

# EXHIBIT 3

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11  
12 **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**  
13 **CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**  
14 **SOUTHERN DIVISION**

15 ACACIA MEDIA TECHNOLOGIES  
16 CORPORATION,

17 Plaintiff,

18 vs.

19 NEW DESTINY INTERNET GROUP,  
20 et. al.,

21 Defendants.

Case No. SACV 02-1040 JW (MLGx)

**Consolidated Cases:**

- SA CV 02-1048-JW (MLGx)
- SA CV 02-1063-JW (MLGx)
- SA CV 02-1155-JW (MLGx)
- SA CV 03-0217-JW (MLGx)
- SA CV 03-0218-JW (MLGx)
- SA CV 03-0219-JW (MLGx)
- SA CV 03-0259-JW (MLGx)
- SA CV 03-0271-JW (MLGx)
- SA CV 03-0308-JW (MLGx)

**Related Cases:**

- SA CV 03-1610-JW (MLGX)
- SA CV 03-1800-JW (MLGX)
- SA CV 03-1801-JW (MLGX)
- SA CV 03-1803-JW (MLGX)
- SA CV 03-1804-JW (MLGX)
- SA CV 03-1805-JW (MLGX)
- SA CV 03-1807-JW (MLGX)

**PLAINTIFF ACACIA MEDIA  
TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION'S  
CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF  
RE: CLAIM TERMS IN THE '702  
PATENT**

22  
23  
24  
25  
26 AND ALL RELATED CASE  
27 ACTIONS.

**DATE: May 19, 2004**  
**TIME: 9:00 a.m.**  
**CTRM: Hon. James Ware**

1 the rules of a code; or (4) capable of representing data in symbolic form using a code  
2 or a coded character set such that reconversion to the original form is possible.

3 As there are multiple definitions for “encode” (and therefore multiple  
4 definitions for “encoder”), the Court must identify which of the possible dictionary  
5 definitions is most consistent with the use by the inventors -- if more than one  
6 meaning is consistent with the use by the inventors, then the claim term may be  
7 construed to encompass all such consistent meanings. Texas Digital, 308 F.3d at  
8 1203.

9 The specification of the ‘702 patent is consistent with and reinforces the  
10 definition of encoder using the definition of encode -- “to express a single character or  
11 a message in terms of a code.” The specification defines the “identification encoder”  
12 as an encoder which gives [or assigns] a unique identification code to an item. (‘702  
13 patent, 6:31-35: “Prior to being made accessible to a user of the transmission and  
14 receiving system of the present invention, the item must be . . . given a unique  
15 identification code by identification encoder 112.”; See also, 6:52-54; 6:57-58; 10:9-  
16 11; 18:11-15).<sup>11</sup> Thus, the “identification encoder” expresses a message -- the unique  
17 identification code.

18 Therefore the “identification encoder” is construed as “a device or software  
19 capable of expressing the identification of an item in terms of a code.”

20 **G. “Transceiver”**

21 The term “transceiver” is found in claims 1, 17, and 27 of the ‘702 patent. A  
22 transceiver is a device that is capable of both transmitting and receiving data.

23 The term “transceiver” is defined essentially the same way in at least four  
24 different dictionaries:

25 \_\_\_\_\_  
26 <sup>11</sup> The specification further defines the identification encoder to optionally log  
27 details about the item (program notes) and assign the item a popularity code. (‘702  
28 patent, 6:34-39; 10:45-46; 12:4-5). As part of these optional features, the  
identification encoder may also map item addresses to item names and may operate a  
program which updates a master item database containing facts regarding items in the  
compressed data library. (‘702 patent, 10:52-58).

1 1. “A terminal device that can both transmit and receive signals.”  
2 (Computer Dictionary and Handbook, Sippl and Sippl, 3rd Ed. 1980 at 594) (Exhibit  
3 16 to Block Decl.);

4 2. “A terminal device that can both transmit and receive signals.”  
5 (Dictionary of Information Technology, 2nd Ed. 1986, p. 341) (Exhibit 17 to Block  
6 Decl.);

7 3. “*Acronym for transmitter and receiver. A device that can both transmit*  
8 *and receive signals on a communication medium.*” (Dictionary of Computing, 3rd  
9 Ed. 1990, p. 474) (Exhibit 18 to Block Decl.); and

10 4. “A device that both transmits and receives data.” (“The IEEE Standard  
11 Dictionary of Electrical and Electronics Terms, 6th Ed. 1996, p. 1128) (Exhibit 19 to  
12 Block Decl.)

