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RICHARD W. WIEKING
CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT

4 Objector in Pro Per

5 THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
6 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
7 SAN JOSE DIVISION

NC

9 IN RE GOOGLE BUZZ USER PRIVACY
LITIGATION

Case No. 10-CV-00672-JW

10 This Pleading Relates to:

**OBJECTION TO PRELIMINARILY
APPROVED CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT**

11 ALL CASES

Hearing Date: January 31, 2010
Hearing Time: 9:00am
Location: Courtroom 8, 4th floor

Honorable James Ware

15 **OBJECTION TO PRELIMINARILY APPROVED CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT**

17 **I. ARGUMENT**

18 **A. The Proposed Settlement Should Not Be Approved**

19 The proposed settlement agreement in this case is neither fair nor reasonable and should not
20 be approved.

21 **1. The Terms Are Neither Fair Nor Reasonable**

22 "With less information about the class, the judge cannot as effectively monitor for
23 collusion, individual settlements, buy-offs (where some individuals use the class action device to
24 benefit themselves at the expense of absentees), and other abuses." *In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up
25 Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liability Litig.*, 55 F.3d 768 (3d Cir. 1995); accord *Acosta v. Trans Union,
26 LLC*, 243 F.R.D. 377, 397 (C.D. Cal. 2007). Extra scrutiny is also required because the parties are no
27 longer in an adversarial posture, and in light of the inherent tension attributable to class counsel's
28 self-interest in achieving a settlement that, like this one, involves a substantial proposed attorneys'

1 fee award in an unlitigated case. *See Staton v. Boeing Co.*, 327 F.3d 938,959- 60 (9th Cir. 2003); *see*
2 *also Powers v. Eichen*, 229 F.3d 1249, 1256 (9th Cir. 2000). This concern is especially relevant
3 where, as here, the settlement offers no direct compensation to the class. *See Mars Steel Corp. v.*
4 *Cont'l Ill. Nat'l Trust Co.*, 834 F.2d 677, 681 (7th Cir. 1984).

5 “We hold the ‘fluid recovery’ concept and practice to be illegal, inadmissible as a solution
6 of the manageability problems of class actions and wholly improper.” *Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin*,
7 479 F.2d 1005, 1018 (2d Cir. N.Y. 1973); *See also Windham v. American Brands, Inc.*, 565 F.2d 59,
8 72 (4th Cir. S.C. 1977)

9 A cy pres distribution must adequately target the plaintiff class. *Six Mexican Workers v.*
10 *Arizona Citrus Growers*, 904 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. Ariz. 1990) *See also, City of Philadelphia v.*
11 *American Oil Co.*, 53 F.R.D. 45 (D.N.J. 1971)

12 The proposed settlement imposes a total fluid recovery to charities “focused on enhancing
13 internet privacy and/or furthering public education about internet privacy.” Memorandum of Points
14 and Authorities in Support of Motion for Preliminary Approval of Settlement 12:8-11 (“MPA
15 Preliminary Approval”). This fluid recovery only approach is generally disfavored by the courts
16 especially when used to circumvent class certification standards such as class manageability.
17 Approval of this settlement is improper for four reasons as follows:

18 *First*, the settlement proposes a total fluid recovery. As discussed further below, *Amchem*
19 *Prods., Inc. v. Windsor*, 521 U.S. 591 (1997) (“Amchem”) does not apply to this action as plaintiffs’
20 attorneys Gary E. Mason, Esq., et al. (“Class Counsel”) contends. Manageability is a necessary part
21 of the approval of this settlement agreement and the class, as defined, is unmanageable and the
22 settlement circumvents class certification standards by the use of the total fluid recovery approach
23 and is illegal, inadmissible and should not be approved. *See*, Section B(2)(a) of this objection.

24 *Second*, the settlement proposes a total cy pres distribution to charities which provide
25 services to and educate the general public. The settlement should benefit only a few million gmail
26 users—or the smaller injured class of only a few gmail users—but is instead designed to benefit over
27 300 million citizens of the United States (US Census Bureau (July 2009). *See*,
28 <http://www.census.gov/popest/states/tables/NST-EST2009-01.xls>) which is over one hundred times

1 larger than the putative class. As such, the settlement is unfair, unreasonable and should be revised to
2 more adequately target the putative class.

