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11 **IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**  
 12 **FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**  
 13 **SAN JOSE DIVISION**

14  
 15 IN RE: FACEBOOK, INC. INTERNET  
 16 TRACKING LITIGATION

No. 5:12-md-02314-EJD

**SECOND AMENDED CONSOLIDATED  
 CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT**

**DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL**

21 **PUBLIC REDACTED VERSION**

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1 **I. INTRODUCTION**

2 1. On April 22, 2010, defendant Facebook, Inc. (“Facebook” or “Defendant”) launched  
3 the “Like” button outside of the Facebook domain. Within weeks it became the single most  
4 important social plug-in ever created, quickly surpassing Facebook’s “Share” button.

5 2. Less than five weeks after the Like button launch, 50,000 websites had installed it;  
6 less than ten weeks after launch, web site consultants were calling it “ubiquitous.” By November  
7 2013, Facebook claimed on its developer blog that its Like and Share buttons drove more referral  
8 traffic than all other social networks combined. Today, Facebook says that web pages containing  
9 the Like button are viewed more than 30 *billion* times each day, and more than 7 million websites  
10 now incorporate them. As the *Huffington Post* summed up, the Like button is now “omnipresent.”

11 3. As discussed in more detail below, when a Facebook user logs into his Facebook  
12 account, a number of session cookies and tracking cookies are written to the user’s browser. When  
13 an Internet user visits a webpage with Facebook functionality (including the Like button), Facebook  
14 causes the user’s browser to send a real-time copy of the referrer URL of the page being viewed,  
15 along with whatever Facebook tracking and session cookies are written to the browser, *to*  
16 *Facebook*. The browser sends the data to Facebook regardless of whether the user actually clicks  
17 on the Like or Share button or even knows of its existence. This means that 30 billion times a day,  
18 Facebook causes computers around the world to report the real-time Internet communications of  
19 hundreds of millions of people – including the entire file path of URLs containing sensitive content  
20 – to Facebook. When Facebook’s session and tracking cookies link the URLs to specific persons,  
21 anonymity disappears and Facebook’s internet tracking becomes the single most pervasive and  
22 grave threat to data privacy today.

23 4. When a subscriber logs out of Facebook, however, Facebook promises to delete  
24 those cookies that contain subscriber’s identifying information, such as user ID. This promise was  
25 made from the very first day Facebook launched the Like button. From the very first day, however,  
26 Facebook broke this promise – logging out did not in fact remove cookies with user IDs, and at  
27 times during the Class Period new cookies were written even when subscribers were logged out.  
28 Discovery has revealed that from the very first day, [REDACTED]

1 [REDACTED]. Not until September 26, 2011 after an  
2 independent researcher publicly disclosed the problem and after the story was picked up by the  
3 *Wall Street Journal*, did Facebook choose to fix the problem.

4 5. The plaintiffs are four Facebook subscribers whose Internet use was tracked by  
5 Facebook between April 22, 2010 through September 26, 2011 (the “Class Period”) while logged  
6 out of their Facebook accounts. They bring federal and California state law claims on behalf of  
7 other similarly-situated Facebook subscribers in the United States (the “Class”) arising from  
8 Facebook’s knowing and unauthorized interception and tracking of users’ Internet communications  
9 and activity, and knowing and unauthorized access to users’ computing devices and web browsers.

10 6. Plaintiffs Quinn, Davis and Lentz also bring these claims on behalf of a subclass of  
11 Facebook subscribers in the United States who used Microsoft’s Internet Explorer (the “Subclass”)  
12 from April 22, 2010 through September 17, 2010. During this period, Internet Explorer protected  
13 the privacy of its users by blocking certain tracking cookies of websites that did not adhere to  
14 standards set by the “Platform for Privacy Preferences” project, or P3P. Facebook knowingly  
15 circumvented P3P’s cookie blocking by misrepresenting its privacy policy to Internet Explorer until  
16 September 17, 2010 when Facebook finally admitted it did not have a compliant P3P policy.

## 17 **II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE**

18 7. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant Facebook because Facebook is  
19 headquartered in this District.

20 8. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the federal claims in this action,  
21 namely the Federal Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (the “Wiretap Act”) and the Stored  
22 Communication Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (“SCA”), pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

23 9. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this entire action pursuant to the  
24 Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d), because this is a class action in which  
25 the amount in controversy exceeds \$5,000,000, and at least one member of the class is a citizen of  
26 a state other than California or Delaware.

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1           10.     This Court also has supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims in this action  
2 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 because the state law claims form part of the same case or controversy  
3 as those that give rise to the federal claims.

4           11.     Venue is proper in this District because Defendant Facebook is headquartered in this  
5 District. In addition, The Facebook Statements of Rights and Responsibilities in force during the  
6 Class Period, which Facebook claims govern the relationship between Facebook and its users,  
7 provides for exclusive venue in state or federal courts located in Santa Clara County, California.

### 8     **III.    THE PARTIES**

9           12.     Plaintiff Mrs. Perrin Davis (“Davis”) is an adult domiciled in Illinois. Davis had an  
10 active Facebook account during the entire Class Period.

11          13.     Plaintiff Prof. Cynthia Quinn (“Quinn”) is an adult domiciled in Hawaii. Quinn had  
12 an active Facebook account during the entire Class Period.

13          14.     Plaintiff Dr. Brian Lentz (“Lentz”) is an adult domiciled in North Carolina. Lentz  
14 had an active Facebook account during the entire Class Period.

15          15.     Plaintiff Mr. Matthew Vickery (“Vickery”) is an adult domiciled in Washington  
16 State. Vickery had an active Facebook account during the entire Class Period.

17          16.     Defendant Facebook is a Delaware corporation which maintains its headquarters at  
18 1601 Willow Road, Menlo Park, California 94025. Facebook is a “social network” that permits its  
19 members to interact with one another through a web site located at www.facebook.com. By the  
20 end of the Class Period, Facebook had approximately 800 million members, of whom 150 million  
21 were in the United States. Today, Facebook claims approximately 1.4 billion members.

### 22     **IV.    FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS**

#### 23         A.     The Facebook Terms of Service

24          17.     Facebook asserts that the agreement governing its relationship with users is the  
25 “Statement of Rights and Responsibilities” or “SSR” which incorporates a number of other  
26 documents by reference. The SSR at the start of the Class Period is dated April 22, 2010, and is  
27 attached to this complaint as Exhibit A.

28

1           18. Updated SSRs in the Class Period are dated August 25, 2010 (see Exhibit B),  
2 October 4, 2010 (see Exhibit C) and April 26, 2011 (see Exhibit D).

3           19. Each of these SSRs, regardless of date, provides that “[t]he laws of the State of  
4 California will govern this Statement, as well as any claims that might arise between you and us,  
5 without regard to conflict of law provisions.” *See, e.g.*, SSR dated April 22, 2010 at ¶ 15, Ex. A.

6           20. Each of these SSRs incorporated by reference the Privacy Policy (later called the  
7 “Data Use Policy” starting April 26, 2011). *See* Exhibits E through H. For example, Facebook  
8 said in the SSR “[w]e encourage you to read the Privacy Policy, and to use it to help make informed  
9 decisions.” SSR dated April 22, 2010 at ¶ 1, Ex. A. At the end, the SSR stated, “The Privacy  
10 Policy is designed to help you understand how we collect and use information.”

11           21. The Privacy Policies (and Data Use Policy) are long and difficult to comprehend. A  
12 December 8, 2011 inquiry from the United States House of Representatives noted that Facebook’s  
13 privacy policy was “longer than that of all other social networks and exceed in length the United  
14 States Constitution. . . . We are concerned . . . that long, complex privacy policy statements make  
15 it difficult for consumers to understand how their information is being used.” *See* Ex. I., p. 8.

16           22. In its January 6, 2012 response to the Congressional inquiry, Facebook agreed: “We  
17 also agree that long and complex privacy policies can make it difficult for consumers to understand  
18 how their information is being used . . . . we use a layered approach, summarizing our practices  
19 on the front page and then allowing people to click through the Policy for more details.” *Id.* at 9.

20           23. The Privacy Policies and the later Data Use Policy linked to Facebook’s Help Page  
21 as a part of this “layered approach.” One Help Page entry provided more detail related to  
22 Facebook’s use of cookies, which “are small files that store information about your account, web  
23 browser, computer, mobile phone or other device.” Facebook also represented in the social plug-  
24 in discussion that “*when you log out of Facebook, we remove the cookies that identify your  
25 particular account.*”

26           24. The Privacy Policies dated April 22, 2010 (Ex. E), October 5, 2010 (Ex. F) and  
27 December 22, 2010 (Ex. G) link to these representations, contradict none of them, and never purport  
28 to obtain consent for Facebook to use account-identifying cookies after logout. In fact, on

1 September 7, 2011 Facebook moved the social-plugin discussion from the Help Center directly into  
2 the Data Use Policy, and continued to represent that Facebook would only use User ID cookies  
3 when the user is “logged in to Facebook.” Ex. H, section I (“Other Information We Receive About  
4 You.”).

5 25. The Facebook Privacy Policies as explained by the help pages are consistent with  
6 all public representations made by Facebook. For example, four days into the Class Period, on  
7 April 26, 2010, Facebook explained social plug-ins on its “Facebook Notes” blog. Facebook was  
8 clear that “you only see a personalized experience with your friends if you are logged into your  
9 Facebook account.”

10 26. When privacy rights and civil liberties organizations 2010 raised a number of  
11 privacy concerns associated with social plug-ins and other changes to the Facebook Privacy Policy  
12 at the beginning of the Class Period, it was believed that Facebook was only tracking logged in  
13 users via the Like button. So, for example, the ACLU, Center for Democracy and Technology,  
14 Center for Digital Democracy, Consumer Action, Consumer Watchdog, Electronic Privacy  
15 Information Center, Electronic Frontier Foundation and the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse jointly  
16 wrote to Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg regarding a number of “outstanding privacy problems.”  
17 *See* Open Letter dated June 16, 2010, attached as Ex. J. The authors objected that the Like buttons  
18 “provide Facebook with information about every visit to the site *by anyone who is logged in to*  
19 *Facebook.*” *Id.* at 2 (emphasis added). Not one of these well-respected and tech-savvy privacy  
20 groups understood that Facebook was also tracking logged out as well as logged in users, which  
21 would have been a far more serious concern.

22 27. Throughout the entire Class Period and thereafter, Facebook consistently told the  
23 public that it was not tracking users post-logout. In a series of interviews with USA Today in mid-  
24 November, 2011, for example, Facebook said it did not log any personal information associated  
25 with Internet surfing by logged out users – all logging would be done only by an anonymous  
26 browser cookie. When asked if even the anonymous data could somehow be re-associated with the  
27  
28



1 browsing history, Facebook reiterated: “We’ve said that we don’t do it, *and we couldn’t do it*  
2 *without some form of consent and disclosure.*”<sup>1</sup>

3 B. URLs Contain the “Contents” of an Electronic Communication

4 28. To browse the web via the Internet, users employ a web browser. The most popular  
5 web-browsers include Apple Safari, Microsoft Internet Explorer, Google Chrome, and Mozilla  
6 Firefox.

7 29. Web browsers are software applications that allow consumers to send, receive and  
8 view electronic communications on the Internet and to view the content of web pages. Web  
9 browsers include a Terms of Use or Service, which prohibit users from engaging in unlawful or  
10 unauthorized tracking of the communications of others or from using the service to engage in  
11 criminal or otherwise unlawful acts. For example, major web-browsers such as Google Chrome,  
12 Microsoft Internet Explorer, and Apple Safari all expressly prohibit unlawful acts.<sup>2</sup> Plaintiffs are  
13 not aware of any major web-browser which consents to the use of its service to engage in criminal  
14 or otherwise unlawful acts.

15 30. Every website is hosted by a server through which it sends and receives  
16 communications with Internet users and their web browsers to display web pages on users’ monitors  
17 and screens, depending on the user’s chosen computing device.

18 31. The basic command to communicate with websites is called the ‘GET’ command.  
19 For example, when an Internet user types a URL into the navigation bar of her web browser and  
20 hits *enter* (or more commonly, when an Internet user clicks on a hyper-link), the user sends a ‘GET’  
21 command to the server hosting the website to which the user is sending the communication. The  
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23 <sup>1</sup> See Acohido, Byron, *How Facebook Tracks you across the Web*, USA TODAY, Nov. 16, 2011.  
24 [http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/story/2011-11-15/facebook-privacy-tracking-  
data/51225112/1](http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/story/2011-11-15/facebook-privacy-tracking-data/51225112/1).