13 The specification of the ‘702 patent is consistent with and reinforces this  
14 definition. The transceiver 201 for the reception system is shown in Figure 6 of the  
15 ‘702 patent. The ‘702 patent states that the transceiver 201 of the reception system  
16 “automatically receives the information from the transmitter 122 as compressed data  
17 blocks.” (‘702 patent, 17:25-27).

18 Transceivers are also shown in the transmission system in Figure 2b of the ‘702  
19 patent. Figure 6 shows transceivers, which both transmit and receive information  
20 (note the arrows both to and from the transceivers). These transceivers are shown in  
21 Figure 2b as operating on communication channels, such as ISDN, B-ISDN, LAN  
22 [local area network] or MAN [metropolitan area network], and telephone.

23 One district court has construed the term “transceiver” in a patent claim  
24 consistent with the construction offered here by Acacia. In Inline Connection Corp. v.  
25 AOL Time Warner, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 2d 307, 324-325 (D. Del. 2004), the court held  
26 that the defendants failed to overcome the heavy presumption that the term transceiver  
27 should not carry its ordinary meaning. Id. The court therefore construed  
28 “transceiver” to mean “a device capable of both sending and receiving information.”

1 Id. The court obtained this ordinary meaning from the Dictionary of Computing (3rd  
2 ed. 1991, p. 474) (Exhibit 18 to Block Decl.), cited by Acacia above. Inline  
3 Connection, 302 F. Supp. 2d at 325 n 79.

4 Thus, the term “transceiver” is construed to mean “a device that is capable of  
5 both transmitting and receiving data.”

6 **H. “Wherein Said Identification Encoder Allows Entry Of A Popularity**  
7 **Code”**

8 The phrase “wherein said identification encoder allows entry of a popularity  
9 code” is found in claims 6 and 27 of the ‘702 patent.

10 The term “popularity” means: “the quality or state of being popular.”

11 (Webster’s, at 915; Exhibit 12 to Block Decl.) The term “popular” means:

12 “frequently encountered or widely accepted; commonly liked or approved.”

13 (Webster’s, at 915; Exhibit 12 to Block Decl.) The term “code” means: “a system  
14 symbols (as letters, numbers, or words) used to represent assigned and often secret  
15 meanings.” (Webster’s, at 255; Exhibit 12 to Block Decl.)

16 Thus, a popularity code is the symbols, letters, or words or combinations  
17 thereof used to represent the popularity of a particular item.

18 This meaning is consistent with and reinforced by the specification of the ‘702  
19 patent. The ‘702 patent states that the identification encoder may also allow entry of a  
20 popularity code for an item: “The storage encoding process performed by  
21 identification encoder 112 also allows entry of a popularity code.” (‘702 patent, 12:4-  
22 5). The ‘702 patent further states that the popularity code is assigned on the basis on  
23 how often the item is expected to be requested for transmission: “The popularity code  
24 is preferably assigned on the basis of how often the corresponding item is expected to  
25 be requested from the compressed data library 118.” (‘702 patent, 12:5-8). Further,  
26 the popularity code may be updated, to take into account how often an item is actually  
27 transmitted: “Once assigned, the popularity code may be dynamically updated, by  
28 factoring item usage against system usage.” (‘702 patent, 12:13-14).

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SA CV 03-1807-JW (MLGX)

**PLAINTIFF ACACIA MEDIA  
TECHNOLOGIES  
CORPORATION'S OPPOSITION  
TO DEFENDANTS' CLAIM  
CONSTRUCTION BRIEF RE:  
CLAIM TERMS IN THE '702  
PATENT**

22  
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27 AND ALL RELATED CASE ACTIONS.

