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8	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9	SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11	TERRY DON EVANS,) Civil No. 06cv877-JM (RBB)
12	Plaintiff,) ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S) DECLARATIONS FOR ENTRY OF
13	v.) DEFAULT [DOC. NOS. 70, 74],) PLAINTIFF'S APPLICATION FOR
14	COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO; WILLIAM B.) ENLARGEMENT OF TIME TO FILE KOLENDER, Sheriff; DR. EARL) AMENDED PLEADINGS [DOC. NO.
15	GOLDSTEIN, County Sheriff's) 80], AND PLAINTIFF'S Medical Director; BRUCE LEICHT,) APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO FILE
16	Medical Administrator,) THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT [DOC.) NO. 87]
17	Defendants.)
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19	Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma
20	pauperis, filed a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
21	1983 on April 13, 2006 [doc. no. 1]. On September 1, 2006, Evans
22	filed an Amended Complaint [doc. no. 11], and on January 8, 2007,
23	he filed a Second Amended Complaint [doc. no. 18] naming the County
24	of San Diego, William Kolender, and John/Jane Doe #1, Chief Medical
25	Officer, as Defendants. (Second Am. Compl. 2.) The Court ordered
26	the U.S. Marshal to serve the County of San Diego, William
27	Kolender, and John/Jane Doe #1, Chief Medical Officer [doc. no.
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21]. Certificates of service of process for each Defendant were
 2 filed on February 28, 2007 [doc. nos. 24-26].

The County of San Diego and Kolender filed a Motion to Dismiss [doc. no. 28] on March 19, 2007, which this Court recommended be denied on December 6, 2007 [doc. no. 48]. United States District Judge Jeffrey T. Miller issued his Order Adopting Report and Recommendation on March 27, 2008 [doc. no. 49]. Defendants County of San Diego and Kolender filed an Answer on April 21, 2008 [doc. 9 no. 50].

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I. Plaintiff's First Motion for Entry of Default

11 On September 11, 2008, Evans filed a Declaration for Entry of 12 Default against Defendant John/Jane Doe #1, Chief Medical Officer 13 [doc. no. 70]. Four days later, on September 15, 2008, San Diego 14 County Counsel filed an Answer to Plaintiff's Second Amended 15 Complaint on behalf of Defendant Dr. Earl Goldstein [doc. no. 69]. 16 The Court issued an order setting a briefing schedule for 17 Plaintiff's requested default [doc. no. 76]. Defendants' 18 Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendants' 19 Opposition to Plaintiff's "Declaration for Entry of Default" was 20 filed on October 27, 2008 [doc. no. 81].

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II. Plaintiff's Second Motion for Entry of Default

Evans submitted a Declaration for Entry of Default against
Bruce Leicht, Medical Administrator [doc. no. 74], which was filed,
nunc pro tunc, to September 23, 2008. An Answer to Plaintiff's
Second Amended Complaint was filed on behalf of Bruce Leicht on
October 2, 2008 [doc. no. 75]. Defendants subsequently filed a
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendants'
Opposition to Plaintiff's "Declaration for Entry of Default" on

1 November 12, 2008 [doc. no. 85]. Evans's Reply was filed, nunc pro 2 tunc, to November 7, 2008 [doc. no. 89], and its accompanying 3 exhibits were filed on November 24, 2008 [doc. no. 92].

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III. Plaintiff's Application for Enlargement of Time to File Amended Pleadings

Evans filed an Application for Enlargement of Time File 6 Amended Pleadings [doc. no. 66] requesting a sixty-day extension of 7 time in order to file a complaint that "conform[s] to evidence or 8 after completion of discovery" (Pl.'s Application 9 Enlargement Time File Am. Pleadings 2, Aug. 28, 2008.) Defendants 10 did not oppose Plaintiff's request to "join other parties." 11 (Defs.' Non-opp'n 1.) The Court did not find good cause, but, due 12 to Defendants' non-opposition, issued an Order partially granting 13 Plaintiff's request [doc. no. 68]. Evans was allowed to file a 14 motion to join parties, amended pleadings, or file additional 15 pleadings to be heard by October 8, 2008. (Order Granting in Part 16 Pl.'s Mot. Enlargement 1-2.) Plaintiff failed to meet the deadline 17 and instead filed a second Application for Enlargement of Time to 18 File Amended Pleadings nunc pro tunc to October 8, 2008, or, 19 alternatively, requested an extension to November 7, 2008 [doc. no. 20 801.