3 *Third*, the settlement admittedly seeks to benefit an overbroad, nationwide putative class
4 of non-injured plaintiffs. The settlement proposes a total fluid recovery which would rob injured
5 plaintiffs eligible for compensatory and other damages of their relief. Furthermore, Class Counsel
6 negotiated total fluid recovery based on 2000 complaints, by people without damages, out of the
7 millions of gmail users which is under 0.002% of the putative class. The settlement is unfair and
8 unreasonable as to the injured plaintiffs¹.

9 *Fourth*, requiring the litigation of class certification through standard law and motion
10 procedures will help narrow the current overbroad, nationwide putative class of primarily non-injured
11 persons to a better defined class of injured persons. The narrowed class would be sufficiently smaller
12 to both be manageable and warrant a direct, non-fluid, fair and reasonable recovery. If the class does
13 not become sufficiently smaller, a settlement similar to this may still be negotiated and brought
14 before this Court for approval.

15 Class Counsel defends their position that the total fluid recovery is appropriate for the
16 situation citing three non-binding, trial court level cases. *Lane v. Facebook, Inc.*, No. 08-cv-3845 RS
17 (N.D. Cal. 2009), *In re DoubleClick, Inc. Privacy Litig.*, No. 00 Civ 0641 (NRB) (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
18 and *DeLise v Fahrenheit Entertainment*, Civ. Act. No. CV-014297 (Cal. Sup. Ct., Marin Cty. Sept.
19 2001). However, these cases do not apply to the instant case.

20 In *Lane*, litigation extended *over a year and a half* before a settlement was reached.
21 Plaintiffs endured a motion to dismiss, which was ultimately dropped by defendants, as well as over
22 *seven months of settlement negotiations. Facebook fought the action and resisted settlement.* This
23 privacy action involved the transmission of unrelated activities on third party websites, *such as a*
24 *movie the user recently rented from Blockbuster's website*, to Facebook for publication on the users'

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26 ¹ Though benefitting a class of non-injured persons in sound, it's only the named plaintiffs and Class Counsel who benefit
27 from the settlement. A similar request that the settlement benefit the named plaintiffs only was previously made in the
28 Court of Appeals but not discussed because interests of the named plaintiffs must not diverge from the interests of the
class. See, *Kincade v. General Tire & Rubber Co.*, 635 F.2d 501 (5th Cir. Tex. 1981). In this action, the Court should
give less weight to the requests of the named plaintiffs and Class Counsel as the settlement here also creates a conflict of
interest between them and the putative class.

1 home and profile pages where minimal damages exist.

2 In *DoubleClick*, limited information is available. However, this privacy action involved
3 the collection of contact information, browser history and online purchase behavior, *which is not*
4 *disseminated to third parties, for the purpose of targeted advertising* where minimal damages exist.

5 In *DeLise*, limited information is available. However, this privacy action involved the
6 collection of music preferences, listening habits and preventing the use of music on portable MP3
7 players *to prevent online music theft* where minimal damaged exist.

8 In the instant action, Google sought to correct its privacy mishap prior to the filing of any
9 litigation, contacted Class Counsel after a complaint was filed to have an informal meeting and made
10 offers to Class Counsel prior to and during mediation. Class Counsel made little to no effort in
11 seeking settlement. Settlement was reached within a few months of initiation of this action. *This*
12 *action was barely litigated by any party.* In essence, Google is buying off Class Counsel and the
13 named plaintiffs to the detriment of the putative class. This privacy action involves Google's *invasion*
14 *into private communications* and third party social networking accounts for *transmission to the entire*
15 *world* via the internet where significant damages potentially exist especially with professionals who
16 have confidential and privileged communications and relationships which must not be disclosed.

17 As such, the instant action is distinguished from other cases which total fluid recovery is
18 decidedly acceptable. The use of total fluid recovery in this case is illegal and inadmissible and
19 should not be approved. The terms of settlement are neither fair nor reasonable and should not be
20 approved.

21 **B. The Court Should Not Certify a Settlement Class**

22 The proposed settlement class does not meet the predominance and superiority
23 Requirements of Rule 23(B)(3).

24 **1. Individual Questions Predominate and Settlement is Improper**

25 Predominance is determined not by counting the number of common issues but by weighing
26 their significance. *Mullen v. Treasure Chest Casino, L.L.C.*, 186 F.3d 620, 627 (5th Cir. La. 1999)

27 Predominance is a far more demanding test than commonality alone. *Amchem Prods., Inc. v.*
28 *Windsor*, 521 U.S. at 623-624.

