ROBERT A M TTELSTAEDT ESQ 1555 California Street 26th Floor San Francisco California 94104 415 626 3939 ramittelstaedt@jonesday com 18 19 Also Present L SA OLLE ALEXE D AS V DEOGRAPHER | 1 |



Toll Free: 800.300.1214 Facsimile: 619.239.4117





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|--|---|----------------|--|
| 1 | of FarP ay as the d g tar ghts management | 1 | A. Yes. |
| 2 | so ut on that App e was offer ng? | 2 | Q. Do you know where I would find out sort of |
| 3 | A. Yes. | 3 | a comp ete vers on h story of Fa rP ay? Is that |
| 4 | Q. And what d d you do? What work d d you do | 4 | someth ng that App e wou d ma nta n? |
| 5 | on that? | 5 | A. No. |
| 6 | A. In the very beg nn ng, I he ped des gn how | 6 | Q. Okay. Do you know whether there's sort of |
| 7 | t wou d work. I m ght have f xed some bugs in the | 7 | documents document ng each change? If there s not |
| 8 | code as t was being developed. I d dn t do the | 8 | sort of a vers on h story, do you be eve that there |
| 9 | core mp ementat on, but I worked on the | 9 | are documents that exp a n what each vers on of |
| 0 | arch tecture for t. | 10 | FarP ay over the years has been? |
| 1 | Q. And when you say you worked on the | 11 | A. No, I don't think there's a document that |
| 2 | arch tecture for that, can you exp a n to peop e | 12 | descr bes each vers on of Fa rP ay. |
| 3 | ke me, who do not have a software brain, what that | 13 | MR. MITTELSTAEDT: When you come to a |
| 4 | means? | 14 | conven ent stopp ng po nt, f we could take a short |
| 5 | A. It means that I wou d have worked with the | 15 | break. |
| 6 | eng neers to try to f gure out the mechan sms for | 16 | MS. BERNAY: Why don't we do that now. |
| 7 | mp ement ng the DRM. So try ng to just i gure out | 17 | That's tota y fine. Is that a right? |
| 8 | how t would work, how we would keep it secret or | 18 | MR. MITTELSTAEDT: Sure. |
| 9 | secure. It's a broad | 19 | THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Off the record at |
| 0.0 | Q. Sure. And I m just try ng to get at sort | 20 | 10:13 A.M. |
| 21 | of a genera understand ng as to what you how you | 21 | (Recess taken.) |
| 22 | worked on t. | 22 | THE VIDEOGRAPHER: And we are back on the |
| 23 | A. Mm-hmm. | 23 | record at 10:20 A.M. |
| 24 | Q. And s t I ve seen some references to | 24 | MS. BERNAY: Thank you. We come back from |
| 25 | something called an AAC audio stream. Can you te | 25 | our short break. |
| | 50 | | .52 |
| 1 | me what that s? | 1 | Ms. Court Reporter, would you mind just |
| 2 | A. AAC s an aud o codec format. Its how | 2 | reading back the last question and answer, please. |
| 3 | you convert sound into a compressed form. | 3 | (Record read as follows: |
| 4 | Q. Okay. And stright that FarPay fes | 4 | "QUESTION: Okay. Do you know whether |
| 5 | were MP4 f es w th an encrypted AAC aud o stream? | 5 | there's sort of documents documenting |
| 6 | Is that accurate? | 6 | each change? If there's not sort of a |
| 7 | A. FarPaysaDRM. Its more than just a | 7 | version history, do you believe that |
| 8 | f e format. An MP4 s an AAC f e that has | 8 | there are documents that explain what |
| 9 | FarP ay app ed to t. | 9 | each version of FairPlay over the years |
| LO | Q. Okay. And strght that Appe put | 10 | has been? |
| 11 | FarPay on a musc that t so d n the Tunes | 11 | "ANSWER: No, I don't think there's a |
| 12 | Mus c Store once the Tunes Mus c Store was aunched | 12 | document that describes each version of |
| 13 | or t was protected by Fa rP ay? | 13 | FairPlay.") |
| 14 | A. A songs that we so d when the Tunes | 14 | MS. BERNAY: Thank you. |
| 15 | Mus c Store first opened were protected with | 15 | BY MS. BERNAY: |
| 6 | FarPay. | 16 | Q. We were just talking about that there were |
| | Q. Were there or have there been var ous | 17 | a number of versions of FairPlay. Is that accurate? |
| | vers ons or terations of FairP ay over the years? | 18 | A. Yes. |
| 8. | | 19 | Q. Okay. Do you know whether at some point |
| L8 L9 | A. Yes. | 12.0 | to the control of the control of the control of |
| 18 19 20 | A. Yes. Q. Do you know how many versions of FairP ay. | 20 | in time, music sold at the on the iTunes Store |
| 18 19 20 21 | A. Yes. Q. Do you know how many vers ons of Fa rP ay there we been over the years? | 20 21 | was no longer protected by FairPlay? |
| 18 19 20 21 | A. Yes. Q. Do you know how many versions of FairP ay there we been over the years? A. No. | 20 21 22 | was no longer protected by FairPlay? A. Yes. |
| 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | A. Yes. Q. Do you know how many vers ons of Fa rP ay there we been over the years? | 20 21 | was no longer protected by FairPlay? |



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APPLE'S (PROPOSED) REDACTIONS

EXHIBIT 11 [Filed Under Seal]

| UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT | 1 INDEX OF EXAMINATION |
|---|---|
| NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA | 2 |
| SAN JOSE DIVISION | 3 WITNESS: AUGUSTIN J. FARRUGIA |
| | 4 EXAMINATION PAGE |
| | 5 By Mr. Carpenter 7 |
| THE APPLE IPOD ITUNES Lead Case No. | 6 By Mr. Kiernan 212 |
| ANTI-TRUST LITIGATION. C-05-00037-JW (HRL) | 7 By Wit. Richian 212 |
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| HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - ATTORNEYS' EYES ONLY | |
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| VIDEOTAPED 30(b)(6) DEPOSITION OF | 12 |
| AUGUSTIN J. FARRUGIA | 13 |
| ON BEHALF OF | 14 |
| APPLE, INC. | 15 |
| VOLUME I | 16 |
| | 17 |
| December 8, 2010 | 18 |
| 9:16 a.m. | 19 |
| | 20 |
| | 21 |
| 1755 Embarcadero Road | 7.7 |
| Palo Alto, California | 22 |
| | 23 |
| Ana M. Dub, RMR, CRR, CSR 7445 | 24 |
| | 25 |
| APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL | INDEX TO EXHIBITS |
| For the Plaintiffs: BONNETT, FAIRBOURN, FRIEDMAN, & BALINT, P.C. | 2 Symbility Department Page |
| TODD D. CARPENTER, ESQ. | 3 Exhibit Description Page 4 Exhibit 21 Organization Chart, Bates13 |
| 4 2901 N. Central Avenue, Suite 1000 Phoenix, Arizona 85012 | No. Apple_AllA00099092 |
| 619.756.6978 | Exhibit 22 Letter on the Letterhead of23 |
| tcarpenter@bffb.com | 6 Jones Day Dated |
| and | November 15, 2010 to Alexandra Bernay from David |
| 7 ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP | Kiernan |
| PAULA M. ROACH, ESQ. | 8 Exhibit 23 E-Mail Chain, Top E-Mail125 |
| 655 West Broadway, Suite 1900 San Diego, California 92101 | 9 Dated April 27, 2005, to |
| 619.231.1058 | Tom Neumayr from Greg 10 Joswiak, Bates |
| proach@rgrdlaw.com For the Defendant Apple, Inc.: | Nos. Apple_AllA00090485-88 |
| 2 JONES DAY | Exhibit 24 Printout of iChat, Bates132 |
| DAVID C. KIERNAN, ESQ. 555 California Street, 26th Floor | 12 Nos. Apple_AllA00798326-27 |
| San Francisco, California 94104 | 13 Exhibit 25 Series of E-Mails, Top144 E-Mail Dated July 5, 2005. |
| 4 415.875-5745 dkiernan@jonesday.com | 14 to Roger Pantos from |
| | Augustin J. Farrugia, Bates Nos. Apple AllA00099178-91 |
| and S | 16 Exhibit 26 E-Mail Chain, Top E-Mail147 |
| JONES DAY | Dated November 7, 2005, to 17 Jeff Robbin from Augustin |
| MICHAEL CULHANE HARPER, ESQ. (Morning Session) 1755 Embarcadero Road | J. Farrugia, Bates |
| Palo Alto, California 94303 | 18 No. Apple_AllA00091906 |
| 650.739.3916 mcharper@jonesday.com | 19 Exhibit 27 Printout of iChat, Bates154 No. Apple AllA00798303 |
| Also Present: | 20 |
| APPLE, INC. LISA OLLE, SENIOR CORPORATE COUNSEL LITIGATION | Exhibit 28 E-Mail Dated April 25, 2006162 21 to Dave Heller from Chris |
| 1 Infinite Loop, MS 36-35U | Wysocki and Attachment, |
| Cupertino, California 95014 | 22 Bates Nos. Apple |
| 408.862.8888 | AIIA00094563-69 |



MATTHEW COPE, VIDEOGRAPHER

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| | HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - | | | 47 |
|----|--|----|---|----|
| 1 | management technology or software; correct? | 1 | A. Yeah. | 4/ |
| 2 | A. What do you mean by "software"? You put | 2 | Q. Okay. How would you descr be the music | |
| 3 | "software" here. | 3 | file that's transferred to the end user's computer? | |
| 4 | Q. Okay. How about I leave out "software." | 4 | A. It's a file that contain the song encoded | |
| 5 | And the question is: FairPlay is a | 5 | with ASE's encoding process. | |
| 6 | digital rights management technology; correct? | 6 | Q. In technical terms, what would you | |
| 7 | A. Which is correct. | 7 | describe the file as or how would you name the file? | |
| 8 | Q. If I refer to digital rights management as | 8 | A. Song, digital song. | |
| 9 | DRM, you'll understand what I'm talking about? | 9 | Q. Okay. Is it accurate to say that the song | |
| 10 | A. Correct. | 10 | that is transferred to the end user's computer is in | |
| 11 | Excuse me. Before you ask question, can I | 11 | MPEG-4 container format? | |
| 12 | have a glass of water, please? | 12 | A. Maybe. | |
| 13 | Q. Sure. | 13 | Q. Is it your testimony that you're not aware | |
| 14 | When was FairPlay originally developed? | 14 | of what the song format is? | |
| 15 | A. I cannot say about FairPlay before my | 15 | A. I'm not I'm not sure about the format. | |
| 16 | time, but I developed the first version of FairPlay | 16 | Q. Okay. What would you how would you | |
| | | 17 | explain the primary purpose for developing or | |
| 17 | when I was at Apple. | 18 | redesigning FairPlay in the manner that you did once | |
| 18 | Q. I'm sorry. Did you say that you developed the first version of FairPlay when you came to | 19 | you were with Apple, once you came to Apple? | |
| 19 | Apple? | 20 | A. Developing or redesigning? | |
| 20 | | 21 | Q. Developing of redesigning? | |
| 21 | A. I cannot speak before my time — Q. Sure. | 22 | A. I rather answer the question about | |
| 22 | | 23 | redesigning first | |
| 23 | A. — because Apple has a FairPlay | 24 | Q. Sure. | |
| 24 | implementation before my time and I cannot speak about that. | 25 | A. — if you don't mind. | |
| 25 | | 23 | A. — II you don't mind. | _ |
| | But I did what I called the Version 1.0 of | | As a cognity expert the first thing you | 48 |
| 1 | The state of the s | 1 | As a security expert, the first thing you | |
| 2 | FairPlay when I came. | 2 | do when you come to a project I ke FairPlay is to | |
| 3 | Q. And that Version 1.0, was that an update | 3 | analyze what you have and to do a risk assessment. And the risk assessment I saw at the time | |
| 4 | to FairPlay? | 4 | | |
| 5 | A. No. It was a change on the architecture. | 5 | was completely upside down, which mean that the | |
| 6 | It was a complete redesign. | 6 | design and the architecture and the implementation | |
| 7 | Q. It was a complete redesign? | 7 | Apple had of FairPlay before my time was really | |
| 8 | A. Redesign, yes. | 8 | upside down. | |
| 9 | Q. Are you familiar with an MPEG-4 file? | 9 | The example I use is: Do you like to wa k | |
| 10 | A. M? MPEG-4, yes. | 10 | with shoes with the heel on the front? That was I | |
| 11 | Q. Okay. Can you describe or explain what an | 11 | discover. That's pretty difficult, right? | |
| 12 | MPEG-4 is to me? | 12 | And this was my first initial reaction, | |
| 13 | A. It's a container which contain different | 13 | saying: Look, your design is upside down. We need | |
| 14 | type of content. | 14 | to redesign everything. | |
| 15 | THE COURT REPORTER: I'm sorry. | 15 | Q. From a technical standpoint, why did you | |
| 16 | THE WITNESS: A container that contains | 16 | believe that it was upside down? | |
| 17 | digital content. It's a standard. | 17 | Because as a security expert, it was done | |
| 18 | BY MR. CARPENTER: | 18 | incorrectly. | |
| 19 | Q. Does Apple utilize MPEG-4 files strike | 19 | Q. Okay. What leads you to say that it was | |
| | | | | |

22

24

25



Are the iTunes music contained in MP-4 -

Q. Okay. When you say "maybe," you're not

20 that.

22 MPEG-4 files?

A. Maybe.

21

23

24

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20 done incorrectly if we had to drill down into what


23 you have -- you know what you design in security,

A. A common practice we know in security, and

and it was done upside down vis-a-vis the common

the actual process was?

practice we have in security.



24

25

didn't know.



That is my question to you.

A. You understood that we said that's for new


product. Now, the question is update for what?

23

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
affected Harmony. And he already testified he

THE WITNESS: I don't know the answer to





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ATTORNEYS' EYES ONLY 193 195 A. Let me read. 1 A. Not that I remember. 1 Q. Can I direct your attention to page 80, Q. I'm sorry? 2 2 please. In particular, the section that reads -A. Can I read? 3 MR. KIERNAN: He said let him read. the section underneath the subheading 4 4 MR. CARPENTER: Oh, absolutely. 5 (Witness reviews document.) (Witness reviews document.) 6 BY MR. CARPENTER: 7 THE WITNESS: Yes, it has been implemented 7 8 Q. Are you ready? 8 partially. 9 Mm-hmm 9 BY MR. CARPENTER: Q. Is the reference in this section to the Q. When you say "partially," it has not been 10 10 word "Real" a reference to RealNetworks? implemented to the extent described by this 11 document? 12 A Should be 12 Q. Okay. Can you read the sentence that 13 A. This document were describing 2005, 2006. 14 begins And things has changed to have a better way of doing 14 15 Q. So the particular description that's 16 provided by this document has evolved; is that 17 accurate? A. Correct. 19 Q. Did you draft this section? Q. Okay. And how has it evolved or improved? 20 20 21 A Correct 21 MR. KIERNAN: Objection; lacks foundation. Q. Okay. What did you mean by Real could DRM 22 THE WITNESS: Evolved because we want to 22 23 their music? have better performances, for example. 23 BY MR. CARPENTER: 24 A. Is the thing we discussed about the 24 25 injection. Q. I'm sorry. Did you say better 25 194 196 Q. Okay. Does that mean that you're performances? 1 acknowledging that Real could DRM their music to 2 A. Yeah 2 Q. What is your metric to determine whether make it compatible or able to be played on an iPod? 3 3 you're achieving better performances? 4 MR. KIERNAN: Objection; lacks foundation. 5 A. User. If it is too slow to play your 5 Objection; form. 6 song, it's a bad performance. You have to admit 6 THE WITNESS: We know that on the risk 7 that if you play better -- you wait twenty second 7 management we have, and we have this flaw, and it before you have a song, it's not good. was exploited by Real. 8 8 Q. Is it accurate to say that the version BY MR. CARPENTER: 9 9 that's described by this document has been improved Q. Okay. And when you say the flaw was 10 10 by making it faster? exploited by Real, did you mean that Real was able 11 11 12 For example. to make its music to be played on the iPod? 12 13 Q. What FairPlay version was it implemented 13 In any way. Yes, correct. into -- first implemented into? Q. Okay. Why would you describe that as a 14 14 A. Guesstimate is the first version of 15 flaw? Core FP. Remember Core FP? A. Because, like I said, if you inject things 16 16 Q. Is it implemented into any subsequent 17 improperly inside the ecosystem and you do it improperly, the user will have a bad experience. 18 versions of Core FP? 18 A. Yes. 19 19 Q. If the user desired to have its Q. All subsequent versions or particular RealNetwork music played on the iPod, wouldn't that 20 20 subsequent versions? be viewed as a positive experience? 21 21 22 All, should be all version. 22 MR. KIERNAN: Objection; lacks foundation, 23 Q. When you're describing the evolved version 23 calls for speculation, objection to form.

24

25



or the improved version, is that -- does that

correlate to a specific version of Core FP?

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
THE WITNESS: As we may have seen that we

have customers after that, they are calling us, and

ATTORNEYS' EYES ONLY 201 203 Music purchased from iTunes or music purchased from 1 (Whereupon, Deposition Exhibit 30 was 1 2 marked for identification.) Real? 2 3 BY MR. CARPENTER: A. All the musics. 3 4 Q. You ready? Q. Okav. 4 5 A. Mm-hmm. A. All the songs. Q. Can you describe this document for me? Q. How would the music -- how would the music 6 7 A. It looks like it's e-mail that I sent Tony be erased? 8 Fadell and Guy, October 2006. 9 Q. Okay. And you believe this is an e-mail that you sent to Tony Fadell and Guy Bar-Nahum? 10 11 A. Mm-hmm. Q. Okay. What -- at what point in the 12 Q. And would you normally communicate with 12 them through e-mail in the normal course of consumer experience would this problem occur? When 13 13 14 business? the consumer sunk the iPod with its computer, or 14 when the consumer sunk the iPod with the RealNetwork A. Correct. 15 15 media player? 16 Q. Have you ever seen this e-mail before 16 A. It would be when the consumer tried to 17 today? 17 18 A. Yes, I did. 18 play the music. 19 Q. Aside from when you originally drafted it? Q. Okay. I'm a little bit confused. If the 19 20 A. Yes, I should. Yeah. 20 consumer tried to play the music on the iPod, Q. Can you explain the contents to me or put 21 wouldn't the -- strike that. 21 22 it in context? 22 Would the iPod -- would the consumer not be able to play its music from the moment it 23 23 downloaded the RealNetworks song? 24 MR. KIERNAN: Objection to form; lacks 25 202 204 Q. Can I turn your attention to the second 1 foundation. 1 THE WITNESS: You are confusing me now. 2 page. BY MR. CARPENTER: 3 A. Mm-hmm. 3 Q. Is this -- and can you explain to me what 4 Q. Okay. What would immediately precede the 4 music being rendered inoperable? What would the 5 this is? 5 6 last action the consumer would have taken have been? 6 A. Looks like is a page of a forum from 7 MR. KIERNAN: Objection; lacks foundation, 7 RealNetworks. 8 calls for speculation. Objection; form. Q. Did you send this Web page to the 8 THE WITNESS: That will occur when the recipients of this e-mail? 9 9 consumer will sync the content on the iPod. A. Probably. 10 10 MR. CARPENTER: I'm sorry. Can you repeat Q. Okay. Do you recall why you sent this to 11 11 12 them? 12 that. 13 (Record read as follows: 13 "THE WITNESS: That will occur when the 14 consumer will sync the content on the 15 iPod.") 16 BY MR. CARPENTER: 17 Q. What content are you referring to? 18 A. Any content which is not synced with a 19 correct ecosystem. 20 MR. CARPENTER: Okay. Set that aside. 21 And can I introduce Exhibit No. 30, I 22 23 believe, to Mr. Farrugia's deposition, Bates stamped AIIA00802966. 24 25



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APPLE'S (PROPOSED) REDACTIONS

