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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FACEBOOK, INC.,  
  
Plaintiff,  
  
-against-  
  
POWER VENTURES, INC. d/b/a POWER.COM, a  
California corporation; POWER VENTURES, INC.  
a Cayman Island Corporation, STEVE VACHANI,  
an individual; DOE 1, d/b/a POWER.COM, an  
individual and/or business entity of unknown nature;  
DOES 2 through 25, inclusive, individuals and/or  
business entities of unknown nature,  
  
Defendants.

Case No. 5:08-cv-05780 (JF)

**DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM  
OF LAW IN OPPOSITION TO  
FACEBOOK INC.'S MOTION FOR  
JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS  
PURSUANT TO FED. R. CIV. P.  
12(C) OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE,  
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT  
OF LIABILITY UNDER  
CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE §  
502(c)**

Date: February 26, 2010  
Time: 9:00 a.m.  
Judge: Hon. Jeremy D. Fogel  
Courtroom: 3

1 Defendants Power Ventures, Inc. and Steve Vachani (hereafter collectively referred to as  
2 “Defendants” or “Power”) respectfully submit this Memorandum Of Law In Opposition To  
3 Facebook Inc.’s Motion For Judgment On The Pleadings Pursuant To Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) Or, In  
4 The Alternative, Partial Summary Judgment Of Liability Under California Penal Code § 502(c).

### 5 I. INTRODUCTION

6 Facebook seeks judgment on a single claim, Count 3 of Facebook’s First Amended  
7 Complaint, a novel civil claim under a state criminal statute, California Penal Code § 502. This  
8 claim is based on the fact that, during a roughly two-month period, from December 2008 through  
9 January 2009, Power offered Facebook users a different and potentially superior browser through  
10 which they could access their Facebook accounts to copy, update, and/or port their own “User  
11 Content.” This “User Content” includes photos, profiles, messages, notes, text, information, music,  
12 video, advertisements, listings, and other content that users upload, publish or display on the  
13 Facebook site. *See* Amended Answer at 7:3-6. Facebook owns no copyright to such User Content.  
14 *Id.* at 7:6-7. Indeed, Facebook’s Terms of Use expressly state that “Facebook does not assert any  
15 ownership over your User Content.” *Id.* at 7:7-8.

16 Though Facebook “does not assert any ownership” over this User Content, Facebook does  
17 attempt to prevent users from copying it – to make it difficult for users to port their User Content to  
18 other websites. *See* Vachani Decl. ¶ 2. This gives Facebook an unfair competitive advantage  
19 because users will be less likely to join a new social networking website if the user is unable to port  
20 his contacts and other User Content without laboriously re-typing and/or re-uploading each item.  
21 *See id.* ¶ 3. Thus, even if Power offers new technology that is superior to Facebook, a user is not  
22 likely to migrate to that new technology if doing so would require, for example, re-typing hundreds  
23 of entries in an address book stored in the user’s Facebook account. *See id.* ¶ 4. So, while  
24 Facebook “does not assert any ownership” over the user’s address book, Facebook does employ a  
25 variety of measures to make it very difficult to copy it. *See id.*

26 Power’s browser provides users with utilities that allow them to copy their own User  
27 Content for purposes of updating it and making it portable to other sites – without copying other  
28 elements of the Facebook website. *See id.* ¶ 5; Amended Answer at 7:12-15. Facebook does not

1 allege that Power has copied any element of the Facebook website that is subject to a copyright  
 2 owned by Facebook – and in fact Power has not done so. *See* Vachani Decl. ¶ 6; Amended Answer  
 3 at 7:15-16. Facebook does not allege that any data, any software, or any computer owned by  
 4 Facebook has been damaged in any way by users accessing their accounts through the Power  
 5 browser – and in fact no such damage has occurred. *See* Vachani Decl. ¶¶ 7, 11.