25 <sup>2</sup> See [https://www.google.com/intl/en\\_US/chrome/browser/privacy/eula\\_text.html](https://www.google.com/intl/en_US/chrome/browser/privacy/eula_text.html) (last visited  
26 July 28, 2014); [http://windows.microsoft.com/en-US/internet-explorer/products/ie-9/end-user-  
license-agreement](http://windows.microsoft.com/en-US/internet-explorer/products/ie-9/end-user-license-agreement) (last visited July 28, 2014); and  
27 <http://www.apple.com/legal/sla/docs/SafariWindows.pdf> (last visited Sept. 10, 2014).  
28

1 'GET' command instructs the website server to send the content contained within the file the  
2 Internet user has requested onto the user's browser for display.

3 32. Another basic command is the 'POST' command. The 'POST' command is used  
4 when a user enters data into a form on a website and clicks *enter* or the submit button. The 'POST'  
5 command sends the data entered into the form to the website.

6 33. Each website server has an IP address. For example, the IP address for the website  
7 "www.nytimes.com" is "170.149.161.130." An IP address, however, is not the same thing as a  
8 URL. The New York Times website has a single or just a handful of IP addresses for all of the  
9 articles, essays, and other content hosted on its webserver. Thus, revealing that an Internet user  
10 sent a series of communications to 170.149.161.130 only reveals the parties to the communication  
11 – the user and the New York Times. In contrast, a full-string detailed URL reveals both the parties  
12 to the communication and the contents of a communication.

13 34. A URL is composed of several different parts. For example, consider the following  
14 URL: <http://progressivehealth.hubpages.com/hub/How-Do-I-Reduce-Herpes-Breakouts>:

- 15 a. **http://** – This is the protocol identified by the web browser to the web  
16 server which sets the basic language of the interaction between the browser  
17 and the server. The forward-slashes indicate that the browser is attempting  
18 to make contact with the server.
- 19 b. **progressivehealth.hubpages.com** – This is the name that identifies the  
20 website and corresponding website server with which the Internet user has  
21 initiated a communication. There is an IP address associated with the  
22 "progresivehealth.com" server.
- 23 c. **/hub/** – This part of the URL indicates a folder on the web-server where the  
24 communication is located, a file of which the Internet user has requested.
- 25 d. **/How-Do-I-Reduce-Herpes/Breakouts/** – This is the name of the precise file  
26 requested and it constitutes and/or contains information relating to the  
27 substance, purport, and meaning of a communication. The IP address attached  
28 to this particular URL would only reveal that the user was in the process of

1 sending and receiving communications from HubPages.com. The full string  
2 details URL would reveal the user was interested in, and was seeking and  
3 requesting information from HubPages.com about, herpes breakouts and their  
4 reduction.

5 e. **/hub/How-Do-I-Reduce-Herpes-Breakouts** – This combination of the  
6 folder and exact file title is called the “file path.”

7 35. To further illustrate the distinction between an IP address and a full-string detailed  
8 URL, consider an Internet user seeking information on “stress after 9/11.” This user might type that  
9 exact search term into Google and the first result they would get is a link to an article on the  
10 NYTimes.com website:

11 [Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder From 9/11 Still Haunts - The ...](#)  
12 [www.nytimes.com/.../post-traumatic-stress-disorder-fr...](#) The New York Times ▾  
13 Aug 9, 2011 - 10 Years and a Diagnosis Later, 9/11 Demons Haunt Thousands ... after  
14 the Vietnam War, that post-traumatic **stress** disorder was added to the ...

15 The user who clicks on the phrase “Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder from 9/11 Still Haunts” would  
16 be sending a communication through the user’s browser to the New York Times seeking that  
17 information via a ‘GET’ request and the full-string detailed URL:  
18 [http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/10/nyregion/post-traumatic-stress-disorder-from-911still-](http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/10/nyregion/post-traumatic-stress-disorder-from-911still-haunts.html)  
19 [haunts.html](http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/10/nyregion/post-traumatic-stress-disorder-from-911still-haunts.html). The IP address for the New York Times would be the same whether the user went to  
20 NYTimes.com or sent this detailed request for information via a URL. The user would receive in  
21 return a 3,000 word article from the New York Times on the topic of Americans suffering from  
22 stress a full ten years after 9/11.

23 36. Although a single webpage appears on a user’s screen as a complete product, it is  
24 more often an assembled collage of independent parts. Some portions often exist on different  
25 servers, often operated by third parties, which send the additional information to a window called  
26 an iframe. In essence, the iframe is a small portion of the third-party’s website that peeks through  
27 the first-party website, usually in the form of an advertisement or social plug-in:  
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37. To display each part of a single webpage as one complete product, the host server leaves the iframe blank. Upon receiving a ‘GET’ command from a user’s web browser, the website server contemporaneously re-directs the user’s web-browser to send a separate but simultaneous GET command to the third-party responsible for the iframe, thereby allowing the third-parties to gain limited access to the user’s web-browsers.

38. In addition to the GET command received by the third-party, the detailed URL from the first domain is acquired by the third-party. These URLs are called “referrer headers” (technically spelled “referer” due to a quirk of history).

39. The re-direction of the referrer URL and the sending of the re-directed GET command is accomplished through the individual Internet user’s web-browser without any further action or knowledge of the user.

40. The third-party servers to which the GET requests are contemporaneously re-directed, and which thereby gained access to the user’s web-browser, responds by sending information to user’s web-browser to fill in the blank iframe.

41. The sending of the re-directed GET request and acquisition of the referrer headers by third-parties occurs both contemporaneously with the user’s communications with the first-party website and while the information is in storage by the first-party website and the user’s computing device and web-browser.

42. The entire process happens in milliseconds. The precise length of time from the original ‘GET’ request from the user to the website and the corresponding communication from

1 the website back to the user is determined by the user’s Internet speed and the speed of the  
2 website server and server(s) to which the user’s referrer URL and GET request was  
3 contemporaneously re-directed.

4 43. Facebook has always understood the sensitivity of content included in referrers, and  
5 the privacy concerns associated with referring URLs to another website. One month into the class  
6 period, for example, Facebook engineer Matt Jones wrote a blog post called “Protecting Privacy  
7 with Referrers.” See Ex. K. He first noted that Facebook does truly want to track its users across  
8 the internet:

9 Here at Facebook, we’re all about understanding how people interact with  
10 our site – including how they end up here from across the vast expanse of  
11 the internet. We’re not the only ones, though – most web sites want similar  
insights about the people who use them.

12 Despite its tragic misspelling, the HTTP standard’s “referrer” header sent  
13 by browsers gives websites the information they need to see how users  
found them, and how they explore the sites once there.

14 44. Then under the heading “Referrers: not always welcome,” Mr. Jones added:

15 But sometimes referrers just don’t belong – maybe there is sensitive  
16 information in a URL, or maybe a site just doesn’t want its users’ browsers  
17 telling others how they use the site. . . . *Facebook is one site where referrers  
don’t really belong . . .*

18 *Id.* (emphasis added).

19 45. Similarly, at the beginning of the Class Period, Facebook met with representatives  
20 of [REDACTED] regarding [REDACTED] possible integration of Like buttons. Facebook  
21 employee Matt Kelly recorded that [REDACTED] wanted to use a version of the button that would  
22 provide greater privacy to its users; Mr. Kelly noted “[REDACTED]  
23 [REDACTED]” In response, Facebook employee Ethan Beard noted the challenge of  
24 request, and proposed an alternative “[REDACTED]  
25 [REDACTED]  
26 [REDACTED].” See Ex. Q at p. 1.

1 C. Internet Tracking Through the Facebook “Like” Button

2 1. *Tracking Logged-In Subscribers*

3 46. When signing up for a Facebook account, subscribers fill out an electronic form,  
4 sending communications to Facebook which personally identified them:

5  
6 **Sign Up**  
7 It's free and always will be.

8 First Name:

9 Last Name:

10 Your Email:

11 Re-enter Email:

12 New Password:

13 I am:

14 Birthday:

15 Why do I need to provide my birthday?

16

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18 47. Each Facebook subscriber manually enters his or her first and last name, email  
19 address, a password, gender and birthdate before signing-up. Upon clicking the green “Sign Up”  
20 button, their web-browser sent a ‘POST’ communication to Facebook.

21 48. Facebook then creates a database entry for the new user in an internal database called  
22 [REDACTED] and assigned a unique user ID to the subscriber. Facebook also then writes a number of  
23 cookies to the user’s web browser that Facebook correlates with the information in the [REDACTED]  
24 database. As each user adds more information to their Facebook account via communications  
25 while logged-in to Facebook, Facebook adds the information to the database entry for each user.

26 49. Facebook describes its social plug-ins as a “little piece of Facebook” embedded on  
27 a first-party website, as described above. When an internet user lands on a webpage with this  
28 embedded piece of Facebook, the user’s browser is instructed to redirect a copy of the user-to-

1 website communications, along with several Facebook cookies, to Facebook, which can then be  
2 added to the [REDACTED] database. The adoption rate and growth of Facebook social plug-ins, most  
3 importantly the Like button, has been historic:

4 a. By the beginning of June 2010, just weeks after launch, more than 50,000  
5 websites incorporated Like buttons.

6 b. By August 2010, more than 350,000 websites had Like buttons.

7 c. By the one-year anniversary on April 22, 2011, 2.5 million websites had Like  
8 buttons, including 80 of the top 100 websites in the United States ranked by comScore. 250 million  
9 people each day were viewing websites with Like buttons.

10 50. The process differs for logged-in users compared to logged-out users and non-  
11 subscribers, and is described in detail in the attached Technical Report recently prepared for the  
12 Belgian Privacy Commission on June 25, 2015. *See Ex. L.*

13 51. When a Facebook subscriber is logged into Facebook, the users' browser will  
14 contain more than 10 Facebook cookies, written to the browser at various times.

15 52. Cookies are small text files that web-servers can place on a person's web-browser  
16 and computing device when that person's web-browser interacts with a website server. Cookies  
17 can perform different functions. Eventually, some cookies were designed to track and record an  
18 individual Internet user's communications with and activities on websites across the Internet.

19 53. In general, cookies are categorized by (1) duration and (2) party. There are two  
20 types of "duration" cookies, known as session cookies and persistent cookies.

21 54. "Session cookies" are placed on a person's computing device only for the period  
22 during which the user is directly communicating with the website that placed the cookie. The  
23 person's web-browser normally deletes session cookies when the user closes the browser.

24 55. "Persistent cookies" are designed to survive beyond a single browsing session.  
25 Persistent cookies are not permanent. Instead, the party creating the persistent cookie determines  
26 its lifespan – which is longer than a single browsing session. A "persistent cookie" can record a  
27 person's Internet communications for months or years. By virtue of their lifespan, persistent  
28 cookies can track a person's communications with dozens, hundreds, or thousands of websites on

1 the Internet. Persistent cookies are also sometimes called “tracking cookies.”

2 56. Cookies can also be classified by “Party.” “First-party cookies” are set on a user’s  
3 web-browser by the website with which the user is knowingly communicating. For example,  
4 NYTimes.com sets a collection of its own first-party cookies on user’s web-browsers when they  
5 visit pages at NYTimes.com. First-party cookies can be helpful to the user, server, and website to  
6 assist with security, log-in, and functionality.

7 57. “Third-party cookies” are set and accessed by website servers other than the website  
8 with which the user is knowingly communicating. For example, the same user who visits  
9 NYTimes.com will also have cookies placed and accessed from their web browser by third-party  
10 web-servers, including Facebook. Unlike first-party cookies, third-party cookies are typically not  
11 helpful to the Internet user. Instead, third-party cookies typically work in furtherance of data  
12 collection, behavioral profiling, and targeted advertising.

13 58. Facebook writes the following cookies to the browsers of logged-in users; the  
14 sample values below relate to an actual test in 2015 using Mozilla’s Firefox browser:

Cookie	Sample Value	Information Contained	Expires
c_user <sup>3</sup>	10000004223456398	User’s Facebook ID	Session / 1 month
datr	S3fJVgeTh7_ikK5frtHsHPmE	Browser ID	2 years
fr	0glRJJKaszKOLdKz8.AWXGH1RxSLM3P HeHxfrORv10H8.BCVchV.Sj.FUJ.0.AW Wsuv8a	Encrypted Facebook ID plus browser ID	1 month
lu	wfKm8lftbXqRKINoERo10H1H	Encrypted ID of the last user	2 Years
p	-2	User’s channel partition	Session
presence	EM426705095EuserFA21B0911298286 A2EstateFDutF1426705095426Et2F	Chat state	Session
s	Aa67DZudqH2wPH19	?	Session / 1 month
xs	244%3AjlZKp45fK9ceMA%3A%3A14267 05088%3A3455	Session number and secret	Session / 1 month
csm	2	Insecure indicator	Session / 1 month
act	1426704200575%2F14	Timestamp and counter of user actions	Session
wd	1280X653	Browser window dimensions	Session


27 <sup>3</sup> During the Class Period, Facebook used several cookies to identify users, including the a\_user,  
28 c\_user, and m\_user cookies.