EXHIBIT 14 [Filed Under Seal]

| 1 | UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT | |
|----|--|--------|
| 2 | NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA | |
| 3 | SAN JOSE DIVISION | |
| 4 | | |
| 5 | | |
| | THE APPLE IPOD ITUNES Lead Case No. | |
| 6 | ANTI-TRUST LITIGATION. C-05-00037-JW (HRL) | |
| 7 | ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | |
| 8 | | |
| 9 | | |
| 10 | HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - ATTORNEYS' EYES ONLY | |
| 11 | | |
| 12 | VIDEOTAPED 30(b)(6) DEPOSITION OF | |
| 13 | DAVID K. HELLER | |
| 14 | ON BEHALF OF | |
| 15 | APPLE, INC. | |
| 16 | VOLUME I | |
| 17 | | |
| 18 | December 15, 2010 | |
| 19 | 9:16 a.m. | |
| 20 | | |
| 21 | | |
| | 1755 Embarcadero Road | |
| 22 | Palo Alto, California | |
| 23 | | |
| 24 | Ana M. Dub, RMR, CRR, CSR 7445 | |
| 25 | | |
| | | Page 1 |

| 1 APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL | 1 INDEX OF EXAMINATION |
|---|--|
| 2 3 For the Plaintiffs: | 2 |
| 4 ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP | 3 WITNESS: DAVID K. HELLER |
| ALEXANDRA S. BERNAY, ESQ. 5 PAULA M. ROACH, ESQ. | 4 EXAMINATION PAGE |
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| 619.231.1058 | 6 By Mr. Mittelstaedt 257 |
| 7 xanb@rgrdlaw.com proach@rgrdlaw.com | 7 8 |
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| olle@apple.com | 22 |
| 22 23 MATTHEW COPE, VIDEOGRAPHER | 23 24 |
| 24 25 | 25 |
| Page 2 | Page 3 |
| | |
| 1 INDEX TO EXHIBITS 2 Sublish Description Page | 1 INDEX TO EXHIBITS - CONTINUED 2 |
| Exhibit Description Page 3 Exhibit 32 E-Mail Chain, Top E-Mail115 | Exhibit Description Page 3 |
| 4 Dated April 23, 2004, to Jeff Robbin from Chris | Exhibit 39 E-Mail Dated August 19,204 4 2004 to Jeff Robbin and David Heller from Dave |
| 5 Bell, Production Nos. Apple_A11A00092905-06 | 5 Heller, Production No. Apple_AIIA00090666 |
| 6 Exhibit 33 E-Mail Dated June 22, 2004119 | 6 Exhibit 40 E-mail Dated August 30, 216 |
| 7 to Jeff Robbin and Dave Heller from Jennifer | 7 2004 to Marc Sinykin et al., from Dave Heller, |
| 8 Cavaliere, Production No. Apple_AIIA00093441 | 8 Production Nos. Apple_AIIA00090771 |
| Exhibit 34 E-Mail Chain, Top E-Mail165 Dated July 27, 2004, to | 9 Exhibit 41 E-Mail Chain, Top E-Mail220 |
| Dave Heller from Max 11 Muller, Production | 10 Dated September 3, 2004 to Marc Sinykin from Bud |
| Nos. Apple_AIIA00090428 | 11 Tribble, Production Nos. Apple_AIIA00092433-35 12 |
| Exhibit 35 E-Mail Chain, Top E-Mail169 13 Dated July 19, 2004, to | Exhibit 42 E-Mail Chain, Top E-Mail224 13 Dated September 7, 2004, to |
| Dave Heller and Tom Dowdy 14 from Roger Pantos, Production No. | Jeff Robbin from Jennifer 14 Cavaliere, Production |
| 15 Apple_AlIA00093332 16 Exhibit 36 E-Mail Chain, Top E-Mail178 | Nos. Apple_AIIA00092918-23 15 |
| Dated July 28, 2004, to 17 Meriko Borogove from | Exhibit 43 E-Mail Dated September 10, 227 16 2004 to Patrice Gautier |
| Jennifer Cavaliere, 18 Production No. | from Dave Heller, 17 Production No. |
| Apple_AllA00092916 19 Evhibit 27 Printout of Source Code 192 | Apple_AIIA00091825 18 Exhibit 44 E-Mail Dated September 16, 230 |
| Exhibit 37 Printout of Source Code,182 20 Production Nos. Apple_AIIA00099034-51 | Exhibit 44 E-Mail Dated September 16, 230 19 2004 to Grant Erickson from Dave Heller, Production |
| 21 (Retained by Counsel for Defendant) | 20 No. Apple_AIIA00090826 21 Exhibit 45 Cloakware Document Entitled233 |
| 22 Exhibit 38 E-Mail Dated August 11,194 | "Static Analysis of Binary 22 Executalbe iTunes 4.7 |
| 23 2004, to Jeff Robbin from Jennifer Cavaliere, | Release Candidate," 23 Production Nos. |
| 24 Production Nos. Apple_AIIA000928748-52 25 | Apple_AIIA00093567-78 |
| Page 4 | Page 5 |
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order to purchase content on the iTunes Store, a user had to update their iPod firmware? 2

MR. MITTELSTAEDT: And implicitly, you're meaning to ask: And to play that on an iPod? MS. BERNAY: I'm sorry.

6 BY MS. BERNAY:

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Q. And to play that on an iPod. Thank you, Bob.

A. I -- yeah. So the -- to answer the first part of your question, there's never been a firmware update that required you to update your iPod to buy content from the store.

Q. Okay.

A. But to sync content down, I believe that I can only recall the one time.

Q. Okay. You had mentioned there were a number of file formats that that first generation of iPods could play. Do you recall that --

A. Yes.

Q. -- testimony?

Do you know whether you could buy online music from sources before the iTunes Music Store was launched and play them on your iPod?

MR. MITTELSTAEDT: Object; scope.

THE WITNESS: If those -- if those sources

Page 46

were offering up standard MP3 or WAV or AIFF files, 2 those should have played on the pod just fine.

3 BY MS. BERNAY:

Q. Okay.

A. I'm not aware of specific examples of such services.

Q. Do you know whether iTunes, the Desktop Client, worked with any other media players prior to the launch of the iTunes Store?

MR. MITTELSTAEDT: Objection; scope.

THE WITNESS: What do you mean by "media player"?

BY MS. BERNAY: 13

> Q. For example, a Zune or other device, a non-iPod device.

A. iTunes had support for several specific third-party devices in iTunes prior to the launch of the Store.

19 Q. Do you know if iTunes had support for 20 other devices after the launch of the iTunes Store?

A. Yes, we did.

22 Q. What other devices?

23 A. It's the same set as before the Store.

Q. So I think one of the devices that

25 provided support -- or that iTunes provided support

Page 47

for was the Rio One. Are you familiar with that device?

MR. MITTELSTAEDT: Objection; scope. Can I have a continuing objection to this line on scope? MS. BERNAY: Sure.

MR. MITTELSTAEDT: Thank you.

THE WITNESS: The Rio One was one of the devices we added support for.

BY MS. BERNAY:

Q. And it's your testimony that the Rio One could still play -- could it purchase -- I'm sorry.

Could a user of a Rio One, after the launch of the iTunes Store, purchase content from the iTunes Store and play it on the Rio One after the launch of the iTunes Store?

A. To the best of my knowledge, the Rio One did not support our protected format and that content would not play.

Q. Okay. When the iTunes Store was launched, it was only Mac compatible; is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. And do you know about when the iTunes for -- iTunes Store for Windows was launched?

A. iTunes for Windows itself, which had the support for the Store, was launched, I believe, in

October of 2003. 2

Q. Prior to October of 2003, there was -- is it right that there wasn't a desktop media player iTunes version that was available for Windows?

MR. MITTELSTAEDT: Objection; scope.

THE WITNESS: Apple did not offer iTunes 6 on the Windows platform prior to the first -- that first version of iTunes for Windows. 8

9 BY MS. BERNAY:

Q. Okay. Thank you.

Prior to the launch in October 2003 of the iTunes -- is it right to say client for Windows or the iTunes program?

A. iTunes application for Windows.

Q. Thank you.

Was there something for Windows that was compatible with an iPod prior to that time?

A. Apple had an arrangement with Musicmatch to do support within Musicmatch for putting files onto an iPod. I don't recall when that arrangement began, but that was a Windows solution for using Windows with an iPod.

Q. So another topic -- and we've sort of been talking about all these things because they do overlap -- was the general overview of how updates

Page 49

Page 48

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Q. And is that something that you did

anything about?

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- A. Can you clarify that?
- 4 Q. What did the iTunes Team do in response to 5 that?

MR. MITTELSTAEDT: Objection; assumes facts not in evidence.

THE WITNESS: As far as I know, we did nothing to do anything about Harmony.

BY MS. BERNAY: 10

- Q. Did you investigate or look at the Harmony software at any time?
 - A. We did, yes.
 - Q. Okay. And why did you do that?
- A. We were looking to see what they were doing to get their protected songs onto the iPod and why the iPod would be able to play them.
 - Q. Why did you do that?
- A. We wanted to see if this was a DRM-circumvention hack.



Page 86

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
25

Page 88

Q. You said that they were mimicking Apple's DRM system.

A. They were encrypting the files the same way that FairPlay does.

Q. So how would that be a problem or a circumvention?



Page 87

purchased from RealNetworks Harmony did anything to the iPod database that caused any of the problems that you just referred to?

MR. MITTELSTAEDT: Objection; beyond the scope.

THE WITNESS: The -- RealNetworks did not write a completely correct database that would cause loss of functionality in the iTunes application. BY MS. BERNAY:

Q. What was not completely correct about it?

A. They --

MR. MITTELSTAEDT: Objection; beyond the scope.

THE WITNESS: They neglected to preserve the song ID attributes and the artist and playlist ID attributes, the songs purchased from the iTunes Store. The RealNetworks Harmony database neglected to preserve what we called the DRM versions field of the database, as well as neglecting to preserve a 20 lot of the iTunes UI aspects of the database.

21 BY MS. BERNAY:

> Q. Which iTunes UI of the database did it neglect to preserve?

A. The -- if a customer had gone through their playlist on the iPod and set up custom views, custom columns, sorting, all that information was lost when the RealNetworks database was written.

Q. And is this something that actually occurred that you're aware of?

A. Yes.

Q. And how are you aware that any of these items that you mentioned occurred?

A. Because my analysis of the database showed that this data was being lost when RealNetworks would save the database.

Q. Did any customer ever tell you that any of these issues -- or I'm sorry.

13 Did any customer ever tell Apple that any of these issues occurred? 14

MR. MITTELSTAEDT: Objection; beyond the 15 16 scope --

17 THE WITNESS: I am --

18 MR. MITTELSTAEDT: -- calls for

19 speculation, lack of foundation.

20 THE WITNESS: I am not involved in 21 customer relations, so I do not know.

22 BY MS. BERNAY:

23 Q. Are these problem that you're referring to 24 theoretical problems?

MR. MITTELSTAEDT: Objection;

Page 89

| 1 2 3 | And that's a it says: "(New iPod.)" Do you see that? | 1 2 3 | BY MS. BERNAY: Q. You've had a chance to look at the Exhibit 15? |
|--|---|--|--|
| 4 | A. Yes. | 4 | A. Yes. |
| 5 | Q. And is that the photo iPod? | 5 | Q. And I think when we talked earlier today, |
| 6 | A. No. The color iPod | 6 | you said you had looked at a number of documents, |
| 7 | Q. Oh, I'm sorry. Thank you. | 7 | some of which had refreshed your recollection. |
| 8 | A is that. | 8 9 | Is this one of those documents? A. Yes. |
| 10 | is the iPod shuffle. It's the first iPod shuffle. | 10 | Q. And what is Exhibit 15? |
| 11 | Q. Okay. And you mentioned that that was | 11 | A. Exhibit 15 is an e-mail I sent to Jeff |
| 12 | there was a specific iTunes update to deal just with | 12 | Robbin and others around what we discovered when we |
| 13 | the iTunes shuffle earlier. | 13 | first looked at Harmony. |
| 14 | A. Yes. iTunes 4.7.1. | 14 | Q. And the bottom e-mail there is something |
| 15 | MS. BERNAY: Put that to the side, please. | 15 | from Mr. Robbin. Do you see that? |
| 16 | The next document was previously marked as | 16 | A. Yes. |
| 17 | Exhibit 15. It's a single-page document | 17 | Q. And it says: |
| 18 | Bates-stamped Apple_AIIA00090427. | 18 | "Hi guys: I don't have a PC here, |
| 19 | If you could take a moment to review that, | 19 | but harmony appears to be |
| 20 | please. | 20 | downloadable from" |
| 21 | MR. MITTELSTAEDT: 15, did you say? | 21 | And he lists the Web site. He notes: |
| 22 | MS. BERNAY: It was previously Exhibit 15. | 22 | "I'm available on my cell phone at |
| 23 | (Witness reviews document.) | 23 | any time." |
| 24 | THE WITNESS: Okay. | 24 25 | Did I read that accurately? A. Yes. |
| 25 | Dago 124 | 25 | |
| | Page 126 | | Page 127 |
| | | | |
| 1 | Q. And did you perceive this e-mail from | 1 | discussed with Mr. Robbin or others Harmony prior to |
| 1 2 | Q. And did you perceive this e-mail from Mr. Robbin as a request to do a technical evaluation | 1 2 | discussed with Mr. Robbin or others Harmony prior to its release? |
| | Mr. Robbin as a request to do a technical evaluation of the of Harmony? | | its release? MR. MITTELSTAEDT: Object; argumentative. |
| 2 3 4 | Mr. Robbin as a request to do a technical evaluation of the of Harmony? A. I believe this was a request, yes, for us | 2 3 4 | its release? MR. MITTELSTAEDT: Object; argumentative. THE WITNESS: It I don't recall. It |
| 2 3 4 5 | Mr. Robbin as a request to do a technical evaluation of the of Harmony? A. I believe this was a request, yes, for us to go look at Harmony. | 2 3 4 5 | its release? MR. MITTELSTAEDT: Object; argumentative. THE WITNESS: It I don't recall. It probably was discussed around the fact that the |
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| 2 3 4 5 6 7 | Mr. Robbin as a request to do a technical evaluation of the of Harmony? A. I believe this was a request, yes, for us to go look at Harmony. Q. And why would Mr. Robbin have asked you to do that? | 2 3 4 5 6 7 | its release? MR. MITTELSTAEDT: Object; argumentative. THE WITNESS: It I don't recall. It probably was discussed around the fact that the Harmony had a press release around the product, and he's telling us here that it looks like it's |
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| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 | Mr. Robbin as a request to do a technical evaluation of the of Harmony? A. I believe this was a request, yes, for us to go look at Harmony. Q. And why would Mr. Robbin have asked you to do that? MR. MITTELSTAEDT: Object; beyond the scope, calls for speculation, lack of foundation. | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 | its release? MR. MITTELSTAEDT: Object; argumentative. THE WITNESS: It I don't recall. It probably was discussed around the fact that the Harmony had a press release around the product, and he's telling us here that it looks like it's actually available for download now. BY MS. BERNAY: |
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| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | Mr. Robbin as a request to do a technical evaluation of the of Harmony? A. I believe this was a request, yes, for us to go look at Harmony. Q. And why would Mr. Robbin have asked you to do that? MR. MITTELSTAEDT: Object; beyond the scope, calls for speculation, lack of foundation. THE WITNESS: Well, he is my boss. And the the time that these hacks come out, usually | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 | its release? MR. MITTELSTAEDT: Object; argumentative. THE WITNESS: It I don't recall. It probably was discussed around the fact that the Harmony had a press release around the product, and he's telling us here that it looks like it's actually available for download now. BY MS. BERNAY: Q. Do you know whether, in fact, you spoke to anyone at Apple prior to the release of Harmony |
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correct? Q. And I assume you have access to various 2 A. Yes. 2 computers and iPods at your office; is that Q. And you worked together to take a look at 3 accurate? 3 Harmony; is that right? 4 4 MR. MITTELSTAEDT: Objection; 5 A. Yes. 5 argumentative. Q. And do you have a specific or general 6 6 THE WITNESS: Yes, I do have access to recollection regarding actually taking a look at 7 7 several iPods. 8 Harmony? 8 BY MS. BERNAY: 9 MR. MITTELSTAEDT: Objection; compound. 9 Q. Okay. And so you note here that you took a look at Harmony, and then you have: THE WITNESS: I vaguely recall doing that 10 10 "Here is what we found." and composing this e-mail. 11 11 BY MS. BERNAY: 12 And then you have a list of 12 items; is 12 Q. What did you do? 13 that right? 13 A. Pretty much what I needed to do to come up A. Yes. 14 14 with these items, which was install the Harmony 15 15 Q. Do you know whether there was anything that you discovered when looking at Harmony that you software, get a Harmony store count -- whatever the 16 term was -- download a song, take that song and use 17 did not include in this list? 17 the Harmony software to put it on an iPod, 18 A. I don't recall. 18 19 Q. Okay. So the first thing here that you 20 note is: 21 "Downloaded song is 192kbps AAC." 22 Do you see that? Q. And is this something that you did at the 23 A. Yes. 23 24 Q. What is that 192kpb -- bps AAC? 24 office? 25 A. Yes. 25 A. It means 192 kilobits per second, which is Page 130 a measurement of the audio bit rate and quality for BY MS. BERNAY: 1 2 2 an AAC audio file. Q. At some point did music at the iTunes 3 Q. Do you know what the audio bit rate was at 3 Store -- I'm sorry. this time for music that was purchased from the 4 4 At some point was music sold through the 5 iTunes Store sold at a rate higher or different than 5 iTunes Store? A. It was 128 kbps. 6 this 128 kbps? 6 Q. And is it accurate that generally 7 MR. MITTELSTAEDT: Objection; beyond the 7 8 speaking, the 192 kbps is a better quality of audio 8 scope. than the 128 kbps? 9 9 THE WITNESS: Most songs we offer in the MR. MITTELSTAEDT: Objection; beyond the 10 iTunes Store today are 256 kbps. 10 BY MS. BERNAY: 11 scope --11 12 THE WITNESS: If --12 Q. What about in 2007? What was the kbps 13 MR. MITTELSTAEDT: -- lack of foundation. 13 rate that was sold on music at the iTunes Store? THE WITNESS: If the files are created MR. MITTELSTAEDT: Objection; beyond the 14 14 with the same encoder, 192 should be better. But to 15 15 scope. 16 say that a file that's 192 is always better than 128 16 THE WITNESS: I do not recall when we is not an accurate statement. started offering the higher bit rate songs. 17 17 BY MS. BERNAY: 18 18 BY MS. BERNAY: 19 Q. And why is that not an accurate statement? 19 Q. What -- after -- what was the first MR. MITTELSTAEDT: Same objection. 20 20 upgrade or increase in kbps rates of music that was THE WITNESS: The quality of the encoder 21 21 sold through the iTunes Store? and the techniques used by the particular encoding 22 22 MR. MITTELSTAEDT: Objection; beyond the 23 software is -- is very germane to the resulting 23 scope.

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Page 132

"what was"?

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
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
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
Page 133


Page 131

THE WITNESS: I'm sorry. When you say










APPLE'S (PROPOSED) REDACTIONS

EXHIBIT 48 [Filed Under Seal]

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| UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA SAN JOSE DIVISION | 1 INDEX OF EXAMINATION 2 WITNESS: MARK DONNELLY 3 4 EXAMINATION Page 5 EXAMINATION BY MS. ROACH 7 6 7 INDEX TO EXHIBITS 8 No. Description Page 9 Exhibit 95 Plaintiff's Rule 30(B)(6) Notice 10 Of Videotaped Deposition Of Corporate Designees 11 Exhibit 96 Apple Computer, Inc. Minimum 15 Advertised Price (MAP) 12 Confidential Listing (Apple_AIIA00972959-962) 13 Exhibit 97 Apple Computer, Inc. 27 14 Confidential Adjustment Price Listing for FY03 Approved 15 Federal Contracts (Apple_SOM0000600-603) 16 Exhibit 98 Apple Computer, Inc. Collegiate 29 Purchase Program Premier Price List May 6, 2003 (Apple_SOM0000604-629) 19 Exhibit 99 Apple Computer, Inc. Collegiate 31 Purchase Program Demo Unit Confidential Price List April 12, 2003 (Apple_SOM0000538) Exhibit 100 Apple Computer, Inc. Direct 32 Purchase Resellers Confidential Price List April 12, 2003 (Apple_SOM00000539-547) |
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| APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL FOR THE PLAINTIFF: ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP 655 West Broadway, Suite 1900 San Diego, CA 92101 BY: PAULA M. ROACH, ESQ. 619-231-7423 ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP 655 West Broadway, Suite 1900 San Diego, CA 92101 BY: ALEXANDRA BERNAY, ESQ. 619-231-7423 FOR THE DEFENDANT: JONES DAY 555 California Street, 26th Floor San Francisco, CA 94104 BY: ROBERT MITTELSTAEDT, ESQ. 415-626-3939000 ALSO PRESENT: ERICA GREULICH LISA OLLE FRANK CLAIRE, VIDEOGRAPHER | 1 Exhibit 101 Apple Computer, Inc. Apple 36 |




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


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
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
The Apple iPod iTunes Anti-Trust Litigation

Videotaped Deposition of ROGER NOLL, PH.D.

