EXHIBIT A

1	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2	FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
3	SAN JOSE DIVISION
4	
5	FACEBOOK, INC.,) CV-08-5780-JW)
6	PLAINTIFF,) SAN JOSE, CALIFORNIA)
7	VS.)) JUNE 7, 2010
8	POWER VENTURES, INC.,)
9	DEFENDANT.) PAGES 1-52
10	
11	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
12	BEFORE THE HONORABLE JAMES WARE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
13	
14	APPEARANCES:
15	
16	FOR THE PLAINTIFF: ORRICK HERRINGTOPN SUTCLIFFE
17	BY: NEEL CHATTERJEE JULIO AVALOS 1000 MARSH ROAD
18	MENLO PARK, CA 94025
19	
20	FOR THE DEFENDANT: LAW OFFICES OF SCOTT BURSOR BY: SCOTT BURSOR
21	369 LEXINGTON AVE, 10TH FL NEW YORK, NY 10017
22	NEW TORK, NI 10017
23	(APPEARANCES CONTINUED ON THE NEXT PAGE)
24	
25	OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER: SUMMER FISHER, CSR, CRR CERTIFICATE NUMBER 13185

1		ORRICK HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE
2		BY: JESSICA PERS 405 HOWARD STREET
3		SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94105
4	FOR THE DEFENDANT:	
5		BY: LAWRENCE TIMOTHY FISHER 2125 OAK GROVE ROAD, STE 120
6		WALNUT CREEK, CA 94598
7	ALSO PRESENT:	JENNIFER GRANICK
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1	SAN JOSE, CALIFORNIA JUNE 7, 2010
2	PROCEEDINGS
3	(WHEREUPON, COURT CONVENED AND THE
4	FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS WERE HELD:)
5	THE CLERK: CALLING CASE NUMBER 08-5780.
6	FACEBOOK, INC. V. POWER VENTURES, INC., ET AL.
7	ON FOR PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON
8	THE PLEADINGS AND FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGEMENT.
9	PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO DISMISS COUNTERCLAIMS AND TO
10	STRIKE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES, AND DEFENDANT'S MOTION
11	FOR SUMMARY JUDGEMENT ON COUNT THREE.
12	30 MINUTES EACH SIDE FOR ALL MOTIONS.
13	COUNSEL, PLEASE COME FORWARD AND STATE YOUR
14	APPEARANCES.
15	MR. BURSOR: GOOD MORNING, YOUR HONOR.
16	SCOTT BURSOR FOR THE DEFENDANTS POWER VENTURES AND
17	STEVEN VACHANI. AND WITH ME IS MY COLLEAGUE
18	TIM FISHER, AND MY CLIENT IS WITH US TODAY AS WELL.
19	THIS IS ROB POLLOCK, THE CEO OF POWER.COM.
20	THE COURT: THANK YOU FOR COMING.
21	MR. CHATTERJEE: GOOD MORNING,
22	YOUR HONOR. NEEL CHATTERJEE FOR FACEBOOK. WITH ME
23	IS JULIO AVALOS AND JESSICA PERS FROM MY OFFICE.
24	THE COURT: THANK YOU. HAVE A SEAT. YOU
25	DON'T HAVE TO SIT DOWN, THE ADVOCATES, I WAS

TALKING ABOUT THE REST OF THEM.

BUT LET'S SEE, WHAT DO I HAVE? I HAVE A

MOTION BY FACEBOOK FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS OR

IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGEMENT

UNDER THIS 502 STATUTE, AND A DEFENDANT'S MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGEMENT. AND I HAVE A MOTION TO

DISMISS THE COUNTERCLAIMS, STRIKE AFFIRMATIVE

DEFENSES -- I CAN SEE WHY MY STAFF SAID 30 MINUTES

EACH SIDE IF WE ARE GOING TO ADDRESS ALL OF THIS.

ACTUALLY, THE ISSUE THAT I THOUGHT WOULD BE IMPORTANT FOR US TO DISCUSS IS THIS 502 ISSUE.

AND I UNDERSTAND THAT THERE ARE CERTAIN AMICUS

BRIEFS THAT HAVE BEEN FILED WITH RESPECT TO THIS.

SO I WOULD ACTUALLY CALL UPON COUNSEL FOR FACEBOOK

FIRST TO ADDRESS THE QUESTION OF WHETHER OR NOT

THERE IS A SUFFICIENT ALLEGATION OF A VIOLATION OF

502.

MR. CHATTERJEE: SURE, YOUR HONOR, I'M HAPPY TO.

FIRST, IF I MAY ADDRESS THE AMICUS BRIEF,
WE HAD CONTACTED CHAMBERS BECAUSE IT ACTUALLY HAD
NEVER BEEN FILED. THERE WAS A MOTION REQUESTING IT
AND YOUR HONOR ISSUED AN ORDER SETTING A DEADLINE
AND THEN IT WAS NEVER FILED.

IF YOUR HONOR IS GOING TO CONSIDER THAT

BRIEF, WE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO FILE

A RELATIVELY SHORT RESPONSE TO IT. I CAN ALSO

ADDRESS IT DURING THE ARGUMENT TODAY.

AFTER YOU GAVE LEAVE, THE AMICUS BRIEF
WAS ACTUALLY NOT FILED PER YOUR ORDER. AND IT'S A
PROCEDURAL HOUSEKEEPING ISSUE, ALTHOUGH WE THINK
THAT BECAUSE THEY DIDN'T FILE IT, IT SHOULD NOT BE
CONSIDERED AT THIS POINT.

THE COURT: WELL, I HAD -- THERE WAS A

DOCUMENT FILED WHICH WAS A MOTION FOR LEAVE TO

FILE. AND IT'S THAT, THAT I HAD READ. AND SO YOUR

POSITION IS THAT THIS IS NOT THE BRIEF THAT WAS

SORT OF FOLLOWED ON THAT WAS GOING TO COME FROM

THIS.

MR. CHATTERJEE: THEY ATTACHED A BRIEF ON THE MOTION AND THEN YOUR HONOR ISSUED AN ORDER GIVING THEM UNTIL, I BELIEVE THE 14TH, TO ACTUALLY FILE THAT BRIEF.

IT WAS, IN FACT, NEVER FILED. WE HAD

CONTACTED YOUR HONOR TO FIGURE OUT WHAT WE SHOULD

DO, IF ANYTHING. AND ALL I ASK YOUR HONOR IS THAT

IF IN FACT YOU ARE GOING TO CONSIDER THEIR

SUBMISSION, WE BE GIVEN LEAVE TO FILE A FAIRLY

SHORT RESPONSE TO IT. SO IF YOU ARE CONSIDERING

THE ISSUE -- ANY ISSUES RAISED THEREIN, WE CAN

1 ENSURE WE'VE HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD.

THE COURT: ALL RIGHT.

I HAD ASSUMED THAT I HAD BEFORE ME THE AMICUS MATERIAL AND HAD LOOKED AT IT. SO TO THE EXTENT THAT I FIND THERE'S A NEED FOR YOU TO SAY ANYTHING MORE, PERHAPS YOU CAN RESPOND TO THAT AS WELL.

MR. CHATTERJEE: SURE, YOUR HONOR.

IF I CAN GRAB SOME AIDES FOR OUR ARGUMENT TODAY ON THE 502(C) ISSUE.

THE COURT: SURE.

MR. CHATTERJEE: YOUR HONOR, I WILL GIVE
OPPOSING COUNSEL A COPY OF THIS. I WILL ALSO GIVE
A COPY FOR YOU, AND I'M HAPPY TO GIVE ONE FOR YOUR
LAW CLERK AS WELL. THE AIDES ARE FAIRLY
STRAIGHTFORWARD, ALMOST ALL OF IT ARE MATERIALS
THAT ARE ALREADY SUBMITTED. THERE'S ONLY ONE
ADDITIONAL PIECE OF WORK PRODUCT.

LET'S START WITH KIND OF, I GUESS THE
FUNDAMENTAL ISSUE THAT'S PRESENTED BY THIS MOTION.

THE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUE THAT'S PRESENTED BY THIS

MOTION IS WHETHER FACEBOOK CAN REGULATE ACCESS TO

ITS WEBSITE BY THIRD PARTIES AND OTHER COMMERCIAL

ENTITIES. AND IT IS NOT, AS VARIOUS PEOPLE IN THE

BRIEFING ON THIS CASE SUGGEST, PURELY ABOUT A TERMS

OF USE ISSUE.

I WAS VERY INTERESTED IN YOUR HONOR'S

COMMENTS ABOUT THE MULTIVEN CASE THAT WAS JUST HERE

BECAUSE IT WASN'T A MATTER OF FACEBOOK LOCKING A

DOOR, IT WAS FAR MORE THAN THAT. FACEBOOK HAD A

TERMS OF USE THAT RESTRICTED ACCESS TO ITS WEBSITE

FOR PARTICULAR PURPOSES. WHEN IT WAS CLEAR THAT

POWER WAS INCENTIVISING ITS USERS TO VIOLATE THAT

TERMS OF USE, FACEBOOK SAID DIRECTLY TO POWER, AND

POWER DOESN'T DISPUTE THIS, DON'T ACCESS OUR

WEBSITE.

POWER AGREED. THEY ACTUALLY SAID, OKAY,
WE WON'T ACCESS IT, WE ARE GOING TO TRY TO WORK
THROUGH A MECHANISM THAT FACEBOOK DOES ALLOW FOR
THAT ACCESS. BUT THEN AT THE LAST MINUTE THEY
CHANGED THEIR MIND AND THEY SAID, WE ARE GOING TO
CONTINUE ACCESSING FACEBOOK'S WEBSITE DESPITE
FACEBOOK'S EXPRESS REQUEST SAYING, DO NOT ACCESS
OUR WEBSITE.

AT THAT POINT IN TIME FACEBOOK PUT UP
TECHNICAL BARRIERS, THEY BLOCKED THE IP ADDRESS OF
POWER TO FORECLOSE POWER FROM ACCESSING THE
WEBSITE. WHEN THAT HAPPENED POWER, NOW THAT THERE
HAD BEEN A LOCK ON THE DOOR, THERE HAD BEEN AN
EXPRESS REQUEST NOT TO TRESPASS AND THERE HAD BEEN

1 A FENCE BUILT AROUND THE FACEBOOK WEBSITE, POWER
2 DECIDED TO JUMP OVER IT.

THAT, YOUR HONOR, IS AN UNAUTHORIZED

TRESPASS TO A COMPUTER SYSTEM. AND AT THE VERY

TIME THAT THEY WERE JUMPING OVER THOSE FENCES, THEY

THEN ACCESSED THE FACEBOOK WEBSITE AND THEY START

SENDING COMMERCIAL MESSAGES THROUGH A CALENDARING

FUNCTION OF FACEBOOK TO INVITE POTENTIALLY

THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE TO JOIN THE POWER WEBSITE.

YOUR HONOR, THAT IS THE CLASSIC CASE, IT

IS AN EXTREME CASE OF COMPUTER TRESPASS, WHICH IS

WHAT CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE IN 502(C) SEEKS TO

COVER.