1 59. Several of these cookies can identify the subscriber. Certainly the c\_user cookie,  
2 which is the user ID, identifies the subscriber because Facebook assigned that ID to the user upon  
3 creating an account. But at least two other cookies can also uniquely identify the user. For example,  
4 the fr cookie has the user ID (encrypted) included therein. The lu (“last user”) cookie contains the  
5 user ID (encrypted) of the last user to use that browser, which would precisely identify the current  
6 user if the computer is not a shared computer. Internal Facebook documents confirm that [REDACTED]  
7 [REDACTED]. See, e.g., Ex. V, at p. 5 (“ [REDACTED]  
8 [REDACTED]”). Finally, Facebook assigns each  
9 browser a unique identifier (the datr cookie) which can and do identify actual current users when a  
10 computer is not a shared computer. [REDACTED]  
11 [REDACTED]

12 See Ex. Y, p. 1.

13 60. When a logged-in subscriber visits a webpage with a Facebook Like button, a copy  
14 of the referrer URL is acquired by Facebook along with the cookies above. However, Facebook is  
15 not a party to the communication recorded in the referrer URL – instead it acquires the URL from  
16 the user. For example, if a logged-in Facebook subscriber visited www.walmart.com, the series of  
17 conversations among computers would look like this:



1           61.     Even for an ostensibly innocuous page view – say, perhaps hand towels at Walmart  
2 – Facebook acquires an enormous amount of individualized data. Facebook gets the full referral  
3 URL (including the exact subpage of precise items being purchased), and through the use of  
4 cookies, correlates that URL with the user ID, time stamp, browser settings and even the type of  
5 browser used. Facebook not only receives a copy of the user’s communication with Walmart, but  
6 can put the communication in the precise context of time of day and other user actions on the same  
7 website.

8           62.     No matter how sensitive the website, the referral URL is acquired by Facebook  
9 along with the cookies that precisely identify the user. As the researchers noted in the Belgian  
10 Technical Report, if a user visited a certain explicit page of the gay website [www.gayworld.be](http://www.gayworld.be),  
11 Facebook would receive all of the cookies identified above, including time stamp and user ID,  
12 along with this referrer: <http://www.gayworld.be/holebi-cultuur/wereldwijd/belgie/>. *See* Ex. L,  
13 Fig. 7, Section 5.1.

## 14                   2.     *Tracking Logged-Out Subscribers*

15           63.     When a subscriber logs out of his or her Facebook account, from the beginning of  
16 the Class Period until today Facebook has always represented publicly that it only receives  
17 “technical information” about user communications with other websites; when users “log out of  
18 Facebook, we remove the cookies that identify your particular account.”

19           64.     Thus, upon logout Facebook deletes the `c_user` cookie completely, and sets the `lu`  
20 cookie value to zero. Facebook still acquires substantial amounts of data when a logged out user  
21 visits a webpage with Facebook functionality – including referrer URLs – and sets a new cookie  
22 called “locale,” which is the location of the last user to use that browser.

23           65.     Facebook also records the unique browser ID of the browser used (via the `datr`  
24 cookie), and it appears from the Belgian Technical Report that the `fr` cookie also remains, despite  
25 containing the encrypted user ID. Discovery is still ongoing and it is not yet clear precisely how  
26 Facebook uses the `datr` cookie and/or the `fr` cookie to associate referrer URLs with actual users.

27           66.     Finally, the “presence” cookie describes the “chat state,” for example, which chat  
28 tabs are open. Although not mentioned by the Belgian Technical Report, [REDACTED]

1 [REDACTED]. Thus, for example, Facebook engineering  
2 director Alex Himel assigned [REDACTED] to engineer Adam Wolff  
3 on January 27, 2011, during the Class Period:

4 [REDACTED]  
5 [REDACTED]  
6 [REDACTED]  
7 See Ex. M.

8 67. Discovery is ongoing and it is not yet clear to what extent Facebook [REDACTED]  
9 [REDACTED] during the Class Period.

10 D. Facebook Unlawfully Tracked Logged-Out Subscribers

11 68. As soon as the Like button was rolled out on April 22, 2010, Facebook found it had  
12 a problem - a large number of users were logging out of their accounts prior to surfing the web.

13 Facebook product manager Austin Haugen noted in an internal email dated October 28, 2010, “[REDACTED]  
14 [REDACTED]  
15 [REDACTED]  
16 [REDACTED]” See Ex. N at p. 1. A few months later, after  
17 reviewing detailed cookie data, Mr. Haugen determined that only approximately “[REDACTED]  
18 [REDACTED]” See Ex. O at p. 4.

19 69. The genesis for these discussions was pressure coming directly from [REDACTED]  
20 [REDACTED]. In an email dated September 21, 2010, Mr. Haugen wrote: “[REDACTED]  
21 [REDACTED].” See Ex. P at p. 2.

22 70. Facebook came up with an easy but unlawful interim solution: simply break  
23 Facebook’s promise to stop tracking users post-logout. This was done both by failing to delete  
24 cookies containing user IDs (such as c\_user, lu and fr) [REDACTED]  
25 [REDACTED].

26 71. Facebook’s deception was noticed by some investigators who alerted Facebook.  
27 The first was [REDACTED], who wrote the following in an email to Facebook  
28

1 spokesman Andrew Noyes on June 4, 2010, just 6 weeks after the launch of the Like button outside  
2 the Facebook domain:

3 [REDACTED]  
4 [REDACTED]  
5 [REDACTED]

6 [REDACTED]  
7 [REDACTED]

8 [REDACTED]  
9 [REDACTED]

10 Ex. R, bates numbers 7472-73. Evidently a flurry of activity within Facebook ensued, but  
11 subsequent emails have been redacted. *See id.*, bates numbers 7469-72. In any event, Facebook  
12 continued to track users post-logout.

13 72. The next day, June 5, 2010, a task was created called “[REDACTED]”  
14 [REDACTED].” Facebook engineering director Alex Himel commented, “[REDACTED]”  
15 [REDACTED]  
16 [REDACTED].” *See Ex. S.*

17 73. On June 7, 2010, Mr. Himel created a task with the tag “[REDACTED]” and assigned it to  
18 engineer Chuck Rossi. The task noted:

19 [REDACTED]  
20 [REDACTED]

21 [REDACTED]  
22 [REDACTED]

23 [REDACTED]  
24 [REDACTED]  
25 [REDACTED]

26 *See Ex. T.*

27 74. In the following month in July 2010, Mr. Himel “[REDACTED]”  
28 [REDACTED]

1 [REDACTED]” but noted in an August 19, 2010 email that changes still had  
2 not been made:

3 [REDACTED]  
4 [REDACTED]  
5 [REDACTED]  
6 [REDACTED]  
7 [REDACTED]

8 Ex. U.

9 75. After Mr. Himmel’s email above, [REDACTED]  
10 [REDACTED]. No attempt was made to delete user-  
11 identifying cookies post-logout. These include any of the user cookies (for example, a user,  
12 c\_user), the fr cookie, and the lu cookie. This distinction was [REDACTED] on  
13 February 7, 2011: “[REDACTED]  
14 [REDACTED]” See Ex. V (emphasis added).

15 76. Occasionally during the class period, [REDACTED]  
16 [REDACTED]  
17 [REDACTED]. For example, on January 28, 2011 Alex Himmel noted that “[REDACTED]  
18 [REDACTED]” See Ex. W. An unknown Facebook  
19 employee responded, “[REDACTED]  
20 [REDACTED]”

21 77. No attempt was made to correct the false statements Facebook made publicly about  
22 tracking logged-out users, and communications with partners and customers were equally  
23 misleading. The internal emails on this point are revealing. For example, on February 2, 2011,  
24 Facebook partner [REDACTED] emailed Aimee Westbrook at Facebook to report that they might  
25 be willing to adopt the Like button. They noted, “[REDACTED]  
26 [REDACTED]” See  
27 Ex. X, pp. 2-3. Alex Himel internally crafted a response which represented the data collected from  
28 logged in users, and then for logged out users he simply said “[REDACTED]”

1 This statement was only five days before Mr. Himel noted the opposite internally: “[REDACTED]  
2 [REDACTED]” upon logout. *See* Ex. V, discussed above.

3 78. Two weeks later, on February 19, 2011, Facebook employee Douglas Purdy drafted  
4 a table “[REDACTED]  
5 [REDACTED]” which only listed [REDACTED] for logged out users. *See* Ex.  
6 Y. Facebook engineer Matt Jones made a number of revisions and comments, and said “[REDACTED]  
7 [REDACTED]  
8 [REDACTED]” *Id* at 2 (emphasis added). Alex Himel concluded by saying:

9 [REDACTED]  
10 [REDACTED]  
11 [REDACTED]  
12 *See* Ex. Y at 1.

13 79. At exactly the same time, three Facebook employees filed a patent application (later  
14 assigned to Facebook), facilitating the post-logout tracking of Facebook users on other domains.

15 80. On February 8, 2011, Kent Matthew Schoen, Gregory Luc Dingle and Timothy  
16 Kendall (Facebook’s “Director of Monetization”) filed a patent application entitled  
17 “Communicating Information in a Social Network System about Activities from Another  
18 Domain.”<sup>4</sup> As the first claim in the Patent Application explains, the applicants were seeking to  
19 patent:

- 20 1. A method for tracking information about the activities of users of  
21 a social networking system while on another domain, the method  
22 comprising: maintaining a profile for each of one or more users  
23 of the social networking system...; receiving one or more  
24 communications from a third-party website having a different  
25 domain than the social network system, each message  
26 communicating an action taken by a user of the social networking  
27 system on the third-party website; logging the actions taken on  
28 the third-party website in the social networking system...; and  
correlating the logged actions with one or more advertisements  
presented to one or more users.

4 *See* U.S. Patent Application No. 20110231240, filed February 8, 2011 and published September 22, 2011 (the “Patent Application”) at 1.

1 Patent Application at 2.

2 81. The detailed description of this tracking method reveals that it enables Facebook to  
3 capture and log actions taken by Facebook users on websites other than Facebook, *even when the*  
4 *user is not logged in:*

5 [0054] As described above, in particular embodiments, the social  
6 network system 100 also logs actions that a user takes on a third party  
7 website 140. The social network system 100 may learn of the user's  
8 actions on the third party website via any of a number of methods. In  
9 particular embodiment, in response to certain actions such as, a user  
10 registering with a third-party website 140, purchasing a product from  
11 a third-party website 140, downloading a service from a third-party  
12 website 140, or otherwise making a conversion, the third-party  
13 website 140 transmits a conversion page, such as a confirmation or  
14 "thank you" page to the user at the user's client device. In particular  
15 embodiment, this page includes an embedded call or code segment  
16 (e.g., JavaScript) in the HTML or other structured document code  
17 (e.g., in an HREF(Hypertext REference) that, in particular  
18 embodiments, generates a tracking pixel that, when executed by the  
19 client's browser or other rendering application, generates a tracking  
20 pixel or image tag that is then transmitted to the social network  
21 system (*whether the user is logged into the social network system*  
22 *or not*). The tracking pixel or image tag then communicates various  
23 information to the social network system about the user's action on  
24 the third-party website. By way of example, the tracking pixel or call  
25 may transmit parameters such as the user's ID (user ID as registered  
26 with the social network system), a product ID, information about the  
27 third-website, timestamp information about the timing of the  
28 purchase or other action, etc. In one example, if the third party  
website 140 is a commercial website on which users may purchase  
items, the third party website 140 may inform the social network  
system 100 in this manner when a user of the social network system  
100 buys an item on the third party website 140.