December 18, 2013

CONFIDENTIAL


| 1 | Page 1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT | 1 | UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT | Page |
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| 5 | VIDEOTAPED DEPOSITION OF ROGER G. NOLL, PH.D. | 15 | Videotaped Deposition of ROGER G. NOLL, PH.D., | |
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| 1 | Page 3 APPEARANCES | 1 | INDEX TO EXAMINATION | Page |
| 2 | | 2 | ROGER G. NOLL, PH.D. | |
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| | For the Plain iffs and the deponent, Dr. Noll: | 4 | | |
| 5 | ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD, LLP | | EVALUATION DAGE | |
| 6 | BY: ALEXANDRA S. BERNAY, ESQ. BY: JENNIFER N. CARINGAL, ESQ. | 5 | | |
| 0 | 655 West Broadway, Suite 1900 | 6 | BY MR. KIERNAN 7 | |
| 7 | San Diego, California 92101 | 7 | | |
| | (619)231-1058 | 8 | | |
| 8 | xanb@rgrdlaw.com | 9 | | |
| 9 | | 10 |) | |
| | For the Defendant, Apple Inc.: | 11 | | |
| 1 | JONES DAY | 12 | | |
| 2 | BY: DAVID KIERNAN, ESQ. BY: AMIR AMIRI, ESQ. | 0.00 | | |
| - | BY: ROBERT MITTELSTAEDT, ESQ. | 13 | | |
| 3 | 555 California Street, 26th Floor | 14 | | |
| | San Francisco, Californía 94104 | 15 | | |
| 4 | (415)626-3939 | 16 | 6 | |
| | dkiernan@jonesday.com | 17 | , | |
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| | Also present: | 20 | | |
| 9 | Peter Hibdon, Videographer | | | |
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| | | age 25 1 standard statistical tests? | Page 26 |
| | talking about a source of bias in the coefficients. | 2 MS. BERNAY: Objection. Calls for | |
| | We're talking about a source of bias in the | 3 speculation. | |
| | estimated statistical significance, the – | | |
| | BY MR. KIERNAN: | 4 THE WITNESS: Well, actually, that's not | |
| 5 | Q. The standard errors? | 5 what most – what typically – | |
| 6 | A. Yeah, the values of the – the expected | 6 BY MR. KIERNAN: | |
| | value of the regression coefficients is not | 7 Q. Can you just eyeball it? | |
| 8 | affected. | 8 A. – happens. | |
| 9 | Q. The coefficients aren't affected, but the | 9 (Reporter inquires.) | |
| 10 | calculations of the standard errors are affected? | 10 BY MR. KIERNAN: | |
| 11 | A. Right, the calculations of the standard | 11 Q Can you just eyeball it? | |
| 12 | errors are affected, but the - but the estimated | MS. BERNAY: Objection. Vague. | |
| 13 | effect of the independent variable is the same, the | 13 THE WITNESS: Can I finish my first answer | |
| 14 | expected estimated effect. | 14 before I answer the next question? | |
| 15 | Q. And if the residual errors are correlated | 15 BYMR. KIERNAN: | |
| 16 | within a particular group, the standard errors could | 16 Q. Yes. | |
| 17 | either be overstated or understated? | 17 A. Okay. It is the case that if you plot the | |
| 18 | A. Yes. | 18 errors, you will know from experience if you | |
| 19 | Q. Without a correction? | 19 actually have a problem that is causing the | |
| 20 | A. They could be. Although, again, the- | 20 regression equation to be unreliable. But so | |
| 21 | it's not - it's not a dichotomous issue. They - | 21 "eyeball" is sort of a bizarre word. | |
| 22 | A, they may be affected, and B, the magnitude of the | 22 What you actually do is you look at the | |
| 23 | effect depends on the exact conditions. | 23 actual scatter plot of points around the regression | |
| 24 | Q. And to know the magnitude of effect, you'd | 24 line and see if there is a clustering of | |
| | have to test it, you'd have to run one of the | 25 observations above and below it. The problem with | |
| - | | age 27 | Page 28 |
| 1 | that - that's a good way to see if there's positive | 1 A. I didn't refer to a group. I don't know | , ago za |
| | error correlation, but it's not a good way to see if | 2 what you're talking about. I know I fully | |
| | there's negative error correlation. | 3 intended - | |
| 4 | And the second point is that the nature of | 4 Q. You used the term "duster" | |
| | the error correlation may be that it's dependent on | 5 (Reporter admonishes.) | |
| | particular combinations of variables; and that one, | 6 BY MR. KIERNAN: | |
| | the standard tests wouldn't even tell you that it | 7 Q You used the word cluster, within a | |
| | exists. | 8 duster. | |
| 9 | Q. In this case, did you do anything to check | 9 A. I don't agree that there are any clusters | |
| | whether the residual errors in your regression set | 10 here. | |
| 11 | ACCUSE AND THE CONTRACT OF THE | 11 MS. BERNAY: Objection. | |
| | correlated with any particular group? | 12 BY MR. KIERNAN: | |
| 13 | MS, BERNAY: Objection, Vague and | 13 Q. That's not my question, Dr. Noll. Tasked | |
| | | 14 you, did you do anything to check whether the | |
| | ambiguous. THE WITNESS: What do you mean by "group"? | 15 residual errors in your regressions set forth in | |
| 15 | | 16 Exhibit 3A and 3B are correlated within any cluster | |
| 16 | | 17 or group? | |
| 17 | Q. Within any group. A. What do you group. "a group."? I don't | 18 MS, BERNAY: Objection. Asked and | |
| 18 | A. What do you mean, "a group"? I don't | 19 answered. | |
| 19 | | 20 THE WITNESS: I don't know what you mean | |
| 20 | Q. We've been using group for the last ten | | |
| 21 | minutes. | 21 by a group. And you used the word "or," and I don't | |
| 22 | MS. BERNAY: Objection. Argumentative. | 22 believe there are any clusters. So how can I test | |
| 23 | BY MR, KIERNAN: | 23 for something when I don't – I think it either | |
| - | Q. Same group that you've – the same group | 24 doesn't exist or I don't understand what you're | |
| 24 25 | | 25 asking? | |

| Ro | ger Noll, Ph.D. | The Apple iPod iTunes Anti-Trust Litigation |
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| | Page 33 | Page |
| | there, so instead of having 100-odd iPod models, I | 1 certain particular groups in the transaction data at |
| | only had 20, and within those 20, I had just drawn a | 2 issue in this case are correlated, that is, they are |
| 3 | sample of transactions instead of looking at the | 3 statistically significantly different from zero, |
| 4 | entire universe, then, in principle, there might be | 4 your opinion is it has no impact on the calculation |
| 5 | a clustering problem. But when you don't have a | 5 of the standard errors in the case? |
| 6 | sample of either the models or the transactions, | 6 A. That's not what I said. |
| 7 | it's not a duster problem. | 7 MS. BERNAY: Objection. Misstates his |
| 8 | So testing for cluster effects is a | 8 prior testimony. |
| | non sequitur. It's inappropriate, because you don't | 9 BY MR. KIERNAN: |
| 10 | have duster samples. | 10 Q. What was wrong with – what do you |
| 11 | Q. Okay. And other than that basis that | 11 disagree with in the question I just asked? |
| 12 | the second control of | 12 MS. BERNAY; Objection. Vague. |
| 13 | sample from a population, any other reason, any | 13 THE WITNESS: First of all, if you look |
| | | 14 within a – if you define the group as a particular |
| 14 | other basis for your opinion that there's not a | |
| 15 | dustering issue? | 15 model of an iPod, and you look at the errors in |
| 16 | A. Only the fact it doesn't satisfy the | 16 predicting that, and you find they're correlated, it |
| 17 | conditions for doing cluster analysis? | 17 may be – it's perfectly explained if you took into |
| 18 | Q. The one that you just described. | 18 account all the values of all the other independent |
| 19 | A. Yes. That's why it isn't a cluster | 19 variables. |
| 20 | problem, is because it's not a cluster sample. And | 20 So that test in and of itself doesn't |
| 21 | cluster sampling is a procedure you use when you are | 21 prove anything. All right. The only way it proves |
| 22 | sampling on both groups and people within a group. | 22 something – again, let's go back to the reasons |
| 23 | If you have a population instead of a | 23 cluster sampling can be a problem. And as stated in |
| 24 | sample, there's no duster issue, by definition. | 24 the report, there's three reasons why it can be a |
| 25 | Q. And so if the mean residual errors within | 25 problem. One is a sample bias problem, and the |
| ÷ | Page 35 | Page |
| 1 | other two are versions of omitted variable problems. | MS. BERNAY: Same objection. |
| 2 | So the issue is, is there a sampling issue | 2 THE WITNESS: It may or may not. You |
| 3 | here? The answer is no. | 3 haven't - there's not enough information in your |
| 4 | Are there omitted variables? I'm not | 4 question to make a prediction about the effect on |
| 5 | aware of any that would add statistical significance | 5 the calculation of the standard errors. |
| 6 | to the regression equation without being so highly | 6 BY MR. KIERNAN: |
| 7 | multicollinear that they would destroy the | 7 Q. What additional information do you need? |
| 8 | coefficient estimates. | 8 A. You have to understand what is the source |
| 9 | So there can't - there isn't any - none | 9 of what you're measuring. All right. You have |
| | of the three reasons why you might have a problem | 10 to – |
| | | 11 Q. The source of the observations? |
| 11 | exist. So I don't care what the test is, because | |
| 12 | DETECTION OF THE SECOND SE | 12 A. No. |
| 13 | | 13 THE REPORTER: What's the question? |
| 14 | BY MR. KIERNAN: | 14 You guys are cutting each other off. |
| 15 | | 15 THE WITNESS: Yeah, he does do this, |
| 16 | - CO MANAGORI NA NA PARA NO MANAGORI NO | 16 doesn'the? |
| 17 | | 17 The very first step is precisely what |
| 18 | | 18 residual errors are you correlating, what actually |
| 19 | impact on the calculation of the standard errors? | 19 is it. All right. And I don't know the answer to |
| 20 | MS, BERNAY: Objection. Vague and | 20 that. |
| 24 | ambiguous. Misstates prior testimony as well. | 21 All you're telling me is that within a |
| 21 | | 22 model of iPods, the mean residual error isn't |
| | | |
| 22 | | 23 zero. That's all you're telling me. You're not |
| 21 22 23 24 | Q. Let me put it differently. It does not | 23 zero. That's all you're telling me. You're not24 telling me anything else about why it might be |

| 4 | Page 4 | | are loce. That's on average | Page 50 |
|----------|--|-------|--|---------|
| | understand it. | 1 2 | are less. That's on average. Q. And then in the last sentence, you state | |
| 2 | Q. Well, yeah, okay. | | that "for most of the damages period, the lock-in | |
| 3 | MR. KIERNAN: Move to strike the last | | effect on new iPod purchasers would not be an | |
| | part. | | important factor affecting iPod prices." | |
| | BY MR. KIERNAN: | 6 | | |
| 5 | Q. So the new iPod owners includes both | 1100 | On the new – when you refer to "new iPod | |
| | purchasers of iPods with 7.0 and iPods without 7.0? | | purchasers," are you referring to the new iPod | |
| 8 | A. To differing degrees, yes. | 200 | purchasers that occurred in late 2006? | |
| 9 | Q. Okay. And in the rest of the paragraph, | 9 | A. I'm referring to people who bought – what | |
| 0 | you state that the "lock-in would not have affected | 10 | this means, is about, is people who bought their | |
| 1 | the demand for subsequent iPods for a long period | 11 | first iPod after – in late 2006, yes. | |
| 2 | because these purchasers would not soon make | 12 | Q. Okay. And those purchasers, you're | |
| 3 | repurchase decisions." | 13 | stating here, would not be an important factor | |
| 4 | What's the basis for that? | 14 | affecting iPod prices during most of the damages | |
| 5 | A. That it's information we have about how | 1000 | period? | |
| 6 | long people own electronic devices. They don't buy | 16 | A. That's right. Because they wouldn't buy | |
| 7 | a new electronic device with the same frequency they | 17 | another MP3 player until nearly the end of the | |
| 8 | buy music. | 18 | damages period. | |
| 9 | Q. And that's the 18-month to two-year period | 19 | Q. Okay. With respect to the lock-in theory, | |
| 20 | that you referred to in your initial merits report? | 20 | are there any iPod owners that would impact the | |
| 21 | A. I think that's those - I don't remember | 21 | demand for iPods during the damages period as a | |
| 2 | from memory, but that sounds about right as to | 22 | result of lock-in? | |
| 23 | frequency of repurchase of iPods. | 23 | MS. BERNAY: Objection. Vague and | |
| 4 | Q. Okay. | 24 | ambiguous. | |
| 25 | A. The mean frequency. Some are more, some | 25 | THE WITNESS: Yes. I mean, the people who | |
| - | Page 5 | | 2007 2 2 2 2 2 2 | Page 5 |
| 1 | are buying replacement iPods are the - what this is | 1 | you start to see an effect. | |
| 2 | about is the fact that it's mainly people who are | 2 | There would be other things happening that | |
| 3 | buying replacement iPods that experience the | 3 | would cause it to have some effect on demand, like | |
| 4 | immediate effect of lock-in. They are, to some | 4 | multiple iPods within the same family unit that want | |
| 5 | degree, locked in. And the point of Harmony was to | 5 | access to the same music, things like that. | |
| 6 | reduce the degree to which existing users of iPods | 6 | But the main immediate effect of lock-in | |
| 7 | were locked in. | 7 | is the existing or established base. It's not the | |
| 8 | BY MR. KIERNAN: | 8 | new people. And the new people would just gradually | |
| 9 | Q. Okay. And I think I'm following you now, | 9 | through time get added to the people who are | |
| 10 | Dr. Noll. When you're referring to "new iPod | 10 | affected by lock-in in terms of their effect on the | |
| 11 | purchasers" in the last paragraph on page 27, you're | 11 | demand for iPods. | |
| . C. | referring to customers who did not own an iPod | 12 | MR. KIERNAN: Let's just take a short | |
| | before that time? | 13 | Parameter and the control of the con | |
| 14 | A. Yes. This is new purchasers. This is not | 14 | THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Off the record at | |
| 15 | replacement purchasers. | 15 | | |
| 16 | Q. Okay. And for a new purchaser in late | 16 | (A brief recess was taken.) | |
| 17 | 2006, your opinion is for most of the damages | 17 | THE VIDEOGRAPHER: On the record at 10:18. | |
| 18 | | 18 | BY MR. KIERNAN: | |
| 19 | affecting iPod prices because they wouldn't purchase | 19 | Q. In the regression that is in Exhibits 3A | |
| | a replacement for the 18- to 24-month period? | 20 | and 3B to Not 10, you turn on the dummy variable | |
| 20 | | 21 | for 7.0 at different times for different models; is | |
| 21 | A. The – yeah. Of course, it's not | 12.00 | | |
| 22 | | 22 | that right? | |
| 200 | grows through time. But initially, it would not be | 23 | Well, the indicator is on for a model that | |
| | 그렇다면 하는 것 같습니다. 그는 하는 것 같아요. 그런 하는데 그렇다면서 보다 되었다면 모든데 그렇다. | 0.4 | has 70 as 3 Co as the that was sales and all the | |
| 23 24 | important because you don't replace your iPod every month. All right. So it would take a while before | 24 | has 7.0 on it. So anything that was released after the first date would have it, quote, turned on, | |



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| REDACTED | Page 59 REDACTED | Page 60 |
| | | |

Confidential - Attorneys' Eyes Only
The Apple iPod iTunes Anti-Trust Litigation Roger Noll, Ph.D. Page 61 REDACTED 1 happened to the entire equation, including the 2 interaction variable, to answer that question. 3 BY MR. KIERNAN: Q. Okay. A. The right way to think of the regression 6 model is that it's based on differences in prices 7 between two models. All right. And so the premise of the regression 9 equation is essentially with some amendment, because 10 there's differences in other independent variables, 11 that what you're really looking at to determine 12 damages is the price difference between those that 13 were affected and those that were not. REDACTED Page 64 Page 63 REDACTED REDACTED

| REDACTED | Page 65 | REDACTED | Page 66 |
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| | Page 67 | 1 I mean, there could be differences owing 2 to whatever remaining specification errors there 3 are. But basically you would expect that the 4 number – the aggregate number would be correct, but 5 the allocation among models would be wrong. 6 Q. Okay. In your rebuttal report, Noll 10, | Page 6 |
| | | 7 you discuss the impact of what you refer to as the 8 lock-out effect and that the effect on iPod prices 9 would be immediate. 10 MS. BERNAY: Do you have a page reference 11 for that? 12 MR. KIERNAN: I'm just going to – I'm not 13 going to ask with the actual words. 14 BY MR. KIERNAN: 15 Q. Who specifically would be locked out under 16 that theory, under your lock-out theory? 17 MS. BERNAY: Objection. Incomplete 18 question, vague. 19 THE WITNESS: Lock-out arises because 20 somebody who uses another device pays a higher 21 switching cost to buy an Apple product. And so if 22 somebody has used another device and has used that 23 device to download audio and video files from 24 RealNetworks, then they can't – the cost of 25 switching to have their next MP3 player be an Apple | |

| | r Noll, Ph.D. Page 6 | 9 | Page 70 |
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| 1 goes | s up if they no longer – if the act of doing it | that the others ones are competitive. So the fact | ragori |
| | uld cause them no longer to be able to play | 2 that the market inelasticity and demand became more | |
| | atever files they had downloaded from the | 3 inelastic for other MP3 players wouldn't necessarily | |
| | alNetworks site. | 4 imply their price went up, because there's | |
| 5 | Harmony allows people to switch from MP3 | 5 competition in devices that use other DRM systems, | |
| | vers that access the RealNetworks site, that use | 6 because there's multiple vendors of devices that can | |
| A 100 | RealNetworks DRM system, to an Apple iPod. And | 7 be used for other sites, but there's only one vendor | |
| | armony is disabled, then they can't have that | 8 that can be used for the Apple site. | |
| 9 swit | | 9 So the increase in the inelasticity of | |
| | And so the extent of price competition | 10 demand for MP3 players that can access RealNetworks | |
| 0 1 bob | ween manufacturers of MP3 players that can be | 11 is dissipated in price competition among those | |
| 6 4075 | ed for the Real - on the RealNetworks site and | 12 device manufacturers, but the increase in the | |
| - | | | |
| | ple MP3 players, the competition between them is | 13 inelasticity of demand for iPods does not face | |
| | luced, Both sides experience a more inelastic | 14 competition from other vendors of devices. And so | |
| - | mand curve instantaneously because of that effect | 15 that would lead to a price increase. | |
| 22 830 | MR. KIERNAN: | 16 Q. Okay. And with respect to – when you | |
| | Q. For the owners of the non-iPods that you | 17 refer to MP3 players, you're referring to non-iPods? | |
| | re just describing with RealNetworks music, your | 18. I just want to make sure we're using the same | |
| | t point is that it would also impact the | 19 definitions here. | |
| | lasticity of demand for non-iPods? | 20 A. MP3 players, I was making as the category, | |
| | A. That's the whole idea of lock-out. That's | 21 and then there are subsets depending on which site | |
| 2 the | whole idea of walled garden, is that you – | 22 you can access. And general - you know, to be | |
| 23 | Q. What impact on prices would that have on | 23 clear, you know, usually people refer to all | |
| 24 the | non-iPods? | 24 portable digital media players as MP3 players, | |
| 25 | A. It would go up. Well, except for the fact | 25 including an iPod, | |
| _ | Page 7 | 1 | Page 7 |
| 1 | But dearly an iPod is different because | 1 switching costs – normally we think of switching | |
| 2 of its | s tetheredness to Apple, like Zune is tethered | 2 costs as costs you have to bear from using one | |
| 3 orw | vas tethered to Microsoft. | 3 device to using another. And the switching costs | |
| 4 | Q. I'll just use the word "non-iPods." | 4 there have to do with learning how to use it, | |
| 5 | A. Yeah, non-iPod MP3 players, and then | 5 perhaps differences in - in prices of the things | |
| 6 ther | re's iPods. | 6 you use. So there's other things that affect | |
| | Q. Fair enough. | 7 switching costs. | |
| 8 | Looking at the non-iPod side, as a result | 8 But lock-out refers to the component of | |
| | 0, your opinion is that certain consumers that | 9 switching costs that is due to incompatibility. | |
| | ve music from RealNetworks are now locked out of | 10 Q. And how much RealNetworks music would a | |
| 2.00 | ods? | 11 consumer need or have in its possession to be locked | |
| 12 | MS, BERNAY: Objection. Misstates prior | 12 out of an iPod? | |
| | stimony. | 13 MS. BERNAY: Objection. Vague. | |
| 14 | THE WITNESS: Yeah, lock-out in the sense | 14 THE WITNESS: Well, the question presumes | |
| | at they face a higher switching cost than they | 15 there's a dichotomous effect, and the whole point of | |
| | ould have faced prior to the introduction of 7.0. | 16 the last answer was to say there wasn't. | |
| | \$45 July 18 45 21 4 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 | | |
| | MR. KIERNAN: | | |
| 18 | Q. And does that depend on how much | 18 the inelasticity of the demand curve looks like, | |
| | alNetworks music they had? | 19 that the that the demand curve becomes more | |
| 20 | A. Yes. | 20 inelastic. | |
| 21 | Q. What else would it depend on? | 21 But small changes in price still have an | |
| 7 | A. Well, the pure lock-out effect is just | 22 effect on quantity. And so what the demand curve | |
| | | | |
| 23 tha | at, it's the degree to which you contain a library | 23 tells you is the distribution of people in terms of | |
| | | 23 tells you is the distribution of people in terms of 24 the magnitude of the lock-out effect. 25 /// | |