1 Novel and immature torts are improper for class treatment. *Castano v. American Tobacco Co.*,
2 84 F.3d 734, 749 (5th Cir. La. 1996).

3 Indeed, there are questions which are common to the entire class such as, their identical
4 operative facts and legal theories. MPA Preliminary Approval 17:20-22. These, however, are
5 dwarfed by the significance of the question of damages. As Class Counsel admits, there are different
6 classes of injured persons; the vast majority of uninjured plaintiffs and the few injured plaintiffs.
7 MPA Preliminary Approval 17:22-23. The settlement forecloses any possible recovery of
8 compensatory damages as to the injured putative class members.

9 The overbroad, nationwide class definition not only includes conflicting classes of persons
10 such as injured and non-injured persons but also businesses and consumers. Occasionally a
11 professional or small business owner will open a personal email account, such as gmail, for
12 professional and business activities. Google's alleged privacy violations would have affected
13 businesses and consumers differently but the settlement includes both and provides a total fluid
14 recovery regardless of their incorporation status².

15 The question of damages is also significant in another way. Class Counsel indicates that
16 federal privacy statutes have yet to be applied to internet based social networks. MPA Preliminary
17 Approval 13:2-3. How the novel application of privacy statutes to internet based social media is not
18 the only question but also how it is applied to the different types of putative class members; these
19 additional questions are individual in nature³. Regardless of how privacy laws fit with internet based
20 social media, the settlement assumes all putative class members will be entitled to injunctive relief
21 and not entitled to compensatory damages. Furthermore, Class Counsel negotiated total fluid
22 recovery based on 2000 complaints, by people without damages, out of the millions of gmail users
23 which is under 0.002% of the putative class.

24 Instead of addressing these issues, the parties attempt to circumvent the predominance of
25 individual questions of the putative class by use of total fluid recovery and justify it by saying that
26

27 ² Though not applicable to Objector's argument, *Amchem* also notes that the existence of narrower possible classes within
a larger overbroad class creates questions as to class typicality and adequacy of representation. *Amchem* at 626.

28 ³ Though not applicable to the Objector's argument, *Castano* notes that class actions based on novel and immature torts
often result in many mini-trials rendering it unmanageable and inferior to individual litigation. *Castano* at 749.

1 “each class member would seek to remedy the same grievance” (MPA Preliminary Approval 17:24)
2 to the detriment of the putative class members who were injured in fact and would lose compensatory
3 damages because of this settlement.

4 Individual questions predominate because the class definition is overbroad. Resolution of the
5 predominance of individual issues could result in a better, legal and admissible settlement for the
6 class.

7 **2. Manageability Must Be Considered, the Putative Class is Unmanageable and**
8 **Settlement, in this Context, is Illegal**

9 Class Counsel proposes that manageability is not necessarily a determining factor in
10 provisional certification for settlement approval procedures and cites *Amchem Prods., Inc. v.*
11 *Windsor*, 521 U.S. 591 (1997) in support of this claim. However, the instant case is distinguished
12 from *Amchem* and it does not apply.

13 In *Amchem*, the Supreme Court indeed concluded that class manageability need not be
14 considered as part of approval of a class settlement. However, the *Amchem* settlement was founded
15 upon a stipulation of over 100 pages providing a detailed administrative mechanism *which provided*
16 *direct cash settlement* to several well defined classes of injured people *and excluded non-injured*
17 *class members* from recovery. Furthermore, the administration of claims in *Amchem* was structured to
18 include a Plaintiff Steering Committee. *Amchem* was also founded upon products liability torts which
19 normally result in many expensive mini-trials focused on individualized causation and damage issues
20 which typically render them improper for class treatment⁴. A class likely would not have been
21 certified by the trial court if not for the settlement. *Amchem id* at 599-605.

22 Here, the settlement barely exceeds ten pages *for an overbroad nationwide class of*
23 *admittedly non-injured class members with a total fluid recovery* by cy pres distribution to charities
24 which do not adequately target the class in that the charities provide services to and educate the
25 general public. This action is founded in privacy rights with a single event leading to the damage (or
26 lack thereof) of the entire putative class which could easily be certified and resolved through

27
28 ⁴ See, *In re Northern Dist. of California, Dalkon Shield IUD Products Liability Litigation*, 693 F.2d 847, 853 (9th Cir. Cal. 1982), class certification reversed because product liability actions are not suitable for class treatment.

1 traditional class action procedures and yield better compensation for the class if the putative class
2 were more manageable in size⁵.