THE COURT: NOW LET ME SEE IF I CAN PARSE
THAT JUST A BIT.

SO DO I UNDERSTAND FROM YOUR ARGUMENT
THAT FACEBOOK IS NOT CONTENDING THAT POWER'S
INITIAL ACCESS WHERE IT DID NOT INVADE ANY
TECHNOLOGICAL BARRIER, WAS A VIOLATION OF 502? THE
VIOLATION CAME AFTER FACEBOOK INITIATED THE
TECHNOLOGICAL BARRIER; AND POWER, USING SOME
MECHANISM THAT'S NOT CLEAR TO ME AT THIS POINT,
OVERCAME THAT BARRIER?

MR. CHATTERJEE: YOUR HONOR, IT'S A VERY GOOD QUESTION.

THE ANSWER IS A LITTLE MORE COMPLICATED
THAN THAT. THE ISSUE YOUR HONOR RAISED WITH
RESPECT TO THE MULTIVEN CASE WAS ONE OF, AT WHAT
POINT DOES SOMETHING BECOME A KNOWING VIOLATION?
IT WAS THE KNOWLEDGE REQUIREMENT THAT I THINK
YOUR HONOR WAS CONCERNED ABOUT IN ASKING THE
QUESTIONS ABOUT THE DIRECTOR LEVEL PERSON AND WHAT
HE -- WOULD HE KNOW ABOUT OR NOT KNOW ABOUT OR THE
OTHER PERSON WHO WAS USING HIS PASSWORD THAT WOULD
KNOW ABOUT THE ACCESS TO THE CISCO COMPUTER SYSTEM.

WHEN YOU ARE JUST TALKING ABOUT A TERMS

OF USE VIOLATION, WE ARE NOT SAYING THAT, IN AND OF

ITSELF WOULD NECESSARILY RISE TO A KNOWING

VIOLATION; THAT'S AN ISSUE FOR ANOTHER DAY. BUT IN

THIS INSTANCE WITH THESE FACTS THAT ARE ADMITTED,

THERE IS NO QUESTION THAT THE STOP SIGN WAS ON THE

OUTSIDE OF THE FACEBOOK WEBSITE.

THERE WASN'T ONE INSTANCE OF A TERMS OF

USE GIVING NOTICE, THERE WAS A DIRECT MESSAGE SENT

TO POWER THAT THEY ACKNOWLEDGED AND RECOGNIZED THAT

THE WELCOME SIGN WASN'T ON AND THEN AFTER THEY

CHOSE NOT TO HONOR IT, THEY ADMITTED THAT THEY KNEW

WE PUT IN PLACE TECHNICAL BARRIERS AND THEY CHOSE

TO JUMP OVER THAT FENCE.

WITH THOSE THREE THINGS, THE KNOWING

1 ELEMENT IS UNDISPUTABLE. AND THAT IS THE POINT AT 2 WHICH THERE'S NO QUESTION THERE WOULD BE A 3 VIOLATION UNDER CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE 502(C). 4 DOES THAT ANSWER YOUR QUESTION, 5 YOUR HONOR? THE COURT: I THINK SO. 6 7 YOU SAID THE ANSWER IS NOT AS 8 STRAIGHTFORWARD AS THAT. I DIDN'T GET AN ANSWER, 9 BUT IT SEEMS THAT THE ANSWER IS YES. 10 INDEED, THERE'S NO CLAIM -- YOU ARE 11 MAKING YOUR CLAIM BASED UPON THE STATE OF THE 12 AFFAIRS THAT EXISTED AFTER OVERCOMING THE TECHNICAL 13 BARRIER, AND PERHAPS IT'S MOOT WHAT HAPPENED 14 EARLIER. 15 BUT AS I WAS READING THROUGH THE HISTORY 16 OF THE CASE, AND AS YOU RECITED IT, THERE WAS AN 17 EARLY ENTRY UNDER DIFFERENT CIRCUMSTANCES. THERE 18 WAS SOME CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE PARTIES WITH 19 RESPECT TO THAT. SOME EFFORT WAS MADE TO SEE 20 WHETHER OR NOT POWER WOULD BECOME AN ACCEPTED USER 21 BECAUSE THIS IS A PROCESS THAT FACEBOOK ALLOWS PERHAPS, AND EVEN ENGAGES IN, BUT DIDN'T HAVE POWER 22 23 AMONG ITS AUTHORIZED VENDORS FOR PURPOSES OF THIS 24 GATHERING OF INFORMATION THROUGH FACEBOOK.

AND THEN IN THE COURSE OF TIME, AS I

25

1 UNDERSTAND IT, FACEBOOK PUT IN PLACE VARIOUS
2 TECHNOLOGICAL BARRIERS AND THOSE WERE CIRCUMVENTED.
3 AND IT'S THAT STATE OF AFFAIRS, THE CIRCUMVENTION
4 THAT I AM LOOKING AT, TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT
5 THERE'S A 502 VIOLATION.

MR. CHATTERJEE: CORRECT, YOUR HONOR.

WE ARE NOT MOVING SOLELY UPON THE TERMS

OF USE VIOLATION, ALTHOUGH IT'S AN ADMITTED FACT

THAT IS RELEVANT FOR YOUR HONOR TO CONSIDER.

THE COURT: WELL, AS A HISTORICAL PURPOSE

IT SEEMS TO ME -- SO MAYBE THIS IS AN INVITATION

FOR THE COURT TO RENDER AN ORDER WHETHER OR NOT

TERMS OF USE VIOLATIONS ALONE CONSTITUTE A

VIOLATION OF 502 SO AS TO REMOVE THAT FROM A

OUESTION.

SO IT'S A QUESTION I'M RAISING, NOT A
STATEMENT OF SOMETHING I'M GOING TO DO, BUT YOU'VE
RAISED AT LEAST ENOUGH OF A CONCERN IN THE COURT'S
MIND THAT AN ANSWER TO THAT QUESTION MIGHT BE
NECESSARY.

LET ME HEAR FROM YOUR OPPONENT AND I WILL COME BACK.

MR. CHATTERJEE: YOUR HONOR, IF I CAN

JUST SAY, AN ANSWER TO THAT QUESTION IS NOT

NECESSARY HERE BECAUSE YOU CAN RELY SOLELY ON THE

1 CIRCUMVENTION AFTER THE REQUEST WAS MADE NOT TO
2 ACCESS AND THE BARRIERS WERE JUMPED OVER.

THE COURT: I UNDERSTAND.

COUNSEL?

MR. BURSOR: YOUR HONOR, I THINK THE

COURT IN ITS COLLOQUY WITH MR. CHATTERJEE HAS

JUMPED PAST A DISPOSITIVE ISSUE THAT REALLY OUGHT

TO BE THE FOCUS OF THE ANALYSIS ON THIS MOTION,

WHICH IS NOT WHETHER THERE WAS A VIOLATION OF 502

DUE TO AUTHORIZE OR LACK OF AUTHORIZE, AND I CAN

ADDRESS WHY WE THINK THERE WAS NO VIOLATION OF 502

BECAUSE THE USERS WERE AUTHORIZED TO ACCESS THEIR

ACCOUNTS; HOWEVER, THAT DISCUSSION JUMPS OVER A

VERY BIG HURDLE AND THAT IS THE BASIS FOR OUR

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGEMENT.

WE THINK THE COURT DOESN'T EVEN GET THERE
BECAUSE FACEBOOK LACKS STANDING TO ASSERT ANY CLAIM
FOR 502 EVEN IF THERE WAS A VIOLATION. AND THE
REASON IS BECAUSE YOUR HONOR, CALIFORNIA'S PENAL
CODE SECTION 502 IS, OF COURSE, A CRIMINAL STATUTE,
IT'S MEANT TO BE ENFORCED BY THE GOVERNMENT.

IT DOES, HOWEVER, CREATE A PRIVATE RIGHT
OF ACTION IN CERTAIN LIMITED CIRCUMSTANCES. AND
THOSE ARE SPELLED OUT IN SECTION 502 (E) (1) WHICH
CREATES PRIVATE LITIGATE STANDING FOR THE OWNER OR

LESSEE OF A COMPUTER WHO HAS SUFFERED DAMAGE OR
LOSS BY REASON OF A VIOLATION.

AND OUR MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGEMENT,

YOUR HONOR, IS PREMISED ON THE COMPLETE ABSENCE OF

ANY ALLEGATION THAT FACEBOOK SUFFERED DAMAGE OR

LOSS COGNIZABLE UNDER THE STATUTE OR THAT IT MADE

WHAT'S CALLED A VICTIM EXPENDITURE, WHICH IS A

PARTICULAR TYPE OF LOSS, RECOGNIZED UNDER SECTION

502.

WHAT HAPPENED IN THIS CASE, YOUR HONOR,
IS THAT FACEBOOK USERS WHO WERE AUTHORIZED, HAD
ACCOUNTS ON FACEBOOK, HAD PASSWORDS AND LOGIN NAMES
ISSUED BY FACEBOOK, HAD PERMISSION TO ACCESS THEIR
FACEBOOK ACCOUNTS, DID SO THROUGH A DIFFERENT
BROWSER OFFERED BY POWER THAT PROVIDED ADDITIONAL
UTILITIES THAT FACEBOOK DIDN'T WANT TO HAVE
PROVIDED.

AND WHEN THOSE USERS ACCESSED THEIR OWN

ACCOUNTS THEY DID NOT TAKE ANY ACTION THAT CAUSED A

DAMAGE OR LOSS TO FACEBOOK; THEY HAD NO EFFECT ON

FACEBOOK WHATSOEVER.

SO A FUNDAMENTAL PREREQUISITE FOR A

PRIVATE LITIGANT LIKE FACEBOOK TO ASSERT A CLAIM

UNDER 502 IS THEY HAVE TO SHOW ONE OF TWO THINGS:

THEY HAVE TO SHOW AN INJURY AS DEFINED BY

THE STATUTE, WHICH IS DEFINED BY 502 (B) (8) AS THE ALTERATION, DELETION, DAMAGE OR DESTRUCTION OF A COMPUTER SYSTEM, COMPUTER NETWORK, COMPUTER PROGRAM OR DATA, OR THE DENIAL OF ACCESS TO LEGITIMATE USERS; THAT'S ONE THING THEY COULD SHOW.

OR ALTERNATIVELY THEY COULD SHOW WHAT'S

CALLED A VICTIM EXPENDITURE WHICH IS IDENTIFIED IN

502(B)(9) WHICH IS THE EXPENDITURE OF RESOURCES

REASONABLY AND NECESSARILY INCURRED BY THE OWNER OR

LESSEE OF THE COMPUTER SYSTEM TO VERIFY THAT THE

INJURIES DESCRIBED IN (B)(8), NAMELY THE

ALTERATION, DELETION, DAMAGE, OR DESTRUCTION OF

THEIR COMPUTER SYSTEM, NETWORK OR DATA, EITHER DID

OR DID NOT OCCUR.

