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14

15 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
16 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

17

18 MATTHEW CAMPBELL and MICHAEL
HURLEY, on behalf of themselves and all
19 others similarly situated,

20 Plaintiffs,

21 v.

22 FACEBOOK, INC.,

23 Defendant.

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27

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Case No. C 13-05996 PJH

**PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR CLASS
CERTIFICATION**

Date: March 16, 2016
Time: 9:00 a.m.
Judge: Hon. Phyllis J. Hamilton
Place: Courtroom 3, 3rd Floor

1 **NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION**

2 **TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:**

3 **PLEASE TAKE NOTICE** that at 9:00 a.m. on March 16, 2016, or as soon thereafter as
4 the matter may be heard by the above-entitled Court, in the courtroom of the Honorable Phyllis J.
5 Hamilton, 1301 Clay Street, Oakland, CA 94612, Plaintiffs Matthew Campbell and Michael
6 Hurley (“Plaintiffs”) will and hereby do move under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), or
7 in the alternative, Rule 23(b)(2) for an order certifying the following Class:

8 All natural-person Facebook users located within the United States
9 who have sent, or received from a Facebook user, private messages
10 that included URLs in their content (and from which Facebook
11 generated a URL attachment), from within two years before the
12 filing of this action up through the date of the certification of the
13 class.^[1]

14 This Motion is based on this Notice of Motion and Motion, the within Memorandum of
15 Points and Authorities, the Declarations of Michael Sobol, Hank Bates, David Rudolph, and
16 Melissa Gardner (including as attached thereto, the Reports of experts Jennifer Golbeck and
17 Fernando Torres), filed in support of the Motion, the Court’s files in this action, the arguments of
18 counsel, and any other matter that the Court may properly consider.

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25 ^[1] Excluded from the Class are the following individuals and/or entities: Facebook and its parents,
26 subsidiaries, affiliates, officers and directors, current or former employees, and any entity in
27 which Facebook has a controlling interest; counsel for the putative class; all individuals who
28 make a timely election to be excluded from this proceeding using the correct protocol for opting
 out; and any and all federal, state or local governments, including but not limited to their
 departments, agencies, divisions, bureaus, boards, sections, groups, counsels and/or subdivisions;
 and all judges assigned to hear any aspect of this litigation, as well as their immediate family
 members.

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1 **I. INTRODUCTION**

2 The Court should certify for class treatment the Plaintiffs’ claims under the Electronic
3 Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510 *et seq.* (“ECPA”) and the California Invasion of
4 Privacy Act, Cal. Penal Code §§ 631 *et seq.* (“CIPA”), on behalf of all persons in the United
5 States who sent a private message containing an Internet link (or URL address) via Defendant
6 Facebook, Inc.’s (“Facebook”) electronic messaging service, on the grounds that common proof
7 will establish that Facebook unlawfully intercepts the content of private messages in violation of
8 these laws, without the consent of its users, and monetizes the content of these private messages
9 for its sole benefit.

10 Facebook’s routine business practices, confirmed by its operational computer source code,
11 reveal rampant abuses of its users’ privacy, continuing to this day. Every time a user sends a
12 private message with an Internet link, Facebook [REDACTED]

13 [REDACTED] It also contemporaneously redirects the URL information [REDACTED]
14 [REDACTED]
15 [REDACTED]. The interception of this private message content occurs
16 [REDACTED]
17 [REDACTED]. Facebook acquires
18 the content of private messages simultaneously with their transmission using [REDACTED]
19 [REDACTED].

20 Facebook admits that it previously captured URL information in private messages to
21 publicly increase “Like” counts on third-party websites (though it hides behind hyper-technical,
22 and erroneous, defenses to liability). However, Facebook admits to just this sliver of its practices
23 to deflect scrutiny from its more pervasive—and *continuing*—acquisition of private message
24 content which more generally informs its targeted advertising. Facebook’s obfuscation has
25 included repeated efforts to define Plaintiffs’ case as only relating to the increase in the Like
26 counts (in order to, *e.g.*, impede the proper scope of discovery). However, as the rulings of the
27 Court and Magistrate Judge hold, Plaintiffs’ ECPA and CIPA claims concern the acquisition of
28 any and all private message content, and are not limited by any single specific use Facebook

1 makes of that content. As a result, Plaintiffs have amassed relevant evidence demonstrating that
2 with each private message containing a URL, [REDACTED]

3 [REDACTED] Indeed, Facebook's own
4 technicians cannot discern the full extent of Facebook's exploitation of users' private message
5 content, stating that [REDACTED]

6 [REDACTED] That conduct alone is
7 sufficient for purposes of establishing violations of ECPA and CIPA. However, Facebook also
8 fueled its targeted advertising platform with the intercepted private message content to [REDACTED]
9 [REDACTED]
10 [REDACTED] as well as to increment the "Like" social plugin counter. Facebook's surreptitious
11 conduct is essential to its ability to become one of the wealthiest corporations on the planet.

12 The evidence of Facebook's conduct will undoubtedly be common as to the Plaintiffs and
13 the class members, and will command the focus of the trial of this matter. Plaintiffs' and the class
14 members' unwitting entanglement in Facebook's scheme will likewise be demonstrated through
15 common proof. In its ruling on the Motion to Dismiss, this Court noted that Facebook's self-
16 serving disclosures were insufficient to show users' express consent to interception of their
17 private messages. These self-serving statements also comprise common proof of users' lack of
18 consent. Moreover, unlike other cases where it was found that consent could be implied from
19 attendant circumstances, here no such attendant circumstances exist. To the contrary, there is
20 overwhelming, common evidence that Facebook has actively concealed its practices from public
21 view. Facebook's deliberate efforts to hide its unbounded use of private messages will be shown
22 through common evidence and will defeat Facebook's cynical attempt to imply users' knowing
23 and intelligent relinquishment of their privacy rights.

24 Class certification under Rule 23(b)(3) is appropriate because the trial of this matter will
25 predominately consist of common evidence establishing Facebook's liability and Plaintiffs' and
26 class members' entitlement to statutory damages or restitution. Alternatively, class certification
27 of Plaintiffs' request for declaratory and injunctive relief is appropriate under Rule 23(b)(2)
28 because Facebook's unlawful interception, scanning and sharing of the content of private

1 messages, is conduct “generally applicable to the class as a whole.”

2 Accordingly, Plaintiffs request that the Court grant their motion for class certification,
3 appoint plaintiffs as class representatives, and appoint Lief Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein and
4 Carney Bates & Pulliam as class counsel.

