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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
SAN JOSE DIVISION

SIMULADOS SOFTWARE, LTD.,
Plaintiff,
v.
PHOTON INFOTECH PRIVATE, LTD.,
Defendant.

Case No. [5:12-cv-04382-EJD](#)

**ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A
MATTER OF LAW AND GRANTING
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
ATTORNEYS' FEES**

Re: Dkt. Nos. 177, 178

Following a jury trial, Defendant Photon Infotech Private, Ltd. moves for judgment as a matter of law, and Plaintiff Simulados Software, Ltd. moves for attorneys' fees. Photon's motion will be denied and Simulados's motion will be granted.

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1 **I. BACKGROUND**

2 Simulados alleges that Photon breached a contract to adapt Simulados’s software to be
3 used as an online application and to be used on Windows and Apple operating systems. Joint Short
4 Statement of the Case 1, Dkt. No. 135. Following a jury trial, judgment was entered in favor of
5 Simulados on its claims for breach of contract and fraud, and against Photon on its counterclaim
6 for breach of contract. Judgment, Dkt. No. 167. The jury awarded \$309,674 in damages to
7 Simulados for the breach-of-contract claim, and it awarded the same amount for the fraud claim.
8 Verdict Forms, Dkt. No. 165.

9 Now before the Court are (1) Photon’s motion for judgment as a matter of law and (2)
10 Simulados’s motion for attorneys’ fees. Pl.’s Mot. for J. as a Matter of Law (“JMOL Mot.”), Dkt.
11 No. 178; Def.’s Mot. for Att’ys’ Fees (“Fees Mot.”), Dkt. No. 177.

12 **II. LEGAL STANDARD**

13 **A. Judgment as a Matter of Law**

14 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50 permits a district court to grant judgment as a matter of
15 law when “the evidence, construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, permits
16 only one reasonable conclusion, and that conclusion is contrary to that of the jury.” Estate of Diaz
17 v. City of Anaheim, 840 F.3d 592, 604 (9th Cir. 2016) (quotation marks omitted). The court must
18 draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing
19 Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000). “[T]he court should give credence to the evidence favoring
20 the nonmovant as well as that ‘evidence supporting the moving party that is uncontradicted and
21 unimpeached, at least to the extent that evidence comes from disinterested witnesses.’ ” Id. at 151
22 (quoting 9A C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2529 at 300 (2d ed.1995)).
23 However, the court “may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.” Id. at 150.

24 **B. Attorneys’ Fees**

25 “Under the American Rule, the prevailing litigant is ordinarily not entitled to collect
26 reasonable attorney’s fees from the losing party.” Travelers Cas. and Sur. Co. of Am. v. Pac. Gas

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1 & Elec. Co., 549 U.S. 443, 448 (2007) (internal citations and quotations omitted). However,
2 attorneys' fees can be recovered under statutory provisions or the terms of a contract. Id. "In a
3 diversity case, the law of the state in which the district court sits determines whether a party is
4 entitled to attorney fees, and the procedure for requesting an award of attorney fees is governed by
5 federal law." Carnes v. Zamani, 488 F.3d 1057, 1059 (9th Cir. 2007). Thus, state law governs the
6 enforceability of a contract's attorneys' fees provision. In California, Civil Code § 1717(a)
7 governs fee applications stemming from contract actions:

8 In any action on a contract, where the contract specifically provides
9 that attorney's fees and costs, which are incurred to enforce that
10 contract, shall be awarded either to one of the parties or to the
11 prevailing party, then the party who is determined to be the party
12 prevailing on the contract, whether he or she is the party specified in
13 the contract or not, shall be entitled to reasonable attorney's fees in
14 addition to other costs.

15 The court determines whether a party has prevailed on the contract for the purposes of
16 awarding fees. Cal. Civ. Code § 1717(b)(1). The prevailing party on a contract is the party that
17 recovered a greater relief in the action on the contract. Id. § 1717(b)(2).

18 **III. DISCUSSION**

19 **A. Judgment as a Matter of Law**

20 This Court held a hearing on Simulados's motion on February 4, 2016. At the hearing, the
21 Court requested additional briefing on the issue of contractual limitations of liability. In its
22 supplemental brief, Simulados stated that it "elects to rescind the contract and requests that the
23 Court revise contract damages for the return of the value of consideration paid by Plaintiff of
24 \$18,848, and uphold fraud damage findings as determined by the Jury." Dkt. No. 189 at 2. (Photon
25 agrees that Simulados paid \$18,848 in consideration. See Dkt. No. 193 at 2.) Simulados argues
26 that it is entitled to recover the amount it paid in consideration (\$18,848) as well damages for
27 fraud that the jury awarded (\$309,674). Dkt. No. 189 at 2.

28 Photon contends that, as a matter of law, Simulados may not recover fraud damages if it
29 chooses to rescind the contract. Dkt. No. 193 at 2. In support of this position, it cites Wong v.

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1 Stoler for the proposition that “[r]escission and damages are alternative remedies. . . . A party may
2 seek rescission or damages for breach of contract or fraud in the event rescission cannot be
3 obtained in the same action. . . . But the election of one remedy bars recovery under the other.”
4 Wong v. Stoler, 237 Cal. App. 4th 1375, 1385 (2015) (citations and quotation marks omitted).

