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8	<b>UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT</b>	
9	SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA	
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11	RODNEY WAYNE JONES,	Civil No. 07-1019 BTM (JMA)
12	CDCR #D-55894,	
13	Plaintiff,	ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S
14	VS.	MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM COURT'S JUNE 26, 2009 ORDER PURSUANT TO FED.R.CIV.P. 60(b)
15	STUART J. RYAN, et al.,	PURSUANT TO FED.R.CIV.P. 00(D)
16	Defendants.	[Doc. No. 111]
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20	I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY	
21	Plaintiff, an inmate currently incarcerated at California State Prison located in Corcoran,	
22	California, and proceeding pro se, filed a First Amended Complaint ("FAC") pursuant to 42	
23	U.S.C. § 1983 [Doc. No. 59]. Defendants Ryan, Ochoa, Jimenez, Zills, Schommer, Ortiz,	
24	Rodiles, Mejia, Sandoval, Wells, Castaneda, Cosio, Flores, Ritter, Bell, Anadalon, Harmon,	
25	Duarte, Stratton, Price, Martinez, Valenzuela and Rangel filed Motions to Dismiss Plaintiff's	
26	First Amended Complaint pursuant to FED.R.CIV. P. 12(b)(6) [Doc. Nos. 63, 95]. In addition,	
27	Defendant Pegues filed a Notice of Joinder and Joinder to Defendants' Motions to Dismiss	
28	Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint [Doc. No. 64].	

07cv1019 BTM (JMA)

On June 26, 2009, this Court granted in part and denied in part Defendants' Motions to
 Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint. *See* June 26, 2009 Order at 18-19. Plaintiff has
 now filed a "Motion for Relief from the Court's June 26, 2009 Order" in which he challenges
 the Court's ruling as to his Fourteenth Amendment due process claims against Defendants
 Andalon, Mejia, Sandoval, Castaneda, Cosio, Bell, Ochoa, Price and Stratton. *See* Pl.'s Mot.
 at 1-9. [Doc. No. 111]. Defendants filed an Opposition on November 12, 2009. [Doc. No. 113.]

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II.

## PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM THE COURT'S JUNE 26, 2009 ORDER

8 Under Rule 60(b), a motion for "relief from judgment or order" may be filed within a 9 "reasonable time," but usually must be filed "not more than one year after the judgment, order, 10 or proceeding was entered or taken." FED.R.CIV.P. 60(b). Reconsideration under Rule 60 may 11 be granted in the case of: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; (2) newly 12 discovered evidence; or (3) fraud; or if (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been 13 satisfied; or (6) for any other reason justifying relief. FED.R.CIV. P. 60(b).

14 Here, Plaintiff seeks to address the Court's June 26, 2009 Order dismissing his Fourteenth 15 Amendment due process claims. In Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint, he alleged that his 16 Fourteenth Amendment due process rights were violated by the alleged false reports and 17 perjured testimony by Defendants that led to criminal charges being brought against him in 18 Imperial County. The Court found in the June 26, 2009 Order that these claims were not yet 19 cognizable pursuant to the favorable termination doctrine set forth in *Heck v. Humphrey*, 512 20 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). See June 26, 2009 Order at 10. ("These Fourteenth Amendment due 21 process claims amount to an attack on the constitutional validity of his ongoing state criminal proceedings, and therefore, may not be maintained pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless and 22 23 until he can show that conviction has already been invalidated.") Plaintiff had also claimed in 24 his First Amended Complaint that he had never been subject to a disciplinary hearing based on 25 these false reports. See FAC ¶ 100.

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In his Motion seeking relief from the Court's Order, Plaintiff claims that his Fourteenth
 Amendment due process claims are now cognizable because all the criminal charges against him
 have been dismissed. *See* Pl.'s Mot. at 5. However, Plaintiff does now claim that due to
 Defendants' "issuance of false reports and perjured testimony" he was "subsequently unjustly
 found guilty of battery on staff during a 'wanton and prejudicial' disciplinary hearing." *Id.* at
 As a result, Plaintiff lost good time credits and was sentenced to the "SHU"<sup>1</sup> for nearly four
 years. *Id.*

However, these claims are also barred by the favorable termination doctrine set forth in *Heck.* Constitutional claims involving a prison's disciplinary decisions to revoke good-time
credits are subject to dismissal since habeas corpus is the exclusive federal remedy whenever
the claim for damages depends on a determination that a disciplinary judgment is invalid or the
sentence currently being served is unconstitutionally long. *Edwards v. Balisok*, 520 U.S. 641,
646 (1997); *Heck*, 512 U.S. at 486-87 (1994); *Preiser v. Rodriguez*, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973).

14 Here, Plaintiff cannot bring these Fourteenth Amendment due process claims which relate 15 to the constitutionality or duration of his continued confinement in that he now admits that he 16 lost good-time credit as the result of a disciplinary conviction. See Pl.'s Mot. at 6. Plaintiff was 17 informed in the Court's previous Orders that in order to state a claim for damages under section 18 1983 on this claim under *Heck* and *Edwards*, Plaintiff must first show that the disciplinary 19 conviction or sentence has already been "reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such a determination, or called into 20 21 question by a writ of habeas corpus." Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87. He has failed to do so, and 22 thus, there is no basis by which the Court could permit Plaintiff to proceed on these Fourteenth 23 Amendment due process claims.

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<sup>1</sup> "SHU" is an acronym for the segregated housing unit.

## III. **CONCLUSION AND ORDER** Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Relief from the Court's June 26, 2009 Order [Doc. No. 111] pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 60(b) is **DENIED**. DATED: December 15, 2009 Juny Ted Mockourt Honorable Barry Ted Moskowitz United States District Judge