NOW, IN THIS CASE FACEBOOK FILED A

COMPLAINT AND THEY FILED AN AMENDED COMPLAINT. AND
IN PLEADING THEIR 502 CLAIM IN BOTH INSTANCES THE
ONLY INJURY THEY ALLEGE WAS INJURY TO THEIR
"REPUTATION AND GOOD WILL." AND YOUR HONOR, THAT'S
AT PARAGRAPHS 118 AND 119 OF FACEBOOK'S AMENDED
COMPLAINT. THAT'S THE ONLY INJURY THEY ALLEGE.
THEY SAY, "OUR REPUTATION AND GOOD WILL WAS
HARMED."

NOW, IN POWER'S ANSWER WE DENY THAT. AND SO ON THE 12(C) MOTION IT HAS TO BE PRESUMED FALSE.

1	BUT THE MORE IMPORTANT POINT, YOUR HONOR, IS
2	WHETHER THAT ALLEGATION IS TRUE OR FALSE ABOUT AN
3	INJURY TO REPUTATION AND GOOD WILL, THAT TYPE OF
4	INJURY DOES NOT QUALIFY AS AN INJURY UNDER 502
5	(B)(8). IT DOES NOT QUALIFY AS A VICTIM
6	EXPENDITURE UNDER 502(B)(9) AND DOES NOT QUALIFY
7	UNDER DAMAGE OR LOSS UNDER 502(B)(1).
8	SO BEFORE FACEBOOK CAN BE HEARD TO
9	COMPLAIN THAT SOMEONE HAS VIOLATED 502(C), THEY
10	HAVE TO SHOW ONE OF THOSE TWO THINGS.
11	THE COURT: DO YOU EQUATE INJURY AND
12	VICTIM EXPENDITURE UNDER THE STATUTE WITH DAMAGE OR
13	LOSS?
14	IN OTHER WORDS, ARE THE ONLY THINGS THAT
15	ARE DAMAGE OR LOSS, WHAT IS DEFINED UNDER
16	SUBPARAGRAPHS 8 AND 9, DEFINED AS INJURY OR VICTIM
17	EXPENDITURE?
18	MR. BURSOR: YES.
19	THE COURT: WHERE DO YOU GET THAT?
20	MR. BURSOR: WHERE I GET THAT,
21	YOUR HONOR, IS FROM THE FACT THAT 502(E)(1) USES
22	THE EXACT SAME LANGUAGE VERBATIM AS (B)(9) WHICH
23	DEFINES VICTIM EXPENDITURE.
24	IF YOU LOOK AT (E)(1), THE LANGUAGE THAT

NECESSARILY INCURRED BY THE OWNER OR LESSEE TO

VERIFY THAT A COMPUTER SYSTEM, COMPUTER NETWORK,

COMPUTER PROGRAM OR DATA WAS OR WAS NOT ALTERED

DAMAGED OR DELETED BY THE ACCESS.

THAT LANGUAGE IS IDENTICAL TO THE

DEFINITION OF VICTIM EXPENDITURE IN (B) (9). AND IF

YOU LOOK TO THE DEFINITION OF INJURY IN (B) (8), IT

SAYS "INJURY MEANS DAMAGE."

INJURY IS A DEFINED TERM TO INCLUDE

DAMAGE AND SOME OTHER -- AND TYPES OF DAMAGE LIKE

ALTERATION, DELETION, OR DESTRUCTION OF A COMPUTER

SYSTEM OR COMPUTER DATA.

SO THERE IS NO FORM OF DAMAGE OR LOSS

THAT COULD GIVE RISE TO STANDING UNDER 502(E)(1)

THAT WOULD NOT ALSO QUALIFY AS AN INJURY OR VICTIM

EXPENDITURE UNDER (B)(8) OR (B)(9).

THE COURT: LET'S ASSUME I GO THAT WAY,

AND I CAN SEE WHY YOU ARGUED THAT, ALTHOUGH THE

STATUTE USES TERMS THAT ARE NOT ALWAYS AS DEFINED

AS SYMMETRICALLY AS YOU ARE ARGUING.

WHY WOULDN'T A CIRCUMSTANCE SUCH AS THIS
WHERE THIS CIRCUMSTANCE WHERE FACEBOOK INVESTIGATED
WHATEVER WAS GOING ON AND UNDERTOOK MEASURES TO
PROTECT THE INTEGRITY, AS IT DEFINED IT, OF ITS
SYSTEM, WHY WOULDN'T THOSE QUALIFY AS DAMAGE OR

1 LOSS?

MR. BURSOR: WELL, THEY WOULDN'T QUALIFY
YOUR HONOR BECAUSE THEY DON'T MEET THE CRITERIA
THAT ARE SPELLED OUT IN THE STATUTE.

I THINK FACEBOOK CONCEDES THAT THEY HAVE

NOT SUFFERED AN INJURY AS DEFINED BY THE STATUTE.

THEIR ARGUMENT IS WE MADE THESE EXPENDITURES TO

INVESTIGATE WHAT WAS HAPPENING, TO HAVE DISCUSSIONS

WITH MR. VACHANI AND THEN TO THEN BLOCK THE IP

ADDRESS.

AND BECAUSE WE MADE THOSE EXPENDITURES

WHICH ARE NOT REALLY SPECIFIED IN ANY WAY, EITHER

IN THE PLEADINGS OR EVIDENTIARY MATERIALS BEFORE

THE COURT, FACEBOOK'S INTENTION IS ANY EXPENDITURE

WILL DO.

YOUR HONOR, IN OUR REPLY BRIEF WE BROKE

THESE OUT ONE BY ONE AND EXPLAINED WHY EACH ONE OF

THEM FAILED THE TEST UNDER 502(B)(9) AND 502(E)(1).

NOW, WE HAD THE DISCUSSION ABOUT (B)(8)

AND THE DEFINITION OF INJURY AND I THINK THAT'S

IMPORTANT, BUT IT'S IMPORTANT TO RECOGNIZE THAT

FACEBOOK HAS CONCEDED THAT POINT. THEY DON'T HAVE

AN INJURY. THEY RELY ENTIRELY ON THESE

EXPENDITURES.

SO IT'S ENTIRELY A (B)(9)/(E)(1) ISSUE

1 WHERE (B) (9) AND (E) (1) USE THE IDENTICAL LANGUAGE.

AND THERE'S THREE REQUIREMENTS FOR AN

3 EXPENDITURE TO FALL UNDER ONE OF THOSE STATUTES.

4 NUMBER ONE, IT HAS TO BE REASONABLY INCURRED. TWO,

IT HAS TO BE NECESSARILY INCURRED. AND NUMBER

THREE, IT HAS TO BE BY REASON OF -- IT HAS TO BE

INCURRED TO VERIFY "WHETHER AN ALTERATION, DELETION

OR DAMAGE HAS OCCURRED TO THE DATA OR THE COMPUTER

NETWORK."

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NOW FACEBOOK --

11 THE COURT: WHERE DO YOU GET THE

12 REASONABLY INCURRED -- THERE'S NO STANDARD AS TO AN

13 AMOUNT HERE, CORRECT?

14 MR. BURSOR: THERE'S NO STANDARD AS TO AN

AMOUNT, BUT I GET REASONABLY AND NECESSARILY FROM

THE LANGUAGE OF (E) (1) AND (B) (9) WHICH SAYS THAT

THE EXPENDITURE HAS TO BE REASONABLY AND

18 NECESSARILY INCURRED.

AND IT HAS TO BE REASONABLE AND

20 NECESSARILY INCURRED FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.

21 THAT PURPOSE BEING "TO VERIFY THAT A COMPUTER

22 SYSTEM, COMPUTER NETWORK, COMPUTER PROGRAM OR DATA

WAS OR WAS NOT ALTERED, DAMAGED, OR DELETED BY THE

24 ACCESS."

SO THE STATUTE DOESN'T SAY ANY

EXPENDITURE, IT DOESN'T SAY IT HAS TO BE A CERTAIN 1 2 AMOUNT. 3 THE COURT: IS THIS A THIRD PARTY STANDARD, REASONABLE AND NECESSARILY INCURRED? 4 5 MR. BURSOR: YOUR HONOR, I THINK WHEN THE 6 LAW USES THE TERM "REASONABLE," THAT'S AN OBJECTIVE 7 STANDARD, YES. 8 SO YOUR HONOR, WHEN THE MOTION CAME IN, FACEBOOK SAID VERY LITTLE ABOUT WHAT THEY DID OTHER 9 10 THAN THEY TRACKED AND BLOCKED THE ASSESS. 11 THEY NEVER SAID IN THEIR MOVING PAPERS THAT THE ASSESS CAUSED ANY INJURY, ALTERATION, OR 12 13 DELETION OF DATA. THEY DIDN'T PUT IN ANY EVIDENCE 14 THAT SUGGESTED THAT THAT HAPPENED. THEY DIDN'T PUT 15 ANY EVIDENCE THAT THEY EVEN HAD A CONCERN THAT THAT 16 HAPPENED. THEY DIDN'T PUT IN EVIDENCE THAT THE 17 REASON THEY TRACKED THE ACCESS WAS OUT OF CONCERN 18 THAT THERE WAS AN ALTERATION OR DELETE OF DATA. 19 NOTHING ABOUT THIS. 20 WE THEN FILED A CROSS MOTION FOR SUMMARY 21 JUDGEMENT ON THIS POINT SAYING FACEBOOK HAS NO 22 STANDING BECAUSE THEY HAVE NO INJURY. THEY'VE ONLY PLEADED HARM TO REPUTATION, THAT DOESN'T OUALIFY. 23

THEY THEN CAME BACK --

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25

THE COURT: LET ME SLOW YOU DOWN BECAUSE

THESE ARE IMPORTANT ENOUGH THAT I WANT TO UNDERSTAND BECAUSE THIS IS ALL STATUTORY INTERPRETATION.

I DON'T HAVE MUCH TO GO ON IN TERMS OF
HOW TO LOOK AT THE STATUTE, BUT IT SEEMS TO ME AS I
HEAR YOUR ARGUMENT, IF A THIRD PARTY STANDARD OF
REASONABILITY IS TO BE APPLIED AND THE OWNER OF THE
SYSTEM KNOWS THAT THERE HAS BEEN THIS INTRUSION AND
THEY WANT TO INVESTIGATE WHETHER IT HAS ALTERED,
DAMAGED ANYTHING, WHETHER OR NOT IT ACTUALLY HAS
TAKEN PLACE AND SOME EXPENDITURE IS INCURRED FOR
THAT.

YOUR ARGUMENT IS THAT THAT'S NOT COVERED BY THE STATUTE; IS THAT CORRECT?

MR. BURSOR: YOUR HONOR, IN ORDER TO BE
COVERED IT WOULD HAVE TO BE REASONABLY INCURRED AND
THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE EVIDENCE OF THAT BUT THAT
SKIPS OVER --

THE COURT: I INCLUDED THAT IN MY
HYPOTHETICAL. I SAID IF THEY REASONABLY AND
NECESSARILY, MEETING A THIRD PARTY STANDARD,
DECIDED THEY ARE GOING TO INVESTIGATE AND WHAT THEY
FIND IS THERE'S NO LOSS, THAT THAT EXPENSE OF THE
INVESTIGATION IS NOT COVERED; IS THAT CORRECT? IS
THAT YOUR ARGUMENT?