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IV. Plaintiff's Application for Leave to File a Third Amended Complaint

Evans also filed an Application for Leave to File a Third
Amended Complaint nunc pro tunc to November 8, 2008, requesting
permission to amend his Complaint to name both Dr. Earl Goldstein
and Bruce Leicht as defendants [doc. no. 87].

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The Court found Plaintiff's motions to be suitable for
 decision without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule
 7.1(d)(1) [doc. no. 94].

A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

5 In January 2004, Evans was housed as a pretrial detainee in 6 the San Diego County detention facility in Vista, California. 7 (Second Am. Compl. 3.) Plaintiff slipped and fell while exiting 8 the shower area of a housing unit. (<u>Id.</u>) Evans contends that his 9 right knee and leg were injured, and he suffered severe pain. 10 (<u>Id.</u>)

Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint alleges that Evans's right to adequate and meaningful medical care was violated. (<u>Id.</u>) He named the Chief Medical Officer as a defendant in his individual capacity and described the person as "legally responsible for the management, supervision and medical care [for] all inmates, prisoners and/or detainees [of the] County of San Diego Sheriff Department." (<u>Id.</u> at 2.)

B. DEFAULT

19 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide, "When a party 20 against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has 21 failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is shown by 22 affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must enter the party's default." 23 Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). Even a default, however, does not 24 automatically entitle a plaintiff to a default judgment. The 25 clerk of the court may enter a default judgment "[if] the 26 plaintiff's claim is for a sum certain or a sum that can be made 27 certain by computation . . . " Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(1). In all

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1 other cases, the party must apply to the court for a default 2 judgment." Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2).

3 Generally, "[i]f a defendant fails to respond to a complaint, 4 default judgment may be entered on behalf of the plaintiff." Fed. 5 Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 757 (2002) 6 (citation omitted) (discussing the Federal Maritime Commission 7 Rules of Practice and noting the similarity to the Federal Rules 8 of Civil Procedure). But "default judgments are ordinarily 9 disfavored." Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1472 (9th Cir. 10 1986). "Cases should be decided upon their merits whenever 11 reasonably possible." Id. (citing Pena v. Sequros La Comercial, 12 S.A., 770 F.2d 811, 814 (9th Cir. 1985)); see also Cmty. Dental 13 <u>Servs. v. Tani,</u> 282 F.3d 1164, 1170 (9th Cir. 2002).)

14 A default judgment may not be entered before the defendant 15 has an obligation to defend the suit. Ashby v. McKenna, 331 F.3d 16 1148, 1152 (10th Cir. 2003). Plaintiff must complete proper 17 service of process before a default judgment may be entered. 18 Jacobs v. Tenney, 316 F. Supp. 151, 165-66 (D. Del. 1970). 19 Generally, entry of default judgment is not proper if there has 20 been an appearance in the case. See Direct Mail Specialists, Inc. v. Eclat Computerized Techs., Inc., 840 F.2d 685, 689 (9th Cir. 21 1988). Although a defendant is late in filing a responsive 22 23 pleading, if the plaintiff has not been prejudiced by the delay, 24 the district court may deny a motion for entry of default 25 judgment. Mitchell v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 294 F.3d 26 1309, 1317 (11th Cir. 2002). 27

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1. Entry of Default

i. Plaintiff's First Motion

Evans asks the Court to enter a default against the fictitiously named John/Jane Doe #1, Chief Medical Officer. (Decl. Entry Default 3, Sept. 11, 2008.) He claims that more than twenty days have elapsed since he filed and served the Second Amended Complaint on John/Jane Doe #1, Chief Medical Officer. (Id. at 2.)