| Roger Noll, Ph.D. | The Apple iPod iTunes Anti-Trust Litigation |
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| Page 7 | Page 74 1 more inelastic demand curve. How many of these |
| | 2 files they have determines where they are on that |
| Q. And do you have any estimate of the number of people, number of customers who were locked out | 3 demand curve. |
| 1 5700 | 4 Q. And do you have an estimation or – do you |
| 4 from purchasing iPods as a result of 7.0? 5 A. The number that faced higher switching | 5 have an estimation of how many consumers that had |
| 6 costs would be the number of people who had | 6 RealNetworks music were locked out of purchasing an |
| 7 libraries of files that used the DRM system of | 7 iPod because they deemed the switching costs to be |
| 8 RealNetworks. | 8 too high? |
| 9 Q. All people that had libraries regardless | 9 MS. BERNAY: Objection. Calls for |
| 10 of size from RealNetworks? | 10 speculation. |
| 11 A. Yeah, the size determines the magnitude of | 11 THE WITNESS: First of all, "lock-out" |
| 12 the lock-out but not the existence. So the lock-out | 12 refers to the switching cost itself. And the only |
| 13 effect is translated into the demand curve. We said | 13 way I can answer that is that there's no answer to |
| 14 that the demand curve becomes more inelastic. We | 14 the question because it's not a meaningful question. |
| 15 didn't say it becomes perfectly inelastic; we said | 15 The demand curve becomes more inelastic. |
| 16 it becomes more inelastic. | 16 So the greater the price differential |
| 17 At low prices, there are some people still | 17 between an iPod and some other MP3 player, the fewer |
| 18 with a low switching cost, and they'd be the ones | 18 people there are who would be prevented from |
| 19 who for small price differentials still might | 19 switching. All right. |
| 20 switch. | 20 And the – where anybody is on that demand |
| 21 But the increase in the extent to which | 21 curve is determined by the switching cost, and then |
| 22 the demand curve is inelastic reflects the | 22 how many of them switch is determined by the |
| 23 distribution of people who use MP3 players for | 23 relative prices of the MP3 players and the iPods. |
| 24 listening to RealNetworks DRM files. That | 24 Remember that the other MP3 players also |
| 25 distribution determines where they are on this new | 25 might have a price increase, or it might not, |
| | Pogo 76 |
| Page 7 1 depending on the nature of competition among those | 5 Page 76 1 lost all possible switchers. |
| 2 devices. | 2 BY MR. KIERNAN: |
| 3 So – and it's the gap, it's the | Q. With respect to the non-iPods – excuse |
| 4 differential in the price that determines how many | 4 me. |
| 5 people would actually switch, and that - the bigger | 5 With respect to the non-iPods and the |
| 6 the gap, the more people would switch. | 6 inelasticity of demand, did you do anything to |
| 7 And everybody is going to set the price of | 7 determine or analyze whether 7.0 impacted the |
| 8 their player depending on two phenomenon, right? | 8 elasticity of demand for non-iPods? |
| 9 One is within technology competition, of which | 9 A. Well, that's what the coefficient tells |
| 10 there's some for the other MP3 players and none for | 10 you, right? |
| 11 Apple; and the across technology, cross-elasticity | 11 Q. Which coefficient? |
| 12 of demand between the other players and Apple. And | 12 A. The coefficient on 7.0 is positive only |
| 13 we're talking about the latter. | 13 because the price went up, and the price went up |
| 14 So if we take an extreme assumption and | 14 only because the demand curve became more inelastic. |
| 15 assume that due to competition, 7.0 had no effect at | 15 All right. |
| 16 all on other MP3 player prices and the sole effect | 16 Q. The demand curve for non-iPods? |
| 17 was to raise the price of Apple, then they would | 17 A. Oh, excuse me. No, no, I did not |
| 18 raise the price up to the point at which the loss to | 18 examine – I thought you meant iPods. Again, I'll |
| 19 them of losing switchers was exactly offset by the | 19 acknowledge – |
| 20 gains from charging the higher price. | 20 Q. Let me restate the question. Focusing |
| 21 And I don't know how – what precise | 21 just on non-iPods. |
| 22 number of people that is, but the number of people | 22 A. Okay. I'm sorry. I didn't hear "non." |
| 23 who actually switched from others to Apple's was | 23 Q. That's okay. Understood. |
| 24 probably not very large because it would not be in | 24 Focusing on non-iPods, did you do anything |
| 25 Apple's interest to raise the price so high that it | 25 to analyze whether 7.0 impacted the elasticity of |
| 25 Apples interest to raise the price so high triatile | 20 to direiges whose or 7.0 impacted the diabethy of |

| Roger Noll, Ph.D. | The Apple iPod iTunes Anti-Trust Litigatio |
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| demand for non-iPods? A. No, I did not. Q. With respect to non-iPods, would you expect 7.0 to have any impact on the competition | Page 77 1 would be another anticompetitive effect of 7.0 2 because the consumers who bought those things were 3 harmed. But I have basically assumed that's zero 4 because I think the supply conditions in the MP3 |
| 5 between manufacturers of non-iPods? | 5 market would not make it possible for anybody to |
| 6 MS. BERNAY: Calls for speculation. 7 THE WITNESS: In the long run, no. In the | 6 sustain a significant price increase in that market 7 just because of 7.0. |
| 8 short run, it might, because the competition between 9 them and Apple had intensified with the introduction | 8 BY MR. KIERNAN: 9 Q. Okay. And is your opinion, Dr. Noll, that |
| 10 of Harmony, and that goes away. So there might be a 11 short-run effect. | the impact on prices caused by 7.0 would beimmediate because of the lock-out effect? |
| But there's lots of producers of digital electronic devices, so I would not expect in the | 12 A. Yes.13 Q. Okay. And why is that? Why would it be |
| long run there would be a change in the intensity of competition in the non-iPod MP3 market. | 14 immediate?15 A. Because there's this group of people, |
| 16 BY MR. KIERNAN: 17 Q. And what impact on prices of non-iPods | there's just a continuous flow of people who want to replace an MP3 player that were available to Apple |
| 18 would you expect 7.0 to have? 19 MS. BERNAY: Calls for speculation. | before 7.0 was introduced and for at least somemodels are not available to them afterwards. |
| THE WITNESS: Exactly as I just said. I would not expect in the long run there would be any | Q. And can you cite to me any evidence in the case record in the case where Apple considered what |
| price effect. Conceivably, there could have been one in the short run, but I doubt that that's true. | you just described as the lock-out effect in determining the prices of any iPods that were sold |
| 24 I wouldn't expect to find it. 25 If such a price increase did occur, that | 24 with Tunes 7.0? 25 MS. BERNAY: Objection. Vague and |
| 1 ambiguous. | Page 79 Page 8 |
| THE WITNESS: I'm not aware of any documents that directly address the relationship | And so the basis for it is the economic theory of lock-in, the optimal pricing of a firm |
| between lock-in and price. BY MR. KIERNAN: | 4 that has a product with lock-in and other switching 5 costs, and then the empirical test of whether that |
| Q. I asked about look-out. Let's talk about that. | 6 theory predicts what actually happened.7 BY MR. KIERNAN: |
| A. Lock-out. They're the same thing. I mean, one side being locked in is the other side being locked out. | REDACTED |
| So I'm not aware of any documents that explicitly analyze lock-in and lock-out. | |
| Q. Okay. So what are you relying on for the basis of your opinion that the impact on price would | |
| 15 be immediate due to lock-in or lock-out as a result 16 of 7.0? | 17 MS. BERNAY: Objection. Vague. |
| A. It would – why a demand curve becomes 8 more inelastic is not really relevant to the | 18 THE WITNESS: No. But I know that - I |
| 19 question of what is an increase in the degree of 20 inelasticity of the demand curve on price. There's | 19 know that Apple is aware of the economic 20 consequences of closed systems. |
| 21 no – it doesn't matter what the cause is. If the 22 demand curve becomes more inelastic, the profit | 21 BY MR. KIERNAN: 22 Q. What are you relying on for that? |
| 23 maximizing price goes up. | A. Statements, you know, in other contexts. |

| Page 81 information technology space. And then there's discussions of this in Jobs' biography. So, I mean, I'm not relying on it in this | REDACTED | Page 82 |
|---|--|---------|
| 4 case, but I know that Apple is aware of the | 5 BY MR. KIERNAN: | |
| 5 advantages and disadvantages of having a closed 6 system. And they have – they have had the strategy | 6 Q. And, Dr. Noll, what evidence are you | |
| 5.74.74.75.15.15.15.77.15.75.15.15.22.27.14.35.25.14.55.75.75.75.75.75.75.75.75.75.75.75.75. | 7 relying on for your opinion that 7.0 had an | |
| | 8 immediate impact on the elasticity of demand for | |
| 8 benefits of a closed system outweigh the costs. | 9 iPods? | |
| 9 So I view what's going on in the iPods as | 10 MS, BERNAY: Objection, Asked and | |
| 0 simply a continuation of a policy that they | 11 answered. | |
| 1 understood and thought was in their interests. | 12 THE WITNESS: There's a theory, and | |
| REDACTED | 13 there's an empirical test of the theory, and it's | |
| | 14 confirmed. So that's what we economists do. | |
| | 15 BY MR. KIERNAN: | |
| | 16 Q. And what's the empirical test that you're | |
| | 17 relying on? | |
| | 18 A. That the price went up. | |
| | 19 Q. Is that — | |
| | 20 A. The optimal price went up. | |
| | 21 Q. Do you mean the regression in Exhibits 3 | |
| | 22 and A? | |
| | 23 A. Yes. | |
| | 24 Q. 3A and 3B? | |
| | 25 A. Yes. | |
| | Zi A la. | |
| Page 83 Q. Okay, Anything other than theory and the | But whatever evidence is in all those | Page 84 |
| 2 empirical test set forth in Exhibits 3A and 3B to | 2 reports would be what I'm relying on. | |
| 3 Noll 10 that you're relying on for the opinion that | 3 BY MR. KIERNAN: | |
| 4 the immediate effect of 7.0 was to impact the | 4 Q. Dr. Noll, I'm asking about Exhibits 3A and | |
| 5 elasticity of demand of iPods? | 5 3B, with all due respect. You were talking about | |
| 6 A. Yes, every other report that I've ever | 6 other reports. | |
| 7 written that does any empirical analysis. Other | 7 A. You asked me what other evidence I have | |
| 8 than theory and fact, I have no evidence in support | 8 besides 3A and 3B, and I'm telling you it would be | |
| 9 of this proposition. | 9 in other reports. It would be regressions in other | |
| O Q. Other than the theory and the regression | 10 reports and the data – | |
| 11 set forth in Exhibits 3A and 3B or other regressions | 11 Q. And you're relying on those regressions | |
| 12 that you've run, do you have any evidence that 7.0 | 12 for your opinions in this matter? | |
| impacted the prices of iPods? | 13 MS. BERNAY: Objection. Misstates the | |
| MS. BERNAY: Objection. Asked and | 14 prior testimony. | |
| 5 answered. | 15 BY MR. KIERNAN: | |
| 16 THE WITNESS: The regression analysis is | 16 Q. Well, I want to know. | |
| 7 the evidence that it affected – not only in this | 17 A. Lam relying – | |
| 18 report but in prior reports. | 18 Q. You brought it up, not me. | |
| 19 And, you know, it goes all the way back to | 19 MS. BERNAY: Is that a question? | |
| 20 class certification. I've been writing reports on | 20 MR. KIERNAN; Yeah. | |
| 21 this issue since July of 2008, so – and I | 21 THE WITNESS: This is a reply to your | |
| 22 haven't – I haven't attempted to memorize every | 22 expert reports. Obviously, whatever is in the | |
| 23 single one of them in preparation for this | 23 merits report also addresses the issue of did 7.0 | |
| 24 deposition because I thought this deposition was | 24 cause the price to go up. | |
| | | |

| Roger Noll, Ph.D. | The Apple iPod iTunes Anti-Trust Litigation |
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| Pag 1 in general, creating incompatibilities caused prices | e 85 Page 1 BY MR. KIERNAN: |
| 2 to go up. And there's evidence in all those reports | 2 Q. If there are consumers who are no longer |
| 3 that the creation of incompatibility causes prices | 3 locked out from purchasing an iPod because the music |
| 4 to go up, which is only true if it makes demand | 4 that they purchase from a vendor is now |
| 5 curves more inelastic. | 5 interoperable with an iPod, how would you expect |
| 6 So anything in any report that discusses | 6 that to impact iPod prices? |
| 7 the relationship between lock-in and prices is | 7 MS. BERNAY: Objection. Calls for |
| 8 evidence in support that 7.0 did, in fact, cause the | 8 speculation. |
| 9 demand to become more inelastic. | 9 THE WITNESS: I'm sorry, I didn't follow |
| 10 BY MR. KIERNAN: | 10 the question. Try it again. |
| 11 Q. With respect to the impact on prices on | 11 BY MR. KIERNAN: |
| 12 iPods as a result of the lock-out effect, would you | 12 Q. If there are consumers who are no longer |
| 13 expect the impact to be the same throughout the – | 13 locked out from purchasing an iPod because the music |
| 14 well, would you expect the impact on prices to | 14 they purchase from a vendor is interoperable with an |
| 15 remain the same, to remain constant? | 15 iPod, how would you expect that to impact iPod |
| 16 MS. BERNAY: Objection. Calls for | 16 prices? |
| 17 speculation. | 17 MS. BERNAY; Same objection. |
| 18 THE WITNESS: I would expect it to be, | 18 THE WITNESS: That's what I said. That's |
| 19 yeah, mostly constant through time, although toward | 19 exactly what I was referring to in the last answer, |
| 20 the end of the period, it might become worse. | 20 is that when other sites adopt DRM-free music files, |
| 21 But on the other hand, there are other | 21 that should increase the competition between Apple |
| 22 things in the model that would offset that, such as | 22 and other manufacturers of MP3. |
| 23 the move to DRM-free files by competitors of the | 23 On the other hand, offsetting that is the |
| 23 the move to DRM-free files by competitors of the 24. Trunes Store. | 24 increased inventory of DRM-protected files that have |
| 25 // | 25 been downloaded from the iTunes Store. |
| | Page |
| 1 So the net effect of those two things | 1 period, MP3 sales are going up, and they stopped |
| would be something in the middle. One makes things | 2 going up roughly at the end of the damage period. I |
| 3 worse for people who own iPods, and one makes things | 3 mean, the rate at which they increase declines |
| 4 better. | 4 towards the end of the damage period. |
| 5 And the demand curve, the replacement | 5 BY MR. KIERNAN: |
| 6 demand curve for people who already own iPods would | 6 Q. One potential impact of 7.0 was to reduce |
| 7 become more inelastic, and the replacement demand | 7 the profitability of iPod, the sale of iPods, |
| 8 curve for people who own other MP3s would become | 8 because they locked out a certain segment of |
| 9 more elastic. The net effect on that, on the demand | 9 customers; isn't that true? |
| 10 for iPods is - I don't know. | 10 MS. BERNAY: Objection. Vague and |
| 11 BYMR. KIERNAN: | 11 ambiguous. |
| 12 Q. So your opinion is that 7.0 locked out a | 12 THE WITNESS: No, they wouldn't raise the |
| 13 certain number of customers. What effect would that | 13 price to cause the profit to go down. The profit |
| 14 have on iPod sales? | 14 goes up but the sales goes down. In other words, |
| 15 MS. BERNAY: Objection. Vague and | 15 the point of the price increase is to raise the |
| 16 ambiguous. | 16 profit per unit, knowing that it's going to cause |
| 17 THE WITNESS: The all-else-equal effect | 17 less in the way of sales. All right. |
| 18 would be less. | 18 BY MR. KIERNAN: |
| REDACTED | Q. Let's say they don't make any changes to |
| | 20 price. All else is equal. |
| | 21 A. That's right. |
| | 22 Q. The effect of the lock-out would reduce |
| 23 And then there are other things going on | 23 profits? |
| 24 that cause sales to go up. In general, you know, in | 24 A. At any given price, they have fewer |
| 25 the time frame at the beginning of the damages | 25 people, that's right, buying it. |

| Roger Noll, Ph.D. | The Apple iPod iTunes Anti-Trust | Litigation |
|---|--|------------|
| Page 8: 1 Q. Right. | 9 1 BY MR. KIERNAN: | Page 90 |
| 2 A. And then the off the offsetting | 2 Q. What would they look at? | |
| 3 advantage is that you get a higher profit per unit | MS. BERNAY: Calls for speculation. | |
| 4 because you can raise price. So that's the reason | 4 THE WITNESS: They would – what companies | |
| | 5 do is gather information from their salespeople | |
| 5 you do it. 6 The reason you would create an | 6 about what's going on in the market and how | |
| | 7 sensitive they perceive the market to price and | |
| 7 incompatibility is because you thought the price | | |
| 8 effect exceeded the lock-out effect. | [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] | |
| 9 Q. And is it your opinion that's what Apple | | |
| 10 decided with respect to 7.0? | 10 products. They'd look at the degree to which they | |
| 11 A. My opinion is that Apple's behavior is | 11 were winning or losing sales from other people, | |
| 12 consistent with the economic theory of lock-in | 12 things like that. | |
| 13 that, in fact, the profitability per unit of iPods | 13 BY MR. KIERNAN: | |
| 14 went up. That's what the coefficient in the | 14 Q. Would they look at how many people would | |
| 15 regression measures. | 15 be locked out? | |
| 16 So, yes, the behavior of Apple is | 16 A. Yeah, one of the reasons that it's in the | |
| 17 consistent with the theory. | 17 interest of somebody with a 70 percent market share | |
| 18 Q. What would Apple have to look at to | 18 to engage in lock-in is because it preserves that | |
| 19 conduct the analysis that you just described where | 19 market share. So that's why it's an interesting | |
| 20 you're looking at the number of people that you're | 20 contrast between Apple and Microsoft. | |
| 21 going to lose to non-iPods as a result of the | 21 Microsoft was really foolish to lock | |
| 22 lock-out and how to adjust the price with respect to | 22 people in to the Zune because their market share was | |
| 23 iPod sales to counteract that impact? | 23 so small; it was 1 or 2. So they were giving up | |
| 24 MS, BERNAY: Objection. Compound. | 24 98 percent of the market in order to lock in | |
| 25 /// | 25 2 percent. That was a bad decision, and we know | |
| Page 9 | | Page 92 |
| 1 that it was a bad decision because they left the | when you have a higher market share. | |
| 2 market. | 2 MR. KIERNAN: Why don't we take one more. | |
| 3 The larger your market share, the bigger | 3 break just so I can go through my notes. | |
| 4 the benefits and the lower the costs from engaging | 4 MS. BERNAY: Absolutely. | |
| 5 in a lock-in strategy. | 5 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Off the record at | |
| 6 So normally we would find lock-in strategy | 6 11:10. | |
| 7 only among firms with relatively large market | 7 (A brief recess was taken.) | |
| 8 shares. And we would normally not observe a lock-in | 8 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: This is the end of | |
| 9 strategy in a structurally competitive industry | 9 disc 1. Off the record at 11:14. | |
| 10 because you're giving up too much when you do that. | 10 (A brief recess was taken.) | |
| 11 Q. Wouldn't you also normally see in the | 11 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: This is disc 2. On the | |
| 12 lock-in strategy a firm charging lower prices to | 12 record at 11:24. | |
| 13 attract consumers into that ecosystem? | 13 BY MR. KIERNAN: | |
| 14 A. Well, the degree to which you use price to | 14 Q. With respect to your regression analysis | |
| 15 attract customers is different in a system with | 15 set forth in Exhibits 3A and 3B, describe for me | |
| 16 lock-in and lock-out than a system without it. | 16 what the but-for world is. | |
| 17 Yes, of course, one thing you always | 17 MS. BERNAY: Objection, Vague and | |
| 18 consider on setting a price is your ability to | 18 ambiguous. | |
| 19 attract customers from others. But if there are | 19 THE WITNESS: One in which 7.0 doesn't | |
| 20 fewer others, that's less of a concern to you. So | 20 exist. | |
| 21 the cost in that dimension is lower, of engaging in | 21 BY MR. KIERNAN: | |
| 22 lock-in. | 22 Q. And is it also a world in which the | |
| 23 So, yes, price competition still is a | 23 technology in 4.7 still exists? | |
| 14.00 mag = 15.00 ft 14.00 ft 16.00 ft | 24 A. Well, whatever technologies are around and | |
| | 25 then are captured in the model would be whatever | |
| 25 there's lock-in. And it's a less important fact | 20 mentale papinion in the money would be whatever | |

| V | ger Noll, Ph.D. | The Apple iPod iTunes Anti-Trust I | 1000 |
|----------------------|--|--|---------|
| | | Page 93 1 Q. And it's been replaced by 7.0? | Page 94 |
| | they are throughout time. Like, you know, there's | | |
| | still video capability, there's still this, that and | 2 A. That's correct. | |
| | the other thing. | 3 Q. In the but-for world in which 7.0 does not | |
| 4 | So it's not that technology stops | 4 exist with respect to the iPod nano second | |
| 5 | progressing; it's just that the 7 0 blocking | 5 generation, what technology would exist? | |
| 6 | technology doesn't exist. | 6 A. I don't know. That's up to Apple to | |
| 7 | Q. If we look at, for example, how you dealt | 7 decide. It's like asking the question suppose they | |
| | with the shuffle in your regression reflected in | 8 had not introduced the next generation of an iPod, | |
| 9 | Exh bits 3A and 3B, you do not turn on 70, and you | 9 what would have happened. | |
| 10 | leave the indicator variable for 4.7 on. | 10 There's a variable in there. It could be | |
| 11 | A. Right. | 11 turned off, but they might have done something else. | |
| 12 | Q. What's the assumption for leaving 4.7 on? | 12 I don't know what it is. But what I'm just looking | |
| 13 | A. That the blocking technology that's | 13 at is what's the impact of moving from 4.7 to 7.0. | |
| 14 | embedded in 4.7 continued indefinitely but had | 14 Q. The incremental impact? | |
| 15 | become essentially irrelevant because it gets offset | 15 A. Yeah, Remember that we still have 4.7 on | |
| | by the second-generation Harmony. | 16 for these other guys, so this is the differential | |
| 17 | Q. Okay. And with respect to the iPod nano | 17 effect of 7.0 and 4.7. | |
| 18 | second generation, you turn off 4.7 on the date that | 18 Q. And how does your regression capture the | |
| | The late of the Control of the Contr | 19 impact of the other technology that would exist if | |
| 19 | 7 0 is introduced, correct? | 20 7 0 had not been released on the iPod nano second | |
| 20 | A. That's correct. | | |
| 21 | Q. And I know what your report says, but | 21 generation? | |
| | explain to me why you turn off 4.7. | 22 MS, BERNAY: Objection. Vague and | |
| 23 | A. Because it's not there anymore. It's not | 23 ambiguous. | |
| 24 | the blocking technology that's in there that's been | 24 THE WITNESS: In principle, it can't, | |
| 25 | offset by the Harmony variable. | 25 because we don't know what the technology would have | |
| | F | Page 95 | Page 96 |
| 1 | been. We don't know what they would have done had | 1 Q. That's what it assumes? | |
| 2 | they never introduced 7.0. | 2 A. Yeah. | |
| 3 | BY MR. KIERNAN: | Q. Okay. So wouldn't that mean, then, that | |
| 4 | Q. Fair enough. | 4 the but-for world is a world in which the DRM system | |
| 5 | If the technology - well, strke that | 5 that was first introduced by 4.7 would remain in | |
| 6 | The feature of 7.0 that is at issue in | 6 existence but for 7.0? | |
| 7 | this case was a change to the DRM; is that accurate? | MS. BERNAY: Objection. | |
| 8 | Is that what your understanding is? | 8 THE WITNESS: Maybe, I don't know. I | |
| 9 | MS. BERNAY: Objection. Vague and | 9 mean, the DRM - first of all, we're not ta king | |
| | ambiguous. | 10 about DRM. That's not what's being measured here. | |
| 11 | THE WITNESS: Well, yes, the – yes, 7.0 | 11 What's being measured is the blocking technology. | |
| 12 | | 12 BY MR. KIERNAN: | |
| | 2.11.0010000000000000000000000000000000 | 13 Q. That is the DRM. | |
| 13 | | 14 A. No. Digitalized management is the | |
| 14 | | | |
| 15 | | 15 encryption, the system itself, and a component of it | |
| 16 | A. That's my understanding, yes. | 16 is the – is the component that blocks Harmony, that | |
| 17 | | 17 tries to detect somebody who's trying – and it | |
| 18 | | 18 doesn't detect it in the sense of – it's not | |
| 19 | | 19 something about iTunes stuff, It's stuff about | |
| 20 | A. Assume the DRM system in 7.0 is - | 20 RealNetworks. | |
| | Q. No, no. | 21 Q. Right. | |
| 21 | Assume that on iPod models that did not | 22 A. All right. And so DRM within the Apple | |
| | Assume that of the day had all the | | |
| 22 | | 23 community is still there. The issue is what about | |
| 21 22 23 24 | include 7.0, they had the DRM system that was in | | |