6 The sole injury alleged in Facebook’s complaint is the supposed injury to Facebook’s  
 7 “reputation and goodwill” caused by users accessing their Facebook accounts through the Power  
 8 browser. *See* First Amended Complaint ¶ 119. Facebook has submitted no evidence of that (or  
 9 any other) injury in support of this motion. ***Most importantly, Facebook has neither alleged nor***  
 10 ***submitted evidence that it has suffered any injury to its data, software or computers.***

11 A plaintiff attempting to state a claim for violation of a statute must plead and prove the  
 12 statute in question grants a right to sue. *Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush*, 386 F.3d 1169, 1175 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir.  
 13 2004); *Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc.*, 2009 WL 4842801 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2009). Having  
 14 suffered no injury to its data, software or computers, Facebook cannot establish standing to assert a  
 15 claim under Penal Code § 502. This criminal statute creates a private right of action only in very  
 16 limited circumstances. Standing to assert a civil claim under § 502 is conferred only to “the owner  
 17 or lessee of the computer, computer system, computer network, computer program, or data who  
 18 suffers damage or loss by reason of a violation.” Penal Code § 502(e). The statute further defines  
 19 the types of damage or loss recognized by the statute. Section 502(b)(8) provides a definition for  
 20 “injury”:

21 “Injury” means any alteration, deletion, damage, or destruction of a  
 22 computer system, computer network, computer program, or data  
 23 caused by the access, or the denial of access, to legitimate users of a  
 computer system, network, or program.

24 And § 502(b)(9) provides a definition for “victim expenditure”:

25 “Victim expenditure” means any expenditure reasonably and  
 26 necessarily incurred by the owner or lessee to verify that a computer  
 27 system, computer network, computer program, or data was or was  
 28 not altered, deleted, damaged, or destroyed by the access.

1 A party asserting a private civil claim under § 502 must establish that it suffered “injury” to its data  
2 or computers, or that it made a “victim expenditure” to verify whether its data or computers  
3 suffered such an injury.

4 This, Facebook cannot do. Having suffered no injury to its data or computers, the best  
5 allegation Facebook could muster is unspecified harm to its “reputation and goodwill.” *See* First  
6 Amended Complaint ¶ 119. Power denies that such harm occurred. But regardless, that issue is  
7 immaterial because harm to “reputation and goodwill” simply is not cognizable under § 502. A  
8 party cannot establish standing to assert a civil claim under § 502 based on alleged harm to its  
9 “reputation and goodwill.”

10 Having suffered no injury to its data or computers, Facebook has no right to assert any  
11 claim under § 502. The claim also fails because Facebook has not pled or proved a violation of the  
12 elements of the statute. Finally, even if Facebook could establish its standing and the elements of a  
13 violation, Power has raised triable issues concerning the defenses of fair use, copyright misuse, and  
14 federal preemption.

## 15 II. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS

### 16 A. The Rule 12(c) Judgment On The Pleadings Standard

17 For purposes of Facebook’s motion for judgment on the pleadings under Fed. R. Civ. P.  
18 12(c), the allegations of the non-moving party (Power) must be accepted as true, while the  
19 allegations of the moving party (Facebook) which have been denied are assumed to be false. *Hal*  
20 *Roach Studios v. Richard Feiner & Co.*, 896 F.2d 1542, 1550 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1990) (“[T]he allegations of  
21 the non-moving party must be accepted as true, while the allegations of the moving party which  
22 have been denied are assumed to be false.”). Judgment on the pleadings is proper only when the  
23 moving party clearly establishes on the face of the pleadings that no material issue of fact remains  
24 to be resolved and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. *Id.* However, judgment on the  
25 pleadings is improper when the district court goes beyond the pleadings to resolve an issue; such a  
26 proceeding must properly be treated as a motion for summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c); *cf.*  
27 *Bonilla v. Oakland Scavenger Co.*, 697 F.2d 1297, 1301 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1982) (discussing Fed. R. Civ. P.  
28 12(b)(6)), *cert. denied*, 467 U.S. 1251, 104 S. Ct. 3533, 82 L. Ed. 2d 838 (1984).

1           **B.     The Rule 56 Summary Judgment Standard**

2           Summary judgment is appropriate where “there is no issue as to any material fact” and “the  
3 moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The moving party  
4 “has both the initial burden of production and the ultimate burden of persuasion on a motion for  
5 summary judgment.” *Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz*, 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000),  
6 *citing* 10A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller and Mary Kay Kane, *Federal Practice and*  
7 *Procedure* § 2727 (3d ed. 1998).