9 Four days after Plaintiff moved for entry of default, Dr. 10 Earl Goldstein, County Sheriff's Medical Director, filed an Answer 11 "in an abundance of caution." (Opp'n 1, Oct. 27, 2008.) The 12 Defendant opposes entry of default for the following reasons: (1)13 No individual was identified, named, or served by Plaintiff; (2) a 14 responsive pleading has been entered; and (3) the parties were 15 working together to identify the correct individual. (Id. at 3-16 5.)

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ii. Plaintiff's Second Motion

18 Evans made a second request for default against "John/Jane 19 Doe #1, Chief Medical Officer, whom [sic] name and title corrected 20 or by amendment [sic] is Bruce Leicht, Medical Administrator 21" (Decl. Entry Default 3, Oct. 1, 2008.) He points to the 22 completed proof of service form signed on February 27, 2007, for 23 John/Jane Doe #1, Chief Medical Officer, and the absence of an 24 answer from Leicht to support his assertion that default is 25 proper. (Id. at 2-3.)

On October 2, 2008, the day after Plaintiff made his request for a default, an Answer was filed on behalf of Bruce Leicht, "in an abundance of caution." (Opp'n 1, Nov. 12, 2008.) Leicht

opposes entry of default for the same reasons argued by Defendant Goldstein: (1) No individual was identified, named, or served by Plaintiff; (2) a responsive pleading has been entered; and (3) the parties were working together to identify the correct individual. (Id. at 3-5.)

In Evans's Reply, he explains that he now believes Defendant John/Jane Doe #1, Chief Medical Officer, encompasses two individuals: Dr. Earl Goldstein and Bruce Leicht. (Mem. P. & A. Supp. Pl.'s Reply 2, Nov. 14, 2008.) He blames Defendants for his inability to identify John/Jane Doe #1, earlier. (Id. at 2-3.)

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(a) Individuals Identified, Named, or Served

12 Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint named John/Jane Doe #1, 13 Chief Medical Officer, as a fictitious defendant [doc. no. 18]. 14 Evans provided limited information for serving this Defendant to 15 the United States Marshals Service. Plaintiff gave the following 16 instructions: "Please serve the Chief Medical Officer, San Diego 17 County Sheriff, Department Medical Services Division by personal 18 process service or authorized agent. Tele # (858) 974-2240[.] I 19 was not able to ascertain whether above address is correct [doc. 20 no. 24]." On February 27, 2007, the Complaint and Summons issued 21 for John/Jane Doe #1, Chief Medical Officer, was served on Matilde 22 Aguilar, "Office Spec." at 8525 Gibbs Dr. #303, San Diego, 23 California 92123. [doc. no. 24]. But the County of San Diego does 24 not employ a person with the title 'Chief Medical Officer.' (Opp'n 25 2, Oct. 27, 2008; Opp'n 1, Nov. 12, 2008.) Furthermore, Evans has 26 not demonstrated that Matilde Aquilar was an agent authorized to 27 accept service for either Defendant Goldstein or Leicht. Because 28 the County of San Diego does not employ a "Chief Medical Officer,"

1 Plaintiff cannot show that Aguilar was authorized to accept service 2 of process for the nonexistent position. A party must receive 3 service of process before a default judgment may be entered against Jacobs, 316 F. Supp. at 165-66. Goldstein and Leicht did not 4 him. 5 receive service of process before Plaintiff moved for entry of default. Thus, Plaintiff has not shown that the entry of a default 6 7 for either Goldstein, Leicht, or a "Chief Medical Officer" is 8 proper.

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(b) Responsive Pleadings

Within a few days of Evans's multiple requests for default,
Answers were filed on behalf of Goldstein [doc. no. 69] and Leicht
[doc. no. 75]. Arguably, neither Defendant was properly served,
but both Goldstein and Leicht have voluntarily appeared in the case
and filed responsive pleadings, making the entry of a default for
either improper. <u>Direct Mail Specialists, Inc.</u>, 840 F.2d at 689.

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(c) Cooperation to Identify the Correct Defendants

Evans contends that default is proper because Defendants 17 18 prevented him from properly identifying John/Jane Doe #1, Chief 19 Medical Officer sooner. (Mem. P. & A. Supp. Pl.'s Reply 2, Nov. 20 14, 2008.) Defendants argue that the parties worked together to 21 identify the correct individuals. (Opp'n 5, Oct. 27, 2008.) "Plaintiff cannot show that any medical official with the Sheriff's 22 23 Department is willfully ignoring a summons or does not wish to 24 defend himself in this lawsuit." (Id. at 4; Opp'n 4, Nov. 12, 25 2008.)