1	MR. BURSOR: NO, THAT'S NOT. YOUR HONOR,
2	I THINK THAT WOULD BE COVERED. IF THEY MADE AN
3	EXPENDITURE FOR THE PURPOSE OF VERIFYING
4	THE COURT: HOW MUCH OF AN EXPENDITURE IS
5	REQUIRED?
6	MR. BURSOR: SOMETHING BEYOND A DE
7	MINIMUS EXPENDITURE.
8	THE COURT: WHERE DO YOU GET THAT?
9	MR. BURSOR: WELL, THERE HAS TO BE SOME
10	EXPENDITURE.
11	THE COURT: RIGHT. BUT THERE'S NO
12	STANDARD.
13	MR. BURSOR: THERE'S NO AMOUNT STATED.
14	THE COURT: IF ANY EXPENDITURE IS MADE TO
15	INVESTIGATE, TO VERIFY, EVEN IF THERE'S NO HARM THE
16	PARTY HAS STANDING?
17	MR. BURSOR: CORRECT.
18	THE COURT: ALL RIGHT.
19	NOW LET ME TURN TO YOUR OPPONENT ON THIS
20	ISSUE. I WILL COME BACK. I WILL COME BACK, BUT I
21	WANT TO HEAR ON THE STANDING ISSUE.
22	MR. CHATTERJEE: I WOULD BE HAPPY TO,
23	YOUR HONOR.
24	FIRST OF ALL THERE ARE TWO CASES THAT I
25	THINK ARE PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT TO READ WITH

1 RESPECT TO THE DAMAGE OR LOSS ISSUE. ONE IS THE 2 COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE ACT CASE AND THE OTHER IS 3 ACTUALLY A CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE 502(C) CASE OUT OF, OF ALL PLACES, THE DISTRICT OF JEW JERSEY. 4 5 THE COURT: WHY IS THAT NOTEWORTHY? 6 MR. CHATTERJEE: THE ONLY REASON IS IT'S 7 A NEW JERSEY COURT INTERPRETING CALIFORNIA PENAL 8 CODE 502(C) WHICH IS A LITTLE BIT UNUSUAL. 9 THE COURT: I SEE. 10 MR. CHATTERJEE: AND THE NEW JERSEY CASE 11 IS JOSEPH OAT HOLDINGS, AND THE CITE ON IT IS 2009, 12 U.S. DISTRICT LEXIS 95909. 13 AND THEN THE OTHER IS THE 14 SHURGARD STORAGE CENTERS, INC. CASE OUT OF WESTERN 15 DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON, 119 F. SUPP 2D 1121. 16 IN BOTH OF THOSE CASES -- ONE IS UNDER 17 THE COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE ACT, THAT'S THE 18 SHURGARD STORAGE CASE, AND THE JOSEPH OAT HOLDINGS CASE IS UNDER 502(C), THEY BOTH ENDORSE 19 20 YOUR HONOR'S QUESTION WHICH IS, IF YOU ARE SPENDING 21 EFFORT TO TRY AND STOP AN INTRUSION, THAT IS DAMAGE

NOW THERE'S A STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

QUESTION THAT I THINK YOUR HONOR CORRECTLY NOTICED

ABOUT THE 502(E)(1) STANDING REQUIREMENT.

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24

25

OR LOSS.

THE FIRST THING TO NOTICE ABOUT THE

DAMAGE OR LOSS LANGUAGE IS THAT DAMAGE OR LOSS IS

NOT SOMETHING THAT IS EXPRESSLY DEFINED IN THE

STATUTE. I THINK YOUR HONOR'S QUESTIONS PROPERLY

NOTED THAT THE DEFINITIONS THAT MR. BURSOR RELIED

UPON ARE NOT ABOUT DAMAGE OR LOSS, THEY ARE

DEFINING OTHER TERMS.

WHY IS THAT SO? BECAUSE THE STATUTE

UNDER 502(E)(1) SAYS THAT FACEBOOK, OR A PERSON WHO

IS A VICTIM OF THIS CRIME, CAN FILE A CIVIL ACTION

AGAINST THE VIOLATOR FOR COMPENSATORY DAMAGES AND

INJUNCTIVE RELIEF OR OTHER EQUITABLE RELIEF.

FOLLOWING THAT PORTION OF 502(E)(1) THERE
IS ONE OF THE THINGS THAT COMPENSATORY DAMAGES
SHALL INCLUDE. BUT THE STATUTE IN AND OF ITSELF
IDENTIFIES THAT THERE CAN BE OTHER FORMS OF HARM
BEYOND COMPENSATORY DAMAGES BECAUSE IT ALLOWS FOR
INJUNCTIVE OR OTHER FORMS OF EQUITABLE RELIEF.
IT'S PRECISELY THE RELIEF WE ARE SEEKING HERE.

IN THIS CASE, WHEN POWER DECIDED TO

ENGAGE IN ITS COMPUTER INTRUSION, WE HAD TO COMMIT

RESOURCES TO SENDING A CEASE AND DESIST LETTER, WE

HAD TO SEND RESOURCES TO ENGAGING IN NEGOTIATION

WHICH THEY LATER BAILED OUT OF, WE HAD TO ENGAGE IN

EFFORTS AND EXPENDITURES IN ORDER TO PUT UP

TECHNICAL BARRIERS, AND THEN WE HAD TO ENGAGE IN

EFFORTS TO EVALUATE WHAT HAD ACTUALLY BEEN DONE BY

POWER.

THOSE ARE ALL THE SORTS OF DAMAGES AND LOSSES THAT 502(C), THE SHURGARD STORAGE CASE AND JOSEPH OAT RECOGNIZED ARE PROPER.

THE COURT: WELL, LET ME DO THIS. I TAKE
SERIOUSLY THIS QUESTION ABOUT STANDING AND I WILL
TAKE A LOOK AT IT. MY INITIAL REACTION IS THAT I
SHOULD ACCORD TO FACEBOOK, STANDING TO ASSERT A 502
VIOLATION SO THAT I CAN GET TO THE MERITS OF
WHETHER OR NOT THIS CONSTITUTES SUCH A VIOLATION,
BECAUSE IT SEEMS TO ME THAT I DON'T WANT TO SET TOO
HIGH A BARRIER OF ALLEGED VICTIM TO AT LEAST BRING
THE MATTER TO A COURT.

AND SO IF I WERE TO SAY FACEBOOK HAS NO STANDING I WOULD SAY I'M NOT EVEN GOING TO LISTEN OF WHETHER OR NOT THERE'S BEEN A VIOLATION OF 502, BECAUSE I THINK THE LANGUAGE OF THE STATUTE HAVING TO DO WITH VERIFICATION AND THOSE KINDS OF TERMS ADMIT TO LEGITIMATE, REASONABLE, INVESTIGATION AND WHETHER OR NOT A HARM IS ACTUALLY FOUND AND GIVES STANDING FOR SOMEONE TO BRING THAT TO A COURT.

SO GO TO THE QUESTION OF WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS A VIOLATION OF 502 ON THE MERITS.

MR. BURSOR: YOUR HONOR, IF I MAY, I

THINK -- I DIDN'T GET A CHANCE TO ADDRESS THE

REALLY CRUCIAL ISSUE ON THE STANDING POINT WHICH IS

THE PURPOSE OF THE EXPENDITURE, NOT THE AMOUNT.

WHEN YOU LOOK AT THE EXPENDITURES

DESCRIBED IN FACEBOOK'S PAPERS AND THE EXPENDITURES

DESCRIBED BY MR. CHATTERJEE AT THIS ARGUMENT, NONE

OF THEM HAVE ANYTHING TO DO WITH THE PURPOSE

DESCRIBED IN (E)(1).

THE EXPENDITURES THEY LIST ARE THEY HIRED

OUTSIDE COUNSEL TO SEND A CEASE AND DESIST LETTER.

OUTSIDE COUNSEL DO NOT DO THINGS LIKE VERIFY IF THE

COMPUTER SYSTEM WAS INJURED.

THEY SAY THEY EXPENDED RESOURCES TO BLOCK
FUTURE ACCESS. THE PURPOSES PERMITTED UNDER
502(E)(1) HAVE NOTHING TO DO WITH FUTURE ACCESS,
THEY ARE ALL IN THE PAST TENSE TO VERIFY IF THERE
WAS AN INJURY TO THE COMPUTERS CAUSED BY THE
ACCESS.

SO I THINK, YOUR HONOR, WHEN -- IF THE

COURT IS TO FOCUS ON THE AMOUNT OR OTHER ASPECTS OF

THE EXPENDITURE THAT WAS MADE, THAT REALLY MISSES

THE POINT THAT THESE EXPENDITURES WERE NOT MADE FOR

THE PURPOSE DESCRIBED IN THE STATUTE.

AND YOUR HONOR, THIS IS A SUMMARY

JUDGEMENT MOTION. AND A SUMMARY JUDGEMENT MOTION

IS NOT ABOUT THEORIES THAT LAWYERS PUT INTO A

BRIEF, IT'S ABOUT EVIDENCE.

SO IF THERE WAS AN EXPENDITURE MADE FOR THESE PURPOSES, IT WAS INCUMBENT ON THE DEFENDANTS TO COME FORWARD WITH EVIDENCE.

THE COURT: MAYBE YOU MISUNDERSTOOD ME.

I'LL LOOK AT YOUR STANDING ISSUE, I'M NOT

DISMISSING IT, I'M NOT RULING AGAINST YOU. I'M

ASKING YOU TO MOVE ON TO THE MERITS BECAUSE IF I

GET OVER IT AND I HAVEN'T HEARD FROM YOU ON THE

MERITS THEN YOU ARE IN TROUBLE.

MR. BURSOR: YOUR HONOR, ON THE MERITS,

THERE WAS NO -- EVEN IF FACEBOOK HAD STANDING BASED

ON THIS EPHEMERAL THEORY OF INJURY BECAUSE THEY

HIRED LAWYERS, THERE IS NO VIOLATION OF 502(C) BY

POWER BECAUSE EVERY ACCESS TO FACEBOOK'S WEBSITE

WAS MADE BY AN AUTHORIZED FACEBOOK USER WITH

LEGITIMATE LOGIN CREDENTIALS WHO UNDENIABLY HAD

PERMISSION TO ACCESS THEIR OWN USER DATA ON

FACEBOOK; THERE IS ISN'T EVEN A DISPUTE ABOUT THAT.

POWER NEVER ACCESSED FACEBOOK DIRECTLY,

IT WAS ONLY FACEBOOK SUBSCRIBERS ACCESSING THE

FACEBOOK WEBSITE THROUGH THE POWER BROWSER. THE

SAME WAY ANY USER WOULD ACCESS FACEBOOK THROUGH THE

INTERNET EXPLORER BROWSER OR THE FIREFOX BROWSER OR
THE SAFARI BROWSER. ALL POWER DID WAS GIVE USERS A
MEANS TO ACCESS THEIR OWN DATA WHERE THEY WERE
AUTHORIZED TO DO SO.

