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**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**

BROOKE GARDNER, individually, and on behalf of a class of others similarly situated,  
  
Plaintiff,  
  
vs.  
  
GC SERVICES, LP,  
  
Defendant.

CASE NO. 10-CV-997 - IEG (CAB)

ORDER:

- (1) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO REMAND [Doc. No. 4]; and
- (2) DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS, TRANSFER, OR STAY [Doc. No. 2].

This is a putative class action alleging various claims for unpaid wages under California state law. Currently before the Court are Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, to Transfer to the Eastern District of Missouri, or to Stay Plaintiff’s Claims, [Doc. No. 2], and Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand to State Court, [Doc. No. 4]. Having considered the parties’ arguments, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court **DENIES** both motions.

**BACKGROUND**

**I. Multiple actions**

The present action is brought by Plaintiff Brooke Gardner (“Gardner”), individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, against Defendant GC Services LP (hereinafter, the “Gardner action”). Two earlier-filed actions are also relevant to the disposition of the motions currently pending before the Court. The first one is an action brought by Darryl Easley, individually and on behalf of

1 others similarly situated, against GC Services LP and GC Services Corp. (hereinafter, the “*Easley*  
2 action”). The second one is an action brought by Lora Meyers, Sherry Clere, Patricia Glass, Nota Jean  
3 Barnes, Debra Davis, Cecilia Koster, Johnna Parker, Steven Christy, and Peggy Spurlock, on behalf  
4 of themselves and others similarly situated, against GC Services LP (hereinafter, the “*Meyers* action”).  
5 Each of these is discussed in turn below.

6 A. The *Easley* action

7 On October 20, 2009, Darryl Easley, a Missouri resident and former employee at one of GC  
8 Services’ Missouri call centers, filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern  
9 District of Missouri alleging that he and other similarly situated employees of GC Services and GC  
10 Services Corp. were required to work “off the clock” without compensation and were not paid time-  
11 and-a-half for overtime hours worked. The *Easley* complaint alleged causes of actions under the  
12 Federal Labor Standards Act of 1938 (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-262, as well as under Missouri’s  
13 wage and hour laws. (Def. Motion, Ex. C, ¶¶ 31-52.)

14 B. The *Meyers* action

15 On November 13, 2009, the *Meyers* Plaintiffs filed an action in the United States District Court  
16 for the Southern District of West Virginia similarly alleging that they were required to perform “off  
17 the clock” work without compensation and were not paid appropriate overtime wages. The *Meyers*  
18 complaint alleged only a cause of action pursuant to the FLSA. (*Id.*, Ex. D, ¶¶ 44-53.) While the case  
19 at first appeared to include only employees in West Virginia, it was later amended—in cooperation with  
20 the *Easley* attorneys—to seek a nationwide collective action involving the exact class of employees  
21 making the same claims as in the *Easley* lawsuit. (*See id.*, Ex. E.) The *Meyers* lawsuit also included  
22 opt-in Plaintiffs from California. (*See id.*, Ex. E, ¶ 18; *id.*, Ex. F.)

23 Just like in the present case, defendant GC Services in the *Meyers* lawsuit moved to dismiss  
24 or, in the alternative, to transfer or stay the action in the Southern District of West Virginia in favor  
25 of the action then-pending in the Eastern District of Missouri. On March 18, 2010, the district court  
26 granted defendant’s motion, finding that the first-to-file rule should apply, and transferred the action  
27 to the Eastern District of Missouri. (*Id.*, Ex. B.)

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1 controversy. Abrego Abrego v. Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 683 (9th Cir. 2006) (per curiam).  
2 “Where the complaint does not specify the amount of damages sought, the removing defendant must  
3 prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy requirement has been met.”  
4 Id. (citing Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566-67 (9th Cir. 1992)). Thus, the defendant must  
5 provide evidence that it is “more likely than not” that the amount in controversy satisfies the  
6 jurisdictional requirement. Sanchez v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 102 F.2d 398, 404 (9th Cir. 1996).  
7 This burden is unchanged where, as in this case, the removal is based on the Class Action Fairness Act  
8 of 2005 (“CAFA”). See Abrego, 443 F.3d at 685-86.

9 As the Ninth Circuit has explained, CAFA “vests the district court with ‘original jurisdiction  
10 of any civil action in which the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of \$5,000,000,  
11 exclusive of interest and costs, and is a class action in which’ the parties satisfy, among other  
12 requirements, minimal diversity.” Id. at 680 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)). In the present case,  
13 Plaintiff argues the remand is appropriate because Defendant has failed to meet its burden of  
14 establishing by preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds \$5,000,000.