| REDACTED | Page 97 And thet's not part of digital rights management for |
|--|--|
| KEBAGTEB | And that's not part of digital rights management for Apple, it's part of digital rights management as it |
| | 3 applies to others. |
| 4 O. That was added to the existing DPM | 4 Q. What's the basis of that description? |
| 4 Q. That was added to the existing DRM | |
| 5 technology that was first introduced in 4.7? | |
| A. You want to call it the DRM technology | 6 wanting to have customers who own iPods. All right. |
| 7 It's not part of protecting files from the iTunes | 7 And so it says, ah-hah, here's a mechanism that will |
| 8 Store. That's not what its point is. Its point is | 8 cause your iPod to be able to read files from |
| 9 to prevent people who own an iPod from buying things | 9 RealNetworks. |
| from RealNetworks. That's what the point of it is. | 10 Q. Right. |
| 11 Q. Okay. | A. That doesn't protect Apple's DRM. That |
| A. So it's not – it's really more about the | 12 is – what that does is overcome a potential use of |
| 13 RealNetworks DRM system than it is about the Apple | 13 RealNetworks' DRM. |
| 14 DRM system. It's - it's - you know, it's not | 14 MR. KIERNAN: And so the record is |
| 15 about protecting Apple. | 15 accurate on this, when I'm saying "right," I don't |
| 16 Q. But with respect to - well, strike that. | 16 mean Lagree with Dr. Noll's description. |
| REDACTED | 17 THE WITNESS: You can just say wrong. |
| par viviano | 18 MR. MITTELSTAEDT: That's not a bad idea. |
| | 19 She ought to correct all the rights to wrongs. |
| | 20 BY MR. KIERNAN: |
| | 21 Q. If you have the entire population that's |
| 00 00 00 00 | |
| 22 Q. Okay. And – | 22 the dataset you're using in estimating the |
| 23 A. But I wouldn't call it the Tunes Store | 23 regression, and you have a million transactions that |
| 24 DRM system or the Apple DRM system. It was a | 24 are all at one price, could you have a clustering |
| 25 mechanism to prevent Harmony from working on iPods. | 25 problem? |
| | Page 99 Page 10 |
| MS. BERNAY: Objection. Incomplete | 1 BY MR, KIERNAN: |
| 2 hypothetical. | 2 Q. Okay. |
| 3 THE WITNESS: That's not what dustering | 3 A. You know, you would have – if there's |
| 4 is about, no. | 4 zero variance, there's zero variance to the random |
| 5 BY MR. KIERNAN: | 5 error term. So it's not an independence problem. |
| 6 Q. Okay. If the - can you have an | 6 The only way – in a world in which |
| 7 independence problem? | 7 everything is sold at exactly the same price and all |
| 8 A. No. | 8 products have exactly the same technical |
| 9 MS. BERNAY: Objection. | 9 characteristics, the regression analysis has an |
| 10 BY MR. KIERNAN: | 10 R-squared of 1.0, and it perfectly predicts price, |
| 11 Q. Never? | 11 and all the residual errors are zero, and the value |
| | 12 taken by the residual error in the regression is |
| 12 A. Never. | |
| 13 (Reporter inquires.) | 13 always zero; it has zero variance and means zero. |
| 14 MS. BERNAY: I've lost my mic. | The only way that you can introduce |
| 15 BY MR. KIERNAN: | 15 statistical variance and create something that you |
| 16 Q. And why are you so certain that you could | 16 could estimate is if you had measurement error on |
| 17 not have an independence problem if you have the | 17 either price, a dependent variable, or one of the |
| 18 entire population and the one million transactions | 18 independent variables. And then you would get some |
| 19 that you are studying all had the same price? | 19 variation here. |
| 20 MS. BERNAY: Objection. Asked and | 20 It's just a confusion to say that |
| 21 answered. | 21 independence has anything to do with the magnitude |
| 22 THE WITNESS: Independence isn't about the | 22 of the dependent variable. What independence has to |
| 23 value taken by the dependent variable. Independence | 23 do with is the random shock to the deterministic |
| | 24 system that explains price. |
| E. D. C. C. A. S. C. | The state of the s |
| 25 equation. | 25 And if the deterministic – that's why I |

Roger Noll, Ph.D.

| | ger Noll, Ph.D. | | | The Apple iPod iTunes Anti-Trust | |
|---|---|----------|--|--|----------|
| 1 | put in the stuff about trying to measure the | Page 101 | 1 | to the first class certification report, I've | Page 102 |
| | • man a page an ang tan ang tan an a | | | explained lock-in and lock-out. | |
| | acceleration due to gravity. That you can have a | | 3 | Q. And with respect to 7.0's impact on | |
| | world in which everything is perfectly | | | lock-in – we discussed this morning its impact on | |
| | deterministic, and if there's no measurement error, | | | - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 | |
| | and you have all the right variables in the | | | lock-out – the impact on lock-in, what is your | |
| | equation, and you have the equation specified | | | opinion with respect to what impact it had on | |
| | perfectly, then the random disturbance term will | | | lock-in? | |
| 133 | have not only mean zero, it'll have variance zero. | | 8 | MS. BERNAY: Objection. Compound. | |
| 9 | But it doesn't make the observations not | | 9 | THE WITNESS: Lock-in and lock-out are the | |
| 10 | independent. | | 10 | same thing. They're just - lock-in is about your | |
| 11 | That's as clearly as I think I've ever | | 11 | | |
| | explained it, by the way. | | | device. But it's exactly the same phenomenon. | |
| 13 | MS. BERNAY: Maybe some people are better | | 13 | Lock-in here and lock-out there is the | |
| | questioners. | | 14 | same as lock-in there and lock-out here. They're | |
| 15 | BY MR. KIERNAN: | | 15 | | |
| 16 | Q. Just so I'm clear about this, Dr. Noll - | | | BY MR. KIERNAN: | |
| 17 | because this was the first time I had read your | | 17 | Q. Do they have the same impact on price? | |
| | explication of the so-called lock-out effect on iPod | | 18 | A. The effect on price is the net effect of | |
| 19 | prices - with respect to the lock-in effect, the | | 19 | all - of both of them together. You can't have | |
| 20 | lock-in effect that we've talked about over many, | | 20 | it – you can't have one without the other. | |
| 21 | many reports, to what extent are you still relying | | 21 | Q. And can they move in different directions? | |
| 22 | upon the lock-in effect? | | 22 | That is, directionally, can they impact price in | |
| 23 | A. The lock-in effect and the lock-out effect | | 23 | different directions? | |
| 24 | are just two sides of the same coin, and they've | | 24 | A. That's not a meaningful question because | |
| 25 | been in every report I've written. All the way back | | 25 | they happen simultaneously. And what they have is | |
| 0 | | Page 103 | | | Page 10 |
| | an effect. You could - if the question is, is it | | | your profits to go up. | |
| | possible for lock-in to cause prices to go down, in | | 2 | So it would never happen unless you | |
| | - incide it and deforthe auturbe has a really law | | | | |
| | principle, it could for the guy who has a really low | | 3 | expected it would be profitable to do so. So, | |
| | market share, because that person has a much bigger | | 3 | therefore, it would cause prices to go up. That | |
| 5 | market share, because that person has a much bigger incentive to compete with the guy with the really | | | therefore, it would cause prices to go up. That would always be the case. No rational company would | |
| 5 | market share, because that person has a much bigger | | 4 | therefore, it would cause prices to go up. That would always be the case. No rational company would ever create lock-in if it was unprofitable to do so. | |
| 5 | market share, because that person has a much bigger incentive to compete with the guy with the really | | 4 5 | therefore, it would cause prices to go up. That would always be the case. No rational company would ever create lock-in if it was unprofitable to do so. BY MR. KIERNAN: | |
| 5 6 7 8 | market share, because that person has a much bigger incentive to compete with the guy with the really big market share. All right. So it's conceivable that the creation of lock-out by the guy who has the big market share | | 4 5 6 | therefore, it would cause prices to go up. That would always be the case. No rational company would ever create lock-in if it was unprofitable to do so. | |
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| | ger Noll, Ph.D. | age 105 | Page 108 |
|--|---|---|----------|
| 1 | way you asked the question isn't quite right, | age 105 1 and who manufacture MP3 players. So that was a bad | rage 101 |
| | because the imposition of DRM didn't have to create | 2 decision on their part. | |
| | ock-in effects if the record companies had done | 3 But, yes, it's true that the record | |
| | what they originally planned to do, which was | 4 companies were initially responsible for the fact | |
| | develop their own system and have everybody use it. | 5 that when the iTunes Music Store was first launched | |
| 6 | In fact, that was - from the standpoint | 6 it had a lock-in effect, because that technology was | |
| | of the welfare - or the welfare of the record | 7 not available to anybody else who later got into the | |
| | companies, they'd have been much better off if they | 8 digital download business. | |
| | would have developed a standard. | 9 BY MR, KIERNAN: | |
| 0 | And that was the original intent. If you | 10 Q. And the lock-in effect, as you referred to | |
| | go back to the early 2000s - which is outside the | 11 it, as a result of 7.0, does that level of lock-in | |
| | case but the stuff I know just from knowing the | 12 increase over time? | |
| | industry. If you go back to the early 2000s, the | 13 MS. BERNAY: Objection. Asked and | |
| | original idea of the record company was to create a | 14 answered. | |
| | consortium to create its own DRM system because – | 15 THE WITNESS: For the base of customers, | |
| | and then the reason they ended up with multiple ones | 16 the magnitude of the lock-in rises as they have more | |
| | is that didn't really work. | 17 files. | |
| 18 | And so they wanted to create – what they | 18 And so there's two things happening. One | |
| | thought they were doing - which was stupid - was | 19 is, as time progresses, you may care less about the | |
| | create competition between – among Microsoft, | 20 older files, but then you're adding new ones. And | |
| | RealNetworks and Apple by having them all have | 21 so at some point you reach some sort of maximum | |
| | different DRM systems. | 22 degree of "locked-in"ness, so - but in general, the | |
| 23 | But what that, in fact, did is create | 23 switching cost gets higher the more files you have | |
| | lock-in and transfer profits from the record | 24 in a proprietary technology. So that's what happens | |
| | companies to the people who sell digital downloads | 25 to the installed base. | |
| - | | Page 107 REDACTED | Page 10 |
| 1 | And then there's the new customers and the | TLD/101LD | |
| 2 | | | |
| | people who are customers that use other systems, all | | |
| | right. And the new customers obviously are not | | |
| 4 | right. And the new customers obviously are not locked in. They're the ones that have freedom to | | |
| 4 | right. And the new customers obviously are not locked in. They're the ones that have freedom to choose the first day. Right. They can pick what | | |
| 4 5 6 | right. And the new customers obviously are not locked in. They're the ones that have freedom to choose the first day. Right. They can pick what system they're going to go into. And that – that | | |
| 4 5 6 7 | right. And the new customers obviously are not locked in. They're the ones that have freedom to choose the first day. Right. They can pick what system they're going to go into. And that – that is the most intensive competition that exists among | | |
| 4 5 6 7 8 | right. And the new customers obviously are not locked in. They're the ones that have freedom to choose the first day. Right. They can pick what system they're going to go into. And that – that is the most intensive competition that exists among the people who manufacture MP3 players and the | | |
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| 4 5 6 7 8 9 | right. And the new customers obviously are not locked in. They're the ones that have freedom to choose the first day. Right. They can pick what system they're going to go into. And that – that is the most intensive competition that exists among the people who manufacture MP3 players and the people who have alternative digital download sites. And then there's the other folks who have gotten locked in to somebody else's system, all | 11 reduce the lock-in effect for people who were using | |
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| 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 R | right. And the new customers obviously are not locked in. They're the ones that have freedom to choose the first day. Right. They can pick what system they're going to go into. And that – that is the most intensive competition that exists among the people who manufacture MP3 players and the people who have alternative digital download sites. And then there's the other folks who have gotten locked in to somebody else's system, all right. And there, the issue is how quickly they can switch themselves. All right. | 11 reduce the lock-in effect for people who were using 12 RealNetworks' system. And that's a loss for them, 13 but it gives them access to this huge customer base, 14 which is a gain for them. 15 So the economic incentive to RealNetworks 16 to try to reduce lock-in is much more powerful than 17 the economic incentive of Apple to reduce lock-in. 18 BY MR. KIERNAN: 19 Q. Going back to the installed base, you 20 referred to sort of three segments. There was the 21 installed – as of the time of 7.0, there's the | |
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| 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 | right. And the new customers obviously are not locked in. They're the ones that have freedom to choose the first day. Right. They can pick what system they're going to go into. And that – that is the most intensive competition that exists among the people who manufacture MP3 players and the people who have alternative digital download sites. And then there's the other folks who have gotten locked in to somebody else's system, all right. And there, the issue is how quickly they can switch themselves. All right. EDACTED And that's what gives them the incentive. | 11 reduce the lock-in effect for people who were using 12 RealNetworks' system. And that's a loss for them, 13 but it gives them access to this huge customer base, 14 which is a gain for them. 15 So the economic incentive to RealNetworks 16 to try to reduce lock-in is much more powerful than 17 the economic incentive of Apple to reduce lock-in. 18 BY MR. KIERNAN: 19 Q. Going back to the installed base, you 20 referred to sort of three segments. There was the 21 installed – as of the time of 7.0, there's the 22 installed base, the individuals that are new to 23 iPods that are not locked in, and then the | |
| 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 RI | right. And the new customers obviously are not locked in. They're the ones that have freedom to choose the first day. Right. They can pick what system they're going to go into. And that – that is the most intensive competition that exists among the people who manufacture MP3 players and the people who have alternative digital download sites. And then there's the other folks who have gotten locked in to somebody else's system, all right. And there, the issue is how quickly they can switch themselves. All right. EDACTED And that's what gives them the incentive to invent Harmony, is to – instead of having access | 11 reduce the lock-in effect for people who were using 12 RealNetworks' system. And that's a loss for them, 13 but it gives them access to this huge customer base, 14 which is a gain for them. 15 So the economic incentive to RealNetworks 16 to try to reduce lock-in is much more powerful than 17 the economic incentive of Apple to reduce lock-in. 18 BY MR. KIERNAN: 19 Q. Going back to the installed base, you 20 referred to sort of three segments. There was the 21 installed – as of the time of 7.0, there's the 22 installed base, the individuals that are new to | |

| ., | ger Noll, Ph.D. | ge 109 Page |
|--|--|--|
| 1 | guys. | 1 my granddaughter a nano, but I think it was before |
| 2 | Q. Right, Okay. | 2 the last deposition. |
| 3 | (Reporter inquires.) | 3 Q. And do you recall where you purchased the |
| 4 | THE WITNESS: The installed base of the | 4 nano from? |
| 5 | other guys. | 5 A. Yes, I think. |
| | BY MR. KIERNAN: | 6 Q. Where was that? |
| 7 | Q. The installed base for the non-iPods? | 7 A. I think I got it from Best Buy. |
| 8 | A. The non-iPods. | 8 Q. And – |
| 9 | Q. All right. | 9 A. Are you going to ask me if I've ever been |
| 10 | So focusing on the installed base for | 10 in the Apple Store? The answer is, yes, I was in it |
| 11 | tall of the colour Carlosses and Activity and America Colo | 11 two days ago. |
| | iPods or increasing the lock-in of those people on | 12 Q. Have you ever purchased an iPod from an |
| | iPods, that would occur over time depending upon | 13 Apple Store? |
| 4 | their future purchases, correct? | 14 A. I've never purchased an iPod from an Apple |
| 15 | A. Yeah. And it's not just that. As well, | 15 Store, but I've purchased other things from an Apple |
| 16 | it's also - it doesn't really happen until they buy | 16 Store. |
| 17 | their next device. | 17 Q. Did you pay the list price? |
| 18 | So there's not going to be an | 18 MS, BERNAY; Objection - |
| 19 | instantaneous effect. It's going to be a longer | 19 THE WITNESS: It depends on what it was. |
| 20 | term effect. It's the lack of competition for the | 20. Sometimes I did, and sometimes I didn't. |
| 21 | other guys that is the principal short-term effect. | 21 BY MR. KIERNAN: |
| 22 | Q. I've got to get one update. | 22 Q. At any time did you negotiate the price |
| 23 | Since your last deposition, have you | 23 for— |
| | purchased any iPods? | 24 A. No, you don't negotiate. You either have |
| 25 | A. Probably not since my last one. I bought | 25 a coupon or you don't. |
| | The Control of the Co | |
| 1 | Q. Ever purchase a product from the iTunes – | ge 111 Page 1 THE WITNESS: I have never bought any |
| 2 | strike that. | 2 music from any digital download site, but I've |
| 3 | Did you ever purchase an iPod from the | 3 bought gift cards for my grandchildren. |
| 4 | online Apple Store? | 4 MR. MITTELSTAEDT: Fair enough. |
| 5 | A. No. I've never bought anything from the | 5 BY MR. KIERNAN: |
| 6 | online Apple Store | 6 Q. This will be the last. |
| 7 | MR. MITTELSTAEDT: I don't know how you | 7 A. I hope so. |
| 8 | can resist asking him what he bought at the Apple | 8 Q. Famous last words. |
| 9 | Store. He wants to tell you. | 9 Can you go to page 7 of Noll 10, your |
| 10 | THE WITNESS: Well, I'm just being | 10 rebuttal report. And it says – it's the second |
| 11 | truthful, revealing all the dark ghosts in my family | 11 paragraph, Dr. Noll. It starts with "second." |
| 12 | here. | 12 A. Mm-hmm. |
| 13 | | 13 Q. And it says – it's the sentence that |
| 14 | Q. Now I'm curious. What did you purchase | 14 starts with "While." |
| 15 | recently from the Apple Store? | 15 "While the extent of lock-in does |
| 16 | | 16 increase as a consumer buys more |
| . • | | 17 recordings that can be played only on |
| 17 | 그 교육이 취임 경기에 가지 않는데 얼마나 되었다면 그렇게 하고 있습니다. | 18 iPods, this fact does not imply that, as a |
| | | 19 theoretical matter, the price differential |
| 18 | her the case for it. | |
| 18 19 | | 20 would increase through time." |
| 18 19 20 | (Sotto voce conversation.) | 20 would increase through time." 21 Can you explain what you mean there? |
| 18 19 20 21 | (Sotto voce conversation.) MR. MITTELSTAEDT: Can I ask you something | 21 Can you explain what you mean there? |
| 18 19 20 21 22 | (Sotto voce conversation.) MR. MITTELSTAEDT: Can I ask you something for old time's sake? | 21 Can you explain what you mean there? 22 A. The next sentence: "The reason is" |
| 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | (Sotto voce conversation.) MR. MITTELSTAEDT: Can I ask you something for old time's sake? THE WITNESS: For old time's sake. | 21 Can you explain what you mean there? |

| 100 | Pa | ge 113 | Page 114 |
|-----|--|---|----------|
| 1 | increase - strike that. | 1 MS. BERNAY: You probably want to expedite | 7380340 |
| 2 | It says: "This fact does not imply that, | 2 it too? | |
| 3 | as a theoretical matter, that the price differential | 3 MR. KIERNAN: Yes. | |
| 4 | would increase through time." | 4 And then the final as soon as possible, | |
| 5 | Explain to me what – the price | 5 please. | |
| 6 | differential of what? | 6 MS, BERNAY: We'll take a rough and then | |
| 7 | A. Okay. The price increase due to lock-in | 7 just regular tumaround on the final. | |
| 8 | would not necessarily be continuously increasing | 8 (Deposition concluded at 11:54 a.m.) | |
| 9 | over time because a degree of lock-in was increasing | 9 | |
| 10 | over time. | 10 | Ĭ. |
| 11 | Q. Got it. | 11 | |
| 12 | MR. KIERNAN: That's all I have. | 12 | |
| 13 | MS. BERNAY: All done? | 13 | |
| 14 | MR, KIERNAN: We'll designate this | 14 | |
| 15 | "Attorney's Eyes Only" under the Protective Order. | 15 | |
| 16 | MS. BERNAY: I think we're all done. | 16 | |
| 17 | We'll read and sign. | 17 | 11 |
| 18 | THE VIDEOGRAPHER; This is the end of | 18 | |
| 19 | disc 2 of Roger Noll, Ph.D. | 19 | |
| 20 | Off the record, 11:52. | 20 | |
| 21 | (Discussion off the record.) | 21 | |
| 22 | THE REPORTER: Would you like a rough | 22 | |
| 23 | draft? | 23 | |
| 24 | MR. KIERNAN: I definitely need a rough | 24 | |
| 25 | draft. | 25 | |
| - | Pa | age 115 | Page 116 |
| 4 | DECLARATION UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY | 1 DEPOSITION ERRATA SHEET | |
| 2 | Case Name: The Apple iPod iTunes Anti-Trust Litigation | 2 Page No Line No 3 Change: | |
| 3 | Date of Deposition: 12/18/2013 | 3 Change: 4 Reason for change: | |
| 4 | Job No.: 10008944 | 5 Page No. Line No. | |
| 5 | Catalan Assault and Assault and | 5 Page No Line No 6 Change: | |
| 6 | I, ROGER G. NOLL, PH.D., the witness herein, | 7 Reason for change: | |
| 7 | declare under penalty of perjury that I have read the | 8 Page NoLine No | = |
| В | foregoing in its entirety; and that the testimony | 9 Change: | |
| 9 | contained therein, as corrected by me, is a true and | 10 Reason for change: | |
| 10 | accurate transcription of my testimony elicited at said | 11 Page No Line No | |
| Cu | time and place. | 12 Change: | |
| 12 | AND COME YOUR | 13 Reason for change: | |
| 13 | | 14 Page No Line No | |
| 14 | , 2013, at | 15 Change: | |
| 15 | , California | 16 Reason for change: | |
| 16 | | 17 Page No Line No | |
| 17 | | 18 Change: | |
| 18 | | 19 Reason for change: | |
| 19 | 1.76.2.76.76.WE | 20 Page No Line No | |
| 20 | ROGER G. NOLL, PH.D. | 21 Change: | -3 |
| 21 | | 22 Reason for change: | |
| 22 | | 23 | |
| 23 | | 24 | = |
| 24 | | ROGER G. NOLL, PH.D. Dated | |
| 25 | | 25 | |
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
APPLE'S (PROPOSED) REDACTIONS