20 Patent Application at 5.

21 82. Further, in certain circumstances, Facebook has to hack its way past data protection  
22 software to do this: Facebook deposits a cookie that deliberately and without a user's consent  
23 bypasses security settings on the user's browser for the purpose of gathering intelligence as to what  
24 the user does on the internet in real time, such as what sites are visited, whether purchases are made,  
25 or whether information is downloaded or a link forwarded to a friend. This information is then  
26 instantly relayed back to Facebook, substantially enhancing the value of Facebook's vast repository  
27 of personal data. This is all done whether the Facebook user is logged onto Facebook *or logged*  
28 *off.*

1 83. Technically, this is how the Patent Application describes the bypass:

2 [0099] In one embodiment, the third party website 140 and/or the  
3 social network system 100 determine whether the user is a user of  
4 the social network system 100. For example, the third party  
5 website 140 may access a cookie on the user's computer, where the  
6 cookie is associated with the social network system 100. Since the  
7 social network system 100 and the third party website 140 are on  
8 different domains, the user's browser program may include security  
9 features that normally prevent a website from one domain from  
10 accessing content on other domains. To avoid this, the third party  
11 website 140 may use nested iframes, where the third party website  
12 140 serves a web page that includes a nested iframe in the social  
network website's domain, thereby allowing the nested iframe to  
access the user information and send the information back to the  
third party website 140. Repeated nesting of iframes further allows  
the social networking site 100 to communicate information back to  
the third party website 140. By using this technique, the third party  
website 140 and the social network system 100 can communicate  
about the user without sharing any of the user's personal  
information and without requiring the user to log into the social  
network system 100.

13 Patent Application 10-11.

14 84. Although Facebook's name does not appear in the Patent Application, it is listed in  
15 the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office database as assigned to Facebook. Tellingly, Mr. Kendall,  
16 Facebook's "Director of Monetization," is not an inventor or a computer scientist at all. According  
17 to his LinkedIn profile, Mr. Kendall's job at Facebook is "Product Strategy & Development for  
18 Facebook's revenue generating products." Essentially, Mr. Kendall is charged with figuring out  
19 new and better ways to sell user information to advertisers and third-party websites.

20 E. Facebook Unlawfully Circumvented P3P Privacy Protections on Internet Explorer

21 85. During the Subclass Period, Internet Explorer 6, 7 and 8 by default blocked certain  
22 cookies from websites that did not honor a privacy system called the Platform for Privacy  
23 Preferences Project (P3P). During the Subclass Period, Facebook circumvented this privacy  
24 protection by falsely representing its privacy policy to the browser.

25 86. P3P is a standard format for computer-readable privacy policies, which the World  
26 Wide Web Consortium (W3C) published in 2002. The standard includes a P3P full policy format  
27 and a P3P "compact policy" ("CP") format. The compact policy format is designed to be a shorter  
28 version of a full P3P policy that encodes in a computer-readable format only the parts of a privacy



1 policy that relate to cookies. Use of a compact policy is optional for websites that use P3P full  
2 policies. However, according to the P3P working group, “if a web site makes compact policy  
3 statements it MUST make these statements in good faith.”<sup>5</sup>

4 87. The compact policy is designed to be transmitted in an HTTP header that also  
5 contains an HTTP cookie. It takes the form: CP = "POLICY" where POLICY is a series of three-  
6 and four-letter tokens associated with P3P policy elements as defined in the P3P 1.0 Specification.<sup>6</sup>  
7 Valid compact policies must have at least five of these elements. For example, the following is a  
8 valid P3P compact policy:

9 CP = “NOI NID ADMa OUR IND UNI COM NAV”

10 88. The P3P specification states “If an unrecognized token appears in a compact policy,  
11 the compact policy has the same semantics as if that token was not present.”<sup>7</sup> This means that web  
12 browsers should ignore any tokens that appear in a P3P compact policy that are not defined in the  
13 P3P specification.

14 89. Microsoft introduced support for P3P in the Internet Explorer 6 web browser in  
15 2002; and Microsoft included functionally identical implementations of P3P in its subsequent  
16 Internet Explorer 7, 8, and 9 web browsers (hereinafter, Internet Explorer versions 6-9 are all called  
17 “IE”). By default, without users taking any action to change configuration settings, IE is set to the  
18 “Medium” privacy setting. Users can view and change their privacy settings using the IE “Internet  
19 Options” panel. The panel describes the Medium setting as follows:

- 20 - Blocks third-party cookies that do not have a compact privacy policy
- 21 - Blocks third-party cookies that use personally identifiable information without your  
22 implicit consent

23  
24  
25 <sup>5</sup> W3C. The Platform for Privacy Preferences 1.1. <http://www.w3.org/TR/P3P11/>, November 2006.

26 <sup>6</sup> W3C. The Platform for Privacy Preference 1.0 (P3P1.0) Specification, W3C Recommendation 16  
27 April 2002, <http://www.w3.org/TR/P3P/>.

28 <sup>7</sup> P3P1.0 at Section 4.2.

1 - Restricts first-party cookies that use personally identifiable information without implicit  
2 consent

3 90. Microsoft documentation states, “For most users, Internet Explorer 6 default privacy  
4 settings provides enough privacy protection without disrupting the browsing process.”<sup>8</sup>

5 91. Behind the scenes, IE checks for a P3P compact policy header whenever a website  
6 sends a cookie in an HTTP response. If IE finds a third-party cookie that is not accompanied by a  
7 compact policy, IE blocks that cookie. If IE finds a first-party cookie that is not accompanied by a  
8 compact policy, it “leashes” that cookie and prevents that cookie from being transmitted in a third-  
9 party context. If IE finds an accompanying compact policy, it evaluates that compact policy, and  
10 blocks the cookie if the compact policy is found to be “unsatisfactory.” If IE finds a first-party  
11 cookie that is accompanied by a compact policy, it evaluates that compact policy and turns the  
12 cookie into a session cookie if the compact policy is found to be unsatisfactory. IE considers a  
13 cookie to be unsatisfactory if the corresponding compact policy indicates that the cookie is used to  
14 collect personally identifiable information and does not allow users a choice in its use.

15 92. By blocking cookies on the basis of their P3P compact policies, as described above,  
16 the IE default privacy settings allow users “to enjoy the benefits of cookies, while protecting  
17 themselves from unsatisfactory cookies.”

18 93. At all relevant times, IE treated the representations made in compact policies as  
19 truthful statements. The software makes no attempt to verify the accuracy of the information in a  
20 compact policy. If a website with an unsatisfactory privacy policy were to make an untruthful  
21 statement and misrepresent its policy as a satisfactory one, it could trick IE into allowing its third-  
22 party cookie to be set when it would otherwise be blocked.

23 94. Websites can also trick IE into allowing their third-party cookies to be set without  
24 making affirmatively false statements. Because of the way Microsoft implemented the P3P  
25 compact policy feature, websites can trick IE by simply omitting any compact policy tokens that

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26  
27 <sup>8</sup> MSDN Library. How to Create a Customized Privacy Import File. 2002.  
28 <http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms537344>.

1 would lead IE to classify the compact policy as unsatisfactory. In fact, an invalid compact policy  
2 that contains only a made-up word is classified by IE as satisfactory.

3 95. On September 10, 2010, researchers at Carnegie Mellon University published a  
4 technical report titled “Token Attempt: The Misrepresentation of Website Privacy Policies through  
5 the Misuse of P3P Compact Policy Tokens.” *See* Ex. Z. This report described a research study in  
6 which the authors collected compact policies from 33,139 websites and used automated tools to  
7 check them for errors. The authors found errors in 11,176 compact policies on 4,696 domains,  
8 including 11 of the 50 most-visited websites.

9 96. The study reported that the most popular website to have a compact policy error was  
10 Facebook. The study reported that the Facebook compact policy at the time included only the tokens  
11 DSP and LAW, indicating that the Facebook privacy policy references a law that may determine  
12 remedies for breaches of their privacy policy and that there are ways to resolve privacy-related  
13 disputes. However, the Facebook compact policy was invalid because it did not include required  
14 tokens to disclose the categories of data associated with cookies, how they are used, who will  
15 receive the collected data, the data retention policy, and the policy on providing data access.

16 97. The report also stated, “When doing preliminary work for this study in 2009, the  
17 facebook.com compact policy contained only the single invalid token HONK... [T]hese CPs are  
18 useless for communicating with user agents and users. It is likely that facebook.com is using their  
19 CP to avoid being blocked by IE.”

20 98. On September 16, 2010, Ryan McGeehan, a Security Incident Response Manager  
21 at Facebook emailed Dr. Lorrie Cranor, one of the authors of the report. He explained that he had  
22 seen the report and was trying to determine how to accurately represent Facebook’s privacy policy  
23 in a P3P compact policy and “still enable functionality such as the like button.”

24 99. On September 17, 2010, the New York Times Bits blog reported on the Carnegie  
25 Mellon study. The article included a comment from a Facebook spokesman:<sup>9</sup>

26 A Facebook spokesman said in an e-mailed statement: “We’re committed to providing clear  
27 and transparent policies, as well as comprehensive access to those policies. We’re looking

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28 <sup>9</sup> <http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/09/17/a-loophole-big-enough-for-a-cookie-to-fit-through/>

1 into the paper's findings to see what, if any, changes we can make." Ben Maurer, a software  
2 engineer at Facebook, said that the site used only two codes instead of five because current  
3 compact-policy codes do not "allow a rich enough description to accurately represent our  
4 privacy policy." Mr. Maurer said he did not know the history of how "HONK" made it into  
5 a compact policy.

6 100. Shortly thereafter, Facebook changed its compact policy to reflect the truth:

7 CP="Facebook does not have a P3P policy. Learn why here: <http://fb.me/p3p>"

8 101. By tricking IE with an intentionally invalid compact policy, Facebook was able to  
9 ensure that IE would improperly transmit a user-identifying Facebook cookie back to Facebook  
10 along with sensitive referrer URLs when users visited non-Facebook web sites that had Facebook  
11 like buttons or other embedded Facebook features.

## 12 **V. FACEBOOK'S SURREPTITIOUS TRACKING REVEALED**

13 102. In 2010, Australian researcher and blogger Nik Cubrilovic discovered that Facebook  
14 cookies were tracking users' Internet communications and accessing their computing devices and  
15 web browsers even after user had logged out of Facebook without the users' knowledge or consent.  
16 Cubrilovic's investigation revealed that several cookies that revealed personally identifiable  
17 information remained post logout, and some even remained after the browser was closed and  
18 restarted. Despite its representations to the contrary, Facebook was in fact secretly tracking its  
19 users' Internet communications and accessing their web-browsers without their knowledge or  
20 consent after logout.

21 103. Mr. Cubrilovic contacted Facebook on November 14, 2010 to report his findings  
22 and ask Facebook to fix the problem. He received no response. Again on January 12, 2011, Mr.  
23 Cubrilovic wrote to Facebook alerting it to his findings. Again, Facebook refused to respond. Mr.  
24 Cubrilovic of course had no way of knowing that Facebook [REDACTED]

25 104. On September 25, 2011, Mr. Cubrilovic made his findings public. He wrote, "Even  
26 if you are logged out, Facebook still knows and can track every page you visit." He explained that  
27 "[t]his is not what 'logout' is supposed to mean – Facebook is only altering the state of the cookies  
28 instead of removing all of them when a user logs out." Mr. Cubrilovic had revealed what [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED].” See Ex. V (emphasis added).

105. Mr. Cubrilovic’s blog post spread globally and was picked up the next day by the *Wall Street Journal*, in addition to dozens of other news outlets. Facebook engineer Gregg Stefancik contacted Mr. Cubrilovic and admitted he raised “important issues.” However, Mr. Stefancik never disclosed that [REDACTED]. Instead, he falsely told Mr. Cubrilovic that a “bug” caused a particular user-identifying cookie, the a\_user cookie, not to clear on logout, advising, “We will be fixing that today.” Facebook further admitted that the Company had not “done as good a job as we could have to explain our cookie practices. Your post presents a great opportunity for us to fix that.”

106. Mr. Stefancik also told Mr. Cubrilovic that “if you log out, [the lu] cookie does not contain your user ID” and is used to protect people using public computers. However, the lu cookie actually contained the encrypted user ID of the last user, so Mr. Stefancik’s comment was deeply misleading. It would only be true if an intervening Facebook user were to use the shared computer and then the original user returned without logging into Facebook. For anyone else, the lu cookie continued to identify logged out users, and continued to do so for some time thereafter.

107. More than a month later, on Dec. 5, 2011, Facebook employee Tom Elliott [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]:

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

See Ex. AA.