Any doubt as to the propriety of a default should be resolved in favor of deciding the case on its merits. <u>See O'Connor v.</u> <u>Nevada</u>, 27 F.3d 357, 364 (9th Cir. 1994) (discussing a motion to

1 set aside a default); <u>Qwest Commc'ns Corp. v. Olympic Peninsula</u> 2 Dev. Co., No. C07-5147-RJB 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40800, at *4 (W.D. 3 Wash. June 5, 2007 (holding the same). This is because "default 4 judgments are generally disfavored. Whenever it is reasonably 5 possible, cases should be decided upon their merits." Pena, 770 F.2d at 814 (citing Patapoff v. Vollstedt's, Inc., 267 F.2d 863, 6 7 865 (9th Cir. 1959); see also Schwab v. Bullock's Inc., 508 F.2d 8 353, 355 (9th Cir. 1974).

9 As early as May 29, 2007, Evans was aware of Leicht's identity
10 and position as Medical Services Administrator for the San Diego
11 County Sheriff's Department as evidenced by a letter from County
12 Counsel to Plaintiff asking him to cease contact with Leicht and
13 instead direct all communications to Defendants' attorney. (Mem.
14 P. & A. Supp. Reply Ex. A at 1, Nov. 24, 2008.)

An Order adopting this Court's Report and Recommendation to deny Defendants' Motion to Dismiss was entered on March 27, 2008, and an Answer on behalf of the County of San Diego and William B. Kolender was filed on April 21, 2008 [doc. nos. 49, 50]. A case management conference was held on May 16, 2008, and the Court issued a schedule of dates relating to discovery and pre-trial matters [doc. no. 54].

On August 28, 2008, Plaintiff requested an enlargement of time to file amended pleadings [doc. no. 66]. Defendants filed their non-opposition to joinder of additional parties on September 8, 2008 [doc. no. 67]. The Court partially granted Plaintiff's request and authorized Evans to file a motion to add defendants, to be heard by October 8, 2008 [doc. no. 68].

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1 Even if Evans was not aware of Goldstein's identity by the 2 beginning of September, he was formally provided Goldstein's and 3 Leicht's names and titles on September 15, 2008. (Mem. P. & A. Supp. Defs.' Opp'n Brodie Decl. Ex. 1 at 1, Oct. 27, 2008.) County 4 5 Counsel wrote Evans in response to the Motion for Default and stated in part, "As you have seen in the County's responses to your 6 7 written interrogatories' . . . Bruce Leicht is the medical 8 administrator for the Sheriff's Detention Medical Services 9 Division. Also, Dr. Earl Goldstein is the Medical Director of the 10 Sheriff's Medial Services Division." (Id.)

On September 19, 2008, Evans sent a letter in response indicating that he did not think Goldstein was the appropriate defendant, but rather wished to sue Leicht. (<u>Id.</u> Ex. 2 at 1.) About a month later, on October 20, 2008, Plaintiff changed his mind and wished to sue both Goldstein and Leicht. (<u>Id.</u> Ex. 3 at 1.)

17 On October 23, 2008, Defendants' attorney provided Evans the 18 complete name, title, and job descriptions of both Goldstein and 19 Leicht. (Mem. P. & A. Supp. Reply Ex. B 1-2, Nov. 24, 2008.) The 20 following day, counsel sent another letter to Plaintiff indicating 21 that he was aware Evans wished to sue both Goldstein and Leicht and attempted to persuade Plaintiff to withdraw his motion for default 22 23 by stating, "I will agree to allow you to name either Mr. Leicht or 24 Dr. Goldstein -- or both, if you prefer -- in this lawsuit, and 25 this office will file legal responses on their behalf." (Mem. P. & A. Supp. Defs.' Opp'n Brodie Decl. Ex. 4 at 1.) 26

Based on the forgoing efforts to identify John/Jane Doe #1,
Chief Medical Officer, it does not appear that Goldstein or Leicht

1 attempted to avoid defending this suit. Additionally, Plaintiff 2 had the opportunity to add Goldstein and Leicht as Defendants 3 through amendment rather than seeking a default against them. The Court finds that a default should not be entered against Defendants 4 5 Goldstein, Leicht or John/Jane Doe #1, Chief Medical Officer, due to the failure to properly serve the defendant, the cooperative 6 7 efforts to identify the correct defendants, and judicial policy 8 favoring a decision on the merits rather than entry of default.