EXHIBIT 51 [Filed Under Seal]

| | | Page | 1 |
|----|--|------|---|
| 1 | UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT | | |
| 2 | NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA | | |
| 3 | OAKLAND DIVISION | | |
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| 5 | | | |
| |) | | |
| 6 |) | | |
| | THE APPLE IPOD ITUNES ANTI-TRUST) No. C-05-0037 Y | /GR | |
| 7 | LITIGATION) | | |
| |) | | |
| 8 |) | | |
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| 10 | | | |
| 11 | | | |
| 12 | VIDEOTAPED DEPOSITION OF ROGER G. NOLL | | |
| 13 | San Francisco, California | | |
| 14 | Thursday, May 16, 2013 | | |
| 15 | Volume 1 | | |
| 16 | | | |
| 17 | | | |
| 18 | | | |
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| 20 | | | |
| 21 | Reported by: | | |
| 22 | JENNIFER L. FURIA, RPR, CSR | | |
| 23 | CA License No. 8394 | | |
| 24 | Job No. 1663538 | | |
| 25 | PAGES 1 - 262 | | |

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1
           UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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                                                              APPEARANCES (Continued):
 2
          NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
                                                         2
 3
              OAKLAND DIVISION
                                                         3
                                                              Also present:
 4
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 5
                                                         5
                                                                 KYLE ANDEER
                                                         6
 6
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      THE APPLE IPOD ITUNES ANTI-TRUST ) No C-05-0037 YGR
                                                         8
 7
     LITIGATION
                                                              Videographer:
                                                        9
 8
                                                       10
                                                                 ALEXEI DIAS
 9
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11
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12
         Videotaped Deposition of ROGER G NOLL, Volume
                                                       14
13
     1, taken on behalf of Defendant, at Jones Day, 555
                                                       15
14
     California Street, 26th Floor, San Francisco,
15
     California, beginning at 9:15 a m and ending at 4:37
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16
     p m on Thursday, May 16, 2013, before JENNIFER L
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     FURIA, Certified Shorthand Reporter No 8394
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                                             Page 2
                                                                                                    Page 4
 1
      APPEARANCES:
                                                         1
                                                                          INDEX
                                                         2
 2
                                                              WITNESS
                                                                                           EXAMINATION
 3
      For the Plaintiff:
                                                         3
                                                             ROGER G. NOLL
                                                         4
 4
                                                             Volume 1
                                                         5
 5
         ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP
 6
         BY: BONNY E. SWEENEY, ESQ.
                                                         6
                                                                          BY MR. MITTELSTAEDT
                                                                                                        7
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 7
         655 West Broadway, Suite 1900
                                                         8
                                                                          EXHIBITS
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         San Diego, California 92101
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         (619) 231-1058
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10
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                                                                                                       22
         bsweeney@rgrdlaw.com
                                                             Exhibit 1
                                                                        Declaration of Roger G. Noll
11
                                                       11
                                                       12
12
13
                                                       13
      For the Defendant
                                                       14
14
15
         JONES DAY
                                                       15
16
         BY: ROBERT A. MITTELSTAEDT, ESQ.
                                                       16
17
         and DAVID C. KIERNAN, ESQ.
                                                       17
18
         555 California Street, 26th Floor
                                                       18
                                                       19
19
         San Francisco, California 94104
         (415) 626-3939
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         ramittelstaedt@jonesday.com
22
         dkiernan@jonesday.com
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                                             Page 3
                                                                                                    Page 5
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| 1 | Q I'm asking you more in theory at this point. | 1 | Q And for purposes of your analysis were you |
|----|--|------|---|
| 2 | If 7.0 did something more than what you've just | 2 | assuming that any market or monopoly power enjoyed by |
| 3 | described | 3 | Apple in any relevant market before September 12, 2006 |
| 4 | A Like, for example? | 4 | was lawful and not anticompetitive? |
| 5 | Q and it's not captured in one of these 09:52:43 | 5 | MS. SWEENEY: Objection, to the extent it's 09:55:46 |
| 6 | variables that you just referred to, capacity, whether | 6 | asking for a legal conclusion. |
| 7 | it's photo or video or the size or the cost, | 7 | THE WITNESS: I have assumed for the purpose |
| 8 | then then the coefficient for 7.0 would pick up that, | 8 | of analysis that Apple's activities prior to the release |
| 9 | right? | 9 | of 7.0 were legal. I have also assumed for the purpose |
| 10 | A Like what? I mean, I don't understand what 09:53:05 | 10 | of analysis that Apple does have a certain degree of 09:56:12 |
| 11 | the what the 7.0 in principle could do. What is it | 11 | market power that is achieved for reasons other than |
| 12 | in principle it could do? | 12 | anticompetitive acts. So other than I don't know how |
| 13 | Q Anything that's not captured by one of your | 13 | to answer the question other than that. |
| 14 | other variables. The effect of that would be captured | 14 | BY MR. MITTELSTAEDT: |
| 15 | in your 7.0 variable, correct? By definition. 09:53:22 | 15 | Q Well, are you assuming that and the date I 09:56:3 |
| 16 | A So if you lick your iPod it tastes like wine? | 16 | want to focus on is December or, excuse me, September |
| 17 | Is that what 7.0 does, something like that? | 17 | 12, 2006. |
| 18 | I'm just I have no clue what you're talking | 18 | Are you assuming for purposes of your analysis |
| 19 | about, what it might be. If there's some wonderful | 19 | that any market or monopoly power Apple may have had as |
| 20 | attribute of iPods that cannot be obtained in any way 09:53:40 | 20 | of that date was lawful? 09:56:47 |
| 21 | other than 7.0 and that component is in there, sure, it | 21 | A Well, I'm assuming it's not part of the case. |
| 22 | would affect the price. It would make the it would | 22 | I'm not I'm not making I don't know whether it's |
| 23 | make it more valuable, assuming it's unique, a unique | 23 | lawful or not. In this case, I know that the only issue |
| 24 | attribute that wasn't otherwise included, but I don't | 24 | is 7.0. Whether the whether activities prior to |
| 25 | know what it is and I've never seen anybody describe 09:53:57 | 7 25 | that, either that used to be part of this case, or that 09:57:07 |
| | Page 34 | | Page 36 |
| | | | |
| 1 | anything like is that. | 1 | never were part of this case, are or are not lawful, is |
| 2 | Q And this is the point of my question. The | 2 | a legal question that I'm not competent to answer. |
| 3 | effect of that other attribute would be included in your | 3 | Q Are you assuming for purposes of this case |
| 4 | 7.0 variable, correct? | 4 | that anything Apple did before the launch of 7.0 was |
| 5 | A If there was one, yes. 09:54:11 | 5 | anticompetitive? 09:57:25 |
| 6 | Q And what did you do, if anything, to determine | 6 | A No. I'm not assuming whether it's |
| 7 | what 7.0 did over and above, as you put it, create the | 7 | anticompetitive or procompetitive. I'm just accepting |
| 8 | incompatibility with Harmony? | 8 | the status quo ante, as of September 11, 2006 and saying |
| 9 | A I've read the technical expert's | 9 | all I'm interested in is the incremental market power |
| 10 | MS. SWEENEY: Objection, asked and answered. 09:54:2 | 9 10 | that occurs after that date. 09:57:39 |
| 11 | THE WITNESS: I'm not the technical expert | 11 | Q And you're not assessing damages against Apple |
| 12 | about what's in 7.0. I'm not neither your expert nor | 12 | for anything done before September 12, 2006, correct? |
| 13 | the plaintiff's expert. I relied upon their reports. | 13 | A Of course. |
| 14 | BY MR. MITTELSTAEDT: | 14 | Q How do you use the term market power |
| 15 | Q Did you read Apple's press release for 7.0? 09:54:38 | 15 | differently from monopoly power? 09:57:57 |
| 16 | A Oh, at some point I've read it, yes. | 16 | MS. SWEENEY: You mean in his report? |
| 17 | Q And did it say do you remember anything it | 17 | MR. MITTELSTAEDT: Yes. |
| 18 | said on this topic? | 18 | THE WITNESS: This is always a tough question |
| 19 | A Not sitting here, no. | 19 | for economists, because economists tend to think of |
| 20 | Q Is it accurate to say that your task was to 09:54:52 | 20 | market power as a continuous variable and lawyers tend 09:58:15 |
| 21 | opine on whether 7.0 harmed competition in a market for | 21 | to think of it as two categories, market and monopoly. |
| 22 | portable digital players and, if so, to opine on the | 22 | Monopoly power hinges on unilateral activity. |
| 23 | amount of damages to iPod purchasers from September 12, | 23 | That is to say, an individual firm has sufficient market |
| 24 | 2006 to March 31, 2009? | 24 | power that they, all by themselves, can affect price and |
| 25 | A I was asked to do that, yes. 09:55:23 | 25 | quantity and product quality in the market through their 09:58:46 |
| | Page 35 | | Page 37 |



Pages 46 to 49

| 1 | consumers' heads is whether it's going to be disabled | 1 | effect. |
|--|---|--|---|
| 2 | again, all right. And so it could it could have a | 2 | Q And what I'm asking is why would there |
| 3 | less than a full effect, a full offset effect. | 3 | under what circumstances, precisely as you can, would |
| 4 | You this is something that only the data | 4 | you expect to see a continuing effect of 4.7 even after |
| 5 | can answer. There's no there's no theoretically 10:50:28 | 5 | Harmony's relaunched? 10:53:16 |
| 6 | correct answer to whether Harmony's relaunch would fully | 6 | MS. SWEENEY: Objection, vague and ambiguous. |
| 7 | offset the effect of 4.7. | 7 | THE WITNESS: Consumer expectations about the |
| 8 | You what it does is how consumers respond | 8 | durability of the relaunch. About whether if I if I |
| 9 | and behave. And if they don't trust that Harmony is | 9 | actually use Harmony and buy a bunch of songs from |
| 10 | going to be permanently around, and if they believe that 10:50:4 | 1 10 | RealNetworks, from Rhapsody, am I going to be stuck six 10:53:3 |
| 11 | eventually Apple will will become incompatible again | 11 | months from now with them not working because it will be |
| 12 | with it, and so they'll lose all the songs that they | 12 | disabled again. |
| 13 | bought from RealNetworks, then it would still have an | 13 | BY MR. MITTELSTAEDT: |
| 14 | effect, even if that expectation weren't true. | 14 | Q And could that consumer expectation continue |
| 15 | So it's just not a theoretical question. It's 10:51:02 | 15 | even after 7.0 is issued? 10:53:42 |
| 16 | an empirical question. And it's basically a boring | 16 | A Exactly, it could. And that's that's |
| 17 | empirical question, because 4.7 isn't in the case | 17 | precisely right. 7.0, you know, could could, in |
| 18 | anymore. So what we get in the 4.7 coefficient is some | 18 | fact, have, you know, a similar story to it. But, in |
| 19 | sort of an average at best. | 19 | fact, 7.0 was never undone, so we can't test that |
| 20 | Q But what you're giving I I understand 10:51:21 | 20 | hypothosis. 10:54:04 |
| 21 | when you say it's an empirical question. But what | 21 | Q What I mean is could the consumer expectation |
| 22 | you're giving me would be the theoretical reason to | 22 | created by 4.7 continue after 7.0 is issued? |
| 23 | explain why you might see a continuing effect from 4.7 | 23 | A It could in principle, yes. |
| 24 | even after the launch of Harmony | 24 | Q And under what circumstance would you expect |
| 25 | A Right. 10:51:41 | 25 | to see a continuing expectation created by 4.7 after 7.0 10:54:19 |
| | Page 66 | | Page 68 |
| | | | |
| 1 | O relaunch of Harmony | 1 | is issued? |
| 1 2 | Q relaunch of Harmony. A Right | 1 2 | is issued? A. It would well the effect of 7.0 is going. |
| 2 | A Right | 2 | A It would well, the effect of 7.0 is going |
| 2 | A Right Q And so just focus on the consumer that you | 2 | A It would well, the effect of 7.0 is going to be what was it like before 7.0 was 7.0 was |
| 2 3 4 | A Right Q And so just focus on the consumer that you have in mind. That consumer would think he knows | 2 3 4 | A It would well, the effect of 7.0 is going to be what was it like before 7.0 was 7.0 was launched and what is it like afterwards, okay. And so, |
| 2 3 4 5 | A Right Q And so just focus on the consumer that you have in mind. That consumer would think he knows about 4.7, he knows that that made it so he couldn't use 10:51:54 | 2 3 4 5 | A It would well, the effect of 7.0 is going to be what was it like before 7.0 was 7.0 was launched and what is it like afterwards, okay. And so, again, it's an empirical question whether what 10:54:45 |
| 2 3 4 | A Right Q And so just focus on the consumer that you have in mind. That consumer would think he knows about 4.7, he knows that that made it so he couldn't use 10:51:54 Harmony music on an iPod, and that may have some | 2 3 4 5 6 | A It would well, the effect of 7.0 is going to be what was it like before 7.0 was 7.0 was launched and what is it like afterwards, okay. And so, again, it's an empirical question whether what 10:54:45 people's state of mind was prior to the launch of 7.0. |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 | A Right Q And so just focus on the consumer that you have in mind. That consumer would think he knows about 4.7, he knows that that made it so he couldn't use 10:51:54 Harmony music on an iPod, and that may have some lingering effect on his purchase decisions regardless of | 2 3 4 5 6 7 | A It would well, the effect of 7.0 is going to be what was it like before 7.0 was 7.0 was launched and what is it like afterwards, okay. And so, again, it's an empirical question whether what 10:54:45 people's state of mind was prior to the launch of 7.0. I don't |
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| 1 | expectation then 4.7 would have gone away entirely | 1 | Q Okay. Competitors DRM-Free, what date did you |
|----------|---|----------|--|
| 2 | within shortly after Harmony was relaunched. If they | 2 | turn that on? |
| 3 | didn't believe that, then it wouldn't it wouldn't | 3 | A Well, it's in the report. Again, it's it's |
| 4 | have all completely gone away and it would have had some | 4 | when it's when the all four I didn't do it on the |
| 5 | residual effect at the time that 7.0 was lunched. 10:56:27 | 5 | EMI, E-M-I, decision to do it all DRM-Free. I did it in 11:01:55 |
| 6 | Q And under that approach how long would that | 6 | the dates. I think it's either December of 2007 or |
| 7 | residual effect last after 7.0, residual effect from | 7 | January 2008, but it's it's the date at which all of |
| 8 | 4.7? | 8 | the major distribution companies allow the competitors |
| 9 | MS. SWEENEY: Objection, vague and ambiguous | 9 | to be DRM-Free. |
| 10 | and incomplete. 10:56:38 | 10 | Q Okay. Do you think that the announcement of 11:02:11 |
| 11 | THE WITNESS: Again, there's no way to know | 11 | that event which preceded the actual event could have |
| 12 | except empirically to find out. | 12 | had an impact on iPod demand? |
| 13 | BY MR. MITTELSTAEDT: | 13 | A Well, I suppose yeah, first of all, I did |
| 14 | Q What would be the theory that would explain | 14 | look at the announcement dates, they weren't that far in |
| 15 | that; just what you gave? 10:56:45 | 15 | advance. It was like a month, even less than a month, 11:02:32 |
| 16 | A Yeah. | 16 | SO. |
| 17 | Q The consumer expectation point? | 17 | Q Would it have been just as fair to use the |
| 18 | A Is it okay if I take a two-minute break? Just | 18 | announcement date as the actual event date? |
| 19 | one sec, I'll be right back. | 19 | MS. SWEENEY: Objection to form. |
| 20 | Q Yes, sir. 10:56:53 | 20 | THE WITNESS: I I think I the actual 11:02:52 |
| 21 | Off the record. | 21 | launch date's better, because I don't think that the |
| 22 | THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Off the record 10:57 a.m. | 22 | vast majority of people read the trade press about |
| 23 | (Recess.) | 23 | electronics, consumer electronics. So my expectation |
| 24 | BY MR. MITTELSTAEDT: | 24 | would be that relatively few people knew about it until |
| 25 | Q Okay. Just to complete that, what I asked 10:59:00 | 25 | it happened, but so I would, without more information 11:03:08 |
| | Page 70 | | Page 72 |
| 1 | | 1 | Thirt I will not all love have |
| 1 | just before the break was you described why there could | 1 | I think I would prefer the launch date as opposed to the |
| 2 | be a, theoretically, a lingering effect from 4.7 after | 2 | announcement date |
| 3 | 7.0. You explained it and I said that's the consumer | 3 4 | BY MR MITTELSTAEDT: |
| 4 | expectation point, correct? | 5 | Q Okay. But if the announcement date had an |
| 5 6 | A Well 11:00:28 | 6 | impact on iPod demand you'd want to use the announcement 11:03:19 date, by definition? |
| 7 | MS. SWEENEY: I'm going to object and to the | 7 | . • |
| 8 | | 8 | A Well, it you know, I I understand the |
| 9 | Maybe the court reporter could read back the | 9 | argument for using it I don't think it's the right thing to do But, yes, if you want to use it, go ahead, |
| | last Q and A. | | |
| 10 | THE REPORTER: Certainly. You mean before we 11:00:3 | | see what happens 11:03:39 Q What's the argument for using it? The best |
| 11 | went on the break? | 11 12 | |
| 12 | MS. SWEENEY: Yes, please. | 13 | argument for using it. |
| 13 14 | (Record read.) | 14 | A The best argument for using it would be that consumers' plans about the portable digital media player |
| 15 | THE WITNESS: Yes. The issue is whether consumers expect in the future that they will be locked 11:01:01 | 15 | they are currently buying are affected by what's going 11:03:51 |
| 16 | • | 16 | to be happening in the future And they have perfect |
| 17 | in. DV MD MITTEL STAEDT. | 17 | rationale expectations about what's going to happen in |
| 18 | BY MR. MITTELSTAEDT: O On 13.2 going down the the veriables. If | 18 | |
| 19 | Q On 13.2 going down the the variables. If | 19 | the future So once the announcement is made, the fact that they can't get things DRM-Free today won't dissuade |
| 20 | you wanted to test what the effect of Harmony relaunch | 20 | them because three weeks from now they will be able to 11:04:09 |
| 21 | was I think this is an obvious question you would 11:01:22 | 21 | get them DRM-Free |
| 22 | include a variable for the Harmony relaunch, correct? | 22 | |
| 23 | A Hm-m, that's correct. | 23 | Q Would you think that Apple would be aware of |
| 24 | Q And you'd turn it on as of the date of the | 24 | the announcement? A Of course Apple |
| 25 | Harmony relaunch? A Right. 11:01:35 | 25 | MS SWEENEY: Objection, calls for 11:04:26 |
| 20 | 5 | 20 | - |
| | Page 71 | | Page 73 |