8           To meet its burden of production, Facebook must produce evidence of every factual  
9 element of its claim, and also must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue as to any of those  
10 facts. *See Fonteno v. Upjohn*, 780 F.2d 1190, 1194 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1986) (holding when a plaintiff moves  
11 for summary judgment on an issue upon which he bears the burden of proof, “he must establish  
12 beyond peradventure all of the essential elements of the claim to warrant judgment in his favor”).  
13 The court must accept all of the nonmoving party’s direct evidence as true. *Eastman Kodak Co. v.*  
14 *Image Technical Services, Inc.*, 504 U.S. 451, 457, 112 S.Ct. 2072, 2077 (1992). The “district  
15 court has the responsibility to construe all facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving  
16 party.” *Nelson v. City of Davis*, 571 F.3d 924, 928 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2009). All ambiguities or questions of  
17 credibility are to be resolved against the moving party. *United States v. Diebold*, 369 U.S. 654  
18 (1962). “[I]f a rational trier of fact might resolve the issue in favor of the nonmoving party,  
19 summary judgment must be denied.” *T. W. Electrical Services, Inc. v. Pacific Electrical*  
20 *Contractors Ass’n*, 809 F.2d 626, 631 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1987). Even where the underlying facts are  
21 undisputed, “[s]ummary judgment should not be granted where contradictory inferences may be  
22 drawn from undisputed evidentiary facts.” *United States v. Perry*, 431 F.2d 1020, 1022 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir.  
23 1970).

24           “If a moving party fails to carry its initial burden of production, the nonmoving party has no  
25 obligation to produce anything ... [and] may defeat the motion for summary judgment without  
26 producing anything. *Nissan Fire*, 210 F.3d at 1102. If, however, a moving party carries its burden  
27 of production, the nonmoving party must produce evidence to support its claim or defense. *Id.*

### III. ARGUMENT

#### A. Facebook Has Not Met Its Burden To Establish A Violation Of Penal Code § 502(c)(1)

Facebook has not met its burden to establish a violation of § 501(c)(1) for at least five reasons. *First*, Facebook has neither alleged nor submitted proof that users' accessing their own accounts through the Power browser did anything that altered, damaged, deleted or destroyed any data, computer, computer system or computer network. That did not happen. *See* Vachani Decl. ¶ 7.

#### B. Facebook Has Not Met Its Burden To Establish Standing To Sue Under Penal Code § 502

##### 1. The Only "Injury" Alleged Is To "Facebook's Reputation And Goodwill"

Facebook's First Amended Complaint (Docket Entry No. 9) (hereafter, "Complaint") does not assert any form of injury or victim expenditure cognizable under § 502. Facebook's allegations of injury supporting the § 502 claim are set forth at ¶¶ 118-119:

118. Facebook suffered and continues to suffer damage as a result of Defendants' violations of the California Penal Code § 502 identified above.

119. Defendants' conduct also caused irreparable and incalculable harm and injuries to Facebook (including but not limited to, Facebook's reputation and goodwill), and, unless enjoined, will cause further irreparable and incalculable injury, for which Facebook has no adequate remedy at law.

Facebook's allegations are heavy with adjectives, but light on facts. Facebook's injuries are said to be "irreparable" and "incalculable," but there is no description of exactly what those injuries might be – with one possible exception. The only type of injury that is alluded to in the Complaint is the purported harm to "Facebook's reputation and goodwill." Although, again, there is no indication as to exactly what harm is alleged to have befallen "Facebook's reputation and goodwill." Power's answer denies the allegations of ¶¶ 118-119. (*See* Amended Answer, Docket Entry No. 54, at ¶¶ 118-119.) Thus, so far as Facebook's motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) is concerned, Facebook's allegations must be assumed false. *Hal Roach Studios v. Richard Feiner & Co.*, 896 F.2d 1542, 1550 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1990) ("[T]he allegations of the non-

1 moving party must be accepted as true, while the allegations of the moving party which have been  
2 denied are assumed to be false.”).