1           108. Two days after the Cubrilovic revelations, on September 28, 2011, U.S.  
2 Representatives Edward Markey<sup>10</sup> and Joe Barton, Co-Chairmen of the Congressional Bi-Partisan  
3 Privacy Caucus, submitted a joint letter to the Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission urging  
4 the FTC to expand its investigation of Facebook. The FTC had already commenced an  
5 investigation related to the Like button roll-out and changes to the Facebook Privacy Policy in  
6 2010, prior to discovery of the secret and pervasive post-logout tracking. Digital privacy rights  
7 group EPIC, joined by ten other civil liberties and privacy rights groups had also filed a complaint  
8 with the FTC on May 5, 2010 seeking to restrain Facebook’s “data collection practices” among  
9 other relief, also before knowing about the post-logout tracking. *See* Ex. BB, Complaint in *EPIC*  
10 *vs. Facebook Inc.*

11           109. Congressmen Markey and Barton stated, “[I]n this instance, Facebook has admitted  
12 to collecting information about its users even *after its users had logged out of Facebook.*” They  
13 continued, “*We believe that tracking users without their knowledge or consent raises serious*  
14 *privacy concerns.* When users log-out of Facebook, they are under the impression that Facebook is  
15 no longer monitoring their activities. We believe this impression should be the reality.”

16           110. The FTC sued Facebook under Section 5 of the FTC Act for multiple counts of  
17 misrepresenting its privacy policy, alleging that Facebook engaged in deceptive trade practices. *In*  
18 *the Matter of Facebook Inc.*, FTC File No. 0923184.

19           111. On November 29, 2011, Facebook settled, agreeing to an unprecedented 20 years of  
20 independent privacy audits. No fine was levied because a civil fine is not an available remedy  
21 absent a violation of a prior Commission order.

22           112. Marc Rotenberg, Executive Director of the Electronic Privacy Information Center,  
23 wrote to the FTC submitting an official comment and asking for clarification of a number of points,  
24 including whether the settlement covered Facebook’s post-logout tracking. In response, the FTC  
25 confirmed it did. The complaint “does allege that Facebook violated Section 5 of the FTC Act by  
26 falsely representing to users the protections provided by their privacy settings, [and] by making  
27

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28 <sup>10</sup> Congressman Markey is now Senator Markey.

1 other false promises regarding privacy.” *See* Letter from FTC to EPIC dated July 27, 2012 at p. 3  
2 (Ex. CC). The FTC continued, “the proposed order contains provisions . . . designed to prevent  
3 Facebook from engaging in similar practices involving any Facebook product or service. These  
4 provisions are broad enough to address misconduct beyond that expressly challenged in the  
5 complaint.” *Id.*

## 6 **VI. PLAINTIFF-SPECIFIC FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS**

7 113. Plaintiff Davis is an adult domiciled in Illinois and has an active Facebook account  
8 and had an active account during the entire proposed Class period.

9 114. She accessed the Internet and sent and received communications on several  
10 computing devices, including one that was not a shared computer that used Internet Explorer.

11 115. Using these same computers on which Facebook installed tracking and session  
12 cookies, Mrs. Davis visited websites after logging-out of her Facebook account which Facebook  
13 tracked, intercepted, and, in relation to which, Facebook accessed her computing device and web-  
14 browser. URLs for many of these websites contain detailed file paths containing the content of  
15 GET and POST communications, and are available to show the Court in camera if needed.

16 116. Plaintiff Quinn is an adult domiciled in Hawaii and has an active Facebook account  
17 and had an active account during the entire proposed Class period.

18 117. She accessed the Internet and sent and received communications on a computer that  
19 was not a shared computer that used Internet Explorer.

20 118. Using this same computer on which Facebook installed tracking and session  
21 cookies, Prof. Quinn visited websites after logging-out of her Facebook account which Facebook  
22 tracked, intercepted, and, in relation to which, Facebook accessed her computing device and web-  
23 browser. URLs for many of these websites contain detailed file paths containing the content of  
24 GET and POST communications, and are available to show the Court in camera if needed.

25 119. Plaintiff Lentz is an adult domiciled in North Carolina and has an active Facebook  
26 account and had an active account during the entire proposed Class period.

27 120. He accessed the Internet and sent and received communications on a computer  
28 shared with his wife that used Internet Explorer.

1            121. Using this same computer on which Facebook installed tracking and session  
2 cookies, Dr. Lentz visited websites after logging-out of his Facebook account which Facebook  
3 tracked, intercepted, and, in relation to which, Facebook accessed his computing device and web-  
4 browser. Dr. Lentz visited these websites immediately after logging out and prior to his wife using  
5 his computer. URLs for many of these websites contain detailed file paths containing the content  
6 of GET and POST communications, and are available to show the Court in camera if needed.

7            122. Plaintiff Vickery is an adult domiciled in Washington State and has an active  
8 Facebook account and had an active account during the entire proposed Class period.

9            123. He accessed the Internet and sent and received communications on a computer that  
10 was not a shared computer that used Google Chrome.

11           124. Using these same computers on which Facebook installed tracking and session  
12 cookies, Mr. Vickery visited websites after logging-out of his Facebook account which Facebook  
13 tracked, intercepted, and, in relation to which, Facebook accessed his computing device and web-  
14 browser. URLs for many of these websites contain detailed file paths containing the content of  
15 GET and POST communications, and are available to show the Court in camera if needed.

16           125. None of these four plaintiffs consented to the tracking and interception of their  
17 logged-off communications. Nor did they consent to Facebook's access to their computing devices  
18 and web-browsers while logged-off Facebook.

19           126. None of these four plaintiffs changed the default cookie blocking settings on their  
20 browsers during the Class Period.

21           127. None of these four plaintiffs installed extensions or plug-ins that disable or modify  
22 referrer headers sent to Facebook when visiting websites with embedded Facebook functionality.

23           128. Discovery is still ongoing, and despite Plaintiffs' document requests, Facebook has  
24 not yet produced any documents related to these plaintiffs. The parties have discussed this omission  
25 and Plaintiffs will continue to press for production.

26 **VII. VALUE OF INTERCEPTED REFERRER URLS**

27           129. Facebook is the brainchild of the Company's founder and Chief Executive Officer,  
28 Mark Zuckerberg, who wrote the first version of "The Facebook" in his Harvard University dorm



1 room and launched the Company in 2004. The key to Facebook’s success was to convince people  
2 to create unique, individualized profiles with such personal information as employment history and  
3 political and religious affiliations, which then could be shared among their own network of family  
4 and friends.

5 130. Facebook has become the largest social networking site in the world, approaching  
6 1.5 billion members. At the end of the proposed Class Period, Facebook had over 800 million users  
7 world-wide and over 150 million users in the United States.

8 131. Facebook’s enormous financial success is the result of connecting advertisers with  
9 its huge repository of personal data related to users. As Facebook explained in its Registration  
10 Statement following the end of the Class Period, “Advertisers can engage with more than 900  
11 million monthly active users (MAUs) on Facebook or subsets of our users based on information  
12 they have chosen to share with us such as their age, location, gender, or interests. We offer  
13 advertisers a unique combination of reach, relevance, social context, and engagement to enhance  
14 the value of their ads.” See Amendment No. 5 to Form S-1 Registration Statement, filed by  
15 Facebook, Inc. with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission on May 3, 2012 (the  
16 “Registration Statement”) at 1.

17 132. From 2009 to 2012, over 90% of Facebook’s revenue was attributable to third party  
18 advertising (*see* Registration Statement at 13), and now that Facebook is a public company, it is  
19 even more driven to continue to find new and creative ways to leverage its access to users’ data in  
20 order to sustain its phenomenal growth (*see, e.g.*, Registration Statement at 88-91, 99-100).

21 133. Although Facebook does not require its members to pay a monetary subscription  
22 fee, ***membership is not free***, despite Facebook’s false guarantee to the contrary. Facebook charges  
23 users by acquiring the users’ sensitive and valuable personal information, which includes far more  
24 than mere demographic information and volunteering personal information like name, birth date,  
25 gender and email address. More importantly, Facebook use entails Facebook’s planting of  
26 numerous Facebook small text files, called cookies, on the user’s computer and web-browser,  
27 which allows Facebook to track users’ browsing histories and correlate them with user IDs – but  
28 – Facebook promised - only when users are logged in to Facebook.

1           134.    The information Facebook tracks has and had massive economic value during the  
2 Class Period. This value is well understood in the e-commerce industry, and personal information  
3 is now viewed as a form of currency.

4           135.    Professor Paul M. Schwartz noted in the Harvard Law Review:

5                   Personal information is an important currency in the new  
6 millennium. The monetary value of personal data is large and still  
7 growing, and corporate America is moving quickly to profit from the  
8 trend. Companies view this information as a corporate asset and  
have invested heavily in software that facilitates the collection of  
consumer information.

9 Paul M. Schwartz, *Property, Privacy and Personal Data*, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2055, 2056-57

10 (2004). Professor Schwartz wrote those words in the same year Facebook was launched.

11           136.    Likewise, in the *Wall Street Journal*, former fellow at the Open Society Institute  
12 (and current principal technologist at the ACLU) Christopher Soghoian noted:

13                   The dirty secret of the Web is that the “free” content and services that  
14 consumers enjoy come with a hidden price: their own private data.  
15 Many of the major online advertising companies are not interested in  
16 the data that we knowingly and willingly share. Instead, these  
17 parasitic firms covertly track our web-browsing activities, search  
18 behavior and geolocation information. Once collected, this mountain  
of data is analyzed to build digital dossiers on millions of consumers,  
in some cases identifying us by name, gender, age as well as the  
medical conditions and political issues we have researched online.

19                   Although we now regularly trade our most private information for  
20 access to social-networking sites and free content, the terms of this  
exchange were never clearly communicated to consumers.

21 Julia Angwin, *How Much Should People Worry About the Loss of Online Privacy?*, THE WALL  
22 STREET JOURNAL (Nov. 15, 2011).

23           137.    The cash value of users’ personal information provided during the Class Period to  
24 Facebook as a condition of membership can be quantified. For example, in a study authored by  
25 Tim Morey researchers studied the value that 180 internet users placed on keeping personal data  
26  
27  
28

1 secure.<sup>11</sup> Contact information of the sort that that Facebook requires was valued by the study  
2 participants at approximately \$4.20 per year. Demographic information was valued at  
3 approximately \$3.00 per year. But web browsing histories were valued at a much higher rate:  
4 \$52.00 per year. The chart below summarizes the findings:



17 Across Facebook’s approximately 800 million users at the end of the Class Period, these figures  
18 imply aggregate annual membership fees of \$3.36 billion, \$2.4 billion, and \$41.6 billion,  
19 respectively, for each category of information.

20 138. Similarly, the value of user-correlated internet browsing history can be quantified,  
21 because companies were willing during the Class Period to pay users for the exact type of data that  
22 Facebook illegally intercepted from Plaintiffs and other members of the Class.  
23

24

25

26

27 <sup>11</sup> (“What’s Your Personal Data Worth? <http://designmind.frogdesign.com/blog/what039s-your-personal-data-worth.html>, Jan. 18, 2011).  
28

1           139. For example, Google Inc. had a panel during the Class Period (and still has one  
2 today) called “Google Screenwise Trends” which, according to the Internet giant, is designed “to  
3 learn more about how everyday people use the Internet.”

4           140. Upon becoming a panelist, Internet users would add a browser extension that shares  
5 with Google the sites that users visit and how the panelist uses them. The panelists consented to  
6 Google tracking this information for three months in exchange for one of a number of “gifts,”  
7 including gift cards to retailers such as Barnes & Noble, Walmart and Overstock.com.

8           141. After three months, Google also agreed to pay panelists additional gift cards “for  
9 staying with” the panel. These gift cards, mostly valued at exactly \$5, demonstrated conclusively  
10 that internet industry participants understood the enormous value in internet users’ browsing habits.  
11 Indeed, Facebook’s advertising revenues for 2011 roughly approximate \$5 per user over its  
12 international user base of 800 million members, demonstrating the value of the information  
13 harvested by Facebook. Today, Google now pays Screenwise panelists up to \$3 *per week* to be  
14 tracked.  
15

16           142. In addition to the monetary value of user-correlated URLs, they have non-monetary  
17 privacy value. For example, in a recent study by the Pew Research Center, 93 percent of Americans  
18 said it was important for them to be “in control of who can get information” about them. Seventy-  
19 four percent said it was “very important.” 87 percent of Americans said it was important for them  
20 not to have someone watch or listen to them without their permission. Sixty-seven percent said it  
21 was “very important.” And 90 percent of Americans said it was important that they be able to  
22 “control[] what information is collected about [them].” Sixty-five percent said it was very  
23 important.  
24

25           143. Likewise, in a 2011 Harris Poll study, 76 percent of Americans agreed that “online  
26 companies, such as Google or Facebook, control too much of our personal information and know  
27 too much about our browsing habits.” 65 percent of American Facebook users said they were very  
28 or somewhat concerned about invasions of privacy “when using Facebook.”

