Apple Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd. et al.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Apple Inc. ("Apple") respectfully submits this reply brief in support of its motion for summary judgment of non-infringement of claims 25 and 26 of U.S. Patent No. 7,362,867 ("the '867 patent") and for summary judgment of invalidity of claims 10 and 12 of U.S. Patent No. 7,456,893 ("the '893 patent") and claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 7,577,460 ("the '460 patent").

II. NON-INFRINGEMENT OF THE '867 PATENT

The parties did not ask the Court to interpret any limitations of the '867 patent. However, faced with the prospect of summary judgment, Samsung belatedly seeks a proposed construction for "scrambling code" and offers both intrinsic and extrinsic evidence in an attempt to support its new construction, including a further declaration from its expert (Dr. Wesel) – who now offers almost 16 pages of analysis in support of Samsung's proposed construction. Putting aside the untimeliness of these arguments, the greater problem for Samsung is that its arguments ignore the plain meaning of the asserted claims. In light of the plain meaning and the undisputed facts, Apple is entitled to summary judgment of non-infringement of the '867 patent.

Samsung's newly proposed construction of "scrambling code" is not only inconsistent with the plain meaning, but would in fact eviscerate the meaning of the claim term "scrambling." Samsung's expert agrees that a code is not a "scrambling code" unless it can be used for "spreading" – put simply, to be a "scrambling" code, the code must actually be used to scramble, or spread, the data. (*See* 4/23/12 Wesel Dep. at 164:15-17 (Selwyn Decl., Ex. 5, Dkt. 925-10).) However, if one replaces the "scrambling code" limitation of claim 25 with Samsung's proposed construction ("a code generated by adding a first m-sequence and a second m-sequence" (Opp. at 3)), this fundamental concept of a code used to "scramble" or "spread" data disappears entirely:

Plaintiff and Counterclaim Defendant Apple Inc.'s Notice of Motion and Motion for Summary Judgment of Non-Infringement of U.S. Patent Number 7,362,867 and Invalidity of U.S. Patent Numbers 7,456,893 and 7,577,460, Dkt. 925-4 will be hereinafter referred to as "Mot." Samsung's Opposition to Apple's Motion for Summary Judgment, Dkt. 1005, will be hereinafter referred to as "Opp."

'867 Patent, Claim 25 ("Scrambling Code" Limitation)	"Scrambling code" limitation replaced with Samsung's proposed construction
at least one adder for generating a code as a primary scrambling co adding a shifted first m-sequence the second m-sequence	ode by code as a primary [code generated by

As a matter of law, because Samsung's proposed construction would therefore eliminate the "scrambling" limitation of claim 25, it cannot be correct. *See, e.g., Cat Tech LLC v. TubeMaster, Inc.*, 528 F.3d 871, 885 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (refusing to adopt a claim construction which would render a claim limitation meaningless).

Claim 25 of the '867 patent requires "generating a ... Gold code as a ... primary scrambling code." That portion of the claim imposes two separate requirements: (1) a Gold code must be generated and (2) the primary scrambling code must be a Gold code. Samsung's attempt to conflate these two separate requirements of claim 25 is improper. A product cannot infringe simply by generating a Gold code. Similarly, a product cannot infringe simply by generating a scrambling code. The plain language of claim 25 requires generating a Gold code that is a scrambling code.

Samsung's opposition fails to make this showing. Samsung's infringement argument hinges on the contention that but that is insufficient under the plain meaning of claim 25. Samsung can go no further because the undisputed facts demonstrate that (See id at 5.) As detailed in Apple's opening brief, under the standard, "scrambling codes" and "Gold codes" are distinct entities, (See Mot.

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similarly devoid of any argument for infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.

Apple's opening brief (Mot. at 11-12), Samsung's Infringement Contentions did not articulate a theory of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, and Samsung's expert offered no opinion in his opening report under the doctrine of equivalents. Samsung's opposition is