AND YOUR HONOR, THERE IS SOME CASE LAW
AND MUCH OF IT IS DISCUSSED IN THE ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER FOUNDATION AMICUS BRIEF. WE FOCUSED
HEAVILY ON THE STANDING ARGUMENT, AND WE ARGUED
AUTHORIZATION AS WELL AND EFF FOCUSED ON THAT AS
WELL IN THEIR AMICUS BRIEF.

BUT THERE ARE SEVERAL CASES, YOUR HONOR,
THAT STAND FOR THE PROPOSITION THAT ACCESS IS NOT
UNAUTHORIZED UNDER 502 IF IT'S MADE BY A PERSON WHO
HAS AUTHORIZATION TO ACCESS THE COMPUTER BUT THEN
ACCESSES THE COMPUTER FOR A PURPOSE OR IN A MANNER
THAT GOES BEYOND THE DEFINED AUTHORIZATION.

I WILL GIVE TWO EXAMPLES. IN

CHRISMAN V. LOS ANGELES, THE CASE BEFORE THE

CALIFORNIA COURT OF APPEAL, A POLICE OFFICER HAD

GONE AND USED THE POLICE DEPARTMENT'S COMPUTERS,

THE CITY'S COMPUTERS, TO LOOK UP INFORMATION ABOUT

CELEBRITIES AND OTHER MATTERS THAT HE HAD NO

BUSINESS LOOKING AT.

SO HE WAS AUTHORIZED TO USE THE COMPUTER
SYSTEM BUT HE WAS ONLY AUTHORIZED TO USE IT FOR

PROPER POLICE BUSINESS. AND WHEN HE WENT AND LOOKED AT CELEBRITY GOSSIP TYPE GOSSIP THINGS, HE EXCEEDED WHAT HE WAS AUTHORIZED TO DO.

AND THE CALIFORNIA COURT OF APPEALS SAID NO, THAT IS NOT UNAUTHORIZED ASSESS UNDER 502

BECAUSE THE POLICE OFFICER WAS AUTHORIZED TO USE

THE COMPUTER, HE SIMPLY WENT BEYOND THE PROPER

PURPOSES.

THE COURT: I'M FAMILIAR WITH THAT CASE.

LET ME SEE IF I CAN PUT IT IN THE CONTEXT OF WHAT'S

HAPPENING HERE.

HERE, LET'S ASSUME THAT OFFICER GOES IN

AND HE'S LOOKING FOR INFORMATION FOR A PERSONAL

PURPOSE, AND THE CITY OR WHOEVER IS OPERATING THE

SYSTEM KNOWS THAT PEOPLE ARE DOING THAT SO THEY PUT

IN CERTAIN PROTECTIONS WHERE YOU NEED A POLICE CASE

NUMBER AND YOU NEED THE SERGEANT WHO IS INVOLVED IN

THE CASE AND ALL THAT INFORMATION TO BE ADDED.

AND THIS PERSON DOESN'T HAVE THAT, AND SO
THE TECHNOLOGY IS SET UP SO THAT HE NEEDS TO GET
AROUND THOSE REQUIREMENTS AND HE STARTS TO USE SOME
DEVICE TO GET AROUND IT.

WOULD THAT CHANGE THE CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE
IT BECOMES A HACK AS OPPOSED TO SOMEONE WHO HAS
ACCESS?

MR. BURSOR: I DON'T KNOW THE ANSWER TO
THAT, YOUR HONOR, BECAUSE I DON'T THINK THERE'S A
CASE THAT ADDRESSES THAT ISSUE.

THE COURT: ISN'T THAT WHAT'S RAISED HERE?

IN OTHER WORDS, WHAT FACEBOOK SAID THEY
DID WAS IT PUT IN A TECHNOLOGICAL BARRIER TO THE
KIND OF ACCESS THAT WAS COMING IN. FOR EXAMPLE, IT
IDENTIFIED MAYBE POWER'S, AS A WEBSITE, THAT
THROUGH WHICH IT WOULD NOT ALLOW. SO IN ORDER TO
GET AROUND THAT, POWER MADE SOME MODIFICATIONS TO
ITSELF OR TO HOW IT ACCESSED FACEBOOK TO DISGUISE
WHAT'S GOING ON, AND THAT THEN BECAME SOMETHING
OTHER THAN THE USER SIMPLY USING POWER AS THE KEY
TO ENTERING INTO THEIR OWN ACCOUNT.

MR. BURSOR: WELL, ACTUALLY THE LAST PART
OF YOUR HONOR'S STATEMENT IS NOT ACCURATE. THE
USERS WERE STILL USING THEIR AUTHORIZED USERNAMES
AND PASSWORDS TO GET INTO THEIR ACCOUNT.

THERE WAS A DISPUTE BETWEEN POWER AND FACEBOOK AS TO WHETHER POWER WAS GOING TO BE ALLOWED TO OFFER THOSE SERVICES SO THAT PEOPLE COULD ACCESS THEIR ACCOUNTS THROUGH POWER.

AND I THINK IF YOUR HONOR TAKES A LOOK AT
THE EVIDENCE THAT WAS SUBMITTED BY FACEBOOK

ATTACHED TO MR. AVALOS'S DECLARATION WHERE HE SUBMITTED THE BACK AND FORTH BETWEEN MR. VACHANI AND THE FACEBOOK FOLKS. YOU CAN SEE THERE'S A BACK AND FORTH WHERE POWER IS A NEW BUSINESS THAT'S STARTING AND THEY WANT TO BE ON GOOD TERMS WITH FACEBOOK SO THEY ARE CONSTANTLY TRYING TO ENGAGE FACEBOOK TO SOLVE WHATEVER PROBLEM FACEBOOK HAS AND ATTACH IN AN APPROPRIATE WAY WITHOUT -- WHETHER POWER HAD A LEGAL ENTITLEMENT TO DO WHAT THEY WERE DOING, WHICH THEY BELIEVE THEY DID, NEVERTHELESS BECAUSE THEY WANTED GOOD RELATIONS, THEY WANTED TO WORK WITH FACEBOOK.

AND FACEBOOK HAD THROWN UP THIS BARRIER

AND POWER DID CIRCUMVENT THAT BARRIER, AND THAT IS

ESTABLISHED BY THE PLEADINGS. BUT POWER'S

CIRCUMVENTION STILL DID NOTHING OTHER THAN ALLOW

USERS TO CONTINUE TO ACCESS THEIR OWN ACCOUNTS WITH

THE KEYS AND PASSWORDS THAT FACEBOOK HAD GIVEN

THEM.

WHAT POWER DID WAS TO DEFEND ITSELF SO

THAT IT WOULD BE ON THE SAME FOOTING WITH EVERY

OTHER BROWSER SO THE USER USING THE FACEBOOK

BROWSER COULD ACCESS IT THE SAME AS SOMEONE USING

INTERNET EXPLORER OR FIREFOX OR SAFARI

THE COURT: SO I SHOULD SAY AS A MATTER

OF LAW THAT ANY TECHNOLOGICAL BARRIER WHICH

FACEBOOK ERECTS TO ITS USERS' ACCESS CANNOT, AS A

MATTER OF LAW, VIOLATE 502?

MR. BURSOR: WE ARE NOT ASKING YOU TO DO THAT AT THIS HEARING, YOUR HONOR.

THE COURT: WELL, WHERE IS THE LINE?

IN OTHER WORDS, IF I -- IF THERE IS A TECHNOLOGICAL BARRIER THAT FACEBOOK COULD ERECT WHERE ITS USERS, GOING THROUGH POWER, WOULD VIOLATE 502, DON'T I NEED TO KNOW WHERE THAT IS SO THAT I CAN SAY CLEARLY I'M NOT AT THAT LINE IN THIS CASE? SO THAT'S WHY I ASKED THE QUESTION.

MR. BURSOR: THAT'S A DIFFICULT QUESTION,
YOUR HONOR, PARTICULARLY IN A CASE WHERE THERE'S NO
EVIDENTIARY RECORD PERTINENT TO THAT QUESTION.

THE COURT: LET ME TAKE THAT AS THE

REASON I'M CONCERNED. THIS IS A MOTION FOR

JUDGEMENT ON THE PLEADINGS. SO IF THERE IS A -
THAT MOTION REQUIRES THAT EVERYTHING I ASSUME ON

HIS SIDE CAN BE PROVED AND I'VE GOT TO CONSTRUE THE

EVIDENCE FAVORABLY TO POWER IN THIS CASE.

THIS IS VERY EARLY IN THIS LITIGATION AND

I CAN APPRECIATE WHERE BOTH SIDES WOULD WANT TO

HAVE EARLY COURT DETERMINATION, BUT AM I IN A

POSITION WHERE SIMPLY THE ADMISSION ON THE PART OF

1	POWER THAT IT USES ITS TOOLS TO ALLOW THOSE WHO
2	WOULD WISH TO ACCESS FACEBOOK THROUGH POWER, AREN'T
3	I TOO EARLY IN THIS CASE TO MAKE A JUDGMENT THAT
4	THAT ALONE VIOLATES 502?
5	MR. CHATTERJEE: NO, YOUR HONOR. YOU CAN
6	ISSUE AN ORDER ON JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS IN OUR
7	FAVOR NOW.
8	THE COURT: WHY?
9	MR. CHATTERJEE: BECAUSE THEY ADMITTED AN
10	EXTRAORDINARY AMOUNT OF FACTS IN THEIR ANSWER, AND
11	THAT IS A KEY ISSUE BECAUSE IT'S THE SAME AS A
12	STIPULATION, A REQUEST FOR ADMISSION.
13	THE COURT: HAVE THEY ADMITTED FACTS
14	HAVING TO DO WITH THE NATURE OF THE TECHNOLOGICAL
15	BARRIER AND THE NATURE OF HOW THEY OVERCAME IT THAT
16	I CAN SAY, AS A MATTER OF LAW, THAT CONSTITUTES
17	HACKING?
18	MR. CHATTERJEE: YES, YOUR HONOR; THEY
19	DID.
20	NOT ONLY DID WE SUBMIT IT, MR. VACHANI
21	HIMSELF PUT IN TESTIMONY SAYING THAT HE DIDN'T
22	THINK PUTTING UP A TECHNICAL BARRIER WAS ALL THAT
23	HARD AND HE CIRCUMVENTED IT.

THE COURT: ARE ALL TECHNOLOGICAL BARRIERS TREATED EQUALLY?