5 **II. ISSUE TO BE DECIDED**

6 Whether plaintiffs’ claims satisfy the requirements for class certification under Federal
7 Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b)(3), or in the alternative Rule 23(b)(2).

8 **III. STATEMENT OF FACTS—HOW FACEBOOK ACQUIRES, REDIRECTS AND**
9 **USES URL CONTENT FROM PRIVATE MESSAGES**

10 Facebook systematically employs computer source code devices, designed for the
11 exclusive purpose of acquiring the content of users’ private messages and redirecting it to [REDACTED]
12 [REDACTED], contemporaneously with, but prior to completion of, the transmission of the message to
13 the recipient. The source code Facebook employs to capture and redirect private message content
14 is distinct from, and wholly unnecessary for, the transmission of the message, the scanning of the
15 message for malware or illegal content, or even for generating the thumbnail preview of the URL
16 destination. Facebook’s interception of private messages allows its source code to divine the
17 meaning of the messages content and record their characteristics as [REDACTED]
18 [REDACTED].

19 After intercepting these records in transit, Facebook retains them indefinitely for future
20 use. Facebook acknowledges one such use— its former practice of bumping up the “Like” count
21 on other websites, which it ceased doing shortly after this practice was publicly exposed in
22 October 2012. Facebook has claimed several times in this litigation that it has changed its
23 business practices, implying that it no longer intercepts the content of private messages.¹

24 ¹ When this Court asked Facebook’s counsel: “[w]hen you say ‘the cessation of conduct,’ what
25 specific conduct ceased?” Ex. 1 (October 1, 2015 Hearing Transcript at 5:10-11), Facebook’s
26 counsel only identified the increment in the Like counter. *Id.* at 7:4-7 (“If you included the URL
27 in the message, this anonymous aggregate number...went up, and that’s the conduct, that’s – that
28 stopped”). The Court pressed, asking, “[b]ut did the actual conduct of scanning or looking at
these messages that are sent stop?” *Id.* at 8:9-10. Facebook’s counsel did not respond directly,
but rather began discussing scanning for purposes of detecting malware or criminal conduct, but
nothing else. *Id.* at 9:2-9.

1 However, Facebook’s source code not only reveals that Facebook *continues* to acquire URL
2 content from private messages, but that it also continues to make use of the content it acquires.

3 **A. Facebook Intercepts Content From Private Messages During Transmission**

4 As alleged in the Consolidated Amended Complaint (“CAC”) and detailed in the Report
5 of Dr. Jennifer Golbeck in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification (“Golbeck
6 Report”), Facebook “intercepts” private messages while in transit, using source code-based
7 devices designed solely for the purpose of exploiting their content.²

8 Facebook employs a component of its source code [REDACTED]

9 [REDACTED]³ [REDACTED]
10 [REDACTED]
11 [REDACTED]
12 [REDACTED]
13 [REDACTED]
14 [REDACTED]⁴

15 Thereafter, employing a separate and distinct component of its source code, [REDACTED]

16 [REDACTED]
17 [REDACTED]
18 [REDACTED]
19 [REDACTED]
20 [REDACTED]
21 [REDACTED]
22 [REDACTED]⁷

23
24 ² Ex. 2 (Golbeck Report) at ¶¶ 32-55; 116-118. Unless otherwise stated, all exhibits are to the Declaration of Melissa Gardner in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification.

25 ³ *Id.* at ¶¶ 19-29.

26 ⁴ Ex. 3 (Facebook’s Suppl. Responses and Objections to Plaintiffs’ First Set of Interrogatories), at 13:4-5.

27 ⁵ Ex. 2 (Golbeck Report), at ¶¶ 40-42.

28 ⁶ *Id.* at ¶ 100.

⁷ *Id.* at ¶ 41.

1 Facebook code further intercepts and redirects private message content by [REDACTED]

2 [REDACTED]

3 [REDACTED].⁸ For example, in one instance, private message content is [REDACTED]

4 [REDACTED]

5 [REDACTED]

6 [REDACTED].⁹ In another instance, Facebook [REDACTED]

7 [REDACTED]

8 [REDACTED], described below.¹⁰

9 In sum, Facebook employs unique code-based devices to intercept, redirect and log the
10 contents of user's private messages, including code that [REDACTED]

11 [REDACTED]

12 [REDACTED].¹¹ [REDACTED]

13 [REDACTED]

14 [REDACTED].¹² Facebook did not need to create these data points to process or send the message,
15 and Facebook employs [REDACTED]

16 [REDACTED].¹³

17 The above-described transmission procedures and code, including the code pertaining to
18 the interception of message content and [REDACTED], has
19 remained consistent from the beginning of the class period to the present.¹⁴

20

21 ⁸ *Id.* at ¶¶ 43-54.

22 ⁹ *Id.* at ¶¶ 44-51; 57-64.

23 ¹⁰ *Id.* at ¶ 41.

24 ¹¹ *Id.* at ¶ 55.

25 ¹² *Id.* at ¶¶ 108-115;117.

26 ¹³ *Id.* at ¶¶ 19-29; 108-115.

27 ¹⁴ *Id.* at ¶ 107. The most current version of the Facebook source code that Facebook has
28 produced is dated December 31, 2012, and while the descriptions of the source code set forth
herein are as of that date, Facebook has not produced, or informed Plaintiffs of, any material and
relevant changes to Facebook's source code since then, if any. Notably, Facebook's production
of documents show that as of at least April 20, 2104 [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. *Id.* at ¶ 96;
Ex. 35 (FB000005802-R).

1 **B. Facebook Uses Content From Intercepted Private Messages**

2 According to Facebook, the extent of the records it creates from private message content
3 border on limitless, as do the uses to which it puts such content. In a declaration in this
4 proceeding, a Facebook Engineering Manager acknowledged: [REDACTED]

5 [REDACTED]
6 [REDACTED]¹⁵ [REDACTED]
7 [REDACTED]
8 [REDACTED]
9 [REDACTED]¹⁶ Turning to how Facebook uses the intercepted content, the same declarant
10 explained the possibilities are as expansive as Facebook’s entire source code: [REDACTED]

11 [REDACTED]
12 [REDACTED]¹⁷ Accordingly, “the abstract hypothetical question as to all possible
13 uses is likely impossible to answer.”¹⁸

14 Facebook places no limitations on how it may exploit its users’ data, including the data it
15 acquires from its users’ private messages. Facebook has large and complex data behind its site.
16 Facebook currently stores this data in a data model called TAO (The Associations and Objects).¹⁹
17 Objects represent *things* on Facebook—*e.g.*, users, pages, checkins, comments, locations.
18 Associations represent *relationships* between objects—*e.g.*, friendships between users, a Like that
19 connects a user to a page, or a location that is tied to a user check-in.²⁰ In deposition, Facebook’s
20 30(b)(6) witness testifying on how the company uses private message content stated that [REDACTED]

21 [REDACTED]²¹ Thus, the records
22 that Facebook creates from its users’ private messages, and which are stored indefinitely, may be
23 put to any use, for any reason, by any Facebook employee, at any time.