1	patents are standards-essential, which Apple assumed to be true "solely for purposes of [its]		
2	motion." (Apple's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 3, 20-24 (Dkt. 660-3).) However,		
3	that motion also included an express statement that "Apple disputes that any of the declared-		
4	essential patents that Samsung has asserted against Apple is actually essential to the UMTS		
5	standard and actually embodied in the [] chipsets incorporated into Apple products." (<i>Id.</i> at 3.)		
6	Plainly, there was no admission of infringement or that the '867 patent is <i>in fact</i> essential to the		
7	standard.		
8	III. INVALIDITY OF THE '893 PATENT		
9	Samsung's opposition fails to address or even mention the issue central to Apple's		
10	motion: Apple's and Samsung's experts agree that claim 10 of the '893 patent requires user		
11	action. (See Mot. at 15.)		
12			
13	; see also IPXL		
14	Holdings, L.L.C. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 430 F.3d 1377, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2005); In re Katz		
15	Interactive Call Processing Patent Litig., 639 F.3d 1303, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ("Katz's claims .		
16	create confusion as to when direct infringement occurs because they are directed both to		
17	systems and to actions performed by 'individual callers.'"). On the point, Apple's expert, Dr.		
18	Dourish opined that		
19	the language [of claim 10] indicates that user action is required by the claim. Thus		
20	it is unclear to me whether the language of claim 10 is met when one creates an apparatus that allows the user to switch from the stored-image display mode to the		
21	photographing mode and back to the stored image display mode, or when the user actually switches from the stored-image display mode to the photographing mode		
22	and back to the stored-image display mode. (Dourish '893 Invalidity Report ¶ 204 (Selwyn Decl., Ex. 10, Dkt. 925-15); Mot. at 15.)		
23	Similarly, Samsung's expert, Dr. Yang, testified:		
24	Similarly, Sumsung's expert, D1. Tung, testified.		
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(5/9/12 Yang Rough Dep. at 80:25-81:12 (Selwyn Decl., Ex. 12, Dkt. 925-17); Mot. at 15.) The parties' experts therefore agree that user action is required to practice claim 10.⁴

While Samsung cited a litany of cases in support of its Opposition, those cases are readily distinguishable, as in none of those cases did the parties' experts agree (as they do here) that user

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Although Dr. Yang testified under oath as quoted above, Samsung submitted a further declaration from Dr. Yang with its Opposition, in which he seemingly recants or contradicts his sworn testimony. (Yang Decl. at 3-6 (Dkt. 1001).) Apparently realizing that it would be improper (or at least unconvincing) to rely on a declaration that contradicts sworn testimony, in its Opposition, with respect to the '893 patent, Samsung *only* cites the Yang Declaration for a description of the '893 patent. (Opp. at 7.) However, to the extent Samsung seeks to rely on the Yang Declaration more broadly, Apple respectfully requests that ¶¶ 20-23 of the Yang Declaration be struck or otherwise disregarded by the Court. Paragraphs 20 and 23 contain new opinion that could have been and should have been stated in Dr. Yang's rebuttal report, but were not. (Compare Yang Decl., Dkt. 1001, ¶¶ 20-23 with Yang Validity Report, Declaration of Peter Kolovos in Support of Apple's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Kolovos Decl.") Ex. 1, at ¶ 142.) Further, paragraphs 20-22 of Dr. Yang's new declaration contradict his prior deposition testimony and are therefore improper. See Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 806-07 (1999) (requiring an explanation when affidavits submitted with summary judgment oppositions contradict earlier sworn deposition testimony); Davis v. Brouse McDowell, L.P.A., 596 F.3d 1355, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2010) cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 118, 178 (2010) ("In view of [plaintiff's expert's] inconsistent deposition testimony and his failure to include the patentability opinion of paragraph 5 in his expert report, the court did not abuse its discretion in striking paragraph 5.").