3 **2. Facebook Submitted No Evidence Of Injury**

4 Facebook’s motion does not include any evidence of injury. The only evidence submitted  
5 with Facebook’s motion is the Declaration of Julio C. Avalos (Docket Entry No. 57), one of  
6 Facebook’s lawyers, attaching settlement communications between Facebook’s counsel and Mr.  
7 Vachani, who was, at the time of the correspondence, an unrepresented party. The settlement  
8 correspondence does not establish or evidence any injury to Facebook, and the purpose for which it  
9 was submitted is unclear.<sup>1</sup>

10 **3. Facebook Has Not Met Its Burden To Establish “Injury”**  
11 **As Defined By § 502(b)(8)**

12 Facebook has not alleged any “alteration, deletion, damage, or destruction” of any  
13 computer or data owned by Facebook. *See* Cal. Penal Code § 502(b)(8). Nor has Facebook  
14 alleged any “denial of service” to legitimate users. *See id.* Nor has Facebook submitted any  
15 evidence of such injuries. Thus Facebook has not met its burden to establish an “injury” as defined  
16 by Penal Code § 502(b)(8).

17 **4. Facebook Has Not Met Its Burden To Establish A “Victim**  
18 **Expenditure” As Defined By § 502(b)(9)**

19 Facebook also failed to allege or to submit evidence that it has made a “victim expenditure”  
20 as defined by § 502(b)(9). Facebook contends it “has been forced to commit corporate resources to  
21 deal with the repeated attacks by Power,” in that Facebook “implemented technical measures to  
22 block users from accessing Facebook through Power.com.” Facebook Mot. at 8:1-5. But there is  
23 no evidence of any expenditure made for these purposes. And if such expenditures were made,  
24 they still would not qualify as “victim expenditures” under the statute.

25 First, consider what happened to the Facebook website. The pleadings establish that  
26 Facebook users accessed their own Facebook accounts and their own User Content through the  
27 Power browser. Nothing more. There is no allegation, let alone evidence, that any “computer

28 <sup>1</sup> Defendants object to this evidence under Fed. R. Evid. 402, 403, 407, 408. Defendants hereby  
move to strike the Declaration of Julio C. Avalos (Docket Entry No. 57) in its entirety.

1 system, computer network, computer program, or data was ... altered, deleted, damaged, or  
2 destroyed by the access.” Penal Code § 502(b)(9).

3 Facebook’s characterization of these actions as “cyber attacks” is hyperbole. *See* Facebook  
4 Mot. at 3:16 (“cyber-attack”); *id.* at 8:2 (“repeated attacks by Power”); *id.* at 8:11 (“Power’s  
5 attacks”); *id.* at 8:11-12 (“even more attacks”). Actions by users to access their own accounts and  
6 to copy their own User Content through the Power browser are not “attacks.” These users  
7 employed a utility that is commonplace in the industry and which Facebook itself makes available  
8 to its users to access accounts on other websites. *See* Vachani Decl. ¶ 8; Amended Answer at 2:4-  
9 3:25 (“Facebook solicits users to enter their account names and passwords for users’ email  
10 accounts at Google’s Gmail, AOL, Yahoo, Hotmail, or other third party websites. Facebook then  
11 uses the account information to allow the user to access those accounts through Facebook, and to  
12 import information – *i.e.*, to ‘scrape’ data – from those third-party sites into Facebook.”).  
13 Facebook’s use of the hyperbolic phrase “cyber attack” to describe this common industry practice  
14 is preposterous.

15 Next, consider Facebook’s response. The pleadings establish that Facebook “implemented  
16 technical measures to block users from accessing Facebook through Power.com.” Amended  
17 Answer ¶ 63. These technical measures were quite simple. Facebook blocked Power’s IP address,  
18 so that users attempting to access their Facebook accounts through Power’s browser would be  
19 denied access. *See* Vachani Decl. ¶ 9. Nothing more.