1 **VIII. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS**

2 144. The following claims were brought on a class basis within days of the public reports  
3 of post-logout tracking, and the statutes of limitations are thus tolled: Violation of Federal Wiretap  
4 Act; Violation of the Stored Communications Act; Violation of CIPA § 631; Invasion of Privacy;  
5 Intrusion Upon Seclusion; Trespass to Chattels; and the California Computer Crime Law.

6 145. The following claims are new in this Second Amended Complaint but relate to the  
7 identical “conduct, transaction or occurrence” set out in the First Amended Complaint and thus  
8 relate back to the date of filing of the First Amended Complaint: CIPA § 632; Breach of Contract;  
9 Breach of the Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing; Civil Fraud; and California Statutory Larceny.  
10 All relevant statutes of limitations have therefore also been tolled.

11 **IX. STATUS OF RELATED LITIGATION**

12 A. Austria: Schrems v. Facebook Ireland Limited

13 146. On August 1, 2014, Austrian Facebook user Maximilian Schrems filed a class action  
14 against Facebook’s European subsidiary alleging a number of privacy violations. An English-  
15 language version of the original complaint as provided by Mr. Schrems is attached as Ex. DD.

16 147. Section II.F (paragraphs 100 through 112) relate to the claims in this Action  
17 regarding data collection via Facebook social plug-ins including Like-buttons.

18 148. Section IV.A (paragraphs 180 through 194) set forth claims for damages under  
19 California law.

20 149. The Austrian action asserts 22 counts (numbered 1 through 21 plus claim 4.1) in the  
21 prayer for relief. Claims 7, 8 and 9 relate to consent generally, and claim 10 relates to social plug-  
22 ins (including the Like button) specifically.

23 150. The Austrian action, were it to proceed as a class action, is limited to Facebook users  
24 in Europe. Facebook users in the United States are specifically excluded from the proposed class  
25 definition.

26 151. On June 30, 2015, the Austrian regional court in Vienna (the “Landesgericht”)  
27 dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, without addressing the merits.

28

1           152. On October 19, 2015, the Court of Appeals (the “Oberlandesgericht”) reversed as to  
2 20 of the 22 counts – agreeing with Facebook only as to the question of whether the case could  
3 proceed as a class action under Austrian law.

4           153. Mr. Schrems and Facebook both appealed to the Austrian Supreme Court (the  
5 “Oberster Gerichtshof”) and on November 23, 2015, it was announced that the Supreme Court  
6 would hear the case.

7           B. Belgium: Commission for the Protection of Privacy v. Facebook

8           154. In January 2015, the Belgian Commission for the Protection of Privacy (“Privacy  
9 Commission”), following queries from Facebook users, media, and Parliament, launched an  
10 investigation of Facebook’s privacy practices including the gathering of personal data and internet  
11 browsing history via the Like button.

12           155. On April 29, 2015, the Privacy Commission held a hearing and invited Facebook  
13 representatives as well as academic technical experts. At the hearing, the technical expert presented  
14 a draft report of their findings regarding Facebook social plug-ins. An updated English-language  
15 copy of the technical report dated June 24, 2015 is attached as Ex. L.

16           156. On May 13, 2015, the Privacy Commission issued Recommendation no. 04/2015,  
17 and found that Facebook tracks non-users’ Internet browsing (or users’ browsing post-logout) in  
18 violation of Belgian privacy law via the Like button, and recommended remedial action. The  
19 Privacy Commission sought an order from the Court of First Instance in Brussels via a writ of  
20 summons on June 10, 2015.

21           157. On November 9, 2015, the Court of First Instance granted the requested order,  
22 finding that non-consensual tracking of Internet browsing violates Belgian privacy law irrespective  
23 of how or whether Facebook uses the tracked data. The Court has not yet made an English-language  
24 version available, but the Privacy Commission summarized the order in English in an official  
25 summary on November 10, 2015, attached as Ex. EE.

26           158. The court ordered Facebook to stop tracking Internet users via the datr cookie and  
27 other means, and imposed a €250,000 fine for each day that Facebook fails to comply. The Court  
28

1 found that even anonymous tracking of users can violate European privacy laws, and also found  
2 the matter to be “urgent”:

3 because claims that relate to fundamental rights and freedoms (such as the  
4 protection of privacy) are always urgent, and because this claim does not  
5 relate to the fundamental right of one single individual but of an enormous  
6 group of people. Because of the millions of websites with Facebook social  
7 plug-ins, it is almost unavoidable to escape from these. In addition, it may  
8 relate to very sensitive data revealing, for instance, health or religious,  
9 sexual or political preference.

10 Summary of Court Order by the Privacy Commission, Ex. EE, section 2.

11 159. Facebook took issue with the Privacy Commission’s use of the word “tracking,”  
12 arguing instead to use the phrase “standard web impressions,” and Facebook also argued that the  
13 tracking cookies (in particular the datr cookie) were necessary for security. The court rejected these  
14 arguments:

15 With respect to the security argument invoked by Facebook, the Court finds  
16 it not credible that collecting the datr cookie each time a social plug-in is  
17 loaded on a website, would be necessary for the security of Facebook’s  
18 services. According to the Court, “even an ‘internet illiterate’ understands  
19 that systematically collecting the datr cookie as such is insufficient to  
20 counter the attacks referred to by Facebook because criminals can very  
21 easily circumvent this cookie from being installed by means of software  
22 which blocks cookies being installed.

23 *Id.*, section 4.

24 160. Facebook has stated that it “will appeal this decision” and is negotiating a resolution  
25 with the Belgian government while it awaits the official English translation of the order.

26 C. California: *Ung v. Facebook, Inc.*

27 161. In 2012, three California Facebook users filed a state-court class action in Superior  
28 Court in Santa Clara County. *Ung v. Facebook, Inc.*, Case No. 1-12-cv-217244. Plaintiffs asserted  
various claims for invasion of privacy under California law related to Facebook’s tracking of  
internet browsing via the Like button.

162. On July 2, 2012, the Superior Court denied in part and granted in part Facebook’s  
demurrer. *See* Order of July 2, 2012 (“Ung Order”), attached as Ex. HH. Specifically, the court

1 rejected Facebook’s arguments regarding standing, and also found a fundamental privacy interest  
2 in users’ internet browsing histories:

3 Even tracking a portion of a person’s browsing history, which would  
4 include visits to a large number of sites given that Facebook’s cookies exist  
5 on millions of websites, can paint a comprehensive picture of a person’s  
6 life. For example, repeated visits to certain websites could show a person  
has a particular disease, or religious affiliation, or is contemplating having  
an abortion.

7 *Ung Order* at 2-3.

8 163. The Superior Court also rejected Facebook’s arguments regarding consent, and  
9 rejected Facebook’s arguments regarding ordinary business practice. As to the latter argument, the  
10 Court noted that Facebook might be correct “as to the use of cookies on a single website,” but:

11 Facebook’s alleged conduct goes far beyond that. Facebook is alleged to  
12 have used cookies to track large portions of people’s browsing histories  
13 across numerous other websites so that a profile of each person can be put  
together . . . the Court finds that Facebook’s alleged conduct constitutes a  
14 serious invasion of a privacy interest.

15 *Id.* at 4.

16 164. The *Ung* class action asserts claims only on behalf of California residents and thus  
17 only overlaps with the current Action for those class members who reside in California. Following  
the *Ung* Order, the court stayed the case pending a resolution of this Action.

18 D. Ireland: *Schrems v. Irish Data Protection Commissioner*

19 165. In 2013, following Edward Snowden’s revelations of the NSA’s bulk data collection  
20 programs, five complaints were filed in Europe to prevent the transfer of personal data from the  
21 European Economic Area (plus Switzerland, or “EEA/CH” for short). Complaints against Apple  
22 and Facebook were filed in Ireland, against Microsoft and Skype in Luxembourg, and against  
23 Yahoo in Germany.

24 166. The complaint against Facebook was made with the Irish Data Protection  
25 Commissioner (the “DPC”) on June 25, 2013. The complaint alleged that Facebook’s European  
26 subsidiary transferred protected “personal data” of EEA/CH citizens to Facebook, Inc. (“Facebook-  
27 US”) in violation of data protection laws because Facebook-US could not guarantee the data would  
28



1 be protected from bulk surveillance by the NSA. The data includes but is not limited to Internet  
2 browsing history transferred to Facebook via Like-button functionality.

3 167. The DPC refused to investigate. Under an agreement with the United States in 2000  
4 (the “Safe Harbor”), if a US company self-certifies that it complies with EU data protection laws,  
5 the transfer of personal data to the US would be lawful. Facebook self-certifies compliance with  
6 EU data protection laws, see, e.g., Privacy Policy dated April 22, 2010, section 1, attached as Ex.  
7 E, and thus the DPC found the complaint “frivolous.” The DPC also found no evidence that the  
8 plaintiff’s personal data specifically had be compromised.

9 168. The DPC’s refusal to act was appealed to the Irish High Court, which ruled on June  
10 18, 2014 that the data in question is “personal data” and the transfer would only be lawful if the  
11 Safe Harbor program was still valid. In light of the 2013 Snowden revelations, the Irish Court  
12 referred the matter to the European Court of Justice (the “ECJ”), the highest court in Europe. *See*  
13 Ex. FF, attached.

14 169. In the referral order of June 18, 2014, the High Court explicitly found that the  
15 plaintiff had standing to bring his complaint. The court noted:

16 It is irrelevant that Mr. Schrems cannot show that his own personal data was  
17 accessed in this fashion by the NSA, since what matters is the essential  
18 inviolability of the personal data itself. The essence of that right would be  
19 compromised if the data subject had reason to believe that it could be  
routinely accessed by security authorities on a mass and undifferentiated  
basis.

20 *Id.*, ¶ 75.

21 170. On October 6, 2015, in a landmark opinion, the ECJ invalidated the Safe Harbor.  
22 *See* Ex. GG. The ECJ noted that the processing of personal data is “liable to infringe fundamental  
23 freedoms.” *Id.* ¶ 38. The court also held:

24 To establish the existence of an interference with the fundamental right to  
25 respect for private life, it does not matter whether the information in  
26 question relating to public life is sensitive or whether the persons concerned  
have suffered any adverse consequences on account of that interference.

27 *Id.* ¶ 87.

28

1 171. Following the ECJ's ruling invalidating the Safe Harbor, the Irish High Court held  
2 further hearings on October 20, 2015, and immediately ordered that the DPC "is obligated now to  
3 investigate the complaint" against Facebook.

4 **X. CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS**

5 172. This is a class action pursuant to Rules 23(a) and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil  
6 Procedure on behalf of a Class of all persons who had active Facebook accounts and used Facebook  
7 between April 22, 2010 and September 26, 2011, both dates inclusive, and whose Internet use was  
8 tracked at times not logged into their Facebook accounts. Plaintiffs Quinn, Davis and Lentz also  
9 bring claims on behalf of a Subclass of Facebook subscribers who used Internet Explorer between  
10 April 22, 2010 and September 17, 2010, and whose Internet use was tracked while not logged into  
11 their Facebook accounts.

12 173. Excluded from the Class and the Subclass are the Court, Facebook, and its officers,  
13 directors, employees, affiliates, legal representatives, predecessors, successors and assigns, and any  
14 entity in which any of them have a controlling interest.

15 174. The members of the Class and Subclass are so numerous that joinder of all members  
16 is impracticable.

17 175. Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Class and Subclass  
18 and predominate over any questions affecting solely individual members of the Class. The  
19 questions of law and fact common to the Class and Subclass include whether Facebook violated  
20 state and federal laws by tracking Internet use and intercepting the communication of its users after  
21 the users had logged off of Facebook. Additional questions of fact and law are common to the  
22 Subclass related to Facebook's circumvention of default privacy protections on Internet Explorer  
23 during the Subclass Period.

24 176. Plaintiffs' claims are typical of the claims of other Class and Subclass members, as  
25 all members of the Class and Subclass were similarly affected by Facebook's wrongful conduct in  
26 violation of federal law as complained of herein.

27 177. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members of the Class  
28 and Subclass and have retained counsel that is competent and experienced in class action litigation.

1 Plaintiffs have no interest that is in conflict with, or otherwise antagonistic to the interests of the  
2 other Class or Subclass members.

3 178. A class action is superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient  
4 adjudication of this controversy since joinder of all members is impracticable. Furthermore, as the  
5 damages individual Class and Subclass members have suffered may be relatively small, the expense  
6 and burden of individual litigation make it impossible for members of the Class and Subclass to  
7 individually redress the wrongs done to them. There will be no difficulty in management of this  
8 action as a class action.