24 ¹⁵ Declaration of Dale Harrison for Defendant Facebook, Inc. (Dkt No. 125, Ex. A), at ¶ 17.

25 ¹⁶ *Id.* at ¶ 19.

26 ¹⁷ *Id.* at 20.

27 ¹⁸ *Id.*

28 ¹⁹ Ex. 2 (Golbeck Report), at ¶ 32.

²⁰ *Id.* at ¶ 33.

²¹ Ex. 5 (September 25, 2015 Deposition of Ray He, “He Dep.”), at 172:2-3.

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1. [REDACTED]

Facebook’s code is written to scan private messages [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. Specifically, during the [REDACTED]

The tally of the number of times a URL was discussed in private messages— [REDACTED]

was and continues to be used by Facebook for purposes beyond simply increasing the publicly displayed “Like” count on the website associated with that URL, conduct to which Facebook has already publicly admitted. During the class period, Facebook also used the [REDACTED]

²⁵

As one example, Facebook utilized [REDACTED]

²² See, e.g., Ex. 4 (FB000005502-R) (in which the field designated “[REDACTED]”).
Ex. 6 (FB000008489) at 2 (“[REDACTED]”); See also Golbeck Decl. ¶ 38 (“[REDACTED]”)

²⁴

Ex. 2 (Golbeck Report), at ¶ 84.

²⁵ Id. at ¶¶ 56-64.

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]²⁹ Thus, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] to specific users.

2. Facebook’s Sharing of User Data With Third Parties.

Facebook intentionally and publicly shared demographic data about its users and their private messages with website owners and developers.³⁰ Facebook employed multiple source-code devices to [REDACTED]

Facebook’s “Insights” product, directed to website owners, provides demographic information about interactions on external websites. This includes data [REDACTED].

Facebook makes this information available to any website owner, with the pitch that such information will help the website customize content for its existing visitors and target advertising (presumably, via Facebook) to attract new visitors. Additionally, Facebook’s API (“application program interface”) allowed third-party app developers to [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. This content could be used for any purpose and by any developer.

²⁶ Facebook documents describe [REDACTED].” Ex. 7 (FB000003118). Ray He further explains that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Ex. 5 (He Dep.) at 227:3-4; 11-12.

²⁷ Ex. 5 (He Dep.), at 229:19-230:6.

²⁸ Ex. 2 (Golbeck Report), at ¶¶ 61-64.

²⁹ *Id.*

³⁰ Ex. 33 (Torres Report), at ¶ 16.

1 **3. Increasing “Like” Counts on Third-Party Websites**

2 The Like button is critical for Facebook’s targeted advertising business.³¹ The Like
3 button allows Facebook to monitor its users’ activity, even when those users are on third-party
4 websites.³² With active Likes, if a user clicks a “Like,” [REDACTED]

5 [REDACTED]
6 [REDACTED]
7 [REDACTED]. Further, through
8 Facebook’s Insights product, the Like button enables a third-party website to covertly monitor
9 Facebook users’ interaction with the website—Facebook promotes this feature as helping the
10 website “[REDACTED]” by providing “[REDACTED]
11 [REDACTED]”.³⁵

12 Prior to October 2012, Facebook used the combined values in the “tracking_info” field of
13 an EntGlobalShare—including the share_count derived from private message content—as the
14 Like count publicly displayed on the corresponding third-party website.³⁶ However, when
15 exposed by the Wall Street Journal in early October 2012, Facebook [REDACTED]

16 [REDACTED].³⁷

17 ³¹ See, e.g., Ex. 8 (FB000014365), a 2012 email in which a Facebook employee states [REDACTED]
18 [REDACTED] When explaining what data contributes to the
19 Like count (including URLs found through private message scans), Facebook employee Austin
20 Haugen states [REDACTED] Ex. 9
(FB000003335). See also Ex. 10 (FB000004996) [REDACTED]

21 ³² See, e.g., Ex. 11 (FB000012539), at 2: [REDACTED]
22 [REDACTED]
23 [REDACTED]

24 ³³ See, e.g., Ex. 12 (FB000008268), a Facebook document entitled [REDACTED]
25 [REDACTED]

26 ³⁴ Facebook does this through its Open Graph Protocol, a portion of its platform dedicated to
linking items of data across its social network. See, e.g., Ex. 11 (FB000012539) at 2.

27 ³⁵ Ex. 13 (FB000008722), at 2.

28 ³⁶ Ex. 2 (Golbeck Report), at ¶¶ 82-93.

³⁷ For example, a Facebook [REDACTED]

Footnote continued on next page

1 Indeed, the value of Likes to the business was recognized at the highest levels of the company.³⁸

2 In an [REDACTED]

3 Facebook engineer Alex Himel notes that [REDACTED]

4 [REDACTED]

5 [REDACTED]³⁹ In the same document, Himel further

6 comments that this is [REDACTED] *Id.* However, Facebook took pains to

7 [REDACTED].⁴⁰

8 Nonetheless, Facebook continues to create [REDACTED] from private messages containing

9 URLs, and additionally continues to [REDACTED]

10 [REDACTED].⁴¹ As discussed above, Facebook [REDACTED]

11 [REDACTED].

12 In short, Facebook has intercepted users' private message content has used it for profit,

13 and appears to be doing so to this day.

14 **IV. CLASS CERTIFICATION IS PROPER**

15 Certification of the following class is proper under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23:

16 All natural-person Facebook users located within the United States
17 who have sent, or received from a Facebook user, private messages
18 that included URLs in their content (and from which Facebook
generated a URL attachment), from within two years before the
filing of this action up through the date of the certification of the

19 *Footnote continued from previous page*

20 [REDACTED]

21 Ex. 14 (FB000000594).

22 [REDACTED]

23 [REDACTED]

24 [REDACTED]

25 [REDACTED]

26 ³⁹ Ex. 16 (FB000001265).

27 ⁴⁰ When engineers [REDACTED]

28 [REDACTED] Ex. 17

(FB000006429) at 3.

⁴¹ Ex. 2 (Golbeck Report), at ¶¶ 90-92.