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1 Defendants contend that, because claims 1 and 17 do not define the function  
2 performed by the “sequence encoder,” the claims are indefinite. A system claim, such  
3 as claims 1 and 17, recites a series of elements. There is no requirement that the  
4 claim recite a function for each of the elements. Although it is their burden to do so,  
5 defendants have not shown how one of skill in the art would understand the scope of  
6 this claim when read in light of the specification.

7 Although the term “sequence encoder” is not used in the specification of the  
8 ‘702 patent, when this term is read in light of the specification of the ‘702 patent, it is  
9 clear that persons of skill in the art would understand that the “sequence encoder”  
10 refers to the time encoder. The time encoder functions to place blocks of converted  
11 formatted information from converter 113 into a group or sequence of addressable  
12 data blocks by assigning relative time markers to data prior to subsequent  
13 compression. (‘702 patent, 7:57-59; 8:6-9; 8:46-49; Fig. 2a). Defendants admit that  
14 the time encoder disclosed in the specification is sufficient structure. (Defendants’  
15 Opening Brief, at 29:18-19).

16 Thus, the “sequence encoder” term of claims 1 and 17 of the ‘702 patent is  
17 sufficiently definite. As discussed in Acacia’s Opening Brief, the term “sequence  
18 encoder” is limited by the specification to “a time encoder, i.e., a device or software  
19 which places blocks of converted formatted information into a sequence or group of  
20 addressable data blocks by assigning relative time markers to data prior to subsequent  
21 compression.”

22 **C. Defendants’ Proposed Construction Of “Transceiver” Is Erroneous,**  
23 **Because It Relies On Dictionary Definitions That Are Inconsistent**  
24 **With And Not Supported By The Specification**

25 Defendants’ proposed construction for “transceiver” is erroneous, because it is  
26 inconsistent with the use of the word “transceiver” by the inventors. Defendants  
27 contend that the claim term “transceiver” is limited to “radio” transmitting and  
28 receiving equipment in a “common housing” or “single housing” for “portable or

1 mobile use” employing “common circuit components” for both transmitting and  
2 receiving. (Defendants’ Brief at 27, 19-26).

3 Defendants’ proposed construction is erroneous because it wrongly includes the  
4 limitations of “radio,” “common or single housing,” “portable or mobile use,” and  
5 “common circuit components.” These are extraneous limitations which are  
6 inconsistent with the specification of the ‘702 patent. These limitations are also not  
7 found in the many other relevant dictionary definitions for “transceiver.” Acacia’s  
8 four dictionaries define “transceiver” as “a device capable of both sending and  
9 receiving data.”<sup>13</sup> (Acacia’s Opening Brief at 26:1-12). There is no evidence in the  
10 patent documents that the inventors meant to limit the term “transceiver” or to deviate  
11 from the ordinary meanings given in these dictionaries.

12 Defendants support their erroneous construction with the Fifth Edition of the  
13 IEEE Dictionary and Webster’s. The fact that these dictionary definitions can be  
14 found by defendants does not mean that this is the ordinary meaning of the term  
15 “transceiver” which the Court must accept. As with every dictionary definition, the  
16 Court must always consult the specification to determine whether the dictionary  
17 definition is consistent with the inventors’ use of the term in the patent. Brookhill-  
18 Wilk 1, LLC v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 334 F.3d 1294, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“In  
19 construing claim terms, the general meanings gleaned from reference sources, such as  
20 dictionaries, must always be compared against the use of the terms in context, and the  
21 intrinsic record must always be consulted to identify which of the different possible  
22 dictionary meanings is most consistent with the use of the words by the inventor.”)

23  
24 <sup>13</sup> Defendants rely on the Fifth Edition of the IEEE Dictionary, whereas Acacia  
25 relies on the Sixth Edition of the IEEE Dictionary. The Fifth Edition was published in  
26 1993; the Sixth Edition was published in 1996. Both are relevant to determining the  
27 meaning of terms in the ‘702 patent. The ‘702 patent was issued in 2000. The  
28 Federal Circuit has held that dictionary definitions which are publicly available when  
the patent issued are objective resources which may be consulted by the Court. Texas  
Digital, 308 F.3d at 1202 (“Dictionaries, encyclopedias and treatises, publicly  
available at the time the patent issued, are objective resources that serve a reliable  
sources of information on the established meanings that would have been attributed to  
the terms of claims by those of skill in the art.”).