20 An IP (Internet Protocol) address is a numeric label that is assigned to devices, including  
21 web servers and other types of computers, participating in a computer network. *Id.* For example,  
22 the IP address for the Power.com web server is 70.38.96.9, and the IP address for the  
23 Facebook.com web server is 69.63.186.36. *Id.* The blocking of an IP address is a simple feature  
24 that can be implemented with push-button ease by virtually any web host. *Id.* The “expenditure”  
25 of “corporate resources” to accomplish this “technical measure” would involve, essentially, a few  
26 clicks of a mouse to access the IP blocking feature of the web host, and ten keystrokes to enter  
27 Power.com’s IP address among those to be blocked. *Id.*; *see also* First Amended Complaint ¶ 136  
28



1 (“Facebook employs numerous technological measures, including identifying and blocking the IP  
2 addresses of known offenders.”).

3 Facebook contends that “[t]he time and resources invested by Facebook in tracking Power’s  
4 attacks, blocking Power’s attacks, and then fielding even more attacks after Power’s admitted  
5 circumvention are cognizable injuries demonstrating damage or loss under the computer trespass  
6 statutes.” Facebook Mot. at 8:10-13. Facebook’s contention is both factually and legally  
7 unsupported. The only fact established by the pleadings and the evidence is that Facebook blocked  
8 Power’s IP address. There is no evidence of record concerning what, if any, “expenditure” was  
9 made by Facebook to block Power’s IP address. Nor is there any allegation or evidence related to  
10 any “tracking” or “circumvention” efforts, let alone any “expenditure” related thereto.

11 In any event, resources expended to “track” or “block” access are not a cognizable “victim  
12 expenditure” under § 502. The only expenditures cognizable under § 502 are those “reasonably  
13 and necessarily incurred ... to verify that a computer system, computer network, computer program  
14 or data was or was not altered, deleted, damaged or destroyed by the access.” Cal. Penal Code  
15 § 502(b)(9). There is no allegation, let alone evidence, that Facebook made any expenditure at all,  
16 let alone any expenditure “verify” the matters described in the statute.

17 Facebook’s reliance on *Shurgard Storage Centers, Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc.*, 119  
18 F.Supp.2d 1121 (W.D. Wash. 2000), is misplaced. *Shurgard Storage* involved a different statute  
19 and a very different set of facts. The plaintiff in *Shurgard Storage* alleged that one of its  
20 employees had been lured by a competitor to act as a double-agent, to obtain confidential business  
21 plans and trade secrets from the plaintiff’s computer system, and to email them to a competitor,  
22 before eventually being hired away by that competitor. *See* 119 F.Supp.2d at 1123. The issue in  
23 *Shurgard Storage* was whether the plaintiff had sufficiently pled “damage” to support a claim  
24 under the federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), which defines “damage” to include  
25 “any impairment to the integrity ... of data ... or information.” *Shurgard Storage*, 119 F.Supp.2d  
26 at 1126, *quoting* 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(8)(A). The court found the CFAA’s use of the term  
27 “integrity” ambiguous, and engaged in a lengthy analysis of the legislative history of the statute to  
28 conclude that the disclosure of trade secrets alleged in the complaint impaired the “integrity” of the

1 data, and thus qualified as “damage” under the CFAA. *Shurgard Storage*, 119 F.Supp.2d at 1127;  
2 *see also id.* at 1126-29 (reciting an extensive discussion of the legislative history of the CFAA).

3 *Shurgard Storage* is factually very different from the instant case, because this case does  
4 not involve any theft of proprietary data or trade secret information. On the contrary, the only data  
5 accessed through Power’s utilities were user’s own “User Content,” over which Facebook has  
6 disclaimed any ownership. *See* Vachani Decl. ¶ 5; Amended Answer at 7:13-15 (“Power.com  
7 provides users with utilities that allow them to copy their own User Content ... without copying  
8 other elements of the Facebook website.”); *id.* at 7:6-9 (“Facebook owns no copyright to such User  
9 Content. Indeed, Facebook’s own Terms of Use expressly state that ‘Facebook does not assert any  
10 ownership over your User Content.’”).