5 However, even if a plaintiff elects to rescind a contract, that plaintiff may still recover
6 consequential damages that resulted from the defendant’s wrongful conduct. The Wong court held
7 that “[i]f the court finds that the contract was rescinded, the aggrieved party shall be awarded
8 complete relief, including restitution of benefits, if any, conferred by him as a result of the
9 transaction and any consequential damages to which he is entitled.” Id. at 1386 (internal citations
10 and quotation marks omitted, and emphasis added). In other words, a plaintiff may recover
11 consequential damages while also electing the remedy of rescission. In cases involving rescission,
12 “ ‘the court should do complete equity between the parties’ and to that end ‘may grant any
13 monetary relief necessary’ to do so.” Id. (quoting Runyan v. Pac. Air. Indus., Inc., 2 Cal. 3d 304,
14 316 (1970)). Rescission aims “to bring about substantial justice by adjusting the equities between
15 the parties,” and relief “generally rests upon the sound discretion of the trial court exercised in
16 accord with the facts and circumstances of the case.” Id. (quoting Sharabianlou v. Karp, 181 Cal.
17 App. 4th 1133, 1144–45 (2010) and Hicks v. Clayton, 67 Cal. App. 3d 251, 265 (1977)).

18 Here, the jury found that Simulados suffered consequential damages resulting from
19 Photon’s failure to provide the software as promised. Specifically, it found that Simulados
20 suffered (1) \$96,703 in out-of-pocket expenses and (2) lost profits of \$212,971—together, totaling
21 \$309,674. Verdict Forms, Dkt. No. 165 at 4.

22 Photon contends that, despite the jury’s findings, both damage amounts are too speculative
23 as a matter of law to be recoverable. JMOL Mot. 14–16, 17–18. Photon further contends that there
24 is an insufficient causal connection between Photon’s wrongful conduct and the lost profits that
25 Simulados claims it suffered. Id. at 16–17. Simulados responds that testimony from its founder
26 and owner, as well as expert testimony, “demonstrated the growth of the company using profit and
27

1 losses of the company, accounted for the time periods Photon was involved, showed how work
2 and expenses put in after Photon’s breach was finally discovered, and accounted for profits
3 actually received as to not double recover.” Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. for J. as a Matter of Law
4 18, Dkt. No. 180. Simulados also presented testimony and documentary evidence showing the
5 amount it paid to third-party contractors “who were required to write code to make up for Photon’s
6 failure to perform on the contract.” Id. at 20.

7 The Court finds that Simulados’s consequential damage amounts for lost profits and
8 expenses are sufficiently concrete and traceable to Photon’s conduct. The evidence, viewed in the
9 light most favorable to Simulados, supports the jury’s damages award. See Estate of Diaz, 840
10 F.3d at 604. The jury’s verdict is supported by “relevant evidence that a reasonable mind would
11 accept as adequate.” Callicrate v. Wadsworth Mfg., 427 F.3d 1361, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing
12 Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1346 (9th Cir. 1992)).

13 Accordingly, Photon’s motion for judgment as a matter of law will be denied.

14 **B. Attorneys’ Fees**

15 Under the lodestar method of evaluating a request for attorneys’ fees, the lodestar is the
16 number of hours spent on the case multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. Hanlon v. Chrysler
17 Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1029 (9th Cir. 1998). The lodestar “may be adjusted upward or downward
18 to account for several factors including the quality of the representation, the benefit obtained for
19 the class, the complexity and novelty of the issues presented, and the risk of nonpayment.” Id.

20 Here, Simulados requests an award of \$183,556.91 in attorneys’ fees and expenses. Dkt.
21 No. 177 at 4. That request is based on an hourly rate of \$275 for partners and senior associates,
22 \$225 for associates, \$150 for paralegals, and \$75 for legal assistants and file clerks. Fees Mot. 3;
23 see also Vethan Aff. ¶ 3, Dkt. No. 177-1. The total attorney time spent on this case was 478 hours,
24 and the total amount of legal assistant and paralegal time was 300 hours. Vethan Aff. ¶¶ 6–7. This
25 case involved two amended complaints, numerous dispositive motions, and a jury trial. Based on
26 counsel’s declarations and the circumstances of this case, the Court finds the requested fees to be

1 reasonable under the lodestar method. See, e.g., In re Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” Mktg., Sales
2 Practices, & Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 2672 CRB (JSC), 2017 WL 2178787 (N.D. Cal. May
3 17, 2017) (granting a motion for attorneys’ fees billed at an average hourly rate of \$472.05); Shaw
4 v. Ghimire, No. C12-04687 HRL, 2013 WL 5372400 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2013) (granting a
5 motion for attorneys’ fees billed at an hourly rate of \$350).

6 As such, Simulados’s motion for attorneys’ fees will be granted.

7 **IV. CONCLUSION**

8 The Court orders as follows:

9 1. Photon’s motion for judgment as a matter of law (Dkt. No. 178) is DENIED. In
10 light of the parties’ supplemental briefing, Simulados shall be awarded damages of (1) \$18,848 for
11 the value of the consideration it paid and (2) \$309,674 in consequential damages.

12 2. Simulados’s motion for attorneys’ fees (Dkt. No. 177) is GRANTED.

13
14 **IT IS SO ORDERED.**

15 Dated: September 26, 2017



EDWARD J. DAVILA
United States District Judge