JUDITH I	<sup>°</sup> . BIDERMAN, Bar No. 101577 B. GITTERMAN, Bar No. 115661 STOPHER JHANG, Bar No. 211463			
PERKIN	S COIE LLP asend Street, 3rd Floor			
San Franc	eisco, California 94107-1909			
Facsimile	e: (415) 344-7000 : (415) 344-7050			
Email: JG	<u>Biderman@perkinscoie.com</u> htterman@perkinscoie.com hang@perkinscoie.com			
7 Attorneys	for Defendant Google, Inc.			
3				
	UNITED STATES I	DISTRICT (	COURT	
)	<b>NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, SAN JOSE DIVISION</b>			
l				
	ANSON INDUSTRIES, LLC d/b/a	CASE N	O. C O5-03649 JW	
STERN, o	NDUSTRIAL PRINTING, and HOWARD STERN, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,		DEFENDANT GOOGLE, INC.'S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS' UNJUST	
similarly s				
5	Plaintiffs,		IMENT CLAIM	
V.			Civ. P. 12(b)(6)	
GOOGLE		Date: Time:		
	Defendant.	Place: Judge:	Courtroom 8 Honorable James Ware	
5				
,				
DEFENDA AND MOT	NT GOOGLE, INC.'S NOTICE OF MOTION ION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS' UNJUST ENT CLAIM 05 03649		[41063-0023/BY053610 078]	

NOTICE OF N	<b>IOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS</b>
TO PLAINTIFFS AND THI	EIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE th	hat on March 6, 2006, at 9:00 a.m., or as soon thereafter as
this matter may be heard, in Courtro	oom 8 of the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California, San Jose Divi	ision, defendant Google, Inc. ("Google") will, and hereby
does, move the Court to dismiss pla	intiffs CLRB Hanson Industries, LLC, d/b/a Industrial
Printing, and Howard Stern's ("Plain	ntiffs") claim for unjust enrichment pursuant to Federal Rul
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), on the	ground that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon whic
relief can be granted.	
This motion is supported by	the following memorandum of points and authorities and
such other matters and arguments as	s may be presented to the Court prior to or at the hearing or
the motion.	
Dated: January 3, 2006	PERKINS COIE LLP
	By: <u>/S/</u> David T. Biderman Attorneys for Defendant GOOGLE, INC.

I.

**MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES** 

**INTRODUCTION** 

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## This Court should dismiss plaintiffs CLRB Hanson Industries, LLC, d/b/a Industrial Printing, and Howard Stern's ("Plaintiffs") unjust enrichment claim. In this action, Plaintiffs allege that Google, Inc. ("Google") violated its agreement with advertisers by charging advertisers in excess of the "daily budgets" they set for their ad campaigns and by "misleadingly" committing advertisers to an average daily budget based upon a 30 or 31 day basis, with no exception for days that the ad campaign was paused. Based on these allegations, Plaintiffs assert in their First Amended Complaint ("FAC") causes of action for unjust enrichment, breach of contract, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, violation of California Bus. & Prof. Code §§17200 et seq., and violation of California Bus. & Prof. Code §§17500 et seq.

13 Taking the facts pled by Plaintiffs as true, however, the law bars Plaintiffs' unjust 14 enrichment claim. An unjust enrichment claim implies contractual rights where no contract exists. But where, as here, plaintiffs have pled that an actual contract exists and governs a 15 16 particular dispute, the court need not and cannot imply a contract under Ninth Circuit law. 17 Plaintiffs allege in their FAC that the parties entered into a legally binding contract that governs the parties' respective rights. Plaintiffs also allege that all other Google advertisers, who would 18 19 be members of the putative class, enter the same agreement with Google. Plaintiffs have failed to plead and cannot plead in the alternative, that there is no legally binding contract that governs 20 21 the parties' respective rights because Rule 11 requires a good faith basis for the allegations 22 asserted in Plaintiffs' pleadings. Here, Plaintiffs' repeated allegations of an agreement in both their Complaint and FAC belie any allegation to the contrary. Thus, any amendment would be 23 24 futile, and this Court should dismiss Plaintiffs' unjust enrichment claim without leave to amend.