11 More importantly, the question of injury in *Shurgard Storage* arose under a very different  
12 statute from the one at issue here. This motion concerns Facebook’s claim under California Penal  
13 Code § 502, which is a fundamentally different statute than the federal CFAA, with a  
14 fundamentally different standing requirement. The language defining injury under § 502 is not  
15 even remotely similar to the language of the CFAA. The statutes were enacted by different  
16 legislative bodies and have different legislative histories. *Shurgard Storage* says nothing that is  
17 even remotely relevant to the application of the distinct standing requirements for a private litigant  
18 asserting a civil claim under § 502. There is no authority for private litigant standing under § 502  
19 based on expenditures to “track” or “block” users from accessing their own User Content on their  
20 own accounts. Neither *Shurgard Storage*, nor any other authority, supports the expansion of the  
21 private right of action under § 502 to allow such a claim.

## 22 **5. Facebook Has Not Met Its Burden To Establish Causation**

23 Even if Facebook had met its burden to show an injury or a victim expenditure cognizable  
24 under § 502 – and Facebook has not met that burden – that alone would not be enough. Facebook  
25 must also show that such injury or victim expenditure was caused “by reason of” defendants’  
26 alleged violation. Cal. Penal Code § 502(e)(1). Facebook’s claim fails in this respect as well.  
27 Facebook has neither alleged nor submitted evidence of any causal link between Power’s actions  
28 and any injury to or victim expenditure by Facebook. Moreover, Power has submitted evidence

1 that no such injury or victim expenditure was or could have been caused by its conduct. According  
 2 to the declaration of Power's CEO, Steven Vachani:

3 10. The utilities made available to users through the Power browser  
 4 were merely capable of accessing the user's own account, displaying  
 5 the Facebook website, copying the user's own "User Content," and  
 6 updating the user's own "User Content" if directed to do so by the  
 7 user. The Power browser does not provide any capability to cause  
 8 the alteration, deletion, damage, or destruction of a computer system,  
 9 computer network, computer program, or data. Nor does the Power  
 10 browser provide any capability to cause a denial of access to  
 11 Facebook by a legitimate user.

12 11. I am not aware of any instance in which use of the Power  
 13 browser caused any alteration, damage, deletion or destruction to any  
 14 of Facebook's data or computers. That did not happen and could not  
 15 have happened.

16 12. Upon learning that users were accessing their accounts through  
 17 the Power browser, Facebook would have no reason to believe that  
 18 its computer system, computer network, computer program, or data  
 19 had been altered, deleted, damaged, or destroyed by such access.  
 20 Facebook is familiar with the utilities used by the Power browser  
 21 because Facebook itself has used similar utilities for years. Thus  
 22 Facebook should have been aware, and so far as I could tell *was*  
 23 aware, that it had no cause for such concern. In its communications  
 24 to me, Facebook never suggested any concern that its computers or  
 25 data had been altered, deleted, damaged, or destroyed. Since there  
 26 was no cause for concern, Facebook did not, to my knowledge, make  
 27 any expenditure to verify that its computers or data had not been  
 28 altered, deleted, damaged, or destroyed.

13. Facebook's only response was to block access through Power's  
 IP address. Facebook's decision to block Power's IP address was a  
 pure business decision with only one realistic purpose: to thwart a  
 potential competitor from implementing new technology that may  
 prove superior to Facebook's technology. Facebook's decision to  
 block Power's IP address was in no sense a "reasonable" or  
 "necessary" measure to verify that the Facebook computers or data  
 had not been altered, deleted, damaged or destroyed. Facebook had  
 no need for such verification, and IP blocking has nothing to do with  
 such verification.

Vachani Decl. ¶¶ 10-13.

**C. Facebook Has Not Met Its Burden To Establish A Violation Of  
 Penal Code § 502(c)(1)**

Facebook has not met its burden to establish a violation of § 501(c)(1) for at least five  
 reasons. *First*, Facebook has neither alleged nor submitted proof that users' accessing their own  
 accounts through the Power browser did anything that altered, damaged, deleted or destroyed any

1 data, computer, computer system or computer network owned by Facebook. That did not happen.  
2 *See* Vachani Decl. ¶ 11.