1 class.⁴²

2 Without certification of an appropriate class, privacy rights long acknowledged in the
3 Common Law, as reflected in the legislative enactments of ECPA and CIPA, will go unenforced,
4 thus eviscerating the privacy interests necessary to the sound functioning of a democratic society.
5 *See, e.g.,* J. Cohen, *What Privacy Is For*, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 1904, 1927 (2013) (“In addition,
6 privacy does not only protect individuals. Privacy furthers fundamental public policy goals
7 relating to liberal democratic citizenship, innovation, and human flourishing.”).

8 **A. The Rule 23(a) Criteria Are Met**

9 Plaintiffs have set forth *prima facie* facts that satisfy the four requirements of Rule 23(a):
10 (1) numerosity; (2) commonality; (3) typicality; and (4) adequacy of representation.

11 **1. The Class is so Numerous that Joinder is Impracticable**

12 Plaintiffs satisfy the numerosity requirement because the class “is so numerous that
13 joinder of all members is impracticable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). “Where ‘the exact size of the
14 class is unknown, but general knowledge and common sense indicate that it is large, the
15 numerosity requirement is satisfied.’” *In re Abbott Labs. Norvir Antitrust Litig.*, Nos. 04–1511,
16 04–4203, 2007 WL 1689899, at *6 (N.D. Cal. June 11, 2007) (Wilken, J.) (quoting *Newberg on*
17 *Class Actions* § 3.3 (4th ed. 2002)). During 2012, Facebook identified approximately [REDACTED]
18 monthly active users who utilized the private message function.⁴³ Facebook’s Q4 earnings
19 statement from 2012 states that it had 1.056 billion monthly active users worldwide, with

20
21 _____
22 ⁴² Excluded from the Class are the following individuals and/or entities: Facebook and its parents,
23 subsidiaries, affiliates, officers and directors, current or former employees, and any entity in
24 which Facebook has a controlling interest; counsel for the putative class; all individuals who
25 make a timely election to be excluded from this proceeding using the correct protocol for opting
out; and any and all federal, state or local governments, including but not limited to their
departments, agencies, divisions, bureaus, boards, sections, groups, counsels and/or subdivisions;
and all judges assigned to hear any aspect of this litigation, as well as their immediate family
members.

26 ⁴³ In Ex. 18 (FB000008271), at 4, Facebook [REDACTED]
27 “MAU” appears to stand for “Monthly Active User,” a term Facebook uses elsewhere in the
28 course of describing user engagement. *See, e.g.,* Facebook’s press release for Second Quarter
2015 financial results (defining “MAUs” as “[m]onthly active users.”) (available at
<http://investor.fb.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=924562>).

1 193 million of those users located in North America.⁴⁴ Assuming an even distribution among
2 active message users worldwide, this means as many as tens of millions of members exist in the
3 United States, such that even a tiny percentage of those users would satisfy the numerosity
4 requirement.

5 **2. Questions of Law and Fact Are Common to the Class**

6 Rule 23(a)(2) requires that there be “questions of law or fact common to the class.”
7 Commonality is thus satisfied where the claims of all class members “depend upon a common
8 contention...of such a nature that it is capable of classwide resolution—which means that
9 determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one
10 of the claims in one stroke.” *Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes*, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011)
11 (common questions must “generate common answers” that are “apt to drive the resolution of the
12 litigation”) (citation omitted). “All questions of fact and law need not be common to satisfy the
13 rule.” *Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp.*, 150 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 1998); *Rodriguez v. Hayes*,
14 591 F.3d 1105, 1122 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting that “common” does not mean “complete
15 congruence”). In fact, “[t]hat ‘commonality only requires a single significant question of law or
16 fact’ was recently recognized by both the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit.” *Vietnam*
17 *Veterans of Am. v. C.I.A.*, 288 F.R.D. 192, 212-13 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (Wilken, J.) (citations
18 omitted) (citing cases).

19 In the Joint Case Management Conference Statement, Facebook itself identifies relevant
20 common issues which track the elements to establish Facebook’s violations of ECPA and CIPA.
21 *See* Dkt. 6 at 4-7.⁴⁵ Proof of the elements of ECPA and CIPA is necessarily common because it
22 will focus upon Facebook’s uniform conduct. Such evidence will concern Facebook’s internal
23 operations and source code, revealing its “intent,” to “intercept” private messages while in transit,
24 deriving its “content” and “redirecting” it elsewhere for purposes outside the “ordinary course of

25 ⁴⁴ Ex. 19 (Facebook Quarterly Earnings Slides Q4 2012) at 3.

26 ⁴⁵ Common questions identified by Facebook include: (a) whether Facebook unlawfully
27 ‘redirected’ the content of users’ private messages; (b) whether the interception was
28 contemporaneous with the messages’ transmission; (c) whether the “ordinary course of business”
exemption applies to Facebook’s conduct; and (d) whether Plaintiffs and the class members
expressly or impliedly consented to the interceptions. *Id.*

1 its business.” Here, even the issue of Plaintiffs’ lack of consent to Facebook’s conduct will focus
2 on Facebook’s conduct, *i.e.*, its failure to procure express consent, and its secret, but active
3 concealment of its actual practices. Therefore, proof of these elements will necessarily require
4 the same evidence for any one Plaintiff as it will for the class as a whole, and resolution of these
5 issues will necessarily generate common answers.

6 **3. Plaintiffs’ Claims Are Typical of the Class**

7 Rule 23(a)(3)’s “typicality requirement is to assure that the interest of the named
8 representative aligns with the interests of the class.” *Wolin v. Jaguar Land Rover North America*,
9 617 F.3d 1168, 1175 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting *Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp.*, 976 F.2d 497, 508
10 (9th Cir. 1992)). Typicality exists when the class representatives and the class members are
11 subjected to and injured by the same course of conduct. *Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp.*,
12 657 F.3d 970, 984 (9th Cir. 2011).

13 Representative Plaintiffs Matthew Campbell and Michael Hurley are Facebook users who
14 have sent private messages which contained a URL, or Internet link.⁴⁶ Discovery in this case has
15 confirmed that by operation of its source code and internal policies, Facebook intercepted the
16 representative Plaintiffs’ private messages, acquired the messages’ content, redirected those
17 messages to generate records about the content acquired therein, and stored these records, in
18 perpetuity. Ex. 20 (Defs.’ Suppl. Resp. and Objs. To Narrowed Second Set of Interrogatories), at
19 Ex. 1. Discovery has further revealed that Facebook processed and scanned all private messages
20 [REDACTED], and that Facebook’s code, and accompanying, code-based
21 message-scanning devices, operated uniformly across all class members.⁴⁷ Any Facebook user in
22 the class sending a private message would have URL content intercepted in the same manner as
23 the representative Plaintiffs. Accordingly, the representative Plaintiffs’ claims and the class
24 members’ claims “are so interrelated that the interests of the class members will be fairly and
25 adequately protected in their absence.” *Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon*, 457 U.S. 147, 163 n.13
26 (1982); *Ades v. Omni Hotels Mgmt. Corp.*, No. 13-02468, 2014 WL 4627271, at *9 (C.D. Cal.