action was required to practice the claim.⁵ Moreover, unlike the cases on which Samsung relies, 1 claim 10 of the '893 patent clearly implicates user action. Therefore, on this record, granting 2 3 summary judgment of indefiniteness in favor of Apple would not disturb precedent that the holding of *IPXL* is limited and narrow. 4 5 Samsung's attempt to distinguish *In re Katz*, 639 F.3d at 1318, is similarly unavailing, as a side-by-side comparison of the claim at issue in that case and claim 10 of the '893 patent 6 7 demonstrates: 8 9 10 See Vistan Corp. v. Fadei USA, Inc., No. C 10-4862 JCS, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59348, at *25 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 27, 2012) (no agreement between experts that claim required user action 11 to be practiced); Yodlee, Inc. v. Cashedge, Inc., No. C 05-01550 SI, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86699, at *6-19 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 29, 2006) (same); Collaboration Props. v. Tandberg ASA, No. 12 C 05-01940 MHP, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42465, at *19-20 (N.D. Cal. June 22, 2006) (same); Collegenet, Inc. v. Xap Corp., 442 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1062 (D. Or. 2006) (same); Toshiba Corp. v. 13 Juniper Networks, Inc., C.A. No. 03-1035-SLR, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44348, at *13-14 (D. Del. June 28, 2006) (same); SynOor, Inc. v. Artesyn Techs., Inc., C.A. NO. 2:07-CV-497-TJW-14 CE, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74808, at *96 (E.D. Tex. July 26, 2010) (same); CSB-Sys. Int'l, Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., C.A. No. 10-2156, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45847, at *40 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 15 2012) (same); Wago Verwaltungsgesellschaft Mbh v. Rockwell Automation, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30703, at *19 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 7, 2012) (same); Leader Techs., Inc. v. Facebook, Inc., 16 770 F. Supp. 2d 686, 710 (D. Del. 2011) (same); Freedom Wireless, Inc. v. Alltel Corp., No. 2:06cv504 (TJW-CE), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82785, at *40-41 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 17, 2008) (same); 17 Ricoh Co. v. Katun Corp., 486 F. Supp. 2d 395, 403 (D.N.J. 2007) (same); Sienna, LLC v. CVS Corp., No. 06 Civ. 3364 (DLC), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2, at *22 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2007) (same). 18 19 Compare the language in claim 10 of the '893 patent requiring extensive user involvement ("A digital image processing apparatus comprising: ... wherein upon a user performing a mode-switching operation defined by switching from the stored-image display 20 mode to the photographing mode and back to the stored image display mode...) with the claims 21 at issue in cases cited by Samsung where summary judgment has been denied. See, e.g., Collaboration Properties, 2006 U.S. Dist LEXIS 42465 at *1 ("A teleconferencing system for 22 conducting a teleconference among a plurality of participants, comprising: ... wherein, the system is *configured* to reproduce images, based on data signals shared along the data path...") (emphasis added); Toshiba, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44348 at *11 n.1 ("A network 23 interconnection *apparatus* for transferring packets at a boundary of a plurality of networks, the 24 apparatus comprising: a control message processing unit configured to communicate with a previous hop node...") (emphasis in original); Wago Verwaltungsgesellschaft, 2012 U.S. Dist. 25 LEXIS 30703 at *2, *15-16 ("An input/output *device* for a data bus, said device being located on a support rail and being adapted to be positioned adjacent other such devices, said device 26 comprising: ... configuring the device with other such devices as series terminals ...) (emphasis added).

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1	In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Claim	'893 Patent, Claim 10	
1	1. An interface control system for use with,	10. A digital image processing apparatus	
2	(1) a communication facility including remote	comprising:	
	terminals for individual callers to make calls,	an optical system for receiving a light	
3	wherein said remote terminals comprise a	reflected from a subject;	
4	telephone capability including voice communication means and some of said	 wherein upon a user performing a mode-	
5	remote terminals comprise digital input means for providing data, (2) a multiple port, multiple	switching operation defined by switching from the stored-image display mode to the	
6	format processor for concurrently processing	photographing mode and back to the stored	
0	data from a substantial number of callers in	image display mode the controller causes the	
7	anyone of a plurality of formats, said	display screen to first display a single image	
	communication facility automatically	file that was most recently displayed before the	
8	providing call data signals, as to indicate called	mode-switching operation, the single image	
9	data (DNIS), to select a specific format from said plurality of formats, and (3) a plurality of	file being different from a most recently stored image file, and the single image file being first	
10	live operator attended terminals, for a plurality of formats, said interface control system	displayed irrespective of a duration that the camera was used in the photographing mode	
11	comprising:	during the mode switching operation.	
12	interface means for providing automated		
13	voice messages relating to said specific format to certain of said individual callers, <i>wherein</i>		
14	said certain of said individual callers digitally		
17	enter data, including at least caller		
15	information data, through said digital input		
16	means;		
17	(Kolovos Decl. Ex. 2, U.S. Patent No.	(Samsung's '893 Patent (Selwyn Decl., Ex. 2,	
1 /	5,917,893, claim 1, cited in <i>In re Katz</i> , 639	925-7).)	
18	F.3d at 1308, 1318. ⁷)	, ,	
19	The Federal Circuit found that the claims in <i>Katz</i> fell under the rationale of <i>IPXL</i> because "Katz's		
20	claims create confusion as to when direct infr	ingement occurs because they are directed both	
21	to systems and to actions performed by 'individual callers." In re Katz, 639 F.3d at 1318. In		
22	both the claim at issue in <i>Katz</i> and the asserted Samsung claim, the user is the subject performing		

both the claim at issue in Katz and the asserted Samsung claim, the user is the subject performing the action. (Compare the In re Katz claim language "wherein said certain of said individual callers ... enter data..." to Samsung's '893 Patent's requirement of a "user performing a modeswitching operation defined by switching from the stored-image display mode to the