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### II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

26 This case is premised on the allegation that Google overcharged advertisers for
27 advertising services by charging them in excess of their "daily budgets" and by "misleadingly"

DEFENDANT GOOGLE, INC.'S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS' UNJUST ENRICHMENT CLAIM CASE NO. 05-03649 committing advertisers to an average daily budget based upon a 30 or 31 day basis, with no
exception for days that the ad campaign is paused. *See* Plaintiffs' FAC, ¶¶ 1, 45. Plaintiffs assert
these claims despite Google's disclosure to advertisers that its advertising system may exceed
advertisers' daily budgets "on a given day to make up for potential shortfalls later in the month,"
due to its goal of fully satisfying advertisers' "daily budget[s] over the course of each month.
(That is, [advertisers'] daily budget[s] times the total number of days in the month.)" *See* FAC,
Exhibit A1, p. 49.

Plaintiffs' initial Complaint, filed on August 3, 2005, alleged causes of action for unjust 8 9 enrichment, breach of contract, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, violation of California Bus. & Prof. Code §§17200 et seq., negligent misrepresentation, 10 imposition of a constructive trust, fraud-promise without intent to perform, and injunctive and/or 11 declaratory relief. On October 12, 2005, Google filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint 12 13 for failure to state a cause of action. In response to the motion, on November 14, 2005, Plaintiffs filed their FAC, which alleged causes of action for unjust enrichment, breach of contract, breach 14 of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, violation of California Bus. & Prof. Code 15 16 §§17200 et seq., and violation of California Bus. & Prof. Code §§17500 et seq. Throughout both 17 the Complaint and FAC, Plaintiffs repeatedly alleged that they entered into a legally binding contract with Google that governed the parties' respective rights in Google's advertising program. 18 See Complaint, ¶31, 53, 55; FAC, ¶19, 56, 62. 19

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#### III. ARGUMENT

Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for unjust enrichment. Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6),
dismissal is appropriate where the complaint shows either a "lack of a cognizable legal theory"
or "the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory." *Balisteri v. Pacifica Police Dep't.*, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1990). In making that determination, the court should
accept as true "all material allegations of the complaint," along with "all reasonable inferences to
be drawn from them." *Navarro v. Block*, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2001).

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DEFENDANT GOOGLE, INC.'S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS' UNJUST ENRICHMENT CLAIM CASE NO. 05-03649

California law precludes a plaintiff from asserting an implied contract cause of action 1 2 where an express contract defines the rights of the parties. As the Ninth Circuit explained, "[u]nder both California and New York law, unjust enrichment is an action in quasi-contract, 3 which does not lie when an enforceable, binding agreement exists defining the rights of the 4 parties." Paracor Finance, Inc. v. General Elec. Capital Corp., 96 F.3d 1151, 1167 (9th Cir. 5 1996). "There cannot be a valid, express contract and an implied contract, each embracing the 6 same subject matter, existing at the same time." Berkla v. Corel Corp., 302 F.3d 909, 918 (9th 7 Cir. 2002) (quoting Wal-Noon Corp. v. Hill, 45 Cal.App.3d 605 (1975)); see also Hedging 8 Concepts, Inc. v. First Alliance Mortgage Co., 41 Cal.App.4<sup>th</sup> 1410 (1996). 9

Here, Plaintiffs allege that the parties entered into a legally binding contract that governs
the parties' respective rights. *See* FAC, ¶19. Indeed, Plaintiffs admit on the face of their FAC
that "plaintiff Industrial Printing entered into a contract with Google to advertise," and that
"Plaintiff Stern entered into a contract with Google to advertise." FAC, ¶¶56, 62. Nowhere do
Plaintiffs plead in the alternative that a contract does not govern the parties' respective rights.
Thus, Plaintiffs admit to a binding agreement between the parties, and their unjust enrichment
claim "does not lie." *See Paracor Finance, Inc. v. General Elec. Capital Corp.*, 96 F.3d at 1167.