9 **XI. COUNTS**

10 **COUNT I**

11 **VIOLATION OF THE FEDERAL WIRETAP ACT, 18 U.S.C. § 2510, ET. SEQ.**

12 179. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all other paragraphs as if fully stated herein.

13 180. The Federal Wiretap Act, as amended by the Electronic Communications Privacy  
14 Act of 1986, prohibits the intentional interception of the contents any wire, oral, or electronic  
15 communication through the use of a device. 18 U.S.C. § 2511.

16 181. The Wiretap Act protects both the sending and receipt of communications.

17 182. 18 U.S.C. § 2520(a) provides a private right of action to any person whose wire, oral  
18 or electronic communication is intercepted.

19 183. Facebook's actions in intercepting and tracking user communications while they  
20 were logged-off of Facebook was intentional as shown by the internal company emails detailed  
21 above.

22 184. Facebook's interception of Internet communications that the Plaintiffs were sending  
23 and receiving while logged-off Facebook (i.e., the referrer URLs) was done contemporaneously  
24 with the Plaintiffs' sending and receipt of those communications. In fact, Facebook received the  
25 communications before the communication between the plaintiffs and the various websites were  
26 completed.

27 185. The referrer URLs intercepted by Facebook included "contents" of electronic  
28 communications made from the plaintiffs to websites other than Facebook in the form of detailed

1 URL requests and search queries which plaintiffs sent to those websites and for which plaintiffs  
2 received communications in return from those websites.

3 186. The transmission of data between plaintiffs and the websites on which Facebook  
4 tracked and intercepted their communications without authorization while they were logged-off  
5 were “transfer[s] of signs, signals, writing, ... data, [and] intelligence of [some] nature transmitted  
6 in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic, or photooptical system that  
7 affects interstate commerce[,]” and were therefore “electronic communications” within the  
8 meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12).

9 187. The following constitute “devices” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5):

- 10 a. The cookies Facebook used to track the Plaintiffs’ communications while  
11 they were logged-off of Facebook;
- 12 b. The Plaintiffs’ browsers;
- 13 c. The Plaintiffs’ computing devices;
- 14 d. Facebook’s web servers;
- 15 e. The web-servers of websites from which Facebook tracked and intercepted  
16 the Plaintiffs’ communications while they were logged-off of Facebook; and
- 17 f. The computer code deployed by Facebook to effectuate its tracking and  
18 interception of the Plaintiffs’ communications while logged-off of  
19 Facebook;
- 20 g. The plan Facebook carried out to effectuate its tracking and interception of  
21 the Plaintiffs’ communications while logged-off of Facebook

22 188. Facebook was not an authorized party to the communication because the Plaintiffs  
23 were unaware of Facebook’s redirecting of the referrer URLs to Facebook itself, did not knowingly  
24 send any communication to Facebook, and were logged-off of Facebook when Facebook  
25 intercepted the communications between the Plaintiffs and websites other than Facebook. Facebook  
26 could not manufacture its own status as a party to the Plaintiffs’ communications with others by  
27 surreptitiously redirecting or intercepting those communications.

28

1 189. As illustrated herein, “the” communications between the Plaintiffs and websites  
2 were simultaneous to, but *separate* from, the channel through which Facebook acquired the  
3 contents of those communications.

4 190. The Plaintiffs did not consent to Facebook’s continued gathering of user IDs post-  
5 logout, and thus never consented to Facebook’s interception of the referrer URLs to track or  
6 intercept their communications while they were logged-off of Facebook. Facebook explicitly  
7 promised Plaintiffs and the public that it would not track and intercept their communications to and  
8 from other websites while they were logged-off of Facebook except on an anonymous basis.  
9 Because the referrer URLs were intercepted with user-specific and user-identifying cookies  
10 included, no valid consent can exist.

11 191. After intercepting the communications, Facebook then used the contents of the  
12 communications knowing or having reason to know that such information was obtained through  
13 the interception of electronic communications in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a).

14 192. As a result of the above actions and pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2520, the Court may  
15 assess statutory damages to Plaintiffs; injunctive and declaratory relief; punitive damages in an  
16 amount to be determined by a jury, but sufficient to prevent the same or similar conduct by  
17 Defendant in the future, and a reasonable attorney’s fee and other litigation costs reasonably  
18 incurred

## 19 **COUNT II**

### 20 **VIOLATION OF THE STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT, 18 U.S.C. § 2701, ET. SEQ.**

21 193. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all other paragraphs as if fully stated herein.

22 194. The Stored Communications Act (“SCA”) provides a cause of action against a  
23 person who “intentionally accesses without authorization a facility through which an electronic  
24 communication service is provided” or “who intentionally exceeds an authorization to access that  
25 facility; and thereby obtains, alters, or prevents authorized access to a wire or electronic  
26 communication while it is in electronic storage in such a system.” 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a).

27 195. The SCA defines an “electronic communication service” as “any services which  
28 provides to users thereof the ability to send or receive wire or electronic communications.” 18

1 U.S.C. § 2510(15).

2 196. Internet Service Providers provide a service – to allow users to send and receive  
3 electronic communications on the Internet. Accordingly, ISPs qualify as ECSs under the SCA.  
4 Each of the four plaintiffs used an ISP to communicate with first-party websites.

5 197. The web browsers used by the plaintiffs also qualify as ECSs because they allow  
6 users to send and receive electronic communications over the Internet. Each web browser  
7 provider requires users to agree to a Terms of Service or licensing agreement. Google has  
8 explained that a web browser is where Internet users “search, chat, email, and collaborate,” and,  
9 “in our spare time, we shop, bank, read news, and keep in touch with friends – all using a  
10 browser.”

11 198. The SCA does not provide a separate definition for “facility” but instead it is  
12 defined within the context of the sentence in which it is used. A “facility” under the SCA is,  
13 under the plain language of the statute, that “through which an electronic communication service  
14 is provided.” 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a).

15 199. The items through which the electronic communication services of the Plaintiffs’  
16 ISPs and web-browsers include:

- 17 a. The Plaintiffs’ personal computing devices;
- 18 b. The Plaintiffs’ web-browsers; and
- 19 c. The browser-managed files which, together, constitute all of the programs  
20 contained within the Plaintiffs’ web-browsers.

21 200. Facebook intentionally accessed the Plaintiffs’ personal computing devices, web-  
22 browsers, and browser-managed files while the Plaintiffs were logged-off of Facebook.

23 201. The Plaintiffs did not authorize Facebook to track their communications and  
24 access their personal computers, web-browsers, and browser-managed files while they were  
25 logged-off of Facebook if such communications (the referrer URLs) were coupled with user-  
26 identifying cookies.

27 202. The detailed URLs obtained by Facebook contain contents.

28 203. The SCA defines “electronic storage” as “any temporary, intermediate storage of a

1 wire or electronic communication incidental to the electronic transmission thereof;” and “any  
2 storage of such communication by an electronic communication service for purposes of backup  
3 protection of such communication.” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17).

4 204. Web browsers store cookie information and referrer URLs in browser-managed  
5 files that are temporary, intermediate and incidental to the electronic transmission of electronic  
6 communications.

7 205. Web-browsers store cookie information and referrer URLs for purposes of back-up  
8 protection.

9 206. Web-browsers store a copy of the Plaintiffs’ URL requests in the toolbar while the  
10 user remains present at a particular webpage. When the user leaves the webpage, the copy of the  
11 detailed URL request is no longer present on the toolbar. Storage in the toolbar after the user hits  
12 the Enter button or clicks on a link is “incidental to the electronic communication thereof”  
13 because once a user hits Enter or clicks on a link, the communication is in the process of being  
14 sent and received between the user and the first-party website.

15 207. Web-browsers also immediately store a copy of users’ detailed URL requests in  
16 their browsing history. The precise length of time that each web-browser keeps a copies of users’  
17 URL requests varies. For example, Google Chrome stores browsing history for approximately 90  
18 days while Microsoft Internet Explorer only stores the browsing history for three weeks. Storage  
19 via browsing history qualifies as “temporary storage” because it exists in browsing history for  
20 “purposes of backup protection” to benefit the users of the web-browsing service.

21 208. Plaintiffs and Class Members were harmed by Facebook’s actions, and pursuant to  
22 18 U.S.C. § 2707(c), are entitled to actual damages including profits earned by Facebook  
23 attributable to the violations or statutory minimum damages of \$1,000 per plaintiff, punitive  
24 damages, costs, and reasonable attorney’s fees.

### 25 **COUNT III**

#### 26 **VIOLATION OF THE CALIFORNIA INVASION OF PRIVACY ACT** 27 **CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL CODE §§ 631 AND 632**

28 209. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all other paragraphs as if fully stated herein.

1           210. The California Invasion of Privacy Act is codified at Cal. Penal Code §§ 630 to  
2 638. The Act begins with its statement of purpose:

3                   The Legislature hereby declares that advances in science and  
4 technology have led to the development of new devices and  
5 techniques for the purpose of eavesdropping upon private  
6 communications and that the invasion of privacy resulting from the  
7 continual and increasing use of such devices and techniques has  
8 created a serious threat to the free exercise of personal liberties and  
9 cannot be tolerated in a free and civilized society.

10 Cal. Penal Code § 630.

11           211. Cal. Penal Code § 631(a) provides, in pertinent part:

12                   Any person who, by means of any machine, instrument, or  
13 contrivance, or in any other manner ...willfully and without the  
14 consent of all parties to the communication, or in any unauthorized  
15 manner, reads, or attempts to read, or to learn the contents or  
16 meaning of any message, report, or communication while the same  
17 is in transit or passing over any wire, line, or cable, or is being sent  
18 from, or received at any place within this state; or who uses, or  
19 attempts to use, in any manner, or for any purpose, or to  
20 communicate in any way, any information so obtained, or who aids,  
21 agrees with, employs, or conspires with any person or persons to  
22 lawfully do, or permit, or cause to be done any of the acts or things  
23 mentioned above in this section, is punishable by a fine not  
24 exceeding two thousand five hundred dollars ...

25           212. California Penal Code § 632 provides, in pertinent part:

26                   Every person who, intentionally and without the consent of all  
27 parties to a confidential communication, by means of any electronic  
28 amplifying or recording device, eavesdrops upon or records the  
confidential communication, whether the communication is carried  
on among the parties in the presence of one another or by means of  
a telegraph, telephone, or other device, except a radio, shall be  
punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand five hundred dollars.

29           213. Under either section of the CIPA, a defendant must show it had the consent of all  
30 parties to a communication.

31           214. Facebook is headquartered in California; designed and contrived and effectuated  
32 its scheme to track its users while logged-off from California; and has adopted California  
33 substantive law to govern its relationship with its users.



1           215. At all relevant times, Facebook’s tracking and interceptions of the Plaintiffs’  
2 Internet communications while logged-off of Facebook was without authorization and consent  
3 from the Plaintiffs.

4           216. Facebook’s non-consensual tracking of logged-out users’ Internet browsing was  
5 designed to attempt to learn at least some meaning of the content in the URLs.

6           217. The following items constitute “machine[s], instrument[s], or contrivance[s]”  
7 under the CIPA, and even if they do not, Facebook’s deliberate and admittedly purposeful scheme  
8 that facilitated its interceptions falls under the broad statutory catch-all category of “any other  
9 manner”:

- 10           a. The cookies Facebook used to track the Plaintiffs’ communications while  
11 they were logged-off of Facebook;
- 12           b. The Plaintiffs’ browsers;
- 13           c. The Plaintiffs’ computing devices;
- 14           d. Facebook’s web servers;
- 15           e. The web-servers of websites from which Facebook tracked and intercepted  
16 the Plaintiffs’ communications while they were logged-off of Facebook; and
- 17           f. The computer code Facebook deployed to effect its tracking and interception  
18 of the Plaintiffs’ communications while Plaintiffs were logged-off of  
19 Facebook;
- 20           g. The plan Facebook carried out to achieve its tracking and interception of the  
21 Plaintiffs’ communications while they were logged-off of Facebook

22           218. Plaintiffs and Class Members have suffered loss by reason of these violations,  
23 including, but not limited to, violation of their rights to privacy and loss of value in their  
24 personally-identifiable information.

25           219. Pursuant to Cal. Pen. Code § 637.2, Plaintiffs and the Class have been injured by  
26 the violations of Cal. Pen. Code §§ 631 and 632, and each seek damages for the greater of \$5,000  
27 or three times the amount of actual damages, as well as injunctive relief.

28

1 **COUNT IV**

2 **INVASION OF PRIVACY**

3 220. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all other paragraphs as if fully stated herein.