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⁷ Coincidentally and confusingly, the patent in issue in *In re Katz* and Samsung's patent both end in "893."

photographing mode and back to the stored image display mode".) Both claims require the user to perform an action. For the reasons stated herein and in Apple's opening brief, Dkt. 925-4 at 12-16, independent claim 10 and dependent claim 12 are invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 112, \P 2, because the claims do not apprise a person of ordinary skill in the art of their scope.

IV. INVALIDITY OF THE '460 PATENT

A. Samsung Does Not Dispute that the Plain Language of the Claim Is Ambiguous

Samsung does not dispute that the plain language of claim 1 of the '460 patent has no clear meaning. Unlike the *S3* case cited by Samsung – where the court found that the specification and figures "explain[] and illustrate[]" the contested interaction between claim terms (*see S3 Inc. v. NVIDIA Corp.*, 259 F.3d 1364, 1368–369 (Fed. Cir. 2001)) – here Samsung attempts to manufacture "support" in the specification and file history for its current interpretation of claim 1 where none exists. Rather, as described below, the specification and file history provide no support for Samsung's (or any other) interpretation of claim 1. Because claim 1 is insolubly ambiguous to a person of ordinary skill in the art, the Court should find it invalid as indefinite.

B. None of the Three Possible Interpretations of Claim 1 Finds Support in the Specification

Even when read in light of the specification, claim 1 does not reasonably apprise those skilled in the art of the scope of the invention. Contrary to Samsung's assertions, the first interpretation of claim 1 identified by Apple and adopted by Samsung as its interpretation (sending two separate email messages from two separate email transmission sub-modes) finds no support in the specification or file history.⁸

As set forth in Apple's opening brief, the specification only describes *one* "E-mail transmission sub-mode." (Mot. at 16-17.) Apparently acknowledging this, Samsung does not even assert that the '460 patent discloses two






FIG. 6 (excerpt)

FIG. 8 (excerpt)



FIG. 9 (excerpt)

In paragraph 27 of his Declaration, Dkt. 1001, Dr. Yang unsuccessfully attempts to find support for Samsung's interpretation in FIG. 9 and the related detailed description, i.e., "[u]pon selection of *the* E-mail transmission sub-mode, the portable phone controller 32 controls the OSD 40 to display a message requesting entry of the address of the other party on the color LCD 48 in step 900 of FIG. 9." ('460 patent at 12:4–7 (Selwyn Decl. Ex. 3, Dkt. 925-8) (emphasis added); Srivastava Invalidity Report ¶ 338 (Selwyn Decl. Ex. 22, Dkt. 925-27).) Tellingly, Dr. Yang chooses to omit the entirety of FIG. 9 in his declaration, deleting the depiction of "E-mail transmission sub-mode 610," the single and only E-mail transmission sub-mode disclosed in the specification, at the top of FIG. 9.

Put simply, there is no support in the specification for a "first" and a "second" E-mail transmission sub-mode, let alone for how to practice the claimed method.

Apple objects to Paragraphs 27-34 of the Yang Declaration as untimely expert opinions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2). These paragraphs contain new opinions that could have been and should have been stated in Dr. Yang's rebuttal report, but were not. (*Compare* Yang Decl. ¶¶ 27–34, Dkt. 1001, *with* Yang Validity Report, Declaration of Peter Kolovos in Support of Apple's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Kolovos Decl.") Ex. 1, at ¶¶ 103–111.) *See also supra* n.4.