3 Clearly, the intent behind *Amchem* was not to circumvent traditional class certification
4 procedure in all cases if a settlement was reached but, instead, to assist an otherwise uncertifiable
5 class in obtaining a reasonable settlement without the personal and judicial expense of individual
6 litigation. Also, *Amchem* was not intended to allow an illegal and inadmissible practice such as total
7 fluid recovery. Therefore, the instant action is distinguished, *Amchem* does not apply and the Court
8 must consider class manageability as part of the approval of this settlement.

9 Notwithstanding this analysis of *Amchem*, Objector contends the *Amchem* is not mandatory
10 upon the court and manageability may, and should, still be considered. *Amchem id* at 620. Further,
11 *Amchem* conditionally indicates that only manageability of *trial* need not be considered as part of a
12 provisional certification of a class in settlement not manageability in general. There are factors to
13 manageability other than trial considerations such as size of class (*Castano v. American Tobacco Co.*,
14 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. La. 1996)) which should still be considered.

15 After the holding that manageability is conditionally irrelevant, *Amchem* goes on to say that,
16 during the settlement process, the rules were “designed to protect absentees by blocking unwarranted
17 or overbroad class definitions--demand undiluted, even heightened, attention in the settlement
18 context. Such attention is of vital importance, for a court asked to certify a settlement class will lack
19 the opportunity, present when a case is litigated, to adjust the class, informed by the proceedings as
20 they unfold.” *Amchem id* at 620. Class Counsel accepted a total fluid recovery in lieu of a direct cash
21 settlement due, in part, to the unmanageability of the significant size of the overbroad, nationwide
22 class which, therefore, calls for heightened attention upon the manageability aspect of the class
23 definition.

24 **a. The Class As Defined is Unmanageable in Size**

25 The size of a class may render a class action unmanageable and uncertifiable. *Castano v.*

26 ⁵ See, *Grainger v. State Sec. Life Ins. Co.*, 547 F.2d 303, 307 (5th Cir. Ala. 1977). Class cert denied as individual issues
27 predominate in fraud actions. Appellate Court reversed holding discovery of alleged uniform misrepresentations could
28 resolve deficiencies. See also, *Crasto v. Estate of Kaskel*, 63 F.R.D. 18, 23 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) where subclasses are used to
resolve deficiencies in class definition. The settlement and class definition could be similarly improved through discovery
and subclasses to narrow issues and class size.

1 *American Tobacco Co.*, 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. La. 1996)

2 “We hold the ‘fluid recovery’ concept and practice to be illegal, inadmissible as a solution
3 of the manageability problems of class actions and wholly improper.” *Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin*,
4 479 F.2d 1005, 1018 (2d Cir. N.Y. 1973); *See also Windham v. American Brands, Inc.*, 565 F.2d 59,
5 72 (4th Cir. S.C. 1977)

6 The class, as defined, sets forth a manageability problem in the size of the resulting class.
7 Even in the most favorable class action scenarios where a class member need only submit a claim
8 form for a standardized settlement amount, the sheer volume of claims would render the
9 administration of settlement or trials so costly and time consuming that individual litigation would be
10 superior.

11 The instant action is not the most favorable scenario and presents problems with individual
12 questions of damages. For example, the Wiretap act offers statutory damages in the amount of \$100
13 per day of violation per class member. 18 U.S.C. § 2520(c)(2). How many days were each of the
14 millions of gmail users violated by Google’s conduct? The answer is impossible without an
15 individual showing of damages which would require an extensive, costly and time-consuming claims
16 program in a settlement/judgment or mini-trials.

17 Instead of addressing these issues, the parties attempt to circumvent the unmanageable size of
18 the class by use of total fluid recovery and justify it by saying that “few, if any, Gmail users suffered
19 out-of-pocket damages as a result of the launch of Buzz” (MPA Preliminary Approval 13:18-19) to
20 the detriment of the putative class members who were injured and are robbed of compensatory
21 damages because of this settlement.

22 The use of total fluid recovery in this case is illegal and inadmissible and should not be
23 approved. The class is unmanageable in size because the class definition is overbroad. Resolution of
24 the unmanageability of the class size could result in a better, legal and admissible settlement for the
25 class.

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
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II. CONCLUSION

The terms of settlement are neither fair nor reasonable and should not be approved.

Dated: December 28, 2010

By: 
ABRAHAM A. FLORES III
Objector in Pro Per