27 ⁴⁶ *Id.*

28 ⁴⁷ Ex. 2 (Golbeck Report), at ¶ 107.

1 Sept. 8, 2014) (finding class representatives' claims typical where "course of conduct...common
2 to the class, and privacy invasions typical to those of the class generally" were alleged).

3 **4. Plaintiffs And their Counsel Will Adequately Represent the Class**

4 Rule 23(a)(4) requires that the class representatives and their counsel will "fairly and
5 adequately protect the interests of the class." See *Ellis*, 657 F.3d at 985 (quoting *Hanlon*,
6 150 F.3d at 1020). "Adequate representation depends on, among other factors, an absence of
7 antagonism between representatives and absentees, and a sharing of interest between
8 representatives and absentees." *Id.* In considering the adequacy of plaintiffs' counsel, the court
9 must consider "(i) the work counsel has done in identifying or investigating potential claims in
10 the action; (ii) counsel's experience in handling class actions, other complex litigation, and the
11 types of claims asserted in the action; (iii) counsel's knowledge of the applicable law; and (iv) the
12 resources that counsel will commit to representing the class." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(1)(A).

13 As Plaintiffs' claims are typical of the class, they have no antagonism with class
14 members' interests. Plaintiffs also have committed to prosecute the case vigorously on behalf of
15 all class members, and have devoted substantial time and effort in the case already. Plaintiffs
16 have retained counsel with substantial experience in litigating privacy claims and class actions
17 generally. Bates Decl. Ex. A; Sobol Decl. ¶ 5. Plaintiffs' counsel have devoted a significant
18 amount of time to identifying and investigating the potential claims and pursuing discovery in this
19 matter, and will continue to commit the resources necessary to represent the class. Accordingly,
20 Plaintiffs and their counsel will adequately represent the class.

21 **5. The Class Is Ascertainable**

22 "[C]ourts have implied an additional requirement under Rule 23(a): that the class to be
23 certified be ascertainable." *In re Google Inc. Gmail Litig.*, No. 13-02430, 2014 WL 1102660, at
24 *10 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2014) (Koh, J.). "A class definition should be precise, objective, and
25 presently ascertainable,' though 'the class need not be so ascertainable that every potential
26 member can be identified at the commencement of the action.'" *Gray v. Golden Gate Nat'l*
27 *Recreational Area*, 279 F.R.D. 501, 508 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (LaPorte, J.) (quoting *O'Connor v.*
28 *Boeing N. Am., Inc.*, 184 F.R.D. 311, 319 (C.D. Cal. 1998)). "A class definition is sufficient if

1 the description of the class is ‘definite enough so that it is administratively feasible for a court to
2 ascertain whether an individual is a member.’” *In re High-Tech Employee Antitrust Litig.*, 985 F.
3 Supp. 2d 1167, 1182 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (Koh, J.) (quoting *O’Connor*, 184 F.R.D. at 319). It must
4 be possible to determine whether a class member is included “by reference to objective criteria.”
5 *Id.* (quoting 5 James W. Moore, *Moore’s Federal Practice*, § 23.21[3] (Matthew Bender 3d ed.)).

6 Plaintiffs have precisely defined the class based on objective criteria.⁴⁸ Dr. Golbeck has
7 demonstrated that, by ██████████ Facebook can identify all Facebook
8 users in the United States during the relevant time period from whose messages Facebook has
9 intercepted URL content ██████████. ⁴⁹ In any event, any
10 Facebook user can readily determine whether she sent or received a Facebook message containing
11 a URL within the relevant time period.

12 **B. The Class Is Properly Maintained Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)**

13 Rule 23(b)(3) permits the maintenance of a class where common issues predominate and a
14 class action is superior to individual actions.

15 **1. Common Issues Predominate**

16 The predominance requirement “tests whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive
17 to warrant adjudication by representation.” *Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor*, 521 U.S. 591, 623
18 (1997). Predominance is satisfied when “[a] common nucleus of facts and potential legal
19 remedies dominate [the] litigation.” *Hanlon*, 150 F.3d at 1022. “When common questions
20 present a significant aspect of the case and they can be resolved for all members of the class in a
21 single adjudication, there is clear justification for handling the dispute on a representative rather

22 _____
23 ⁴⁸ “All natural-person Facebook users located within the United States who have sent, or received
24 from a Facebook user, private messages that included URLs in their content (and from which
25 Facebook generated a URL attachment). . . .” When a user includes a URL in a private message,
26 Facebook’s source code ██████████. Ex. 2
27 (Golbeck Report), at ¶¶ 18-29. While the private message is still in transit, the source code

28 ██████████ *Id.* at ¶¶ 30-54. Facebook has nit-picked elsewhere
that ██████████. Although this is the rare
exception, Plaintiffs have tailored the class definition by referring to the generation of the URL
attachment because, by operation of Facebook’s source code, ██████████

⁴⁹ *Id.* at ¶¶ 98-106. In the ██████████

1 than on an individual basis.” *Hanlon*, 150 F.3d at 1022. (citation omitted).

2 This case turns on evidence of Facebook’s uniform treatment of millions of class
3 members. Facebook literally programmed itself to operate exactly the same way with regard to
4 all of its users. Common issues of fact and law predominate because resolution of the common
5 issues—whether Facebook’s programmed, uniform treatment of users who send private messages
6 containing URLs or Internet links violates ECPA and CIPA—can be achieved in this one
7 proceeding.

8 a. **Facebook’s ECPA Violation Will be Established by Common**
9 **Proof**

10 Plaintiffs’ ECPA claim can be adjudicated based upon evidence common to the class.
11 ECPA provides for civil penalties against any person who “intentionally intercepts, endeavors to
12 intercept, or procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral, or
13 electronic communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device” while in
14 transit. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a). An “interception” means acquiring the content of the
15 communication such that “the contents of a wire communication are captured or redirected in any
16 way.” Order on Motion to Dismiss, Dkt. 43 at 5.