15 Contrary to Plaintiff’s contentions, however, there is no obligation on Defendant to submit any  
16 declarations or “summary-judgment-type evidence” in support of its assertion that the jurisdictional  
17 amount is met in the present case. Rather, the Ninth Circuit has explained that:

18 “The district court may consider whether it is ‘facially apparent’ from the complaint  
19 that the jurisdictional amount is in controversy. If not, the court may consider facts in  
20 the removal petition, and *may* ‘require parties to submit summary-judgment-type  
21 evidence relevant to the amount in controversy at the time of removal.’”

22 Abrego, 443 F.3d at 690 (quoting Singer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 116 F.3d 373, 377 (9th  
23 Cir. 1997)) (emphasis added). Accordingly, Defendant can meet its burden as long as the jurisdictional  
24 amount is either “facially apparent” from the complaint or is shown to be “more likely than not” by  
25 the facts alleged in the removal petition. See id.; see also Valdez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 372 F.3d 1115,  
26 1117 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that the Ninth Circuit has “endorsed the Fifth Circuit’s practice of  
27 considering facts presented in the removal petition as well as any summary-judgement-type evidence  
28 relevant to the amount in controversy at the time of removal” (citation and internal quotation marks  
omitted)); Bosinger v. Phillips Plastics Corp., 57 F. Supp. 2d 986, 989 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (noting that  
where the complaint does not specify an amount of damages, “the underlying facts supporting removal

1 must be stated in the removal notice itself”).

2 In this case, Defendant’s Notice of Removal adequately alleges the underlying facts to show  
3 it is “more likely than not” that the amount “in controversy” exceeds \$5,000,000. See Korn v. Polo  
4 Ralph Lauren Corp., 536 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1205 (E.D. Cal. 2008) (“The ultimate inquiry is what  
5 amount is put ‘in controversy’ by the plaintiff’s complaint, not what a defendant will actually owe.”  
6 (citations omitted)). First, Defendant points to Plaintiff’s claim for violation of California Labor Code  
7 § 510, which requires the payment of overtime premium for hours worked in excess of eight in a given  
8 workday. (Notice of Removal, at 3.) Defendant notes that it currently employs 303 full-time  
9 employees who meet the proposed class definition. (Id. at 3; see also Jackson Decl., ¶ 4.) According  
10 to Defendant, if those employees, earning on average \$14.50 per hour, worked 30 minutes of overtime  
11 per day over four years, the unpaid overtime owed on the overtime claim would exceed \$3,000,000.<sup>1</sup>  
12 (Notice of Removal, at 3.) Second, Defendant points to Plaintiff’s claim for failure to timely pay  
13 termination wages under California Labor Code § 203, for which the penalty is 30 days of wages. (Id.)  
14 Defendant notes that it has employed approximately 1,385 account representatives and employees in  
15 equivalent positions since April 2006. who had their employment with GC Services terminated. (Id.;  
16 see also Jackson Decl., ¶ 5.) According to Defendant, the potential recovery by those employees  
17 would be approximately \$4,800,000.<sup>2</sup> (Notice of Removal, at 3.) Together, the recovery on just these  
18 two claims would be approximately \$7,800,000. Accordingly, Defendant provided sufficient  
19 underlying facts to demonstrate that the combined amount “in controversy” exceeds \$5,000,000. See  
20 Rippee v. Boston Market Corp., 408 F. Supp. 2d 982, 986 (S.D. Cal. 2005) (concluding that “an  
21 estimate of the amount of unpaid overtime in *controversy* can be calculated using information from  
22 Defendant's own records”).<sup>3</sup>

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24 \_\_\_\_\_  
25 <sup>1</sup> 0.5 hours \* 1.5 \* \$14.50 (hourly rate) \* 235 per year \* 4 years \* 303 full-time employees =  
\$3,097,417.50.

26 <sup>2</sup> \$14.50 (hourly rate) \* 8 hours per day \* 30 days \* 1,385 separated employees = \$4,819,800.