| | | 1 | |
|----|--|------------|--|
| 1 | speculation. | 1 | Q Okay. Why didn't you have a variable for when |
| 2 | THE WITNESS: I would expect Apple knew | 2 | EMI went DRM-Free? |
| 3 | that I'm not sure the announcement mattered to Apple. | 3 | A Because it's unimportant. |
| 4 | I suspect Apple was negotiating DRM-Free with these guys | 4 | Q Why is it unimportant? |
| 5 | as well, so it may well have known before the 11:04:39 | 5 | A It's a small fraction of the market. 11:06:53 |
| 6 | announcement date. | 6 | Q Unimportant to iPod demand? |
| 7 | BY MR. MITTELSTAEDT: | 7 | A Relatively unimportant. It's EMI at this |
| 8 | Q But if | 8 | point in time is on the order of 10 percent of the |
| 9 | A But I don't know when Apple knew. | 9 | market. |
| 10 | Q Okay. But if under your theory the the 11:04:43 | 10 | Q And you consider that relatively unimportant 11:07:05 |
| 11 | availability of DRM-Free in December 2007 or January | 11 | compared to Harmony? |
| 12 | 2008 had an impact on iPod demand such that it should be | 12 | A No. The the EMI is not sufficiently |
| 13 | included in your regression, would you expect the | 13 | important in the recorded music business, that EMI |
| 14 | announcement of that event to have some impact on | 14 | doing it by itself is going to have much of an effect on |
| 15 | Apple's pricing decisions? 11:05:03 | 15 | consumers, because their portfolio of recorded music is 11:07:29 |
| 16 | A Well, if your first assumption is true then it | 16 | going to have a fairly small fraction of EMI in it and |
| 17 | would you know, if the demand for iPods has shifted, | 17 | hence the degree to which they're locked into a |
| 18 | because of the announcement effect, then obviously Apple | 18 | DRM-based system is not affected by by EMI's |
| 19 | would take that into account in doing pricing. But | 19 | decision. |
| 20 | you're just assuming the answer. 11:05:17 | 20 | They have you know, they're going to have 11:07:48 |
| 21 | Obviously, Apple's pricing decisions are based | 21 | roughly 70 to 80 percent or more of their recorded music |
| 22 | upon demand. And they're not going to they're not | 22 | is going to be DRM protected. And that's going to lock |
| 23 | going to cut the price of iPods until until they have | 23 | them in. So EMI all by itself is not affecting the |
| 24 | to. And so it it all gets back to what is it that | 24 | degree of lock-in of these consumers. |
| 25 | consumers know and and how what is what are 11:05:3; | | What what does affect the degree of lock-in 11:08:10 |
| 23 | Page 74 | 23 | Page 76 |
| | 3 | | |
| 1 | the what are the factors they take into account when | 1 | in consumers is when everybody goes DRM-Free, because |
| 2 | making a purchase | 2 | then no matter what they buy they can play it on |
| 3 | Q Actually, I'm not assuming anything. I'm | 3 | anything |
| 4 | what I was trying to ask was, your regression is based | 4 | Q Okay, but so you think that EMI going DRM-Free |
| 5 | on the assumption that the availability of DRM-Free from 11:05:4 | 3 5 | has less of an impact on iPod demand than RealNetwork 11:08:2 |
| 6 | competitors had some impact on iPod demand. Correct so | 6 | making its music available to play on an iPod? |
| 7 | far? | 7 | A Yes, because the difference is that Harmony |
| 8 | A On testing the hypothesis that it did and my | 8 | applies to all DRM protected products, not just one |
| 9 | expectation is that it would and the coefficient | 9 | label's worth If Harmony had only worked for EMI I |
| 10 | indicates that it did have an effect on iPods 11:06:03 | 10 | would not have anticipated it would have had any 11:08:44 |
| 11 | Q Did you test the hypothesis that the | 11 | effect |
| 12 | announcement also had an effect? | 12 | Q Okay. What was isn't the relative effect |
| 13 | A No I didn't test it, because it doesn't seem | 13 | of Harmony versus EMI going DRM-Free an empirical |
| 14 | to be plausible, but if you want to go ahead and test | 14 | question? |
| 15 | it, go ahead and do it 11:06:15 | 15 | A Yeah, it is, of course, an empirical question, 11:08:59 |
| 16 | Q And you said it's not plausible in part | 16 | but I'm just saying that if you start with the theory of |
| 17 | because you don't know that many consumers would know | 17 | lock-in, Harmony unlocks everybody EMI doesn't unlock |
| 18 | about it. I'm asking, you agree that Apple would know | 18 | anyone, unless there unless there's a customer out |
| 19 | about it? | 19 | there who only buys EMI music and that's extremely |
| 20 | A But that what matters is when you have to 11:06:29 | 20 | unlikely 11:09:21 |
| 21 | cut the price in order to be competitive and when you | 21 | Q What did you do to test? |
| 22 | so what Apple knows is irrelevant What what | 22 | A I didn't test it I just think it's |
| 23 | what's accepted so far is they know something about | 23 | implausible, all right |
| 24 | consumers And the issue is when did the when did | 24 | * - |
| 25 | | 25 | Q Does RealNetworks market share at any point in |
| ∠5 | S . | 25 | time affect your analysis? 11:09:31 Page 77 |
| i | Page 75 | | rage // |

1 A Not really, no. 2 Q Does it affect your view on the plausibility 3 of - of Harmony or 7.0 having an effect on iPod 4 demand? 5 A The magnitude of Harmony's effect on the 11:09:47 6 demand elasticity of iPods depends on their market share, but it's again a continuous thing. The -- the --7 8 what -- what Harmony does is make the demand more 9 elastic, all right. And so, again, it's an empirical 10 question, how much more elastic it made it. 11:10:07 11 O DRM-Free music also makes the demand less 12 elastic, correct? 13 A That's exactly right. And so when everybody goes DRM-Free that should have the same effect of making 14 15 the demand more elastic. 11:10:19 16 The reason EMI -- the parallel you're trying 17 to draw between EMI and Harmony isn't valid, because 18 Harmony applies to everything. And there's a subset of 19 consumers who become not locked in. And then the 20 effect -- and then they have a more elastic demand. EMI 11:10:34 by itself does not make the demand for iPods more 21 22 elastic, because it's too small. It doesn't end the 23 lock-in, because most of people's portfolio of sound 24 recordings are not EMI, the vast majority of it. 25 Q Most people's sound recordings do not come 11:10:52 Page 78 from RealNetwork, correct? 2 A That's correct 3 Q Okay. 4 A But among those who did buy from RealNetworks, 5 they were no longer locked in, so that - the aggregate 11:11:01 demand curve for iPods became less elastic to buy - buy 6 7 share of -- of Rhapsody's market share share, would you expect that to have some impact on the 8 Q And if - well, not Rhapsody, right? You know 8 degree to which it impacted iPod demand under your 9 9 what Rhapsody is? theory if there was any impact at all? 10 A Well, Rhapsody Music Store 11-11-19 10 A If there was an impact it is the fraction of 11:13:38 11 Q What's that? 11 people who used Harmony to play stuff on an iPod. 12 A It's where Rhap - it's where you buy songs 12 They're the ones whose demand became elastic. 13 from other than if you - it's the RMS is the Q And then your next variable, going back to 13 counterpart to ITS for Rhapsody 14 14 13.2, is ITMS all DRM-Free. Why did you include that 15 Q For RealNetwork? 11:11:38 15 variable? 11:14:04 16 A For RealNetworks, yeah 16 A Well, because the -- the main vehicle for the 17 17 Q And what was the - do you know at some point lock-in effect on the Apple side is using Fair Play and 18 Rhapsody was subscription? 18 when Apple stops using Fair Play on ITS, then anything 19 A Yes 19 you buy from ITS from that point on can play on anything. So you're no longer locked into an iPod if 11:14:27 you buy your music from ITS, so that -- that strikes me as a big deal. A very important deal.

| 1 | the interesting question The interesting question is | 1 | of a fairly small increase in price, three-to-six |
|----|--|----|---|
| 2 | had the price been higher would they have switched | 2 | percent, okay And so what that basically means is it's |
| 3 | BY MR MITTELSTAEDT: | 3 | a few percentage points of people went from the category |
| 4 | Q But, for example, if if you take somebody | 4 | of moveable to not moveable |
| 5 | who says I'm never going to buy anything other than 11:58:31 | 5 | Q So how many people? 12:00:52 |
| 6 | iPod, no matter what, no matter what the price is. | 6 | A I don't know how many people |
| 7 | A They are the beneficiaries of competition | 7 | MS SWEENEY: Objection, asked and answered |
| 8 | among those who would switch Those who have extremely | 8 | BY MR MITTELSTAEDT: |
| 9 | high willingness to pay for any particular brand name | 9 | Q Well, when you say a few percentage points |
| 10 | are the beneficiaries of competition for the people who 11:58:47 | 10 | what do you mean? A few percentage points of what? 12:00:58 |
| 11 | are willing to shop | 11 | A A few percentage points of sales were at |
| 12 | Q No, but what I'm what I'm trying to focus | 12 | stake For in order for it to make sense, to be |
| 13 | on is people whose demand is at the margin and who make | 13 | profit maximizing for Apple to raise its price by three |
| 14 | a difference because of 7.0. You know, what's the | 14 | percent, all right, it has to be the case that the |
| 15 | profile of of those people where there's an 11:59:03 | 15 | number of people who switch out used to be too many and 12:01:13 |
| 16 | incremental impact where they decide their switching | 16 | now it's not not too many to make that a profitable |
| 17 | costs are such that they buy an iPod where they would | 17 | price increase, okay |
| 18 | have preferred to buy something else. And if what I'm | 18 | So, normally, in the case of, you know, if |
| 19 | positing is, you can't include in that group people who | 19 | if Apple is going to increase price three percent, it |
| 20 | were going to buy an iPod no matter what. 11:59:24 | 20 | better have the effect on sales be less than three 12:01:31 |
| 21 | MS SWEENEY: Objection | 21 | percent So we move from a world in which the effect |
| 22 | BY MR MITTELSTAEDT: | 22 | might have been three-and-a-half percent to a world in |
| 23 | Q You have to include only the people who | 23 | which it now is two-and-a-half percent So it made |
| 24 | decided to buy an iPod instead of something else, | 24 | sense to raise the price by three percent after the fact |
| 25 | because of their switching costs caused incrementally 11:59:32 | 25 | and it didn't make sense before the fact 12:01:48 |
| | Page 106 | | Page 108 |
| 1 | after 7.0? | 1 | And that's the the issue of how many are |
| 2 | MS. SWEENEY: Objection to form, vague and | 2 | there is is indeterminate. It's just it used to |
| 3 | ambiguous, compound. | 3 | be profitable to have the price be three percent lower |
| 4 | THE WITNESS: I have no idea what you're | 4 | and now it's profitable to have it be three percent |
| 5 | what you're talking about. 11:59:43 | 5 | higher. And that's because the number of customers you 12:02:07 |
| 6 | Yes, there are people who are willing to pay a | 6 | lose by raising the price has gone down by enough to |
| 7 | premium for an iPod and switching costs are one reason | 7 | make the net revenue be positive instead of negative. |
| 8 | why they might be willing to pay a premium. Just being | 8 | Q Okay. |
| 9 | in love with Apple is another reason. And then there | 9 | A And it could be three people. I mean if you |
| 10 | are other people who are at the margin, who plus or 11:59:54 | 10 | were close enough to the margin, the mag the number 12:02:18 |
| 11 | minus ten percent in price, can affect their decision. | 11 | of people is not what matters. The what matters is |
| 12 | And it's the latter that determine pricing and the | 12 | why didn't you raise the price by three percent |
| 13 | extent of competition among brands of portable digital | 13 | anyway. |
| 14 | media players. | 14 | Q Okay. |
| 15 | BY MR. MITTELSTAEDT: 12:00:10 | 15 | A And the answer must be because you expected 12:02:29 |
| 16 | Q Okay. And how many people fit that profile of | 16 | sales to go down by enough to that the higher |
| 17 | being at the margin where their purchase decision | 17 | price times the lower sales would be less profitable. |
| 18 | changed from a non-iPod to an iPod because of 7.0? How | 18 | Now it's more. So it could be a very small number of |
| 19 | many people are in that category? | 19 | people, just less than a percent, as the difference |
| 20 | A We have no way of knowing that. 12:00:24 | 20 | in sales before and after 7.0 that caused the price 12:02:47 |
| 21 | Q Is it is it ten people or 10,000? | 21 | increase to be profitable, when you're talking about a |
| 22 | A We have no way of knowing what the number is. | 22 | price increase that's this small. |
| 23 | All we observe is the actual pricing behavior and the | 23 | Q Okay. So are you saying that it could take |
| 24 | implicit change in the elasticity of demand. | 24 | only three people buying an iPod instead of a non-iPod |
| 25 | We're talking about a fairly small fraction 12:00:36 | 25 | as a result of 7.0 to have the price effect that you are 12:03:05 |

| | | 1 | portable digital media players. |
|-----|--|----------|---|
| | | 2 | Q Okay. The next variable you use is is |
| . 2 | Q Okay. And did it cause iPod prices to go down | 3 | Classic and then Mini, Nano and Shuffle. Your variable |
| 4 | immediately upon the launch of the iTunes Music Store | 4 | for Classic or your coefficient for Classic variable is |
| 5 | going all DRM-Free? 11:15:06 | 5 | positive and it's negative for Mini, Nano and Shuffle. 11:18:01 |
| 6 | A This is this is the this is the effect | 6 | A Remember that the actual effect of a model |
| 7 | | 7 | |
| | over the period afterwards in the dataset. I think it | 8 | that's in the equation is the different is the |
| 8 | probably had a fairly dramatic immediate effect, yes, | 9 | combination of the interceptor plus that the |
| 10 | but you know, that's the number. It's six percent in | | intercept is essentially the Touch. And then these are |
| | this regression and seven percent in the other. 11:15:23 | 10 | adjustments to the Touch effect from due to other 11:18:22 |
| 11 | Q Have you made any analysis of what you would | 11 12 | models. |
| 12 | say the price change was the first month or the second | | Q Okay. |
| 13 | month or the third month. This is or is this just an | 13 | A And so these coefficients are what you would |
| 14 | average over the the whole three-year period? | 14 | expect if your theory was right? |
| 15 | A This is well, it's two years. We only have 11:15:37 | 15 | MS. SWEENEY: Objection, vague and 11:18:36 |
| 16 | two years of data, I believe, beyond, don't we? What | 16 | ambiguous. |
| 17 | is when does the data period end? What's the end of | 17 | THE WITNESS: I have no idea what that |
| 18 | the data period? I can find it. March 26, 2011, so | 18 | question means. |
| 19 | it's two years. | 19 | BY MR. MITTELSTAEDT: |
| 20 | Q March 26, 2000 and 11:16:00 | 20 | Q Okay. Do you see anything anomolous in these 11:18:41 |
| 21 | A '11 is end of the data period, I believe. | 21 | coefficients? |
| 22 | Isn't it? | 22 | A No, not at all. It just it tells you that |
| 23 | Q But what's the end of the period for which you | 23 | cheaper products have lower have a lower intercept |
| 24 | are measuring what you assert are damages? | 24 | term in the regression. |
| 25 | A ITMS becomes DRM-Free on April 1st, 2009, so 11:16:13 | 2 25 | Remember you want to subtract each one of 11:18:54 |
| | Page 82 | | Page 84 |
| 1 | it's about two years worth of DRM-Free data for | 1 | these from the intercept, so what you got is sort of a |
| 2 | for in the dataset. | 2 | baseline price before you do anything else. And all |
| 3 | Q But my my question is different. It's what | 3 | this is telling you is that cheaper ones have lower |
| 4 | the end of the period for which you were measuring what | 4 | intercepts, which is the average price over the whole |
| 5 | you claim are damages? 11:16:30 | 5 | period of a more expensive model is going to be higher. 11:19:11 |
| 6 | A April 1st. That's it. The damages stop at | 6 | That's all that it tells you. |
| 7 | when ITMS goes DRM-Free. | 7 | Q For this variable, the Classic variable, how |
| 8 | Q Why would you expect there to be a dramatic | 8 | do you determine when to turn that on and when to turn |
| 9 | immediate impact on iPod prices from the music store | 9 | that off? |
| 10 | going DRM-Free? 11:16:50 | 10 | A When it's a Classic that's in the transaction. 11:19:23 |
| 11 | A Well, first of all, there was a transition, | 11 | When the transaction is a Classic. |
| | | 12 | |
| 12 | but no, it's because that it's the end of the lock-in. And looking forward, consumers are not going to be | 13 | Q Okay. And so for the Shuffle, when you say you've asked Econ, Inc. to run the regression turning |
| 14 | And looking forward, consumers are not going to be locked in. | 14 | the Shuffle off |
| | | 15 | |
| 15 | And so, you know, what, something like half of 11:17:02 | | A No, that's not what I said. I said you've 11:19:38 |
| 16 | iPod sales are original sales. And so for them going | 16 | turned you turn the 7.0 variable off for Shuffles. |
| 17 | forward, none of those customers are going to be locked | 17 | Q Okay. And how do you do that? |
| 18 | in. | 18 | A You just you just run exactly the same |
| 19 | And then among the customers who are buying a | 19 | regression except an observation for a Shuffle never has |
| 20 | replacement iPod, their new music is not always is 11:17:17 | | 7.0 turned on, even if it's in the damages period. 11:19:55 |
| 21 | going to be subject to the lock-in. And they can, if | 21 | Q But I thought the 7.0 variable was either on |
| 22 | they want to, get the DRM-Free version of what they | 22 | or off? |
| 23 | have, so for the things they want to keep. So it's | 23 | A It's on |
| 24 | my expectation that it's a big deal to go DRM-Free. | 24 | Q Excuse me. Depending on the time period. So |
| 25 | That that basically ends the problem of lock-in in 11:17:36 | 25 | as of September 12, 2006 you turned it on and gave it 11:20:10 |
| | Page 83 | | Page 85 |

APPLE'S (PROPOSED) REDACTIONS

EXHIBIT 52 [Filed Under Seal]

The Apple iPod iTunes Anti-Trust Litigation

Videotaped Deposition of ROBERT TOPEL, PH.D. January 08, 2014 ***CONFIDENTIAL*** Volume II

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Page 195
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            UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                                                                                            APPEARANCES
2
           NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
                                                                               3 For the Plaintiffs: Bonny Sweeney, Esq.
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  THE APPLE IPOD ITUNES
                                ) Lead Case No. C 05-00037
                                                                                               Suite 1900
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5 ANTI-TRUST LITIGATION
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7
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8 This Document Relates To: )
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                  )
9 ALL ACTIONS
                                                                               9
                                                                                 For the Defendant Apple, Inc.:
10
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       V DEOTAPED DEPOSITION OF ROBERT H. TOPEL, Ph.D.
15
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                                                                              13
16
                VOLUME II
                                                                              14
17
               January 08, 2014
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18
               Phoenix, Arizona
                                                                              16 Also Present:
                                                                                                    Thomas C. Tracy, videographer
                                                                              17
19
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20
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21
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22 Reported By:
                                                                              21
                                                                              22
23 Cathy A. Miccolis
                                                                              23
24 RPR, CRR, CSR No. 50068
                                                                              24
25 Job No. 10009199
                                                                              25
                                                                  Page 196
                                                                                                                                                 Page 197
                 INDEX
1
                                                                                        THE VIDEOTAPED DEPOSITION OF ROBERT TOPEL.
2 Witness
                                      Page
                                                                               2 Ph.D., VOLUME II, was continued on January 8, 2014,
      ROBERT TOPEL, Ph.D.
3
                                                                               3 commencing at 12:56 p m. at he offices of BONNETT,
4
                                                                               4 FAIRBOURN, FRIEDMAN & BALINT, P.C., 2325 East Camelback
        EXAMINATION BY MS. SWEENEY
                                                    108
                                                                               5 Road, Suite 300, Phoenix, Arizona, before CATHY MICCOLIS,
5
                                                                               6 a Certified Reporter in he State of Arizona.
6
                                                                               7
7
                                                                                        THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We are now on the record.
                                                                               8
8
               EXHIBITS
                                                                               9 The time is approximately 12:56 p m. Today's date is
9 Exhibit Description
                                         Page
                                                                               10 January 8, 2014. My name is Tom Tracy of Aptus Court
10
         (No newly marked exhibits.)
                                                                               11 Reporting. The court reporter is Cathy Miccolis of Aptus
11
                                                                               12 Court Reporting, located at 600 West Broadway, Suite 300,
12
                                                                               13 San Diego, California 92101.
13
                                                                              14
                                                                                        This begins the videotaped deposition of Robert
14
                                                                               15 Topel, Volume II, testifying in he matter of the Apple
15
                                                                               16 iPod iTunes Antitrust Litigation pending in he District
16
                                                                              17 Court of California, Division of Oakland, Case Number C
17
                                                                               18 05-00037 YGR, taken at 2325 East Camelback, Suite 300,
18
                                                                              19 Phoenix, Arizona 85016.
19
                                                                                        Counsel, will you please identify yourself and
20
                                                                              21 whom you represent for the record at this time, starting
21
22
                                                                              22 with the plaintiffs' counsel.
23
                                                                              23
                                                                                        MS. SWEENEY: Bonny Sweeney for he plaintiffs.
24
                                                                              24
                                                                                        MR. KIERNAN: David Kieman for Apple.
25
                                                                              25
                                                                                        THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Thank you, Counsel. The
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Volume II Robert Topel, Ph.D.

19 variation - did I say that wrong? A variance inflation

22 is to some hing to inflate the variance, but no. 23 Q. Do you know what a condition number is? A. A condition number? Not in the context in

A. I assume the context in which you're using it

20 factor, do you know what that is?

25 which we are using it here.