17 An ECPA claim is naturally suited to classwide determination. In a similar case earlier
18 this year, another court within this District held that “[w]hether Yahoo intercepts emails to and
19 from non-Yahoo mail subscribers while those emails are in transit is a ‘common contention’ that
20 ‘is capable of classwide resolution’ and ‘will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each
21 one of the claims in one stroke.’” *In re Yahoo Mail Litig.*, 308 F.R.D. 577, 590-91 (N.D. Cal.
22 2015) (Koh, J.), *quoting Dukes*, 131 S.Ct. at 2552. Although the court in *Yahoo Mail Litig.* did
23 not reach the issue of predominance because plaintiffs there only sought certification under
24 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2), its rationale that these basic elements of an ECPA claim are “central to
25 the validity” of the claims and can be adjudicated classwide, compels a determination of
26 predominance here.

27 While Facebook denies that it intentionally intercepts private messages while in transit,
28 within the meaning of ECPA, the determination of those issues are undeniably common and

1 susceptible to common proof. Here, expert analysis of Facebook’s source code, corroborated by
2 other internal records, will show that an intentional interception of URL content occurs during
3 transmission and [REDACTED].⁵⁰ Moreover, the source
4 code analysis demonstrates that upon interception of private message URL content, Facebook
5 redirected the content to [REDACTED]
6 [REDACTED] to make use of the content for purposes wholly unrelated to facilitating the
7 transmission of the message.⁵¹

8 ECPA has an exception to liability for interceptions conducted through a device that is
9 “being used by a provider of wire or electronic communication service in the ordinary course of
10 its business.” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5)(a); Order on Motion to Dismiss, Dkt. 43 at 6. The
11 determination of Facebook’s defense through this exception also will be subject to common proof
12 as it focuses exclusively on Facebook’s conduct, source code and development of the private
13 message function. For example, Plaintiffs have determined that Facebook’s source code that
14 redirects private message content operates independently of, and at another point in time from,
15 [REDACTED] that Facebook asserts is part
16 of the message transmission process.⁵² See Order on Motion to Dismiss, Dkt. 43 at 12 (“The fact
17 that Facebook can configure its code to scan message content for certain purposes, but not for
18 others, leaves open the possibility that the challenged practice constitutes a separate
19 ‘interception.’ Simply put, the application of the ‘ordinary course of business’ exception to this
20 case depends upon the details of Facebook’s software code.”).

21 **b. Facebook’s CIPA Violation Will be Established by Common**
22 **Proof**

23 As Facebook acknowledges, the core issues in dispute under the CIPA claim mirror the

24 _____
25 ⁵⁰ Ex. 2 (Golbeck Report), at ¶¶ 116-118.

26 ⁵¹ *Id.* at ¶¶ 32-54; 109 [REDACTED]

27 ⁵² *Id.* at ¶¶ 108-115; 55 [REDACTED]
28 [REDACTED]

1 issues applicable to the ECPA claim. Dkt. 60 at 7. For the reasons set forth above, common
2 issues clearly predominate.

3 At the class certification stage, this Court must ensure that a nationwide class under the
4 law of a single state, CIPA, comports with due process. *Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts*,
5 472 U.S. 797, 818 (1985). California’s choice of law rules govern this consideration. *Klaxon*
6 *Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co.*, 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941); *Zinser v. Accufix Research Inst., Inc.*,
7 253 F.3d 1180, 1187 (9th Cir. 2001). The starting point in this analysis is Facebook’s terms of
8 service, which provide that “the laws of the State of California will govern...any claim that might
9 arise between you and us.”⁵³ See *Nedlloyd Lines B.V. v. Super. Ct.*, 3 Cal. 4th 459, 468-70 (1992)
10 (concluding that where the parties have entered into an agreement that specifies that a particular
11 jurisdiction’s law will govern their disputes, a court’s choice-of-law analysis should begin with an
12 inquiry into whether the claims of putative class members fall within its scope). The broad scope
13 of Facebook’s choice-of-law provision clearly evidences an intent to have California law apply to
14 all disputes arising out of the relationship between Facebook and its users. Moreover, California
15 law has a substantial relationship to the parties. *Nedlloyd*, 3 Cal. 4th at 464. A substantial
16 relationship exists where one of the parties has its principal place of business in the chosen state.
17 *ABF Capital Corp. v. Osley*, 414 F.3d 1061, 1065 (9th Cir. 2005). Accordingly, certification of a
18 CIPA claim on behalf of a nationwide class is appropriate. See *Wolph v. Acer Am. Corp.*,
19 272 F.R.D. 477, 484-85 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (White, J.).

20 c. **Plaintiffs’ and the Class Members’ Lack of Consent to**
21 **Facebook Practices will be Established Through Common**
22 **Proof**

23 Both ECPA and CIPA require that the offending interception occur without the consent of
24 the user. In the ruling on the Motion to Dismiss, the Court reviewed all of Facebook’s relevant
25 disclosures and concluded: “...in the context of express consent, any consent with respect to the
26 processing and sending of messages itself does not necessarily constitute consent to the specific
27 practice alleged in this case—that is, the scanning of message content for use in targeted
28 advertising.” Order on Motion to Dismiss, Dkt. 43 at 16. The three iterations of Facebook’s Data

⁵³ Ex. 21 (FB000000001), at 7; Ex. 22 (FB000000032), at 8; Ex. 23 (FB000000058), at 6.

1 Use Policy during the class period were applicable to all class members and therefore constitute
2 common proof, making the issue of whether these terms disclosed Facebook’s practices of
3 scanning private messages suitable for a classwide determination. Exs. 24 – 26. *Gmail*, 2014
4 WL 1102660, at *15 (finding that express consent is a common question for class members
5 exposed to the same disclosures).

6 In critical respects, this case is not like *Gmail*, where the Court found that individual
7 issues regarding actual, *implied* consent would predominate. There, the record was replete with
8 evidence of class members’ potential, actual advance notice of Google’s practices making implied
9 consent “an intensely individualized” factual question. *Id.* at *20. Here, in contrast, there is a
10 complete absence of any evidence of advance notice. Despite extensive discovery, including not
11 only the depositions of the class representatives, but also the depositions of the recipients of the
12 class representatives’ private messages, Facebook has not produced relevant evidence from which
13 actual notice can be reasonably implied. *Silbaugh v. Viking Mag. Servs.*, 278 F.R.D. 389, 393
14 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (“Having produced no evidence that any individual consented to receive the text
15 messages...defendant is unable to realistically argue that individual issues regarding consent
16 outweigh the commonality.”) Thus, unlike *Gmail*, there is no indication that individual consent
17 issues will overwhelm issues Plaintiffs have shown herein to be resolvable through classwide
18 proof.