27 <sup>3</sup> Contrary to Plaintiff’s arguments, Defendant’s allegations in the Notice of Removal are more  
28 than “magical incantations,” see Abrego, 443 F.3d at 689, “mere averment[s],” see Gaus, 980 F.2d  
at 567, or “conclusory allegations,” see Singer, 116 F.3d at 377, that the Ninth Circuit held are  
insufficient to meet the defendant’s burden of showing that the amount in controversy “more likely  
than not” exceeds the jurisdictional requirement. Moreover, precise certainty is not required for

1 For the foregoing reasons, because the underlying facts alleged in the Notice of Removal  
2 demonstrate that it is “more likely that not” the amount in controversy exceeds \$5,000,000 as required  
3 by CAFA, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2), the Court **DENIES** Plaintiff’s motion to remand.

4 **II. Defendant’s motion to dismiss, transfer, or stay**

5 Defendant argues that in light of the duplicative nature of the claims and of the putative classes  
6 in the *Gardner* and *Beasley* actions, dismissal of the later-filed *Gardner* lawsuit is warranted under  
7 the first-to-file rule. The “first to file” rule is a “generally recognized doctrine of federal comity” that  
8 allows a district court to decline jurisdiction over an action “when a complaint involving the same  
9 parties and issues has already been filed in another district.” Pacesetter Sys., Inc. v. Medtronic, Inc.,  
10 678 F.2d 93, 94-95 (9th Cir. 1982) (citations omitted). Pursuant to the rule, “when two identical  
11 actions are filed in courts of concurrent jurisdiction, the court which first acquired jurisdiction should  
12 try the lawsuit and no purpose would be served by proceeding with a second action.” Id. However,  
13 this rule is “not a rigid or inflexible rule to be mechanically applied, but rather is to be applied with  
14 a view to the dictates of sound judicial administration.” Id.

15 In applying the “first to file” rule, the court looks to three threshold factors: (1) the chronology  
16 of the two actions; (2) the similarity of the parties; and (3) the similarity of the issues. See Alltrade,  
17 Inc. v. Uniweld Products, Inc., 946 F.2d 622, 625 (9th Cir. 1991). If the case meets the requirements  
18 of the “first to file” rule, the court has the discretion to transfer, stay, or dismiss the action. See id. at  
19 628-29. However, even where the rule would otherwise apply, the court also has the discretion to  
20 “dispense” with its application “for reasons of equity.” Id. at 628.

21 **A. Chronology of the two actions**

22 In this case, the first factor is clearly satisfied because the *Gardner* action was filed after both  
23 the *Easley* and *Meyers* complaints were filed, and after they were consolidated in the Eastern District  
24 of Missouri in the form of the *Beasley* action.

25 **B. Similarity of the parties**

26 Defendant, however, failed to establish there is a similarity of the parties such that would

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28 Defendant to meet its burden. See Korn, 536 F. Supp. 2d at 1204-05 (“[A] removing defendant is *not*  
obligated to ‘research, state, and prove the plaintiff’s claims for damages.’” (quoting McCraw v.  
Lyons, 863 F. Supp. 430, 434 (W.D. Ky. 1994))).

1 warrant the application of the “first to file” rule. For the rule to apply, the actions need not be  
2 identical. Byerson v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 467 F. Supp. 2d 627, 635-36 (E.D. Va. 2006);  
3 Inherent.com v. Martindale-Hubbell, 420 F. Supp. 2d 1093, 1097 (N.D. Cal. 2006). Thus, the rule only  
4 requires the parties be “substantially similar.” Inherent.com, 420 F. Supp. 2d at 1097; accord Byerson,  
5 467 F. Supp. 2d at 635-36 (requiring a “substantial overlap” with respect to the parties). Moreover,  
6 in the context of a class action, “the classes, and not the class representatives, are compared.” Adoma  
7 v. Univ. of Phoenix, Inc., — F. Supp. 2d —, 2010 WL 1797263, at \*5 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (citing Ross  
8 v. U.S. Nat’l Ass’n, 542 F. Supp. 2d 1014, 1020 (N.D. Cal. 2008)).

9 In the present case, as Plaintiff correctly notes, the *only* identical party between the two actions  
10 is Defendant GC Services. As for the putative classes, there is no overlap at all, much less “substantial  
11 overlap.” See Byerson, 467 F. Supp. 2d at 635-36. Plaintiff’s complaint here seeks to represent a  
12 putative class of employees who worked in Defendant’s two call centers *in California*. (Def. Motion,  
13 Ex. I, ¶ 17.) The *Beasley* action in the Eastern District of Missouri, on the other hand, specifically  
14 *excludes* all California employees from the putative class. (Id., Ex. A, ¶ 7.)

