UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID EARL PARMER,

Plaintiff,

v.

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S
SECOND MOTION FOR
ALVAREZ, BADGE #75127; CUEVASPEDRO,

Defendants.

Defendants.

Defendants.

On March 17, 2010, Plaintiff David Parmer, a state prisoner proceeding *pro se* and *in forma pauperis* under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, filed a second Motion for Appointment of Counsel. [Docket No. 28.] In his first motion, Parmer stated he had a meritorious case but that he needed the assistance of a lawyer because he does not read well. [Docket No. 14.] That motion was denied on October 20, 2009. [Docket No. 20.] In his current motion, Parmer states the Court should appoint him a lawyer because he is indigent, "unlearned in the law," has only "a 1.4 grade education," and his case requires discovery to "obtain crucial evidence" that only an attorney can pursue. [Docket No. 28 at 1.]

Based on Parmer's citations of the law in his motion, he understands that "there is no absolute right to counsel in civil proceedings." *Hedges v. Resolution Trust Corp.*, 32 F.3d 1360, 1363 (9th Cir. 1994). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), however, district courts are granted discretion to appoint counsel for indigent persons under "exceptional circumstances." *Terrell v. Brewer*, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th

Cir. 1991). "To show exceptional circumstances the litigant must *demonstrate the likelihood of success and complexity* of the legal issues involved." *Burns v. County of King*, 883 F.2d 819, 824 (9th Cir. 1989) (emphasis added). Neither the likelihood of success nor the complexity of the case are dispositive; both must be considered. *Terrell*, 935 F.2d at 1017.

Based on the current record the Court has no reason to believe that Parmer is incapable of having a sufficient grasp of his case or the legal issues involved, or that he might not be able to adequately articulate and communicate the basis of his claims. Moreover, Parmer has not outlined any facts demonstrating the "exceptional circumstances" required for appointment of counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1).

Accordingly, the Court **ORDERS** that Plaintiff's motion for appointment of counsel is **DENIED** without prejudice. Parmer is advised that the Court will not entertain any further motions for appointment of counsel unless *unforeseen and new factual developments* arise that merit further attention of the Court to this matter.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 24, 2010.

Hon. Nita L. Stormes U.S. Magistrate Judge