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(d) Prejudice

10 Plaintiff has not alleged he was prejudiced by Goldstein and 11 Leicht's delay in filing their Answers. A motion for entry of 12 default judgment may be denied, even where defendant is late in 13 filing a responsive pleading, if Plaintiff has not been prejudiced 14 by the delay. Mitchell, 294 F.3d at 1317. Additionally, by 15 October 2, 2008, both Goldstein and Leicht had filed their Answers 16 [doc. nos. 69, 75] leaving adequate time to complete additional 17 discovery. Because Evans has not demonstrated that he suffered any 18 prejudice, an entry of default is not proper.

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(e) Conclusion

20 Plaintiff's Declaration for Entry of Default against Dr. Earl 21 Goldstein or Defendant John/Jane Doe #1, Chief Medical Officer, 22 [doc. no. 70] is **DENIED**, and Plaintiff's Declaration for Entry of 23 Default against Bruce Leicht, Medical Administrator, is also **DENIED** 24 [doc. no. 74].

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C. THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT

Evans first sought an enlargement of time to file an amended complaint [doc. no. 80] and later clarified that he sought leave to file a third amended complaint in order to name Goldstein and

Leicht as defendants in place of John/Jane Doe #1, Chief Medical
 Officer [doc. no. 87].

3 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), "A party may 4 amend its pleading once as a matter of course: (A) before being 5 served with a responsive pleading " Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). In this case, the County of San Diego and Kolender filed an Answer 6 7 on April 1, 2008 [doc. no. 50]. After an answer, "a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party's written consent 8 9 or the court's leave. The court should freely give leave when 10 justice so requires." Id. It rests in the sound discretion of the 11 trial court whether to grant leave to amend. See Bonin v. 12 Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 845 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Outdoor Sys., 13 Inc. v. City of Mesa, 997 F.2d 604, 614 (9th Cir. 1993)).

14 In general, "Rule 15's policy of favoring amendments to pleadings should be applied with `extreme liberality.'" United 15 16 States v. Webb, 655 F.2d 977, 979 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Arnold, 283 F.2d 406 (9th Cir. 1960) (per curiam)). 17 18 The policy of favoring amendments under Rule 15(a) "is applied even 19 more liberally to pro se litigants" than to parties represented by 20 counsel. Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1135 (9th Cir. 1987). 21 The factors to be considered in deciding whether to grant a motion 22 to amend are "bad faith, undue delay, prejudice to the opposing 23 party, futility of the amendment, and whether the party has 24 previously amended his pleadings." Bonin, 59 F.3d at 845 (citing 25 W. Shoshone Nat'l Council v. Molini, 951 F.2d 200, 204 (9th Cir. 26 1991)).

Evans filed his Complaint on April 13, 2006 [doc. no. 1], his
Amended Complaint on September 1, 2006 [doc. no. 11], and his

1 Second Amended Complaint on January 8, 2007 [doc. no. 18]. He made 2 a Motion to File a Third Amended Complaint, which was denied on 3 March 27, 2008 [doc. nos. 40, 49]. Plaintiff initially sought an enlargement of time to file amended pleadings without explaining 4 5 the changes he wished to make. (Application for Enlargement of Time 2.) Evans later sought leave to file a third amended 6 7 complaint in order to name Goldstein and Leicht as defendants. 8 (Application Leave File Third Am. Compl. 2.)

9 Defendants Goldstein and Leicht have each voluntarily appeared
10 in this case by filing Answers [doc. nos. 69, 75]. <u>See Louisville</u>
11 <u>& N.R. Co. v. Schmidt</u>, 177 U.S. 230, 238 (1900); <u>Rauch v. Day &</u>
12 <u>Night Mfg. Corp.</u>, 576 F.2d 697, 700 (6th Cir. 1978); <u>see also Nagle</u>
13 <u>v. Lee</u>, 807 F.2d 435, 440 (5th Cir. 1987).