1 The Court cannot give a term an ordinary meaning using a definition which  
2 contradicts or is inconsistent with the words used by the inventors. See, e.g., CCS  
3 Fitness, 288 F.3d at 1366; Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1584 n  
4 6 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Texas Digital, 308 F.3d at 1204. If more than one dictionary  
5 definition is consistent with the use by the inventor, then the Court shall construe the  
6 term to encompass all such consistent meanings. Texas Digital, 308 F.3d at 1204;  
7 Rexnord, 274 F.3d at 1343.

8 Defendants pay lip service to the specification of the '702 patent in looking for  
9 consistency with their dictionary definitions. Defendants do nothing more than state  
10 the conclusion that their definitions are "consistent" with the patent's use of  
11 transceiver and the use of the term in the prosecution history. (Defendants' Opening  
12 Brief at 27:26-28). Defendants do not cite to any portion of the specification or  
13 prosecution history which they believe to be consistent with their dictionary  
14 definitions. They cannot do so, because there is no portion of the specification or file  
15 history that is consistent with defendants' dictionary definitions.

16 Nothing in the specification of the '702 patent or prosecution history states that  
17 the transceiver transmits or receives only radio signals. (Acacia's Opening Brief at  
18 26:13-22)<sup>14</sup>. Rather, the specification shows and describes transceivers which  
19 transmit and receive signals via a telephone, ISDN, B-ISDN, microwave, DBS (direct  
20 broadcast satellite), cable television, MAN (metropolitan area networks), LAN (local  
21 area networks), and broadcast. ('702 patent, 4:59-61; 15:29-40; Figure 1g, 2b, and 6).  
22 The construction of "transceiver" therefore cannot be limited to radio signals.

23 Nothing in the specification or prosecution history states that the transceiver  
24 must be in a common or single housing. Figure 6 of the '702 patent shows the  
25 receiving function of transceiver occurring in one housing (201) and the transmitting  
26

27  
28 <sup>14</sup> There is a typographical error at line 19 on page 26 of Acacia's brief. The  
reference should be to Figure 2b of the '702 patent, not Figure 6.

1 function of the transceiver occurring in another housing (207). The construction of  
2 “transceiver” therefore cannot be limited to a common or single housing.

3 Nothing in the specification or prosecution history states that the transceiver is  
4 only for portable or mobile use. The construction of “transceiver” therefore cannot be  
5 limited to portable or mobile use.

6 Nothing in the specification or prosecution history states that the transceiver  
7 must employ common circuit components for both transmitting and receiving. Again,  
8 Figure 6 of the ‘702 patent shows the receiving function of the transceiver performed  
9 by one set of components (201) and the transmitting function performed by another  
10 set of components (207). The construction of “transceiver” therefore cannot be  
11 limited to employing common circuit components.

12 Nothing in the specification or prosecution history states that the transceiver  
13 must be “portable or mobile.” Whether the transceiver is fixed or is portable or  
14 mobile is not discussed in the specification or file history of the ‘702 patent. This is  
15 so, because the inventors intended to cover all types of transceivers, whether fixed,  
16 portable, or mobile.

17 Acacia’s construction for transceiver—a device capable of both transmitting  
18 and receiving data—is supported by four dictionary definitions and was adopted by  
19 the court as the ordinary meaning for transceiver in Inline Connection Corp. v. AOL  
20 Time Warner, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 2d 307, 324-25 and n 79 (D. Del. 2004). Acacia’s  
21 construction is correct, because it is consistent with the specification of the ‘702  
22 patent. The specification and Figures of the ‘702 patent show devices which are  
23 capable of both transmitting and receiving data, but do not only transmit and receive  
24 radio signals, do not need to be housed in a single or common housing, do not need to  
25 be portable or mobile, and do not need to utilize common circuitry. The Court should  
26 not construe transceiver to add these entirely extraneous and unsupported limitations.

27 The Court should therefore adopt Acacia’s construction for the term  
28 “transceiver”: “a device that is capable of both transmitting and receiving data.”