19 Rather, this case is more like *Omni Hotels*, where the court found predominance in the
20 absence of actual notification to the class members. 2014 WL 4627271, at 13. Here, Facebook’s
21 undisclosed use of private message content was so extensive that actual consent to the scope of its
22 practices is not reasonably possible. Facebook’s 30(b)(6) witness testified on the topic of
23 Facebook’s use of private message content, stating that [REDACTED]
24 [REDACTED] Ex. 5 (He Dep.) at 172:1-3. Thus, the records that
25 Facebook creates from its users’ private messages, and which are stored indefinitely, have no
26 limitation, and may be put to any use, for any reason, by any Facebook employee, at any point in
27 the future. Facebook’s Engineering Manager submitted a declaration asserting that not even
28 Facebook can determine the extent to which it uses private message content, and that finding a

1 way to identify all objects created in connection with a given Facebook message, “would likely
2 be impossible.” Dkt. 126 (Harrison Decl.), at ¶ 12. If Facebook cannot identify the extent of its
3 use of private message content, surely the average user cannot be implied to have that actual
4 knowledge of those practices.

5 Further, Plaintiffs will present common evidence that rather than disclose its practices (to
6 provide some basis for “actual” knowledge necessary to imply consent), Facebook actively
7 sought to conceal its practices from users. In fact, whether Facebook’s cover-up of its actions
8 defeats any findings of implied consent here, will be a common question. *Gmail*, 2014 WL
9 1102660, at *14 (noting that disclosures by Google which indicated that scanning was *not*
10 occurring indicated “the opposite” of establishing consent). Throughout the class period, and
11 afterwards, Facebook has known that its users were *not* aware of the scanning at issue in this case,
12 and has affirmatively tried to prevent them from finding out. *See, e.g.* Ex. 27 (FB000006435), at

13 3-6 [REDACTED]

14 [REDACTED]

15 [REDACTED]

16 [REDACTED] *See also* Ex. 28 (FB000004406)

17 [REDACTED]

18 [REDACTED]

19 [REDACTED]) Indeed, with regard to

20 Facebook’s incrementing of the Like counter, its executives determined that they “[REDACTED]

21 [REDACTED]

22 [REDACTED].” Ex. 29 (FB000007924), at 2. Indeed, when

23 reversing that practice, Facebook kept it deliberately quiet. *See* Ex. 30 (FB000000502) [REDACTED]

24 [REDACTED]

25 [REDACTED]

26 Discovery also demonstrates that Facebook’s public-facing statements about “procedural
27 safeguards” for ensuring user privacy in product development are false. Facebook has
28 represented, *inter alia*, in its filings with the Security and Exchange Commission that it has “a

1 dedicated team of privacy professionals who are involved in new product and feature
2 development from design through launch” and who conduct “ongoing review and monitoring of
3 the way data is handled by existing features and applications.”⁵⁴ However, when asked to
4 produce documents sufficient to identify the individuals comprising this “dedicated team,”⁵⁵
5 Facebook responded that *none* existed.⁵⁶

6 **d. Allocation of Monetary Relief to Plaintiffs and the Class can be**
7 **Done on a Classwide Basis**

8 Plaintiffs’ and the class members’ monetary relief is “capable of measurement on a
9 classwide basis.” *Comcast Corp. v. Behrend*, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1433 (2013). “The amount of
10 damages is invariably an individual question and does not defeat class action treatment.”
11 *Blackie v. Barrack*, 524 F.2d 891, 905 (9th Cir. 1975); *see also Leyva v. Medline Indus. Inc.*,
12 716 F.3d 510, 513-14 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that the district court abused its discretion in
13 finding that individualized issues of damages precluded class certification).

14 Both ECPA and CIPA provide for statutory damages. 18 U.S.C. § 2520(c)(2); Cal. Pen.
15 Code § 637.2. Federal courts “regularly recognize the superiority of class litigation in suits for
16 statutory damages.” *Holloway v. Full Spectrum Lending*, 976 F.2d 497, *8-9 (C.D. Cal. 2007).
17 Moreover, the Ninth Circuit clearly states that the superiority analysis does not change when the
18 size of the class creates an excessively large damages model. *Bateman v. Am. Multi-Cinema,*
19 *Inc.*, 623 F.3d 708, 721 (9th Cir. 2010) (“enormous” aggregate damages liability “is not an
20 appropriate reason to deny class certification under Rule 23(b)(3).”). Instead, “the district court
21 may be entitled to reduce the award if it is unconstitutionally excessive...but constitutional limits
22 are best applied after a class has been certified.” *Id.* at 723 (quoting *Murray v. GMAC Mortg.*
23 *Corp.*, 434 F.3d 948, 954 (7th Cir. Ill. 2006)). The Seventh Circuit further clarifies the policy

24 ⁵⁴ Facebook Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2013. (available at
25 <http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1326801/000132680114000007/fb-12312013x10k.htm>).

26 ⁵⁵ Ex. 31 (Pltfs.’ First Set Requests for Prod.), Request No. 29 (seeking “[a]ll Documents and ESI
27 related to – and sufficient to identify – the ‘dedicated team of privacy professionals’ identified on
28 page 8 of Your Form 10-K for fiscal year ending December 31, 2013.”)

⁵⁶ Ex. 32 (Ltr. from Joshua Jessen to Hank Bates, April 10, 2015), at 1 (“With respect to Request
No. 29, please be advised that there is no specific list of the ‘dedicated team of privacy
professionals’ referenced in the Request.”).

1 underlying this holding: “[C]onstitutional limits are best applied after a class has been certified.
2 Then a judge may evaluate the defendant's overall conduct and control its total exposure.
3 Reducing recoveries by forcing everyone to litigate independently—so that constitutional bounds
4 are not tested, because the statute cannot be enforced by more than a handful of victims—has
5 little to recommend it.” *Murray*, 434 F.3d at 954.