4 221. Article I, section 1 of the California Constitution provides: “All people are by nature  
5 free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and  
6 liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety,  
7 happiness, *and privacy*.” The phrase “*and privacy*” was added by the “Privacy Initiative” adopted  
8 by California voters in 1972.

9 222. The right to privacy in California’s constitution creates a right of action against  
10 private as well as government entities.

11 223. The principal purpose of this constitutional right was to protect against unnecessary  
12 information gathering, use and dissemination by public and private entities, [including] computer  
13 stored and generated dossiers and cradle-to-grave profiles on every American.

14 224. To plead a California constitutional privacy claim, a plaintiff must show an invasion  
15 of (1) a legally protected privacy interest; (2) where the plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of  
16 privacy in the circumstances; and (3) conduct by the defendant constituting a serious invasion of  
17 privacy.

18 225. As described herein, Facebook has intruded upon the following legally protected  
19 privacy interests:

- 20 a. A Fourth Amendment right to privacy contained on personal computing  
21 devices, including web-browsing history, as explained by the United States  
22 Supreme Court in the unanimous decision of *Riley v. California*;
- 23 b. The federal and California Wiretap Acts as alleged herein;
- 24 c. The Stored Communications Act as alleged herein;
- 25 d. The California Computer Crime Law, Cal Pen. Code § 502, which applies  
26 to all plaintiffs in this case by virtue of Facebook’s choice of California law  
27 to govern its relationship with Facebook users;
- 28 e. Cal. Penal Code § 484(a) which prohibiting the knowing theft or defrauding

1 of property “by any false or fraudulent representation or pretense[.]”

2 f. The Facebook Statement of Rights and Responsibilities; Data Use Policy,  
3 Privacy Policy, and other public promises Facebook made not to track or  
4 intercept the Plaintiffs’ communications or access their computing devices  
5 and web-browsers while logged-off of Facebook.

6 g. The Pen Register Act, codified in 18 U.S.C. § 3121, which prohibits the non-  
7 consensual installation or use of a “pen register” or “trap and trace” device.  
8 Under the statute, a “pen register” is “a device or process which records or  
9 decodes dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling (DRAS) information  
10 transmitted by an instrument or facility from which a wire or electronic  
11 communication is transmitted, provided, however, that such information  
12 shall not include the contents of any communication.” The cookies and  
13 URLs at issue in this case contain both “content” and DRAS information and  
14 therefore fall under both the Wiretap and Pen Register Acts. Similarly, a  
15 “trap and trace device” is a “device or process which captures the incoming  
16 electronic or other impulses which identify the originating number or other  
17 DRAS information reasonably likely to identify the source of a wire or  
18 electronic communication.” The cookies at issue in this case also work as  
19 “trap and trace” devices because, in addition to capturing content, they also  
20 capture impulses identifying the originating number of other DRAS  
21 information of communications. The Pen Register Act creates a statutorily  
22 protected privacy interest in an Internet user’s IP address.

23 226. Plaintiffs had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the circumstances in that:

24 a. Plaintiffs could not reasonably expect Facebook would commit acts in  
25 violation of federal and state civil and criminal laws;

26 b. Facebook affirmatively promised users it would not track their  
27 communications or access their computing devices or web-browsers while  
28 they were logged-off of Facebook.





1           243. Facebook’s relationship with its users is governed by the Statement of Rights and  
2 Responsibilities and several other documents and policies, including a Data Use Policy and a  
3 Privacy Policy.

4           244. The governing documents contain enforceable promises that Facebook made to the  
5 Plaintiffs and the Class.

6           245. In the governing documents, Facebook promised that it would not track user’s web  
7 browsing after log-out except on an anonymous basis. Facebook unambiguously emphasized,  
8 “When you log out of Facebook, we remove the cookies that identify your particular account.”

9           246. Despite this promise, Facebook received more than mere “technical information”  
10 about its users’ IP addresses, browsers, and operating systems, but instead received personally-  
11 identifiable information about the same that were akin to and directly connect in Facebook’s  
12 databases to the very User ID which Facebook promised only to track for logged-in users.

13           247. The governing documents constitute Facebook’s offer to potential users of its  
14 products, by which Facebook promises to respect those users’ privacy in specified ways, including  
15 by not tracking or intercepting users’ Internet communications or accessing their computing devices  
16 or web-browsers while users were logged-off of Facebook. Plaintiffs and other Class members  
17 accepted Facebook’s offer by using Facebook.

18           248. The promises contained in Facebook’s governing documents and the Plaintiffs’ and  
19 other Class members’ use of Facebook are each sufficient consideration to support Facebook’s  
20 contractual obligations to Plaintiffs.

21           249. Under the agreement, Plaintiffs and Class members transmitted personally  
22 identifiable information to Facebook in exchange for use of Facebook and Facebook’s promise that  
23 it would not track users’ communications or access their computing devices or web-browsers while  
24 the users were logged-off of Facebook.

25           250. By reason of the conduct described herein, Facebook materially and uniformly  
26 breached its contract with Plaintiffs and each of the Class members by tracking and intercepting  
27 the Internet communications and accessing the computing devices and web-browsers of Facebook  
28 users while they were logged-off of Facebook.







1 while they were logged-off of Facebook and gaining an advantage by doing so, by misleading  
2 users to their prejudice, as describe herein.

3 269. Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the Class, seek damages from Facebook,  
4 including but not limited to disgorgement of all proceeds Facebook obtains from its unlawful  
5 business practices.

6 **COUNT IX**

7 **TRESSPASS TO CHATTELS**

8 270. Plaintiffs incorporate all preceding paragraphs as though set forth herein.

9 271. Defendant, intentionally and without consent or other legal justification, failed to  
10 delete cookies on Plaintiffs' browsers after logout, enabling Facebook to connect Plaintiffs'  
11 personally identifiable information to specific communications.

12 272. Defendant, intentionally and without consent or other legal justification, also placed  
13 cookies on Plaintiffs' computers post-logout without consent which allowed Facebook to track their  
14 activity while logged-off of Facebook.

15 273. Defendant's intentional and unjustified placing of a cookie designed to track  
16 Plaintiffs' internet activities while logged-off of Facebook and actual tracking of Plaintiffs activities  
17 interfered with Plaintiffs' use of the following personal property owned by Plaintiffs: (a) Plaintiffs'  
18 computers; and (b) Plaintiffs' personally identifiable information.

19 **COUNT X**

20 **VIOLATIONS OF CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE § 502**  
21 **THE CALIFORNIA COMPUTER CRIME LAW ("CCCL")**

22 274. Plaintiffs incorporate all preceding paragraphs as though set forth herein.

23 275. Defendant violated Cal. Penal Code § 502(c)(2) by knowingly and without  
24 permission accessing, taking and using Plaintiffs' and the Class Members' personally identifiable  
25 information.

26 276. Defendant accessed, copied, used, made use of, interfered with, and/or altered data  
27 belonging to Plaintiffs and Class Members: (1) in and from the State of California; (2) in the states  
28 in which the Plaintiffs and the Class Members are domiciled; and (3) in the states in which the

1 servers that provided services and communication links between Plaintiffs and the Class Members  
2 and Facebook.com and other websites with which they interacted were located.

3 277. Cal. Penal Code § 502 provides: “For purposes of bringing a civil or a criminal  
4 action under this section, a person who causes, by any means, the access of a computer, computer  
5 system, or computer network in one jurisdiction from another jurisdiction is deemed to have  
6 personally accessed the computer, computer system, or computer network in each jurisdiction.”

7 278. Defendants have violated California Penal Code § 502(c)(1) by knowingly and  
8 without permission altering, accessing, and making use of Plaintiffs and Class Members’ personally  
9 identifiable data in order to execute a scheme to defraud consumers by utilizing and profiting from  
10 the sale of their personally identifiable data, thereby depriving them of the value of their personally  
11 identifiable data.

12 279. Defendants have violated California Penal Code § 502(c)(6) by knowingly and  
13 without permission providing, or assisting in providing, a means of accessing Plaintiffs’ and Class  
14 Members’ computer systems and/or computer networks.

15 280. Defendants have violated California Penal Code § 502(c)(7) by knowingly and  
16 without permission accessing, or causing to be accessed, Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ computer  
17 systems and/or computer networks.

18 281. Pursuant to California Penal Code § 502(b)(10) a "Computer contaminant" is  
19 defined as "any set of computer instructions that are designed to ... record, or transmit information  
20 within computer, computer system, or computer network without the intent or permission of the  
21 owner of the information."

22 282. Defendants have violated California Penal Code § 502(b)(8) by knowingly and  
23 without permission introducing a computer contaminant into the transactions between Plaintiffs  
24 and the Class Members and websites; specifically, a “cookie” that intercepts and gathers  
25 information concerning Plaintiffs’ and the Class Members’ interactions with certain websites,  
26 which information is then transmitted back to Facebook.

27 283. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s unlawful conduct within the  
28 meaning of California Penal Code § 502, Defendant has caused loss to Plaintiffs and the Class

1 Members in an amount to be proven at trial. Plaintiffs and the Class Members are also entitled to  
2 recover their reasonable attorneys' fees pursuant to California Penal Code § 502(e).

3 284. Plaintiffs and the Class Members seek compensatory damages, in an amount to be  
4 proven at trial, and declarative or other equitable relief.

5 285. Plaintiffs and the Class Members are entitled to punitive or exemplary damages  
6 pursuant to Cal. Penal Code § 502(e)(4) because Defendant's violations were willful and, upon  
7 information and belief, Defendant is guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice as defined in Cal. Civil  
8 Code § 3294.

## 9 **COUNT XI**

### 10 **STATUTORY LARCENY** 11 **CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE §§ 484 AND 496**

12 286. Plaintiffs incorporate all preceding paragraphs as though set forth herein.

13 287. Section 496(a) prohibits the obtaining of property "in any manner constituting  
14 theft."

15 288. Section 484 defines theft, and provides:

16 Every person who shall feloniously steal, take, carry, lead, or drive  
17 away the personal property of another, or who shall fraudulently  
18 appropriate property which has been entrusted to him or her, or who  
19 shall knowingly and designedly, by any false or fraudulent  
20 representation or pretense, defraud any other person of money, labor  
21 or real or personal property, or who causes or procures others to  
report falsely of his or her wealth or mercantile character and by thus  
imposing upon any person, obtains credit and thereby fraudulently  
gets or obtains possession of money, or property or obtains the labor  
or service of another, is guilty of theft.

22 289. Section 484 thus defines "theft" to include obtaining property by false pretense.

23 290. Defendant intentionally designed a program that would operate in a manner  
24 unbeknownst to Plaintiffs whose computers were thus deceived into providing personally  
25 identifiable information to Defendant.

26 291. Defendant acted in a manner constituting theft and/or false pretense.

27 292. Defendant stole, took, and/or fraudulently appropriated Plaintiffs' PII without  
28 Plaintiffs consent.

1           293. Defendant concealed, aided in the concealing, sold, and/or utilized Plaintiffs PII that  
2 was obtained by Defendant for Defendant's commercial purposes and the financial benefit of  
3 Defendant.

4           294. Defendant knew that Plaintiffs' PII was stolen and/or obtained because Defendant's  
5 intentionally failed to delete user-identifying cookies which enabled Defendant to steal and/or  
6 obtain Plaintiffs' PII in a manner that was concealed and/or withheld from Plaintiffs.

7           295. The reasonable and fair market value of the unlawfully obtain personal data can be  
8 determined in the marketplace.

9 **XII. PRAYER FOR RELIEF**

10 WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court:

11 A. Certify this action is a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil  
12 Procedure;

13 B. Award compensatory damages, including statutory damages where available, to  
14 Plaintiffs and the Class against Defendant for all damages sustained as a result of Defendant's  
15 wrongdoing, in an amount to be proven at trial, including interest thereon;

16 C. Permanently restrain Defendant, and its officers, agents, servants, employees and  
17 attorneys, from installing cookies on its users' computers that could track the users' computer usage  
18 after logging out of Facebook or otherwise violating its policies with users;

19 D. Award Plaintiffs and the Class their reasonable costs and expenses incurred in this  
20 action, including counsel fees and expert fees; and

21 E. Grant Plaintiffs such further relief as the Court deems appropriate.

22 **XIII. JURY TRIAL DEMAND**

23 The Plaintiffs demand a trial by jury of all issues so triable.  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28

1 Dated: November 30, 2015

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**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

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I hereby certify that on November 30, 2015, I caused the foregoing to be electronically filed with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing to the e-mail addresses denoted on the Electronic Mail Notice List.

I certify under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on November 30, 2015.

**KIESEL LAW LLP**

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