

09cv0524 WQH (CAB)

frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)2)(B) & 1915A(b). See June 23, 2009 Order at 5-6.
 Plaintiff was given leave to file a First Amended Complaint in order to correct the deficiencies
 of pleading identified by the Court. *Id.* at 6. Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint
 ("FAC") on July 17, 2009.

Initial Screening per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b)

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II.

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## A. Standard of Review

7 As the Court informed Plaintiff in its previous Order, the Prison Litigation Reform Act 8 ("PLRA") obligates the Court to review complaints filed by all persons proceeding IFP and by those, like Plaintiff, who are "incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] accused of, 9 10 sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program," "as soon as practicable after 11 12 docketing." See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Under these provisions, the Court must sua sponte dismiss any IFP or prisoner complaint, or any portion thereof, which is 13 frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or which seeks damages from defendants who are 14 immune. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A; Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th 15 16 Cir. 2001) ("[T]he provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners."); Lopez 17 *v. Smith*, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (noting that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) "not only permits but requires" the court to sua sponte dismiss an *in forma pauperis* complaint 18 19 that fails to state a claim); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 446 (9th Cir. 2000) (§ 1915A).

20 Before amendment by the PLRA, the former 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) permitted sua sponte 21 dismissal of only frivolous and malicious claims. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126, 1130. However, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A now mandate that the court reviewing an IFP or prisoner's suit 22 23 make and rule on its own motion to dismiss before effecting service of the Complaint by the U.S. Marshal pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 4(c)(2). See Calhoun, 254 F.3d at 845; Lopez, 203 F.3d at 24 25 1127; see also McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604-05 (6th Cir. 1997) (stating that sua sponte screening pursuant to § 1915 should occur "before service of process is made on the 26 opposing parties"); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (discussing 28 27 28 U.S.C. § 1915A).

"[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all 1 2 allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the 3 plaintiff." Resnick, 213 F.3d at 447; Barren, 152 F.3d at 1194 (noting that § 1915(e)(2) 4 "parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)"); Andrews, 398 F.3d at 5 1121. In addition, the Court has a duty to liberally construe a pro se plaintiff's pleadings, see Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep't, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988), which is 6 7 "particularly important in civil rights cases." Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 8 1992). In giving liberal interpretation to a prose civil rights complaint, however, the court may 9 not "supply essential elements of claims that were not initially pled." *Ivey v. Board of Regents* 10 of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

As currently pleaded, it is clear that Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint fails to state a
cognizable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 imposes two essential proof
requirements upon a claimant: (1) that a person acting under color of state law committed the
conduct at issue, and (2) that the conduct deprived the claimant of some right, privilege, or
immunity protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States. *See* 42 U.S.C. § 1983; *Nelson v. Campbell*, 541 U.S. 637, 124 S. Ct. 2117, 2122 (2004); *Haygood v. Younger*, 769 F.2d
1350, 1354 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc).

Once again, the allegations in Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint are incomprehensible.
The pleading lacks any coherent factual allegation and claims that this action is a "admiralty or
maritime claim." (FAC at 4.) A complaint is frivolous "where it lacks an arguable basis either
in law or in fact." *Neitzke v. Williams*, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Here, the Court finds
Plaintiff's claims to be frivolous under 1915(e)(2)(B) because they lack even "an arguable basis
either in law or in fact," and appear "fanciful," "fantastic," or "delusional." *Neitzke*, 490 U.S.
at 325, 328. Accordingly, Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint is DISMISSED as frivolous.

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## III. Conclusion and Order

Good cause appearing, **IT IS HEREBY ORDERED** that:

Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint is **DISMISSED** as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b). Moreover, because the Court finds amendment of Plaintiff's

1	§ 1983 claims would be futile at this time, leave to amend is DENIED. See Cahill v. Liberty
2	Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 339 (9th Cir. 1996) (denial of a leave to amend is not an abuse of
3	discretion where further amendment would be futile); see also Robinson v. California Bd. of
4	Prison Terms, 997 F. Supp. 1303, 1308 (C.D. Cal. 1998) ("Since plaintiff has not, and cannot,
5	state a claim containing an arguable basis in law, this action should be dismissed without leave
6	to amend; any amendment would be futile.") (citing Newland v. Dalton, 81 F.3d 904, 907 (9th
7	Cir. 1996)).
8	The Clerk shall close the file.
9	IT IS SO ORDERED.
10	DATED: July 28, 2009
11	William 2. Hayes
12	WILLIAM Q. HAYES United States District Judge
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