IN OTHER WORDS, ARE THERE SOME TECHNOLOGICAL BARRIERS SUCH AS MAYBE -- I KNOW THERE ARE IN USE CERTAIN ENTRY DEVICES SUCH AS, TYPE THE WORD THAT APPEARS BELOW, AND IT'S KIND OF A LITTLE ASKEW SO AS TO ASSURE THERE'S A REAL HUMAN BEING ON THE OTHER SIDE, THAT'S A TECHNOLOGICAL BARRIER. BUT THERE COULD BE OTHERS THAT MAY OR MAY NOT SERVE AS A LINE OVER WHICH YOU CAN OR CANNOT CROSS UNDER 502. AND AREN'T I TOO EARLY IN THIS CASE TO BE DOING THE LINE DRAWING? BECAUSE A JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS MEANS CASE OVER. MR. CHATTERJEE: SURE, YOUR HONOR. BUT THIS IS A CASE THAT'S CONSIDERABLY MORE THAN THAT,

MR. CHATTERJEE: SURE, YOUR HONOR. BUT
THIS IS A CASE THAT'S CONSIDERABLY MORE THAN THAT,
RIGHT? BECAUSE NOT ONLY WERE THERE TECHNOLOGICAL
BARRIERS, WE TOLD THEM WE DIDN'T WANT THEM TO
ACCESS.

THE <u>REGISTER V. VERIO</u> CASE, WHICH WE CITE, IT WAS A CASE WHERE A C&D WAS SENT AND THEY SAID, PLEASE DON'T ACCESS OUR WEBSITE IN THIS WAY.

AND THAT'S ENOUGH -- IF YOUR HONOR IS PUT
IN THE POSITION OF DECIDING WHAT KIND OF TECHNICAL
BARRIER IS ENOUGH, THERE'S NO SUPPORT FOR THAT KIND
OF LANGUAGE IN THE STATUTE.

IN THIS CASE IT'S NOT A PLACE WHERE THE LINE IS CLOSE, THEY CROSSED IT REALLY FAR. WHAT

MORE COULD FACEBOOK HAVE DONE? WE HAD A TERMS OF 1 USE; WE ALERTED THEM TO THE TERMS OF USE; WE SENT 2 3 THEM A CEASE AND DESIST; WE TRIED TO WORK WITH THEM; THEY ASSURED US THEY WERE GONNA WORK WITH US. 4 5 ALL OF THESE ARE ADMITTED IN THE 6 PLEADINGS. WE THEN ERECTED A TECHNICAL BARRIER. 7 THEY SAID, MAYBE YOU SHOULDN'T APPLY 502(C) IN THIS 8 INSTANCE BECAUSE IT WASN'T REALLY THAT HARD TO WORK AROUND IT. AT WHAT POINT DOES THE COURT COME IN 9 10 AND SAY, WELL, WE ARE NOT GOING TO RECOGNIZE WHAT 11 502(C) SAYS BECAUSE THE BARRIER WASN'T ENOUGH --12 THE COURT: SO YOU DON'T THINK ANY 13 TECHNOLOGICAL BARRIER IS SUFFICIENT? 14 MR. CHATTERJEE: I WOULD SAY UNDER THE 15 FACTS THAT ARE ADMITTED IN THIS CASE, THE 16 ESCALATION THAT WAS FOLLOWED AND THE INTENTIONAL DECISION THAT CONSTANTLY DID NOT HONOR FACEBOOK'S 17 18 REQUESTS. THERE WAS A KNOWING AND WITHOUT 19 PERMISSION ACCESS TO THE FACEBOOK WEBSITE. 20 THEY MET THE EXPRESS -- THOSE ADMISSIONS MEET THE EXPRESS LANGUAGE OF CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE 21 22 502(C). 23 MR. BURSOR: YOUR HONOR, MAY I? 24 THE COURT: CERTAINLY.

MR. BURSOR: THE ACTUAL ACCESS THAT

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OCCURRED IN THIS CASE ALL OCCURRED WITHIN A TWO

MONTH SPAN, TWO AND A HALF MONTHS -- LATE DECEMBER

OF '08 THROUGH FEBRUARY OF '09.

AND THE VERY SPARSE EVIDENCE THAT IS IN

THE RECORD FROM THE VACHANI DECLARATION AND FROM

MR. AVALOS'S DECLARATION ATTACHING A CORRESPONDENCE

BETWEEN FACEBOOK AND MR. VACHANI, WHAT THAT SHOWS

IS THAT THE PARTIES AT THAT TIME WERE ATTEMPTING TO

RESOLVE THIS THROUGH HAVING POWER CONNECT TO

FACEBOOK THROUGH MEANS THAT WERE GOING TO BE

ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH SIDES.

WHAT IS NOT IN THE RECORD IS THE TIMING

OF WHEN THE SUPPOSED BARRIER OF THE IP BLOCKING WAS

IMPLEMENTED, WHAT IS NOT IN THE RECORD IS WHAT THE

CIRCUMVENTION WAS THAT GOT AROUND THE IP BLOCKING.

WHAT IS NOT IN THE RECORD IS WHERE THE PARTIES WERE

IN THEIR DISCUSSIONS AND WHETHER THE CIRCUMVENTION

WAS NECESSARY.

THE COURT: CAN I -- LET ME ASK YOU THIS:

CAN I SAY AT LEAST, HOWEVER, THAT IF FACEBOOK

ERECTS A TECHNOLOGICAL BARRIER, ANY CONDUCT TO

OVERCOME IT IS WITHOUT PERMISSION, BY DEFINITION?

MR. BURSOR: I DON'T THINK YOUR HONOR HAS
THE RECORD BEFORE YOU TO MAKE A SWEEPING
PRONOUNCEMENT OF THAT NATURE.

IF THERE'S GOING TO BE A BROAD GENERAL STATEMENT TO THAT EFFECT, IT OUGHT TO BE MADE ON A FULL EVIDENTIARY RECORD BY A COURT THAT KNOWS WHAT HAPPENED IN THIS CASE, KNOWS IT HAS AN ACTUAL CASE OR CONTROVERSY BEFORE IT THAT CALLS FOR RESOLUTION IN THAT MATTER.

THE COURT: THAT MAY BE.

IN OTHER WORDS, ISN'T THE ESSENCE OF

PERMISSION THAT YOU DON'T HAVE TO DO SOMETHING TO

OVERCOME A BARRIER, PERMISSION MEANS THE GATE IS

OPEN. SO IF THEY DO ANYTHING TO LOCK THE GATE,

AREN'T YOU, BY DEFINITION, THEN ENTERING WITHOUT

PERMISSION?

MR. BURSOR: CLEARLY NOT, YOUR HONOR,
BECAUSE THAT WOULD CLEARLY BE WRONG, WITH ALL DUE
RESPECT, BECAUSE THERE WAS A GATE AND THERE WAS A
LOCK ON THE GATE, WHICH WAS THE USERNAME AND
PASSWORD ISSUED TO THE FACEBOOK USERS. FACEBOOK
USERS HAD PERMISSION TO USE THAT KEY AND THAT GATE
BY USING THE LOGIN NAME AND PASSWORD; THAT'S A
BARRIER.

THE COURT: THAT'S A FORM OF PERMISSION

TO THE USER. AND I CAN WORD IT IN A WAY SUCH THAT

IF THE TECHNOLOGICAL BARRIER STILL ALLOWED ACCESS

SIMPLY USING THE USERNAME AND PASSWORD, THAT'S NOT

A TECHNOLOGICAL BARRIER, IT'S ACTUALLY THE SAME.

BUT IF THE BARRIER IS ANYTHING MORE THAN

THAT -- I'M TRYING TO GET TO WHETHER OR NOT I'M IN

A 502 WORLD BECAUSE THE CLAIM IS UNDER 502, AND IF

I'M IN THE 502 WORLD IT STILL RAISES THE QUESTION

OF THE MERITS OF THE CLAIM.

THE QUESTION THAT I'M PUTTING IS, AND I

PUT IT TO BOTH SIDES QUITE FRANKLY IS, IF THERE

WERE TECHNOLOGICAL BARRIERS AREN'T I, AS OPPOSED TO

USERNAME AND PASSWORD, ISN'T THAT WHAT 502 IS ALL

ABOUT?

MR. BURSOR: LET ME EXPLAIN, YOUR HONOR,

I THINK VERY QUICKLY AND PRECISELY, WHY THE COURT

CAN'T MAKE THAT DETERMINATION NOW.

THE COURT DOESN'T HAVE A RECORD OF WHAT
THE BARRIER WAS OR CIRCUMVENTION WAS. SO IF THE
PARTIES ARE IN THE COURSE OF NEGOTIATING A
RESOLUTION OR ATTEMPTING TO, WHICH IS CLEARLY THE
CASE, SEE THE AVALOS DECLARATION, AND FACEBOOK SAYS
WE DON'T WANT YOU ACCESSING OUR SITE IN THIS MANNER
FROM THIS IP THEREFORE WE'VE BLOCKED IT, AND POWER
IS WORKING ON A DIFFERENT MEANS OF ACCESS, TRYING
TO IMPLEMENT FACEBOOK CONNECT AND IS DOING SO
THROUGH A DIFFERENT IP ADDRESS -- AND I'M NOT
SAYING THOSE ARE THE FACTS. I'M SAYING YOUR HONOR

DOESN'T HAVE THE FACTS BECAUSE FACEBOOK PUT IN NO EVIDENCE.

IF THAT WAS THE CASE, THE COURT DOESN'T

HAVE A RECORD OF WHAT THE BARRIER WAS, WHY IT WAS

IN PLACE, HOW IT WAS CIRCUMVENTED, WHETHER THE

CIRCUMVENTION WAS PART OF THE JOINT PROJECT BETWEEN

THE TWO COMPANIES OF TRYING TO FIND COMMON GROUND

ON IMPLEMENTING THIS FACEBOOK CONNECT TECHNOLOGY.

THESE ARE ALL OPEN QUESTIONS IN THE CASE
BECAUSE FACEBOOK BROUGHT ITS MOTION BEFORE ANY
EVIDENCE WAS DEVELOPED, WITHOUT ANY DISCOVERY.

THEY COULD HAVE SUBMITTED A DECLARATION

FROM AN EMPLOYEE SAYING, THIS IS THE MEANS WE USED

TO BLOCK, AND SPECIFIED IT, AND HERE'S HOW IT WAS

OVERCOME AND HERE'S WHY WE DID THAT.

THE COURT: BY BRINGING THE MOTION IT GIVES THE COURT AN OPPORTUNITY TO NARROW THE CASE.

SO ARE YOU SAYING I SHOULD RESIST EVEN

THE TEMPTATION TO SAY IN ORDER TO STATE A CLAIM

UNDER THIS YOU MUST ALLEGE A TECHNOLOGICAL BARRIER

AND GIVE ME FACTS?

AND IT SEEMS TO BE YOUR POSITION IS I

SHOULDN'T EVEN SAY THAT, THE TECHNOLOGICAL BARRIER

BY DEFINITION -- THERE'S NO BARRIER THAT CAN BE TOO

HIGH OR TOO LOW. AND SOMEHOW I'M BOTHERED BY THE

NOTION THAT I SHOULDN'T SAY ANYTHING.

NOW, I AM INTRIGUED BY THE NOTION THAT THERE'S A SETTLEMENT BECAUSE I ALWAYS BELIEVE IN WORLD PEACE AND I BELIEVE IT STARTS RIGHT HERE.

