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8	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT		
9	SOUTHERN DISTRIC	CT OF CALIFORNIA	
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11	ALFREDO PINA,	Civil No. 09-0178 LAB (PCL)	
12	v. Petitioner,	ORDER DISMISSING PETITION	
13	THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,	WITHOUT PREJUDICE AND WITH LEAVE TO AMEND	
14 15	Respondents.		
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17	<ul> <li>Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has paid the \$5.00 filing fee and has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.</li> <li>FAILURE TO NAME PROPER RESPONDENT</li> <li>Review of the Petition reveals that Petitioner has failed to name a proper respondent. On</li> </ul>		
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19 20			
federal habeas, a state prisoner must name the state of 21		he state officer having custody of him as the	
21	respondent. <i>Ortiz-Sandoval v. Gomez</i> , 81 F.3d 891, 894 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Rule 2(a), 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254). Federal courts lack personal jurisdiction when a habeas petition fails to		
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24	name a proper respondent. See id.		
25	The warden is the typical respondent. However, "the rules following section 2254 do no		
26		<i>Id.</i> "[T]he 'state officer having custody' may be 'either the warden of the	
27	stitution in which the petitioner is incarcerated or the chief officer in charge of state penal		
28	institutions." <i>Id.</i> (quoting Rule 2(a), 28 U.S.C	. toll. § 2254 advisory committee's note). If "a	

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petitioner is in custody due to the state action he is challenging, '[t]he named respondent shall
 be the state officer who has official custody of the petitioner (for example, the warden of the
 prison)." *Id.* (quoting Rule 2, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254 advisory committee's note).

A long standing rule in the Ninth Circuit holds "that a petitioner may not seek [a writ of] 4 5 habeas corpus against the State under ... [whose] authority ... the petitioner is in custody. The 6 actual person who is [the] custodian [of the petitioner] must be the respondent." Ashley v. 7 Washington, 394 F.2d 125, 126 (9th Cir. 1968). This requirement exists because a writ of 8 habeas corpus acts upon the custodian of the state prisoner, the person who will produce "the 9 body" if directed to do so by the Court. "Both the warden of a California prison and the Director 10 of Corrections for California have the power to produce the prisoner." Ortiz-Sandoval, 81 F.3d at 895. 11

Here, Petitioner has incorrectly named "The People of the State of California," as Respondent. In order for this Court to entertain the Petition filed in this action, Petitioner must name the warden in charge of the state correctional facility in which Petitioner is presently confined or the Director of the California Department of Corrections. *Brittingham v. United States*, 982 F.2d 378, 379 (9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam).

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## FAILURE TO SIGN PETITION

In addition, Rule 2(c) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases provides that "[t]he
petition shall be typewritten or legibly handwritten and <u>shall be signed under penalty of perjury</u>
<u>by the petitioner</u>." Rule 2(c), 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254 (emphasis added). Here, Petitioner has
failed to sign the Petition and the petition must therefore be dismissed.

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## FAILURE TO ALLEGE EXHAUSTION OF STATE JUDICIAL REMEDIES

Further, habeas petitioners who wish to challenge either their state court conviction or the length of their confinement in state prison, must first exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c); *Granberry v. Greer*, 481 U.S. 129, 133-34 (1987). Ordinarily, to satisfy the exhaustion requirement, a petitioner must "fairly present[] his federal claim to the highest state court with jurisdiction to consider it . . . or . . . demonstrate[] that no state remedy remains available. *Johnson v. Zenon*, 88 F.3d 828, 829 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing *Picard v. Connor*, 404

1	U.S. 270, 275 (1971); Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982)). Moreover, to properly	
2	exhaust state court remedies a petitioner must allege, in state court, how one or more of his or	
3	her federal rights have been violated. For example, "[i]f a habeas petitioner wishes to claim that	
4	an evidentiary ruling at a state court trial denied him [or her] the due process of law guaranteed	
5	by the Fourteenth Amendment, he [or she] must say so, not only in federal court, but in state	
6	court." See Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365-66 (1995)(emphasis added).	
7	Nowhere on the Petition does Petitioner allege that he raised his claims in the California	
8	Supreme Court. In fact, he specifically indicates he did not seek review in the California	
9	Supreme Court as to claims two, three and four. (See Pet. at 7-9.) If Petitioner has raised his	
10	claims in the California Supreme Court he must so specify.	
11	Further, the Court cautions Petitioner that under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death	
12	Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) a one-year period of limitation shall apply to a petition for a writ	
13	of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation	
14	period shall run from the latest of:	
15 16	(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;	
17 18	(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;	
19 20	(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was	
20 21	initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or	
22	(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or	
23	claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.	
24	28 U.S.C.A. § 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D) (West Supp. 2002).	
25	The statute of limitations does not run while a properly filed state habeas corpus petition	
26	is pending. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); see Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999).	
27	But see Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000) (holding that "an application is 'properly filed'	
28	when its delivery and acceptance [by the appropriate court officer for placement into the record]	

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are in compliance with the applicable laws and rules governing filings."). However, absent some
 other basis for tolling, the statute of limitations does run while a <u>federal</u> habeas petition is
 pending. *Duncan v. Walker*, 533 U.S. 167, 181-82 (2001).

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases provides for summary dismissal of a
habeas petition "[i]f it plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to
it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court . . ." Rule 4, 28 U.S.C. foll.
§ 2254. Here, it appears plain from the Petition that Petitioner is not presently entitled to federal
habeas relief because he has not alleged exhaustion of state court remedies.

## **CONCLUSION**

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DISMISSES the Petition without prejudice and with
 leave to amend. To have this case reopened, Petitioner must, no later than <u>April 7, 2009</u>, file
 a First Amended Petition which cures the pleading deficiencies outlined in this Order. THE
 CLERK OF COURT IS DIRECTED TO MAIL PETITIONER A BLANK FIRST
 AMENDED PETITION FORM WITH A COPY OF THIS ORDER.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

16 DATED: February 3, 2009

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Lang A. Burn

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS United States District Judge