17 Moreover, Plaintiffs cannot plead, even in the alternative, that there is no legally binding contract that governs the parties' respective rights. Rule 11 requires Plaintiffs to have a good 18 faith basis for allegations made in their pleadings, including allegations pled in the alternative. 19 Fed. Rules Civ. P. 8(e)(2), 11(b). Here, Plaintiffs repeatedly allege in their FAC the terms of 20 their "AdWords Agreement" with Google; thus, demonstrating that an agreement between the 21 22 parties exists. See FAC, ¶ 32, 34-36, 38. Plaintiffs further allege that all other Google advertisers enter into an agreement with Google. See FAC ¶¶ 19, 32. Plaintiffs' failure to allege 23 24 that a contract does not exist, in both the Complaint and FAC, indicates that such an allegation 25 cannot be pled in good faith. Any amendment to the contrary would lack a "good faith basis," and thus, would be futile. Courts may deny leave to amend where an amendment would be 26

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-3-DEFENDANT GOOGLE, INC.'S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS' UNJUST ENRICHMENT CLAIM CASE NO. 05-03649

tutile. See McQuillion v. Schwarze	enegger, 369 F.3d 1091, 1099 (9 <sup>th</sup> Cir. 2004). Accordin
this Court should dismiss Plaintiffs	s' unjust enrichment claim without leave to amend.
	IV. CONCLUSION
For the above stated reason	ns, Google respectfully requests that the Court dismiss
Plaintiffs' unjust enrichment cause	of action.
Dated: January 3, 2006	PERKINS COIE LLP
	By:/ <u>S/</u>
	David T. Biderman Attorneys for Defendant GOOGLE, INC.
	rittorine je for Defendant 60000LL, if (e.
DEFENDANT GOOGLE, INC.'S NOTIO	- 4 - CE OF MOTION

	PROOF	OF SERVICE		
I, Susa	n E. Daniels, declare:			
	I am a citizen of the United States and am employed in the County of San Francisco,			
State o	f California. I am over the age of 18 ye	ears and am not a party to the within action. My		
busine	ss address is Perkins Coie LLP, 180 To	wnsend Street, 3rd Floor, San Francisco, Californ		
94107-	1909. I am personally familiar with th	e business practice of Perkins Coie LLP. On		
Januar	y 3, 2006, I served the following docun	nent(s):		
DE		OTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO NJUST ENRICHMENT CLAIM		
by plac	cing a true copy thereof enclosed in a se	ealed envelope addressed to the following parties:		
	William M. Audet, Esq. Ryan M. Hagan, Esq.	Attorney for Plaintiffs and the Proposed Class		
	Jason Baker, Esq.	-		
	ALEXANDER, HAWES & AUDET, 152 North Third Street, Suite 600	LLP		
	San Jose, CA 95112 Tel: (408) 289-1776; Fax: (408) 287-	1776		
	Lester L. Levy, Esq.	Attorney for Plaintiffs and		
	Michele F. Raphael, Esq. Renee L. Karalian, Esq.	the Proposed Class		
	WOLF POPPER LLP 845 Third Avenue			
	New York, NY 10022 Tel: (212) 759-4600; Fax: (212) 486-2	2093		
XXX       (By Mail) I caused each envelope with postage fully prepaid to be placed for collection and mailing following the ordinary business practices of Perkins Coie LLP.				
	I declare under penalty of perjury under	er the laws of the State of California that the abov		
is true	and correct and that this declaration wa	as executed at San Francisco, California.		
DATE	D: January 3, 2006.	/S/		
		Susan E. Daniels		
	DANT GOOGLE, INC.'S NOTICE OF MOTI OTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS' UNJUST			
	HMENT CLAIM JO. 05-03649			