3 *Second*, Facebook has neither alleged nor submitted proof of any “scheme or artifice to  
4 defraud, deceive or extort anyone.” *Compare* Cal. Penal Code § 502(c)(1)(A) *with* Vachani Decl. ¶  
5 14 (“The only intended use and the only actual use of the Power browser was to display the user’s  
6 own Facebook account and to enable the user to copy and/or update the user’s own ‘User Content.’  
7 We had no scheme to defraud, deceive or extort anyone. Nor could the Power browser be used for  
8 such a scheme. Nor, to my knowledge, was the Power browser used for such a scheme.”).

9 *Third*, Facebook has neither alleged nor submitted proof that anyone using the Power  
10 browser “wrongfully control[led] or obtain[ed] money, property or data.” *Compare* Cal. Penal  
11 Code § 502(c)(1)(B) *with* Vachani Decl. ¶ 15 (“The Power browser was not intended to and is not  
12 capable of wrongfully controlling or obtaining money, property or data. We did not intend it for  
13 such use. Nor, to my knowledge, was the Power browser ever used for such purposes.”).

14 *Fourth*, Facebook has never identified any instance in which Power accessed any data  
15 without the express permission of the user and rightful owner of the accessed data. Facebook’s  
16 motion contends – without evidentiary support – that “Power has admitted to knowingly accessing  
17 and without permission taking, copying, and/or making use of Facebook login information data.”  
18 Facebook Mot. at 6:7-8. That contention is absolutely false, and is presented in a manner  
19 purposely designed to mislead the Court by creating the impression that Power obtained users’  
20 login information (usernames and passwords) by hacking into Facebook’s computers. The real  
21 facts are that Power has never obtained any usernames or passwords from Facebook’s computers.  
22 *See* Vachani Decl. ¶ 16. Every username and password obtained by Power was manually entered  
23 through the Power.com website by a user who wished to access his or her own account through the  
24 Power browser. *See id.* No data owned by Facebook has ever been altered or destroyed from such  
25 access. *See id.* And the only data that was “copied” or “used” in any substantial way was the  
26  
27  
28

1 user's own User Content, and only for such purposes as were specifically directed by the user. *See*  
 2 *id.*<sup>2</sup>

3 *Fifth*, the pleadings do not establish, and Facebook has submitted no proof, that Power  
 4 acted with the requisite *men rea* to “knowingly” commit a violation § 501(c)(1). To establish  
 5 liability, Facebook is required to establish that Power “knowingly” committed every element of an  
 6 offense under § 501(c)(1). *See, e.g., People v. Hawkins*, 98 Cal.App.4<sup>th</sup> 1428, 1439 (2002)  
 7 (rejecting the assertion that “‘knowingly’ only modifies ‘accesses’ and not the rest of the crime”).  
 8 Neither the pleadings nor the proof submitted by Facebook establish that Facebook acted  
 9 “knowingly” “without permission” to damage any data or computer as part of any scheme to  
 10 accomplish any of the objects prohibited by § 501(c)(1). On the contrary, the only record evidence  
 11 on this issue establishes that Power acted with a good faith belief that (i) “access to users’  
 12 Facebook accounts through the Power browser was done in every instance with the permission of  
 13 the user,” Vachani Decl. ¶ 17, that “in every instance those users had ownership of all “User  
 14 Content” that was accessed and/or copied through the Power browser,” *id.*, and “that no other  
 15 permission was legally required for users to access their own accounts and User Content through  
 16 the Power browser,” *id.* “To the extent that Facebook’s Terms of Use purport to restrict users from  
 17 accessing their own User Content in this manner, Power had, and continues to have, a good faith  
 18 belief that Facebook’s Terms of Use were legally unenforceable or otherwise violative of the  
 19 copyright and unfair competition laws.” *Id.* ¶ 18.<sup>3</sup>

