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8	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9	NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10	SAN JOSE DIVISION
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12	DIOPTICS MEDICAL PRODUCTS, INC.,) Case No.: CV 08-03538 PVT et al.,
13	ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT Plaintiffs, KHUBANI'S MOTION TO DISMISS
14	V.)
15) IDEAVILLAGE PRODUCTS CORP., dba
16	HD VISION,
17	Defendant.
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19 20	On August 31, 2010, the parties appeared before Magistrate Judge Patricia V. Trumbull for
20	hearing on Defendant Anand Khubani's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Based
21 22	on the briefs and arguments submitted, ¹ IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant Khubani's motion is DENIED because there are
22	genuine issues of material fact with regard to Plaintiffs' claim against Khubani, and the jurisdictional
23 24	facts are so intertwined with the merits of that claim that resolution of the jurisdictional issue should
25	be deferred until trial.
26	Most federal courts, including both the Federal Circuit and the Ninth Circuit, "look to the
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28	¹ On September 2, 2010, Plaintiff Live Eyewear electronically filed a letter in which it requests leave to file certain supplemental exhibits. The request is denied. The proffered exhibits make no difference to the court's ruling on this motion.
	Order, page 1

degree of intertwinement between the jurisdictional facts and the facts underlying the merits of the 1 2 cause of action to determine whether dismissal on jurisdictional grounds is appropriate, or whether 3 resolution of the issues must await summary judgment proceedings or trial on the merits." See DDB Technologies, L.L.C. v. MLB Advanced Media, L.P., 517 F.3d 1284, 1291 (Fed.Cir. 2008) ("We 4 5 agree with the majority of the regional circuits that the degree of intertwinement of jurisdictional facts and facts underlying the substantive claim should determine the appropriate procedure for 6 7 resolution of those facts"); see also, Rosales v. United States, 824 F.2d 799, 803 (9th Cir. 1987) ("if 8 the jurisdictional issue and substantive claims are so intertwined that resolution of the jurisdictional 9 question is dependent on factual issues going to the merits, the district court should employ the 10 standard applicable to a motion for summary judgment").

11 The Supreme Court has also acknowledged the propriety of proceeding on the merits where 12 jurisdictional facts are intertwined with the merits of a case. See, Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 203 n. 19 (1974). In Gulf Oil the Court noted that where there is an identity 13 between the "jurisdictional" issues and certain issues on the merits, there is "no objection to 14 15 reserving the jurisdictional issues until a hearing on the merits." *Ibid*.; see also, Land v. Dollar, 330 16 U.S. 731, 735-39 (1947) (finding that, where the question of jurisdiction was dependent on decision 17 of the merits, the District Court had jurisdiction to determine its jurisdiction by proceeding to a 18 decision on the merits).

19 In the present case, Plaintiffs allege that the court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant 20 Khubani because he: 1) "is responsible for and has actively directed, managed, controlled, approved, 21 participated in, and carried out the promotion of IdeaVillage's products, including the accused 22 products, into the stream of commerce with the expectation that those products will be sold and 23 offered for sale throughout the United States, including within California and within this judicial 24 district;" 2) "has actively directed, managed, controlled, approved, participated in and carried out 25 IdeaVillage's infringing activities described herein and has done so with knowledge of Plaintiffs' intellectual property rights and with the specific intent to encourage and induce IdeaVillage's 26 infringement of Plaintiffs' intellectual property rights;" and 3) "actively directed, managed, 27 28 controlled, approved, participated in and carried out the manufacture, promotion, and sale of the

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accused products with the expectation that the advertisements for the accused products and the
 accused products themselves will be offered for sale, sold, promoted and distributed nationwide,
 including in California and specifically in this judicial district." *See*, Second Amended Complaint
 (docket no. 127), ¶ 7.

5 In support of those allegations, Plaintiffs have submitted, among other things, excerpts of 6 Defendant Khubani's deposition testimony related to Khubani's involvement in the design of the 7 accused product, and in the development of commercials for the accused product. Plaintiffs have 8 also submitted copies of purchase orders with Khubani's name on them (albeit apparently initialed 9 by someone else); agreements signed by Khubani (on Ideavillage's behalf) with a company that 10 distributes the accused product in California, and website printouts indicating that Khubani was at 11 one time listed as the owner and administrative contact for a website for the accused product which 12 provides an address in California for all shipments, customer service, and returns of the accused products (which Khubani acknowledged in deposition was the "official" website for the accused 13 14 product).

Defendant Khubani responds with affidavits and deposition excerpts which he claims show
that he did not induce Ideavillage's alleged infringement, he was not the primary decision maker
behind the accused products, and he was not responsible for the ultimate design of the accused
products. He contends the evidence shows that his involvement in the accused products "is no more
than is typical of a company president." Khubani further claims that he did not know the website for
the accused product was registered in his name, and that he has since corrected the website
registration.²

Based on the evidence submitted by the parties, there are genuine issues of material fact as to
the extent of Defendant Khubani's intent and involvement with: the design of the accused product;
the marketing of the accused products in California; and the importation of the accused products into
California. Both this court's personal jurisdiction over Defendant Khubani and the merits of
Plaintiffs' claims against Defendant Khubani depend on a determination of those facts. And a

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² Plaintiffs noted at the hearing that Khubani is still listed as the administrative contact for the website.

reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of either side based on the evidence in the record.
 Thus, applying the standard applicable to a motion for summary judgment,³ dismissal of the claims
 against Defendant Khubani on grounds of lack of jurisdiction would be premature at this juncture.
 See, Rosales v. United States, 824 F.2d at 803.

5 Defendant Khubani's argument that Plaintiffs have had plenty of time to conduct merits 6 discovery as well as jurisdictional discovery misses the point. The determinative factor is not the 7 amount of discovery Plaintiffs have had. It is whether there are genuine issues of material fact as to 8 the facts upon which both jurisdiction and the merits depend. It is only where there are no such 9 genuine issues of material fact that it is appropriate to resolve, in a motion to dismiss, jurisdictional 10 issues that are so closely intertwined with the merits of the case. *See, Rosales v. United States*, 824 11 F.2d at 803; *see also, Gulf Oil*, 419 U.S. at 203 n. 19.

12 Dated: 9/3/10

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mull PATRICIA V. TRUMBULL

United States Magistrate Judge

To obtain summary judgment, a party must demonstrate that no genuine issue of material 27 fact exists for trial, and that based on the undisputed facts he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). "[S]ummary judgment will not lie if the dispute about 28 a material fact is 'genuine,' that is if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).