Samsung also incorrectly asserts that because Apple's expert argued that certain prior art references anticipate claim 1, the claim cannot be indefinite. This argument is contrary to common sense, legal precedent, and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which expressly allow parties to argue in the alternative. F.R.C.P. 8(d)(2)-(3). See also Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (affirming finding of indefiniteness where defendant argued non-infringement in the alternative). Indeed, Samsung ignores Dr. Srivastava's explicit statement in his expert report that his primary opinion is that claim 1 is indefinite. (Srivastava Invalidity Report ¶ 61 (Stake Decl., Ex. 3, Dkt. 1002-3) ("Likewise, it is my opinion that the claims of the '460 patent are indefinite, for the reasons articulated below. Nothing stated here or in the attached claims charts should be construed as an admission or suggestion that I believe the claims of the '460 patent are not indefinite. I offer these opinions as alternative grounds for invalidating the '460 patent, if the fact finder were to disagree with my opinion that the claims are indefinite.").) The deposition testimony of Dr. Srivastava cited by Samsung underscores this point:

- Can we agree that at the very least this claim requires the three core functions that Q: Dr. Yang opined on? . . .
- A: I do find the claim overall confusing as to what method it is citing. Whether there are two E-mail sub-modes or not, the claim language does use the first Email and the second E-mail sub-mode. As I alluded to in my report, the specification is at variance with that. But in terms of does [claim 1] talk about sending an E-mail text alone, an E-mail with text and image and sequentially scrolling through the images, yes, the claim does talk about these three things.

(Srivastava Dep. at 76:4-24 (Stake Decl. Ex. 2, Dkt. 1002-2) (emphasis added). 10)

Finally, Samsung asserts – in another newly offered argument by Dr. Yang – that the second and third possible interpretations identified by Apple (resulting in sending a single E-mail message) do not require performance of all claimed functions. (Yang Decl. ¶ 34 (Dkt. 1001).) This is a red herring. Samsung seems to be arguing that because the first interpretation is correct

Further, whether or not claim 1 refers to certain "core functions" does not clarify what those functions mean, how those functions must be performed, and even whether all of them must be performed in order to infringe claim 1.

(which it is not), the second and third interpretations are necessarily incorrect because they do not require all the functions required by the first interpretation. In addition, although a person of ordinary skill in the art would not be able to determine whether claim 1 requires sending one or two E-mail messages, each of the three possible interpretations identified by Apple includes the recited "first" and "second" E-mail transmission sub-mode and sequentially displaying "other" images through the use of scroll keys. Claim 1's insoluble ambiguity lies in *how* the "first" and "second" E-mail transmission sub-modes are used to carry out the claimed data transmission method. For example, even accepting for the sake of argument that claim 1 recites Samsung's three "core functions," it is impossible to determine whether the claimed method requires that emailing text, and emailing text and an image, are performed together, separately, or as alternatives, and whether the result is one or two E-mail messages. The specification simply provides no description that helps to clarify this insoluble ambiguity.

C. The Prosecution History also Fails to Clarify the Meaning of Claim 1

Samsung places undue weight on the prosecution history. Contrary to Samsung's assertions, the Examiner's mere repetition of the claim limitations in rejecting the claims provides no information about whether the Patent Office "readily understood" or "readily recognized" any aspect of claim 1. (Opp. at 17; Yang Decl. ¶ 30 (Dkt. 1001).) The prosecution history similarly does not provide any guidance as to which of the three possible interpretations should be attributed to the claimed method as a whole. The Examiner's identification of certain individual claim limitations in the prior art does not favor any one of the three interpretations or shed light on how to practice the claim.

Apple does not dispute that the prior art teaches a "first" and "second" E-mail transmission sub-mode. However, the prosecution history (like the specification) is silent on *how* the first and second E-mail transmission sub-modes are related to one another and/or to the claimed sequential display of "other" images, and on what exactly is required to practice the claimed method. As set forth in Apple's opening brief, a person of ordinary skill in the art would not understand whether claim 1 is infringed by: (1) transmission of an E-mail message from the