14 A party to a cause of action is a person who is both named as a party and subjected to the court's 15 jurisdiction. A person named as a party can subject himself to the court's jurisdiction either by voluntarily appearing in court or by being brought under the court's 16 authority through valid service of process. Only a party 17 is bound by or entitled to the benefits of the rules of res judicata. These principles apply with equal force to 18 persons fictitiously named [T]he Restatement states, "the only question with respect to individuals 19 [fictitiously named] is whether the summons and complaint or other notice of the proceedings is a reasonable 20 appraisal that the action concerns him."

21 <u>Id.</u> (Citations omitted). Defendants Goldstein and Leicht, and 22 their counsel, concluded that the allegations in Evans's Second 23 Amended Complaint concerned them. So, they each filed an Answer.

Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes "[a] plaintiff [to] amend a pleading to change the capacity of the parties identified in the complaint, or to correct misnomers. For example, a plaintiff may amend to (1) sue parties in their individual capacities, rather than their official capacities (and

1	vice versa) 3 James Wm. Moore, et al., <u>Moore's Federal</u>
2	Practice § 15.16[2], at 15-68 (3d ed. 2008) (footnote omitted).
3	Plaintiff's request is consistent with this principle. Evans seeks
4	to file his Third Amended Complaint to allege that "the name of the
5	John/Doe defendant is in actuality two separate individuals: Bruce
6	Leicht, Medical Administrator and Dr. Earl Goldstein, Medical
7	Director, Medical Services Division, County of San Diego Sheriff's
8	Department." (Application Leave File Third Am. Comp. Conform Evid.
9	1-2.) "The Third Amended Complaint as amended reflects the
10	identities and the actions of said officials." (<u>Id.</u> at 2.)
11	Counsel representing Goldstein and Leicht had previously
12	stated that he had no opposition to Evans naming Goldstein and
13	Leicht as "individually named defendants." (Defs.' Opp'n Brodie
14	Decl. Ex. 4 at 2, Oct. 27, 2008.) As a result, if Evans's proposed
15	Third Amended Complaint was before the Court and limited to the
16	narrow amendments Plaintiff described, he would be granted leave to
17	file it.
18	To obtain leave of court to amend a pleading the party's motion should attach a copy of the proposed
19	amendment or new pleading. Failure to attach the proposed amendment is not necessarily fatal, but may
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21	unless the court is presented with the substance of the proposed amendment.
22	proposed amendment.
23	
	3 James Wm. Moore, et al., <u>Moore's Federal Practice</u> § 15.17[1], at
24	3 James Wm. Moore, et al., <u>Moore's Federal Practice</u> § 15.17[1], at 15-76 to 15-77 (footnotes omitted). Nevertheless, Plaintiff will
25	15-76 to 15-77 (footnotes omitted). Nevertheless, Plaintiff will
25	15-76 to 15-77 (footnotes omitted). Nevertheless, Plaintiff will be conditionally granted through January 30, 2009, to file a Third

exceeds these limitations, Defendants may file a motion to strike
 for failure to comply with the terms of this order.

Thus, Evans's Application for Enlargement of Time to File Amended Pleadings [doc. no. 80] is **GRANTED** to include the filing of his Application for Leave to File a Third Amended Complaint [doc. no. 87].

D. CONCLUSION

8 For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff's Declaration for 9 Entry of Default against defendant John/Jane Doe #1, Chief Medical 10 Officer [doc. no. 70] is **DENIED**, and Plaintiff's Declaration for 11 Entry of Default against Bruce Leicht, Medical Administrator, is 12 also **DENIED** [doc. no. 74]. Evans's Application for Enlargement of 13 Time to File Amended Pleadings [doc. no. 80] is GRANTED, and his 14 Application for Leave to File a Third Amended Complaint [doc. no. 15 87] is conditionally GRANTED.

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17 DATE: January 8, 2009

Judge Miller

All Parties of Record

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cc:

United States Magistrate Judge