SO IF YOU TELL ME THAT THE PARTIES ARE
WORKING OUT SOME KIND OF A RESOLUTION TO THIS
PROBLEM WHICH WOULD AVOID THE COURT HAVING TO
COMMENT AT ALL ON 502 AND WHERE IT STANDS, BECAUSE
I SEE THE AMICUS AND THAT MEANS THAT THERE'S A
COMMUNITY OF PEOPLE OUT THERE, NOT SAYING YOU TWO
DON'T REPRESENT THAT COMMUNITY, BUT THAT ARE
CONCERNED WITH THE STATUTE AND HOW FAR IT GOES.

SO QUITE FRANKLY I THOUGHT THAT IT WOULD BE BENEFICIAL TO STATE SOMETHING ON IT, BUT I DON'T BELIEVE IN ACTING IF THERE'S NO REASON TO ACT. SO IF YOU TELL ME THAT THESE TWO PARTIES WILL RESOLVE THIS AND I WILL LEAVE IT TO SOME OTHER JUDGE TO DEFINE THESE MATTERS, I'M HAPPY TO DO THAT.

MR. CHATTERJEE: YOUR HONOR, WE DID TRY
MEDIATION IN THIS CASE THROUGH THE COURT'S PROGRAM.
WE MADE ZERO PROGRESS.

JUST TO BE CLEAR, WHAT DOES FACEBOOK WANT
OUT OF THIS LITIGATION? WHAT FACEBOOK WANTS OUT OF
THIS LITIGATION AT THE END OF THE DAY IS THAT IF
POWER CHOOSES TO ACCESS THE FACEBOOK WEBSITE, IT

ACCESS IT THROUGH THE CONNECT PROGRAM WHICH IS WHAT

HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF OTHER COMPANIES DO,

INCLUDING POWER COMPETITORS.

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REQUESTS.

- THAT'S ALL WE WANT. THAT'S ALL WE'VE

 EVER WANTED IN THIS CASE. AND WE DON'T UNDERSTAND

 WHY THEY CAN'T DO THAT. INSTEAD, THEY WANT TO

 ENGAGE IN THIS UNRESTRICTED INTRUSION INTO OUR

 COMPUTER, AND THEY PUT IT UNDER THE GUISE OF USER
 - IF YOU LOOK AT PARAGRAPH 75 AND 66 OF
 THEIR OWN ANSWER, THEY ADMIT THEY ARE THE ONES
 DOING IT, POWER IS, NOT THE USERS.
- THE COURT: WELL, I'M ABOUT TO TAKE THIS

 MATTER UNDER SUBMISSION, BUT I WILL GIVE YOU EACH

 KIND OF A CLOSING WORD.
 - MR. BURSOR: YOUR HONOR --
- THE COURT: I UNDERSTAND I'VE GOT THESE

 ANTI-TRUST CLAIMS, BUT I'M NOT DEALING WITH THOSE

 TODAY.
- MR. BURSOR: ALL RIGHT.
- YOUR HONOR, MY CLOSING WORD WILL BE THIS: I CAN
 UNDERSTAND HOW IN THIS SORT OF NOVEL AREA OF THE
 LAW, WE ARE AT A DIFFICULT SORT OF STITCH IN A
 SOMEWHAT NEW AREA OF THE LAW AND THE COURT WANTS TO
 STATE A RULE WITH SOME CLARITY SO THAT NOT ONLY

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THESE PARTIES BUT OTHER PEOPLE OUT THERE IN THE
WORLD IN THIS FIELD CAN KNOW WHAT THEIR
RESPONSIBILITIES AND WHAT THEIR OBLIGATIONS ARE. I
CAN UNDERSTAND THE COURT'S DESIRE TO DO THAT.

BUT I THINK THE COURT HAS TO FOCUS IN ON
THE MOTION BEFORE IT. AND THE MOTION THAT'S BEFORE
IT DOES NOT PRESENT THE OPPORTUNITY FOR SUCH A
SWEEPING PRONOUNCEMENT. AND THE REASON IT DOES NOT
PRESENT THE OPPORTUNITY IS BECAUSE AS A MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGEMENT, THE COURT HAS TO LOOK TO WHETHER
FACEBOOK HAS MET ITS EVIDENTIARY BURDEN.

A SUMMARY JUDGEMENT MOTION IS AN EVIDENTIARY MOTION, YOU HAVE TO PUT ON EVIDENCE.

AND THEY HAVE NOT PUT ON ANY EVIDENCE THAT COULD ALLOW THE COURT TO FORM A COGENT ANSWER TO ANY OF THE VERY -- YOU KNOW, THE QUESTIONS THE COURT ASKED WERE VERY ON POINT, VERY IMPORTANT, THEY GO TO THE HEART OF THE MATTER. BUT THAT DOESN'T CHANGE THE FACT THAT FACEBOOK HASN'T PUT IN EVIDENCE TO MEET ITS EVIDENTIARY BURDEN UNDER RULE 56 TO GET SUMMARY JUDGEMENT.

WE HAVE -- ON THE STANDING POINT, WE DID

PUT IN EVIDENCE. WE PUT IN A DECLARATION FOR

MR. VACHANI THAT SAID NONE OF THESE INJURIES

HAPPENED, THEY NEVER COULD HAVE HAPPENED, FACEBOOK

1 HAD NO CONCERN EVER THAT THEY WOULD HAVE HAPPENED. 2 AND IF YOU GO AND LOOK AT THE 3 CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN MR. VACHANI AND FACEBOOK, 4 THE CONTEMPORANEOUS CORRESPONDENCE, THERE'S NO 5 CONCERN EXPRESSED BY ANY PARTY TO THOSE 6 COMMUNICATIONS ABOUT ANY OF THESE THINGS TALKED 7 ABOUT IN 502(E)(1) OR 502(B)(9). 8 AND SO YOU HAVE A CASE WHERE YOU HAVE A 9 TOTALLY UNINJURED PARTY THAT'S TRYING TO BULLY SOME 10 SMALLER START UP THAT WANTS TO COMPETE WITH THEM. AND THEY HAVEN'T SHOWN AN INJURY AND THEY HAVEN'T 11 12 PUT ON EVIDENCE OF A VIOLATION TO GET SUMMARY 13 JUDGEMENT. 14 SO THEIR MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGEMENT 15 SHOULD BE DENIED, OURS SHOULD BE GRANTED BECAUSE 16 THEY DON'T HAVE STANDING UNDER 502(E)(1). IF YOU WANT TO COME INTO THIS COURT AND 17 GET RELIEF UNDER 502, YOU HAVE TO SHOW YOU MADE AN 18 19 EXPENDITURE REASONABLY OR NECESSARILY INCURRED FOR 20 THESE PURPOSES. THEY DIDN'T DO THAT. OR YOU HAVE 21 TO SHOW YOU HAVE AN INJURY, AND THEY CONCEDE THEY 22 DIDN'T HAVE AN INJURY. 23 THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 24 THE COURT: VERY WELL.

COUNSEL.

25

MR. CHATTERJEE: I GUESS I WILL START
WITH THE CORE DISAGREEMENT AS TO WHETHER THIS IS IN
FACT A NOVEL QUESTION OF LAW; IT ISN'T.

COURTS HAVE RECOGNIZED FOR A LONG TIME

THAT COMPUTER INTRUSIONS ARE PROTECTED. THEY HAVE

BEEN PROTECTED UNDER THE COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE

ACT AND THEY HAVE BEEN PROTECTED AS THE

NINTH CIRCUIT CASE OF EBAY V. BITTERS EDGE THAT I'M

SURE YOUR HONOR IS FAMILIAR WITH THAT TRESPASS TO

CHATTELS, AND CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE 502(C).

JUDGE SEEBORG IN THE CONNECTU CASE

RECOGNIZED THAT THIS TYPE OF ACTION, A FAR LESS

AGGRESSIVE FORM OF THIS TYPE OF ACTION, IS

ACTIONABLE UNDER CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE 502(C).

THE JOSEPH OAT HOLDINGS CASE THAT I

REFERRED TO YOU GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGEMENT FOR A

COMPUTER INTRUSION, YOUR HONOR.

WE'RE NOT ASKING YOU TO DO ANYTHING
HIGHLY UNUSUAL HERE, WE ARE ASKING YOU TO FOLLOW
WHAT THE LEGIONS OF CASES HAVE SAID IN THE PAST
THAT WHEN YOU SAY THE WELCOME LIGHT IS NOT ON AND
PEOPLE DECIDE TO WALK RIGHT PAST IT, THAT THAT IS
CONSIDERED AND SHOULD BE CONSIDERED A TRESPASS.
WHEN WE HAVE TO CONTINUALLY EXPEND MONEY TO NOTIFY
THEM AND KEEP THE TRESPASSERS OUT, THAT THAT IS A

1 PROPER DAMAGE OR LOSS UNDER THE LAW.

THESE ARE ALL ADMISSIONS UNDER THE

COMPLAINT. IN TAB A OF THE BINDER I GAVE YOU,

YOUR HONOR, WE ACTUALLY WENT THROUGH EACH ONE OF

THE ELEMENTS OF CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE 502(C) AND WE

MARRIED IT TO THE VERY ADMISSIONS OR OTHER EVIDENCE

SUBMITTED BY THE PARTIES TO SHOW HOW EACH ELEMENT

IS MET.

YOUR HONOR, THERE'S NO QUESTION HERE THAT
POWER MADE THE DECISION NOT TO COME INTO FACEBOOK
THROUGH THE AUTHORIZED CHANNELS, BUT AFTER THEY
WERE EXPRESSLY TOLD AND REPEATEDLY TOLD THAT THAT'S
THE ONLY WAY THEY SHOULD COME IN, THEY CHOSE NOT TO
DO THAT AND DECIDED TO HACK AROUND THE TECHNICAL
MEASURES THAT FACEBOOK PUT IN PLAY.

THOSE ARE THE PRECISE TYPES OF THINGS
THAT CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE 502(C) SEEKS TO PROTECT.

THE PREMISE THAT THE PLAINTIFF IS -WE'RE THE PLAINTIFF, I'M SORRY -- THAT POWER IS
ARGUING, IS THAT IT SHOULDN'T BE -- IT SHOULD HAVE
TO BE A REALLY, REALLY BIG DEAL.

YOUR HONOR, THE STATUTE DOES NOT DEFINE

AT WHAT POINT A TECHNICAL MEASURE HAS TO BE SO

SUBSTANTIAL THAT IT COULD CONSTITUTES AN INTRUSION.

HERE, FACEBOOK DID EVERYTHING IT POSSIBLY COULD. POWER DECIDED NOT TO HONOR ANY OF IT. AND AT THAT POINT THEY SHOULD BE ENJOINED FROM ENTERING FACEBOOK WITHOUT OUR EXPRESS PERMISSION. IT'S THE ONLY WAY WE CAN GET THAT RELIEF, AND THAT'S WHAT 502(C) SEEKS TO PROTECT.

THE COURT: THANK YOU BOTH.

I THOUGHT THAT I WAS GOING TO ACTUALLY
HEAR FROM AN AMICUS. MY STAFF GAVE ME A NOTE THAT
WE HAD ACTUALLY CONSIDERED THAT THEIR BRIEF WAS
FILED AND WHAT WE WANTED WAS TO HAVE IT FILED
SEPARATELY FROM THEIR REQUEST FOR PERMISSION.