1	first E-mail transmission sub-mode <i>and</i> transmission of another E-mail from the second E-mail		
2	transmission sub-mode; (2) transmission of a text E-mail from the first E-mail transmission sub-		
3	mode <i>or</i> transmission of an E-mail with an image from the second E-mail transmission sub-		
4	mode; or (3) transmission of information from the first E-mail transmission sub-mode to the		
5	second E-mail transmission sub-mode, followed by transmission of an E-mail with an image		
6	from the second E-mail transmission sub-mode. Therefore, claim 1 is invalid as indefinite.		
7	D. Samsung Does Not Dispute the Inventors' Inability to Understand Claim 1		
8	Despite downplaying the importance of inventor testimony, Samsung attempts to use it to		
9	salvage claim 1. (See Opp. at 18.) According to Samsung, the inventor testimony		
10	As an initial matter, whether or not claim 1		
11	discloses three functions is irrelevant to whether a person of ordinary skill in the art would		
12	understand whether and how the claim requires performance of all or some subset of those		
13	functions. Further, Mr. Oh's testimony,		
14			
15	see Oh Dep. 35:9-36:16 (Stake Decl., Ex. 10, Dkt. 1002-10),		
16	(See Mot. at		
17	19.)		
18	Moreover, as Samsung recognizes, inventor testimony can support an indefiniteness		
19	finding when the specification and prosecution history shed no light on the claim language. See,		
20	e.g., Amgen v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1218 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 12 As discussed above		
21			
22	11 Incredibly,		
23			
24	(Oh Dep. at 47:7-13 (Stake Decl., Ex. 10, Dkt. 1002-10).)		
25	This testimony sheds no light on the proper interpretation of claim 1.		
26	inventor testified about her subjective understanding of her invention which defendants		
27	interpreted to be different from what was claimed. 216 F.3d 1372, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2000). In contrast, the inventors here cannot even understand what was claimed.		

and in Apple's opening brief, that is the case here. With one exception, Samsung does not dispute that its inventors could not explain or define what claim 1 means, including whether claim 1 requires sending two E-mail messages. (Mot. at 18-19.)

This testimony speaks for itself, despite Samsung's attempts to devalue it by denigrating the question. At bottom, the inventors' inability to understand their own patent claim underscores the insoluble ambiguity of claim 1 to those skilled in the art.

E. Samsung and Its Experts Cannot Agree on the Interpretation of Claim 1

Samsung does not dispute that its infringement contentions describe performing the claimed steps in order by first opening the Mail application, returning to the Home screen to open the Photos application, navigating between image files, opening the Mail application again, and opening the Photos application again. (Mot. at 19-20.)

Neither of these two interpretations bears any relation to Samsung counsel's description to Dr. Sukumar of the patented feature as the transmission of a *single* email message with an image in the body and not as an attachment. Samsung suggests that Dr. Sukumar had focused on only the final limitation of claim 1 because that was the "inventive aspect[] of the '460 patent." (Opp. at 20.) But as Samsung itself has admitted, the final limitation already existed in the prior art, and it was not until the applicants added two *other* limitations during prosecution that claim 1 was allowed. (Opp. at 16-18.) Curiously, Dr. Sukumar does not even address those limitations in his expert report. Ultimately, Samsung and its experts have advanced interpretations of claim 1 that are inconsistent with one another, let alone with any "clear meaning" of the claim, which only further underscores the indefiniteness of claim 1. (Mot. at 19-21.)

Apple has moved to strike the new infringement theory, among others, from Dr. Yang's expert report as untimely disclosed pursuant to Patent Local Rule 3-1. (*See* Apple's Motion to Strike Portions of Samsung's Expert Reports (Dkt. 939-1).)

V. **CONCLUSION** 1 For the foregoing reasons, as well as the reasons stated in its Opening Brief, Dkt. 925-4, 2 Apple respectfully requests that the Court grant its motion for summary judgment of non-3 infringement of the '867 patent, and for summary judgment of invalidity of claims 10 and 12 of 4 the '893 patent and claim 1 of the '460 patent. 5 6 Dated: June 7, 2012 /s/ Mark D. Selwyn 7 Mark D. Selwyn (SBN 244180) (mark.selwyn@wilmerhale.com) 8 WILMER CUTLER PICKERING 9 HALE AND DORR LLP 950 Page Mill Road 10 Palo Alto, California 94304 Telephone: (650) 858-6000 11 Facsimile: (650) 858-6100 12 William F. Lee (admitted *pro hac vice*) 13 (william.lee@wilmerhale.com) WILMER CUTLER PICKERING 14 HALE AND DORR LLP 60 State Street 15 Boston, Massachusetts 02109 Telephone: (617) 526-6000 16 Facsimile: (617) 526-5000 17 Attorneys for Plaintiff and 18 Counterclaim-Defendant Apple Inc. 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document has been served on June 7, 2012, to all counsel of record who are deemed to have consented to electronic service via the Court's CM/ECF system per Civil Local Rule 5.4. Any other counsel of record will be served by electronic mail, facsimile and/or overnight delivery.

/s/ Mark D. Selwyn Mark D. Selwyn