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10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
11 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA  
12 SAN JOSE DIVISION

13 IN RE GOOGLE BUZZ USER PRIVACY  
14 LITIGATION

) Case No. 5:10-CV-00672-JW

15 This Pleading Relates To:

16 ALL CASES

)  
)  
) **SURREPLY SUPPORTING OBJECTION OF**  
) **STEVEN COPE TO PROPOSED**  
) **SETTLEMENT AND NOTICE OF INTENT**  
) **TO APPEAR**

) Date: February 7, 2011

) Time: 9:00 a.m.

) Place: Courtroom 8

) Judge: Hon. James Ware

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18  
19 Objector, STEVEN COPE, herein lodges his Surreply to Class Counsel's Reply to his Objection.

20 As a preliminary matter, Cope notes that only two, out of eight, of his objections were addressed  
21 by Class Counsel: that the cy pres recipient must be identified, and that Class Counsel obtained valuable  
22 relief for the class. Cope therefore posits that Class Counsel concedes the merits of the six other  
23 objections he made:

24 1. That the tort is novel, untested, and uncertain, is perhaps better suited for a trial on the  
25 merits rather than settlement. *Castano v. American Tobacco Co.*, 84 F.3d 734 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996);

26 2. That the settlement is premature as damages cannot clearly be determined at this early  
27 stage, precluding an honest assessment of the value of the settlement;

1           3.       That there is a lack of adequate representation by Class Counsel, who, both in the motion  
2 for approval and in its Reply, assume that its class members have not been harmed because they have  
3 not lost money;

4           4.       That there is no evidence supporting why the \$8.5 million figure is fair or reasonable;  
5 Counsel merely asserts that it should take 25% of the common fund;

6           5.       That the opt-out period is too short; and

7           6.       That there is no evidence supporting the reasonableness of the attorneys' fees.

8           Conceding these points leads to the conclusion that Class Counsel has not met the parameters  
9 required in Rule 23 of superiority, adequate representation, and reasonableness. Other problems remain.

10          Class Counsel points out that "only" forty-seven people objected. This number far exceeds  
11 regular settlements in which there are typically less than ten objections filed. Most of the objections  
12 were filed in propria persona, indicating that ordinary class members are offended by the settlement, in  
13 addition to those objectors who engaged attorneys to prepare their objections. Class Counsel attempts to  
14 minimize the number by comparing it to the size of the class as a whole (an extraordinarily large class of  
15 37 million). The fact remains, however, that forty-seven class members took time to read the settlement  
16 and write, and file, an objection.

17          One figure still undisclosed is the number of class members who opted-out. This information  
18 would be useful to the Court in determining the real fairness to the class. Objector Cope attempted to  
19 discover this number prior to filing his objection, and called the Administrator to find out. His calls  
20 were never returned. Moreover, after mentioning this in his objection, Class Counsel still has failed to  
21 inform the Court, or the class, how many opt-outs were received. This harkens back to this Objector's  
22 suggestion that the opt-out period be extended. The thirty-day window provided in the settlement is  
23 uncommonly short and unfair to the class.

24          Of great concern to this Objector is the continued refusal of Class Counsel to acknowledge the  
25 harm done to the class members through this uninvited invasion of privacy. As mentioned in his  
26 Objection, Class Counsel assumes that the class was not harmed because they may have suffered no "out  
27 of pocket" damages. This is not what the harm is. The harm is in the invasion of privacy itself.  
28 Congress did not impose any monetary loss element upon the public to have standing to make a claim

1 under these wire tap and related statutes. Further, there may be lost job opportunities or job terminations  
2 as a result of some of these unknown postings/followings. There may be destroyed marriages, a figure  
3 virtually unquantifiable in terms of emotional and financial harm. This lightning-quick settlement  
4 undermines the potential for harm that this program unleashed. Yet still, in Class Counsel’s reply, they  
5 again insist that the class members “have not suffered” because they may not have lost money. This  
6 attitude is at odds with Class Counsel’s duty to represent the interests of its class members, and destroys  
7 the element of adequacy of representation present in Rule 23.

8 Class Counsel makes much of the fact that it is the largest settlement “of its kind.” When  
9 compared to the length of existence of this type of remedy, a charity dedicated to informing the public  
10 about internet privacy, one realizes that this “kind” of remedy is a new breed, and there are not many  
11 others to which it can be compared.

12 Class Counsel attempts to distinguish *In re Compact Disc*, 370 F.Supp.2d 320 (D.Me. 2005), by  
13 stating that the parties did not name the recipients in the settlement, but worked it out with the court’s  
14 assistance thereafter. The fact remains that the parties had an affirmative duty to present the court with  
15 named cy pres beneficiaries so that the court could assess their relationship to the harms alleged in the  
16 complaint. When this Court is assessing the reasonableness of this settlement, it must be provided with  
17 the identity of the beneficiaries. This is especially important in this settlement, when the ONLY  
18 beneficiaries are the cy pres recipients and not any class members. Class Counsel mentions that no  
19 objector identified any better cy pres recipient than Class Counsel did; however, Class Counsel  
20 identified no recipient itself.

21 Finally, as mentioned, Class Counsel never really provides justification for taking 25% of the  
22 common fund, when one compares \$8.5 million to the \$37 billion at stake. The Court should  
23 strenuously examine the results obtained compared to the fee requested. Class Counsel again admits  
24 that all substantive changes Google made were before suit was filed on February 17 (changes were made  
25 the week of February 13), and by April 5, months before the mediation occurred. No further changes  
26 were made after mediation. What, then, did counsel deliver to the class members as a result of  
27 mediation? Education about a product which will not be changed. This sounds like a hollow victory,  
28 one which calls into question the wisdom of awarding a 25% fee.

1 Finally, the Court has never been provided with any support for the \$8.5 million *cy pres* fund, or  
2 why this is the appropriate amount. This objector has mentioned that perhaps discovery would be  
3 appropriate to determine what profits Google has made from advertisers supporting the Buzz program,  
4 to determine whether disgorgement would be a better measure of damages, or whether it bears any  
5 relation to the \$8.5 million figure herein presented.

6 For these reasons, Objector Cope reasserts his objections to the Request for Final Approval and  
7 for Attorneys' Fees.

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9  
10 Dated: February 4, 2011

By:           /s/ Darrell Palmer            
Darrell Palmer  
Attorney for Objector, Steven Cope