PARTIES' UNDERSTANDING PERHAPS THAT THE COURT DID

NOT HAVE THAT BRIEF UNDER CONSIDERATION BECAUSE IT

WAS NOT FILED, I READ IT AND I CONSIDERED IT AND IT

IS PART OF THE CONSIDERATIONS THAT THE COURT BRINGS

TO AT LEAST A PART OF THIS QUESTION. AND PERHAPS

THE ARGUMENT TODAY HAS ADVANCED THE QUESTION BEYOND

THAT TERMS OF USE ISSUE, BUT I HAD THOUGHT IT WOULD

BE WORTHWHILE TO ADDRESS IT.

VERY WELL. YES?

MS. GRANICK: I'M JENNIFER GRANICK AND

I'M A LAWYER FOR THE ELECTRIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION.

WE FILED THE AMICUS BRIEF IN QUESTION.

1	THE COURT: VERY WELL.
2	MS. GRANICK: JUST ON THE PROCEDURAL
3	POINT, IF I MAY.
4	OUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE
5	THE COURT: COME FORWARD.
6	MS. GRANICK: OUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE
7	ORDER THAT THE COURT HAD FILED WAS THAT THE BRIEF
8	WHICH HAD BEEN ATTACHED TO OUR MOTION FOR LEAVE
9	WOULD BE FILED ON THE COURT DOCKET. I DIDN'T
10	UNDERSTAND FROM THE MOTION THAT WE WERE SUPPOSED TO
11	TAKE ADDITIONAL ACTION TO FILE THE BRIEF.
12	THE COURT: I SEE.
13	MS. GRANICK: WE HAD ATTACHED IT WITH THE
14	MOTION FOR LEAVE.
15	THE COURT: OKAY.
16	MS. GRANICK: NOW GIVEN YOUR DISCUSSION
17	TODAY I UNDERSTAND THAT WHAT WAS BEING ASKED FOR US
18	WAS TO TAKE THE BRIEF AND GO THROUGH ECF AND FILE
19	IT AGAIN.
20	THE COURT: SEPARATE FROM THE MOTION FOR
21	LEAVE.
22	BUT I HAVE IT, SO I WILL CONSIDER
23	UNLESS THERE'S SOME OBJECTION, IT SOUNDED LIKE THE
24	NAMED PARTIES BELIEVED THAT SINCE YOU HADN'T DONE
25	ANYTHING FURTHER THEY NEED NOT RESPOND TO IT. AND

1 PERHAPS WHAT I UNDERSTAND THERE TO BE A REQUEST
2 BEFORE I ISSUE AN ORDER, I GIVE THEM AN OPPORTUNITY
3 TO RESPOND.
4 MS. GRANICK: RIGHT.

AND YOUR HONOR IT MAY BE APPROPRIATE,

GIVEN THE DISCUSSION WE HAD IN THE COURT TODAY, IT

MAY BE APPROPRIATE AT THIS POINT FOR US TO, GIVEN

THE WAY THE ARGUMENT HAS GONE AND WHAT IT SEEMS

THAT YOUR HONOR'S CONCERN IS AND THE PARTICULAR

QUESTION OF TECHNOLOGICAL MEASURES AND

AMEND OUR BRIEF TO ADDRESS MORE SPECIFICALLY THE ISSUES THAT WERE RAISED IN THE HEARING TODAY AND THEN TO FILE THAT AT SOME POINT IN TIME.

CIRCUMVENTION, IT MIGHT BE APPROPRIATE FOR US TO

THE COURT: SURE. I WELCOME YOUR INPUT,
UNLESS THERE'S AN OBJECTION FROM THE PARTIES.

SO WHATEVER WE DO TODAY, SINCE I PRESUME I HAVE A REQUEST FOR YOU TO HAVE LEAVE TO RESPOND TO THE AMICUS.

MR. CHATTERJEE: YES, YOUR HONOR, WE DO.

ALTHOUGH WE WOULD PREFER FOR THINGS TO BE SET, SUBMITTED BECAUSE THIS HAS BEEN LINGERING AROUND.

THE COURT: YOU LIKE CLOSURE, AND EVERYBODY DOES AND SO DO I.

1	BUT IT DOES SEEM TO ME THE INITIAL
2	CONCERN WITH TERMS OF USE STILL REMAINS WITH THE
3	COURT AND I INTEND TO ADDRESS IT. BUT IF YOU HAVE
4	CONCERNS THAT WOULD ADVANCE THE ISSUE FOR THE
5	AMICUS TO EVEN TECHNOLOGICAL BARRIERS, HOW LONG
6	WOULD IT TAKE YOU TO PROVIDE THE COURT WITH YOUR
7	SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF?
8	MS. GRANICK: I DON'T THINK IT WOULD TAKE
9	VERY LONG. I, FRANKLY, THINK IT COULD BE SOMETHING
10	WE COULD DO IN TWO WEEKS.
11	THE COURT: TWO WEEKS IS A LONG TIME FOR
12	ME. I WILL BE ON VACATION.
13	MS. GRANICK: YOU ARE THE JUDGE, SO I
14	CAN
15	THE COURT: TWO WEEKS? YOU GOT IT. HOW
16	LONG WILL YOU NEED AFTER THE TWO-WEEK PERIOD THAT
17	COUNSEL IS ASKING FOR FOR HER SUPPLEMENTAL TO
18	RESPOND TO THAT?
19	MR. CHATTERJEE: YOUR HONOR, I WOULD SAY
20	ONE TO TWO WEEKS.
21	THE COURT: AND SIMULTANEOUSLY
22	MR. BURSOR: WE WOULD LIKE TO RESPOND.
23	THE COURT: SO THE WHOLE THING WILL BE
24	BEFORE ME THEN IN FOUR WEEKS?
25	MR. CHATTERJEE: YOUR HONOR, IF I MAY ASK

A QUESTION, SHOULD THESE -- I JUST WANT TO MAKE

SURE WE ARE NOT GOING THROUGH AND REHASHING ALL OF

THE PAST.

SHOULD WE BE FOCUSSING ON THE QUESTION

YOUR HONOR ASKED ABOUT TECHNOLOGICAL MEASURES AND

WHERE SHOULD THE LINE BE DRAWN, OR SHOULD IT BE

ANYTHING PEOPLE WANT TO SAY?

THE COURT: WELL, THAT IS THE AREA I'M

CONCERNED ABOUT. I WOULD HAVE YOU RESPOND TO THE

EXTENT YOU WISH TO, TO TWO AREAS.

FIRST IS THE ISSUE OF THE TERMS OF USE

BARRIER AND WHETHER THAT QUALIFIES UNDER 502, WHICH

WAS THE INITIAL POSITION I HAD FROM THE AMICUS.

AND TO THE EXTENT THAT THE AMICUS BRIEF WOULD ADD FURTHER ARGUMENT BEYOND WHAT YOU'VE ALREADY ARGUED ON TECHNOLOGICAL TERMS AS PLED.

YOU CALLED IT A MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGEMENT, BUT TECHNICALLY IT'S A MOTION FOR

JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS. SO I ACCEPT WHATEVER

POWER HAS ALLEGED AS PROVABLE, AND SO WHAT I HAVE

BEFORE ME IS FACEBOOK'S ARGUMENT THAT THAT

CONSTITUTES A VIOLATION OF 502.

YOUR AMICUS BRIEF HAS TO MAKE THE SAME
ASSUMPTION TO BE USEFUL. SO YOU HAVE AN
OPPORTUNITY IN YOUR BRIEF TO RESPOND TO WHATEVER

1 NEW INFORMATION IS SUBMITTED. 2 MR. CHATTERJEE: SO WE ARE FOCUSSING ON 3 THE TECHNOLOGICAL MEANS? THE COURT: YES. 4 5 MR. CHATTERJEE: OKAY. THANK YOU. MS. GRANICK: BUT I THINK ALSO, IF I 6 7 UNDERSTAND CORRECTLY, THE SUBSTANTIVE, THE BRIEF WE 8 ATTACHED --9 THE COURT: YES, I SAID THAT INITIALLY. 10 IN OTHER WORDS, THERE IS AN INITIAL 11 MATTER IT SEEMS TO ME WE'VE OVERCOME, BUT I WASN'T 12 CLEAR WE HAD OVERCOME IT WITH AN ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 13 THAT IT WAS NOT A VIOLATION. 14 I DO INTEND TO ADDRESS IT. THAT'S IN THE 15 FIRST AMICUS BRIEF. SO TO THE EXTENT YOU HAVEN'T 16 RESPONDED TO THAT AND YOU WISH TO, YOU MAY IN THIS 17 BRIEF. 18 MR. CHATTERJEE: RIGHT. THANK YOU, 19 YOUR HONOR. 20 MR. BURSOR: YOUR HONOR, CAN I ASK FOR 21 ONE SUBTLE CLARIFICATION. 22 THERE WAS ALSO A MOTION ON OUR 23 COUNTERCLAIMS THAT WAS NOTICED FOR TODAY. DOES THE 24 COURT INTEND TO RULE ON THOSE OR TO HAVE ARGUMENT 25 ON THOSE AT SOME DATE IN THE FUTURE AND THEN RULE

1	ON THEM?
2	THE COURT: I DON'T I WILL LET YOU
3	KNOW. THIS WAS THE ONLY MOTION, THE MOTION HAVING
4	TO DO WITH THE 502 THAT I THOUGHT WAS RIPE FOR A
5	DECISION ONE WAY OR THE OTHER, DENY IT, GRANT IT.
6	AND THE OTHER MOTIONS I WILL SET FORWARD TO ANOTHER
7	TIME.
8	MR. BURSOR: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR.
9	MR. CHATTERJEE: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR.
10	MS. GRANICK: THANK YOU VERY MUCH,
11	YOUR HONOR.
12	THE COURT: VERY WELL. THAT COMPLETES
13	OUR LAW AND MOTION CALENDAR.
14	(WHEREUPON, THE PROCEEDINGS IN THIS
15	MATTER WERE CONCLUDED.)
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1	
2	
3	
4	CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER
5	
6	
7	
8	I, THE UNDERSIGNED OFFICIAL COURT
9	REPORTER OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
10	THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, 280 SOUTH
11	FIRST STREET, SAN JOSE, CALIFORNIA, DO HEREBY
12	CERTIFY:
13	THAT THE FOREGOING TRANSCRIPT,
14	CERTIFICATE INCLUSIVE, CONSTITUTES A TRUE, FULL AND
15	CORRECT TRANSCRIPT OF MY SHORTHAND NOTES TAKEN AS
16	SUCH OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER OF THE PROCEEDINGS
17	HEREINBEFORE ENTITLED AND REDUCED BY COMPUTER-AIDED
18	TRANSCRIPTION TO THE BEST OF MY ABILITY.
19	
20	
21	
22	SUMMER A. FISHER, CSR, CRR
23	CERTIFICATE NUMBER 13185
24	
25	