Confidential - Attorneys' Eyes Only The Apple iPod iTunes Anti-Trust Litigation

Page 219 Page 218 1 as true? Because I hink I said, you know, it could have 1 you know, it's been more han months. It's been a really 2 been hat I did something like hat, but it's been mon hs 2 long time. 3 and I can't remember. 3 BY MS. SWEENEY: 4 BY MS. SWEENEY: Q. Other han what you alluded to earlier, hat Q. Well, it may have been mon hs, but you just 5 is, the regression output, are there standard tests hat 6 submitted a report on December 20 h with these regressions 6 economists use to determine whe her variables are 7 and these additional variables, and I want to know how you 7 correlated? 8 picked hose variables. 8 MR. KIERNAN: Object to form. MR. KIERNAN: Argumentative. 9 THE WITNESS: Sure. 10 THE WITNESS: They are he same ones that we 10 BY MS. SWEENEY: 11 used in the last round. We didn't change anything. 11 Q. Can you give me some examples? 12 BY MS. SWEENEY: A. Well, since you're talking about 12 13 Q. Okay. So my question is, you didn't -- so I 13 multicollinearity, if I had some variable, call it Z, and 14 will represent to you, and you can go back and check it -14 I could -- if it's a problem of multicollinearity you're 15 A. Okay. 15 concerned with, you could regress Z on all the other Xs Q. -- that you took some variables that were in 16 and see how much residual variation there is in Z, that 17 the dataset hat were not used by Noll and put hem in he 17 is, how much -- what's the coefficient of multiple 18 regression, but not all of them, and hen in addition you 18 determination for Z regressed in all the other Xs. 19 took some variables hat were not in the dataset and added Q. Is here a name for that? 20 them. So I'm trying to figure out how you made he 20 A. Regression. (Laughter.) 21 determination about which variables to add to the 21 That's -- you know, it's -- you're finding he 22 regressions. 22 multiple correlation coefficient between Z and the other 23 MR. KIERNAN: Asked and answered. 23 stuff. 24 THE WITNESS: It's been mon hs. You know, if 24 Q. And did you do that in this case on your added 25 variables? 25 you asked me which one, I couldn't tell you. It's been, Page 220 Page 221 A. Well, implicily, yes, because as I said Q. Now, you keep referring back to he results of 2 before, he way the regression coefficient is calculated 2 he regression. Did you add in the variables separately 3 formally is it's using that part of -- I was using he 3 and see what the results were, or did you just conduct the 4 term Z, so I will say Z -- hat part of Z hat's not 4 regression where you added in all your additional 5 variables and hen ran the re ression? 5 correlated, not predictable from the o her Xs, and it's 6 using that variation to identify he coefficient on Z in 7 hat regression. So he fact that - as I said before, 8 he fact hat that residual correlation, the stuff that's 9 not correlated with he o her stuff, can identify a 10 statistically significant coefficient means hat he 11 collinearity between Z and the other Xs isn't so large 12 that you're not able to identify a statistically 13 significant effect. 14 Q. Did you compute a variance inflation factor for 15 each of he additional variables that you used? 16 A. I don't know what you mean by a variance 17 inflation factor for each variable. 18 Q. Do you have any understanding of what a

Page 218..221

APPLE'S (PROPOSED) REDACTIONS

EXHIBIT 53 [Filed Under Seal]

The Apple iPod iTunes Anti-Trust Litigation

Videotaped Deposition of KEVIN MURPHY, PH.D. January 08, 2014 ***CONFIDENTIAL*** Volume II

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Page 234
                                                                 Page 233
            UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                                                                                            APPEARANCES
2
           NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
                                                                               3 For the Plaintiffs: Bonny Sweeney, Esq.
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5 ANTI-TRUST LITIGATION
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8 This Document Relates To: )
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                  )
9 ALL ACTIONS
                                                                               9
                                                                                For the Defendant Apple, Inc.:
                     )
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                                                                                                David C. Kiernan, Esq.
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       V DEOTAPED DEPOSITION OF KEV N M. MURPHY, Ph.D.
16
                                                                              14
17
                VOLUME II
                                                                              15
18
               January 08, 2014
                                                                              16 Also Present:
                                                                                                    Thomas C. Tracy, videographer
                                                                              17
19
               Phoenix, Arizona
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22 Reported By:
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23 Cathy A. Miccolis
                                                                              23
24 RPR, CRR, CSR No. 50068
                                                                              24
25 Job No. 10009198
                                                                              25
                                                                 Page 235
                                                                                                                                                Page 236
                 INDEX
1
                                                                                       THE VIDEOTAPED DEPOSITION OF KEVIN M. MURPHY.
2 Witness
                                       Page
                                                                               2 Ph.D., VOLUME II, was continued on January 8, 2014,
3
      KEVIN M. MURPHY, Ph.D.
                                                                               3 commencing at 9:11 a.m. at the offices of BONNETT,
4
                                                                               4 FAIRBOURN, FRIEDMAN & BALINT, P.C., 2325 East Camelback
        EXAMINATION BY MS. SWEENEY
                                                   237
                                                                               5 Road, Suite 300, Phoenix, Arizona, before CATHY MICCOLIS,
5
                                                                               6 a Certified Reporter in he State of Arizona.
6
                                                                               7
7
                                                                                       THE VIDEOGRAPHER: The time on he record is
                                                                               8
8
               EXHIBITS
                                                                               9 9:11 a.m. Today's date is January 8, 2014. My name is
9 Exhibit Descrip ion
                                         Page
                                                                               10 Tom Tracy of Aptus Court Reporting. The court reporter is
10 Exhibit 6 Supplemental Report
                                              257
                                                                               11 Ca hy Miccolis of Aptus Court Reporting located at 600
11
                                                                               12 West Broadway, Suite 300, San Diego, California 92101.
12
                                                                                        This begins the videotaped deposition of Kevin
13
                                                                              14 Murphy, Volume II, testifying in the matter of he Apple
14
                                                                               15 iPod iTunes Trust (sic) Litigation, pending in he
15
                                                                               16 District Court of California, Oakland Division, Case
16
                                                                              17 Number C 05-00037 YGR. This deposition is taking place at
17
                                                                              18 2325 East Camelback, Suite 300, Phoenix, Arizona 85016.
18
                                                                              19
                                                                                        Will counsel please identify themselves,
19
                                                                              20 starting with he plaintiffs' counsel.
20
                                                                              21
                                                                                        MS. SWEENEY: Bonny Sweeney for he plaintiffs.
21
22
                                                                                        MR. KIERNAN: David Kiernan for Defendant
23
                                                                              23 Apple, and Scott Murray, in-house counsel from Apple, may
24
                                                                              24 be on he phone.
25
                                                                                        Scott, are you on the phone?
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- 1 it's always going to be a judgment. You always have to 2 use some judgment. You're not going to write down some 3 set of rules because there is going to be a circumstance
- 4 hat satisfy hose rules, and you'd say no, hat doesn't
- 5 make any sense in that context. I think you have to use
- 6 your judgment.
- 7 BY MS. SWEENEY:
- 8 Q. When you use your judgment, what other
- 9 considerations are you taking account of hat might lead
- 10 you in your judgment to exclude certain product
- 11 characteristics from your regression?
- 12 A. I guess we have to look at it case-by-case
- 13 basis. I don't see any of he problems wih these
- 14 characteristics that would lead me to exclude hem. You
- 15 know, I gave you the example of occupation. That would be
- 16 one hat I definitely would exclude from an
- 17 education/earnings relationship because hat --
- 18 controlling for hat is going to miss a substantial impact
- 19 of education, which it works hrough changing your
- 20 occupation. So again, you could say, well, economics says
- 21 occupation should matter for earnings, but it's not
- 22 something in general you'd want to hold constant.
- 23 Q. Did you conduct any analyses to see whether any
- 24 of these additional variables that you added to the
- 25 regression are collinear with variables already in

- Page 293 1 Professor Noll's regression?
 - A. Yes, I did. And the easiest way to see that is
 - 3 to evaluate he effect it has on the standard errors of
 - 4 he o her variables. If hey were highly collinear with
 - 5 hose other variables, hat will generally show up as a
 - 6 large increase in he standard error of the other
 - 7 variables in he regression



- Q. Now, so you --16
- 17 A. I didn't even pause that time; correct?
- 18 Q. I hought you had, but go ahead.
- 19 A. I don't hink my mou h even closed.
- 20 Q. I have asked you to continue your response.
- 21 Please do so.
- 22 A. I have lost my train of hought. I'm sorry.
- Q. O her than he effect on the standard errors,
- 24 did you conduct -- or strike that.
- 25 So you said that because he results of your

- 1 regression show that you don't have a collinearity problem
- 2 because of o herwise you would see it in the standard
- 3 errors, are here any other tests hat one could conduct
- 4 to determine whether the product characteristic variables
- 5 hat you added to he regression are collinear with
- 6 variables already in Professor Noll's regression?
- 7 MR. KIERNAN: Objection; argumentative.
- 8 THE WITNESS: There are, but I hink you could
- 9 basically back those out from he standard errors because
- 10 the other primary test that people do is kind of an
- 11 auxiliary regression test where you look at the R-squared
- 12 from regressing that variable on the other included
- 13 variables in the regression. But you can actually back
- 14 that out from he change in he standard errors and the
- 15 change in the residual variance of he equation. So hey
- 16 amount to almost the same thing. That's some hing else
- 17 you can look at.
- 18 BY MS. SWEENEY:
- 19 Q. Did you do that here?
- 20 A. No, because you can really -- you can see
- 21 what's going on with one from looking at the other. They
- 22 are essentially capturing he same phenomena.
- 23 Q. So o her than looking at he standard errors
- 24 and conducting what you called an auxiliary regression
- 25 test, are there any other tests hat one could conduct to

- Page 295 1 determine whether he variables that you added to the
 - 2 regression were collinear with variables already in he
 - 3 model?
 - 4 MR. KIERNAN: Object to form.
 - 5 THE WITNESS: You could. I mean, I assume you
 - 6 could do o her things. Those are he two primary ones
 - 7 that people use.
 - 8 BY MS. SWEENEY:
 - Q. Well, can you give me some specific examples of
 - 10 other kinds of tests you could conduct?
 - A. I mean, it would all amount to essentially the
 - 12 same thing because you're trying to evaluate the extent to
 - 13 which this variable is a linear combination of the o her
 - 14 variables hat are in the regression, so I think anything
 - 15 else you do would be very similar.
 - Q. So, but you can't give me any names of specific
 - 17 kinds of statistical tests you could conduct?
 - A. I wouldn't recall the names, but hey would
 - 19 be -- hey would essentially amount to looking at the same
 - 20 types of hings.
 - 21 Q. Well, what is a variance inflation factor?
 - A. That's looking essentially at how much he
 - 23 standard errors go up when you include he additional
 - 24 variable.
 - Q. So did you compute a variance inflation factor

Page 296

Page 294

| _ | | | • | |
|-------|---|----------|--|----------|
| | 1 for each of he variables that you added to the | Page 297 | 1 variables that you've added and variables hat were | Page 298 |
| | 2 regression? | | 2 already in the regression? | |
| | A. I did not specifically calculate it hat way. | | 3 A. I presume you could. I have never done it that | |
| | 4 I mean, you can calculate it from what we did. We have | | 4 way. But hat would be one hing hat would presumably | |
| | 5 he variance inflation here that you could calculate by | | 5 reflect the impact. I think he bottom-line impact that | |
| | 6 comparing the standard errors you get in he two different | | 6 you care most about is what happens to the standard errors | |
| | 7 ways of calculating he model with or without hose | | 7 because hat is the bottom-line concern. That's why I | |
| | 8 additional variables. | | • | |
| | | | 8 hink that's he most direct and easiest to understand | |
| | 9 Q. But – so I'm not understanding. So you said, | | 9 approach. | |
| | 10 "I did not specifically calculate it that way." So is | | 10 Q. And so going back to he condition number, you | |
| | 11 your testimony hat you can do hat and you can back it | | 11 didn't use a condition number to check whether there was | |
| | 12 out, but you didn't go through that extra step? | | 12 high collinearity between variables that you added and | |
| | 13 A. Yeah, because I didn't like take the ratio of | | 13 variables already in the model; correct? | |
| | 14 the two numbers and square them. You could do hat if you | | 14 A. I did not specifically do hat. | |
| | 15 wanted. | | 15 Q. Let's assume that the variables hat you added | |
| | 16 Q. What about, what is a condition number? | | 16 are highly collinear with he model in Professor Noll's | |
| | 17 A. A condition number is a characteristic of the | | 17 model. If hat's true, what is the added value of | |
| | 18 matrix used to calculate the standard errors. I don't | | 18 including them? | |
| | 19 recall the specifics of how it's calculated. But again, | | 19 A. Well, you can see it – in terms of explanatory | |
| | 20 it's looking at much of the same concept as you're looking | | 20 power, you can see it in the results on he table. And we | |
| - 1 - | 21 at here in terms of he variance inflation factor or the | | 21 talk about his in the report. I mean, if you look at he | |
| 2 | 22 ratio of the standard errors. All those things are | | 22 fraction of he remaining variance that's explained, you | |
| 2 | 23 looking at the same basic concept. | | 23 could compare, for example, you know, column column one | |
| 2 | Q. So in other words, you can use a condition | | 24 and column two. You can see hat adding those | |
| 2 | 25 number to check whe her here is collinearity between | | 25 characteristics explain almost half of he remaining | |
| H | | Page 299 | | Page 300 |
| | 1 variance, which is the standard one generally uses when | | 1 say something we haven't talked about yet is that adding | |
| | 2 hinking about adding variables. | | 2 hose coefficients makes a substantial difference to his | |
| | 3 If you're worried about collinearity, you | | 3 estimated coefficients, for example | |
| | 4 realize hat, for example, in JT-6a hat actually the | | 4 (Reporter clarification.) | |
| | 5 standard error, the precision with which according to | | 5 A. Adding hose variables has a substantial effect | |
| | 6 Professor Noll's analysis you can estimate he iTunes 7 | | 6 on his estimated coefficients, which underscores what we | |
| | 7 coefficient actually is improved, not reduced. So the | | 7 have talked about numerous times, which is his problem or | |
| | 8 problem you're worried about under collinearity of making | | 8 potential problem with omitted variables. These are just | |
| | 9 it much more difficult to identify the existing variables, | | 9 some potential variables you could think about bringing | |
| ' | 10 at least as far as it goes for Professor Noll's iTunes 7 | | 10 into he analysis, and just including hese made a | |
| ' | 11 variable, doesn't happen. | | 11 dramatic difference to his results. | |
| 1 | 12 Q. So is it your opinion hen hat all of he | | 12 BY MS. SWEENEY: | |
| 1 | 13 added value of adding hese variables is reflected in the | | 13 Q. Are you suggesting that here are o her | |
| | 14 regression output that's in your tables? I guess what I'm | | 14 variables hat you could add to the regression? | |
| | 15 trying to get at is, is here any hing else? I mean, I | | 15 A. I don't know if hey are ones that we have, but | |
| - 1 | 16 asked you, what is the added value of adding hese | | 16 it makes the point that his analysis is sensitive to he | |
| | 17 variables if there is collinearity, and you responded by | | 17 existence of omitted variables and, you know, I don't | |
| | 18 pointing to the regression output. Other than the | | 18 think – we kind of know we don't have everything that | |
| - 1 | 19 regression output, can you identify for me any added value | | 19 would determine pricing, and hat makes us worried that | |
| | 20 of adding variables to your regression? | | 20 o her variables could cause his coefficients to change | |
| | 21 A. Ithink hat – | | 21 even more. | |
| | 22 MR. KIERNAN: Objection; argumentative and to | | 22 Q. So if you add variables to your regression that | |
| | 23 he extent it misstates his prior testimony. | | 23 are highly collinear with variables that are already in | |
| 1 ' | THE WITNESS: I high thous is some added value | | == 5.5.1.g.lly collision that tallables allatale alloway in | |

25 the model?

24 the model, can one effect be to reduce the reliability of

THE WITNESS: I hink there is some added value

25 hat's also -- it is reflected in the tables, but I would

| 10 Till Illian priy, 1 Tilb 1 | The Apple is dust allow Alla Islaet | • |
|--|---|----------|
| 1 MR. KIERNAN: Object to form. Vague. | Page 301 1 added in he additional characteristics; correct? | Page 302 |
| 2 THE WITNESS: If in fact they were highly | 2 A. Yes. | |
| 3 collinear, you could have hat problem, but generally hat | 3 Q. And did you do any analysis whereby you just | |
| will be reflected in he standard errors, and he impact | 4 added these additional variables one at a time? Is that | |
| 5 it has is going to depend on the other variable you're | 5 reflected anywhere in your report or in he exhibits? | |
| | | |
| 6 concerned about. If I introduce a variable hat's highly | 6 MR. KIERNAN: Object to form. | |
| 7 correlated with variable A, but it's not highly correlated | 7 THE WITNESS: It's not reflected in he | |
| 8 in a multi-varied sense with variable B, it may affect the | 8 exhibits. I don't recall whether we did that or not. | |
| 9 precision which I can affect estimate the coefficient | 9 BY MS. SWEENEY: | |
| 10 on A, but it may not have much effect at all | 10 Q. I had – let's see. Strike that. | |
| 11 (Reporter clarification.) | 11 You talk in your report about additional | |
| 12 A the precision with which I can estimate he | 12 characteristics that you have added having joint | |
| 13 coefficient on the variable where it has a strong | 13 significance. What do you mean by that? | |
| 14 relationship, but often won't have an impact on my | A. That is, you're asking how much do they add to | |
| 15 precision of estimating the other variable. And so you | 15 the explanatory power on a combined basis, not on a | |
| 16 don't want to like have this blanket statement across the | 16 one-off basis. You're asking joint significance says | |
| 17 regression. | 17 formally if you're thinking about a statistical test, | |
| And what's key here is hat the precision wi h | 18 you're testing he hypo hesis that the coefficients on all | |
| 19 which I can estimate the iTunes 7 variable, which is I | 19 the variables are zero, that he true model is zero | |
| 20 think he primary variable of interest here, is not | 20 coefficient on all he variables. You're not testing | |
| 21 reduced substantially by and in some cases actually | 21 whether any one of them is zero. You're testing whe her | |
| 22 increased by adding these additional variables. | 22 they are all jointly equal to zero. That's the hypothesis | |
| 23 BY MS. SWEENEY: | 23 being tested in that joint test. | |
| 24 Q. So looking at Exhibit JT-1a, which is the | 24 Q. Can you have joint significance in a regression | |
| 25 this reflects at least in the right-hand columns when you | 25 that also exhibits high multicollinearity? | |
| | | |
| 1 MR. KIERNAN: Object to form. Vague. | Page 303 1 R-squared with high multicollinearity, but if they were | Page 304 |
| THE WITNESS: You could in principle, but he | 2 really – but hat's kind of like orthogonal to what we | |
| 3 evidences in this case is there isn't high degree of | 3 are talking about here. The key here is that adding hese | |
| 4 multicollinearity between hat and the o her variables of | 4 variables added to the explanatory power of the regression | |
| 5 interest in his regression, which is what really matters | 5 substantially. In he limit if these things were just | |
| • | | |
| 6 for he purpose of our analysis. 7 BY MS, SWEENEY: | 6 multicollinearity with what you already had, hey wouldn't | |
| | 7 add any hing. And they are not reducing the precision | |
| 8 Q. Is here high collinearity between hat and | 8 wi h which I can estimate he other coefficients. | |
| 9 variables other than the variables of interest? | 9 That's and particularly the coefficient of interest. | |
| 10 MR. KIERNAN: Object to form. | 10 That's the key question about whether you have an issue | |
| 11 THE WITNESS: I don't know about high. I | 11 here wi h multicollinearity. | |
| 12 there – here are going to be varying degrees to which | 12 BY MS. SWEENEY: | |
| 13 they are correlated with other variables in the | 13 Q. Did you look at the extent to which he | |
| 14 regression. But he impact of hat is primarily going to | 14 additional characteristics that you added are correlated | |
| 15 be on he coefficients of hose variables, not on he | 15 with particular iPod models or families? | |
| 16 coefficients of the variables hat continue to have | 16 MR. KIERNAN: Object to form. | |
| 17 substantial amounts of independent variation. | 17 THE WITNESS: My suspicion is they would be | |
| 18 BY MS. SWEENEY: | 18 correlated. In some sense that's why you're controlling | |
| 19 Q. You say in your report that he additional | 19 for them. One of the major reasons you control for | |
| 20 characteristics that you've added, he additional | 20 variables is hat they are correlated with o her aspects | |
| 21 variables, increases he R-squared of he regressions. | 21 of the model you have. | |
| 22 Can a regression hat exhibits high multicollinearity have | 22 BY MS. SWEENEY: | |
| 23 a high R-squared? | 23 Q. And in some cases isn't it true that some of | |
| 24 MR. KIERNAN: Object to form. Vague. | 24 these characteristics are probably 100 percent correlated | |
| 25 THE WITNESS: Yeah, you could have a high | | |
| | 25 with a particular iPod model? | |

APPLE'S (PROPOSED) REDACTIONS

EXHIBIT 62 [Filed Under Seal]

| 1 | UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT |
|----|--|
| 2 | NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA |
| 3 | SAN JOSE DIVISION |
| 4 | 000 |
| 5 | THE APPLE iPOD iTUNES |
| 6 | ANTITRUST LITIGATION |
| 7 | No. C-05-00037-JW(RS) |
| 8 | |
| 9 | / |
| 10 | |
| 11 | |
| 12 | VIDEOTAPED DEPOSITION OF ROGER G. NOLL |
| 13 | VOLUME I |
| 14 | (Pages 1 to 215) |
| 15 | |
| 16 | Taken before ERIN F. ROBINSON |
| 17 | CSR NO. 12199 |
| 18 | April 7, 2011 |
| 19 | |
| 20 | |
| 21 | |
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| 24 | |
| 25 | |
| | |

54 of 82 Page 210 to 213 210 212 211 213 MR. MEDICI: Object to form. THE WITNESS: If they assume that it. BY MR. MITTELSTAEDT: 9 Q. -- then they wouldn't change prices? 10 A. Then they wouldn't change prices. 11 $\label{eq:MR.MITTELSTAEDT: Okay. Why don't we stop} \end{substitute} \begin{substitute}{0.5\textwidth} \textbf{MR. MITTELSTAEDT: Okay. Why don't we stop} \end{substitute}$ 12 there for the day. 13 THE WITNESS: Okay. 14 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: This concludes Volume 1 of 15 Dr. Roger Noll. We are off the record at 3:38. 16 (Whereupon, the deposition was adjourned at 17 3:38 p.m.) 18 19 SIGNATURE OF WITNESS 20 21 22 23 24 25