6 ECPA also authorizes “equitable...relief as may be appropriate,” as well as “profits made
7 by the violator as a result of the violation.” 18 U.S.C. § 2520(b)(1), (c)(2). Plaintiffs can offer
8 common proof to calculate the value which Facebook derived from intercepting private message
9 content, as well as a method for an equitable allocation of those ill-gotten gains to the members of
10 the class. *See* Ex. 33, Report of Fernando Torres in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class
11 Certification (“Torres Report”). Through interceptions of private messages, Facebook creates
12 related Objects and Associations which populate Facebook’s Social Graph. *Id.* at ¶ 23.
13 Facebook’s Social Graph represents the integration of information collected by Facebook about
14 Facebook users, and encompasses their location, demographics, interests, behaviors, and
15 connections. *Id.* at ¶ 21. The unlawfully intercepted private message content contributes
16 meaningful data to the Social Graph, increasing the quality of its ability to provide predictive
17 value, and, consequently, increasing Facebook’s advertising revenue and value. *Id.* at ¶¶ 36 *et*
18 *seq.* A reasonable value to Facebook of the intercepted content can be assigned on a per URL
19 basis, and can be allocated to class members on that basis. *Id.* at ¶ 60.

20 In addition, Facebook generated value from its inflation of third-party Like counters. The
21 economic benefit derived by Facebook attributable to this conduct lies between two bounds: a
22 higher bound represented by the cost that client websites saved by not having to acquire
23 additional Likes; and a lower bound determined by the market value of artificially acquired Likes.
24 *Id.* at ¶ 63. Again, the value of these Likes can be allocated to class members based upon
25 Facebook’s data which retains user-specific logs for each artificially derived Like. *Id.* at ¶ 73.

26 **2. A Class Action Is Superior to Any Alternative**

27 The “objectives of the particular class action procedure will be achieved in th[is]
28 particular case,” making class certification the superior method for litigating class members’

1 claims. *Hanlon*, 150 F.3d at 1023. Here, a class action is the only mechanism by which Plaintiffs
2 and class members can practically vindicate the privacy interest at issue, as it stands in direct
3 conflict with the business model of one of the world’s largest corporations.⁵⁷ The resources
4 required to litigate these claims could never sustain an individual action against Facebook.⁵⁸
5 Accordingly, absent class certification, the boundaries of permissible private surveillance,
6 established by the Common Law and embodied in ECPA and CIPA, will go unenforced and will
7 likely be breached with impunity. As electronic communications through social media such as
8 Facebook become the dominant mode of interpersonal communication, the need for proper
9 boundaries has never been more important. *See, e.g.*, J. Cohen, *What Privacy Is For*, 126 Harv.
10 L. Rev. 1904, 1927-32 (2013).

11 **3. This Class Action Is Manageable**

12 Class-wide resolution of class members’ claims will be manageable. First, all of the
13 claims are governed by the same statutory laws. Second, the central issue of liability will hinge on
14 the several categories of common proof outlined herein: Either Facebook intercepted messages in
15 transit, or it did not; either Facebook’s scanning devices were “being used in the ordinary course
16 of its business,” or they were not; either Facebook’s public disclosures of its practice could have
17 provided “actual knowledge,” of the alleged violations, or they did not. Third, the potential
18 measures of class-wide relief require common proof: statutory damages, profits resulting from
19 Facebook’s conduct, and/or other appropriate equitable relief. *See Six (6) Mexican Workers v. Az.*

20 ⁵⁷ This weighing of fundamental privacy interests against corporate profit is exemplified by [REDACTED]
21 [REDACTED]
22 [REDACTED] Ex. 30 (FB000000502). Implicit in this analysis is the
23 proposition that.

23 [REDACTED] Earlier,

24 [REDACTED] . *See, e.g.*, Ex. 34 (FB000000802)

25 [REDACTED]
26 ⁵⁸ *See* Declaration of Joshua Jessen in Support of Defendant Facebook, Inc.’s Opposition to
27 Plaintiffs’ Renewed Motion to Continue Deadlines (Dkt. 135-1) (detailing, generally, productions
28 occurring from February, 2015 through the end of October, 2015; discovery disputes resolved by
Magistrate Judge Maria-Elena James; and the fact that “Plaintiffs and their experts have
collectively spent 48 days reviewing Facebook’s source code.”).

1 *Citrus Growers*, 904 F.2d 1301, 1306 (9th Cir. 1990) (affirming class certification, explaining
2 that individualized proof manageability issues “are not at issue where the underlying statute
3 permits awards without a showing of actual damage.”). “Indeed, the only difficulties likely to be
4 encountered in this case would result from not certifying the class, given the expenditure of time
5 and resources that would result—from both the court's and the parties' perspectives—in requiring
6 each class member's action to proceed independently.” *In re Online DVD Rental Antitrust Litig.*,
7 No. 09-2029, 2010 WL 5396064, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 2010) (Hamilton, J.) *aff'd*, 779 F.3d
8 934 (9th Cir. 2015).⁵⁹

9 **C. Alternatively, Class Certification Under Rule 23(b)(2) Is Appropriate**

10 A class may be certified pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) when plaintiffs “complain of
11 a pattern or practice that is generally applicable to the class as a whole.” *Rodriguez*, 591 F.3d, at
12 1125 (quoting *Walters v. Reno*, 145 F.3d 1032, 1047 (9th Cir. 1998)); Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
13 The conduct Plaintiffs challenge in this litigation—Facebook’s scanning, intercepting, cataloging,
14 and using of private message content—affects all class members uniformly and has been
15 implemented in a way that violated class members’ legal rights identically and consistently.
16 *Yahoo Mail Litig.* (certifying a class under Rule 23(b)(2) where “[p]laintiffs contend that all
17 emails sent from and to Yahoo Mail subscribers are subject to the same interception and scanning
18 processes [and thus] challenge a pattern or practice that is generally applicable to the class as a
19 whole.”) 308 F.R.D. at 598 (internal citations, quotations omitted). Further, the relief sought—
20 cessation of the practice, destruction of any records created from illegally-obtained private
21 message content, and a declaration that such conduct violates ECPA and CIPA—would benefit
22 the class as a whole. *Id.* (“Moreover, Plaintiffs seek only injunctive and declaratory relief, which
23 is appropriate under Rule 23(b)(2).”) (citations omitted). Accordingly, as an alternative to
24 certification pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3), the Court should allow the class to seek injunctive and
25 declaratory relief pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2).

26 _____
27 ⁵⁹ The superiority and manageability of the proposed class proceeding are so straightforward that
28 a trial plan is self-evident. *See Karim v. Hewlett-Packard Co.*, No. 12-5240, 2014 WL 555934, at
*7 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2014) (Hamilton, J.) (certifying class action because superiority is self-
evident even without a trial plan).

1 **V. CONCLUSION**

2 Plaintiffs request that the Court grant their motion for class certification, appoint Matthew
3 Campbell and Michael Hurley as class representatives, and appoint Lief Cabraser Heimann &
4 Bernstein and Carney Bates & Pulliam as class counsel.

5 Dated: November 13, 2015

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