20 \_\_\_\_\_  
 21 <sup>2</sup> Magistrate Judge Seeborg’s decision in *Facebook Inc. v. ConnectU LLC*, 489 F.Supp.2d 1087  
 22 (N.D. Cal. 2007) held that Facebook stated a claim under § 502(c)(2) where it alleged that  
 23 ConnectU collected email addresses of registered Facebook users, and then sent commercial email  
 24 to those persons “without permission.” But *ConnectU* is both factually and legally distinguishable.  
 25 *ConnectU* was a Rule 12(b)(6) case, which required that Facebook’s allegations be accepted as true  
 26 and that all inferences be drawn in Facebook’s favor. The procedural posture on this motion  
 27 requires that similar allegations, which have been denied by Power, “are assumed to be false.”  
 28 *Hal Roach Studios v. Richard Feiner & Co.*, 896 F.2d at 1550. Furthermore, Power has made a  
 substantial showing that it has never accessed any user account other than as specifically directed  
 by the user, has never directly sent any communication to any address obtained through Facebook,  
 and has never made any use of “User Content” other than as specifically directed by the user. *See*  
 Vachani Decl. ¶¶ 10, 14. Given the distinct procedural posture and distinct facts of this case,  
*ConnectU* is not a useful precedent.

<sup>3</sup> In December 2008, after receiving notice that Facebook objected to users’ access through the  
 Power browser, Power immediately began working with Facebook to implement a different type of  
 connection through “Facebook Connect.” Vachani Decl. ¶ 19. Power maintained its belief that it

1                   **D. Facebook Has Not Met Its Burden To Establish A Violation Of**  
 2                   **Penal Code § 502(c)(2)-(4) or § 502(c)(7)**

3                   Facebook has not met its burden to establish a violation of § 501(c)(2)-(4) and (7) because  
 4                   neither the pleadings nor the evidence establish that Power “knowingly” accessed any Facebook  
 5                   account “without permission,” for the same reasons as those set forth in Part III.B, above.  
 6                   Facebook has not met its burden to establish a violation of § 501(c)(4) for the additional reason that  
 7                   neither the pleadings nor the evidence establish that Power “knowingly” and “without permission”  
 8                   added, altered, damaged, deleted or destroyed any data, computer software, or computer programs.  
 9                   See Vachani Decl. ¶ 11 (“I am not aware of any instance in which use of the Power browser caused  
 10                  any alteration, damage, deletion or destruction to any of Facebook’s data or computers. That did  
 11                  not happen and could not have happened.”).

12                   **E. Power Has Raised Triable Issues Of Fact Concerning Its**  
 13                   **Affirmative Defenses**

14                  Power has asserted two formidable affirmative defenses based on Fair Use under 17 U.S.C.  
 15                  § 107, see Amended Answer ¶¶ 161-164, and the common law doctrine of copyright misuse, *id.*  
 16                  ¶¶ 165-168. The facts asserted in those defenses must be accepted as true on this motion. See Part  
 17                  II.A and II.B, above.

18                  It now appears that a third defense, federal preemption, may also apply. As explained in  
 19                  Part III.A.1, *supra*, the only injury Facebook alleges in support of its § 502 claim is injury to  
 20                  “Facebook’s reputation and goodwill.” If Facebook had asserted an injury under § 502 based on  
 21                  the use or display of copyrighted information through the Power browser, the § 502 claim would be

---

22  
 23                  had done nothing wrong, and that it had every legal right to allow users access to their own  
 24                  Facebook accounts through the Power browser. *Id.* Nevertheless, in an effort to reach an amicable  
 25                  resolution, Power agreed to try to work through “Facebook Connect” instead. *Id.* By January  
 26                  2009, Power had taken down its existing Facebook integration through the Power browser, and had  
 27                  focused its efforts exclusively on implementing “Facebook Connect.” *Id.* Power has not made any  
 28                  connection to Facebook since January 2009, and has no current plan to re-start its Facebook  
 integration. *Id.* Nevertheless, at all times through January 2009, and continuing through to today,  
 Power believed and continues to believe, in good faith, that it had all permissions legally required  
 to permit users to access their own Facebook accounts and to copy their own User Content through  
 the Power browser. *Id.* Power never “knowingly” acted “without permission,” as those terms are  
 used in § 502(c). *Id.*

1 preempted by the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 301(a). This may be why Facebook purposely  
2 omitted such an allegation of harm.

3 **IV. CONCLUSION**

4 For the foregoing reasons, Facebook's motion for judgment on the pleadings, or in the  
5 alternative, for summary judgment, of liability under California Penal Code § 502(c) should be  
6 denied.

7  
8 Dated: January 15, 2010

Respectfully submitted,  
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10  
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