15 Defendant’s arguments to the contrary are not persuasive. Although Defendant argues the  
16 actions were brought by the same attorneys against the same defendant, it fails to cite any case law  
17 as to why this would be relevant in this context. Similarly, the fact that the actions *before amendment*  
18 might have involved a “substantial overlap” between the parties is not dispositive. See, e.g., Ross, 542  
19 F. Supp. at 1020 (denying defendant’s motion to dismiss despite the fact that both actions were  
20 “brought against the same defendant by the same counsel, and both *initially alleged* putative classes  
21 of U.S. Bank employees in California, Oregon, and Washington” (emphasis added)). Rather, the focus  
22 is on the composition of the two classes at this point. See, e.g., Walker v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co.,  
23 No. C03-656R, 2003 WL 21056704, at \*2 (W.D. Wash. May 9, 2003) (“Whatever plaintiffs’ stated  
24 intentions, the fact remains that they are currently parties in the *Camp* action, and it is this fact, not  
25 plaintiffs’ future plans, that the court finds controlling.”). Accordingly, in this case, the second factor  
26 of the “first to file” rule is not met because there is no longer any substantial similarity of parties  
27 between the two actions. See Inherent.com, 420 F. Supp. 2d at 1097.

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1           C.       Similarity of the issues

2           Defendant also failed to establish there is a similarity of the issues between these two actions.  
3 As with the parties, the issues in the two actions need not be identical, as long as they are  
4 “substantially similar.” Adoma, 2010 WL 1797263, at \*5; Inherent.com, 420 F. Supp. at 1097.

5           Defendant argues the issues in the *Gardner* and *Beasely* actions are substantially similar  
6 because “[b]oth lawsuits allege that GC Service’s call center employees performed various tasks off-  
7 the-clock, such as logging into computer applications before and after their scheduled shift and  
8 working during meal breaks.” (Def. Motion, at 7 (internal citations omitted).) However, this is a false  
9 similarity. As Plaintiff correctly notes, while the *Beasely* complaint alleges only a violation of the  
10 FLSA, (see Def. Motion, Ex. A, ¶¶ 21-29), the complaint in this case only alleges five causes of action  
11 under California state law, (see id., Ex. I, ¶¶ 27-52). This distinction results in significant differences  
12 between the claims asserted and remedies requested in the two actions.

13           First, while the *Beasely* action only seeks relief for Defendant’s failure to pay overtime wages,  
14 (see Def. Motion, Ex. A, ¶¶ 11-12), the present action also seeks relief for Defendant’s failure to pay  
15 straight-time wages (Count I), Defendant’s failure to pay compensation due and owing at termination  
16 (Count III), and Defendant’s violation of California Business and Professions Code § 17200 et seq.  
17 (Count IV), (see id., Ex. I, ¶¶ 27-30, 37-52).

18           Second, the certification process is different for the two actions. Under Rule 23 of Federal  
19 Rules of Civil Procedure, once the Court conditionally certifies a class, all the prospective class  
20 members are a part of the class unless they affirmatively *opt-out* of the action. See FED. R. CIV. P.  
21 23(c)(2), (c)(3). On the other hand, collective actions brought under the FLSA require that individual  
22 members *opt in* by filing a written consent. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (“No employee shall be a party  
23 plaintiff to any such action unless he gives his consent in writing to become such a party and such  
24 consent is filed in the court in which such action is brought.”).

25           Finally, the remedies available in two actions are different. By way of example only, while the  
26 FLSA mandates overtime to be calculated on a weekly basis at one and one-half of the regular pay  
27 rate, California law mandates overtime to be paid for more than eight hours worked in any workday  
28 or for any time worked on the seventh day in a workweek, and provides for double rate whenever an



1 employee works more than twelve hours in one workday or more than eight hours on the seventh day.  
2 Compare 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) with CAL. LABOR CODE § 510(a).

3 The cases cited by Defendant do not mandate a different conclusion. Thus, in Jumapao v.  
4 Washington Mutual Bank, F.A., No. 06-CV-2285 W (RBB), 2007 WL 4258636 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 30,  
5 2007), the court granted the motion to transfer where both actions alleged claims under the FLSA *and*  
6 California state law, and where the first action involved 249 individuals from California. Similarly,  
7 in Walker, 2003 WL 21056704, the court granted a motion to dismiss based on prior action where the  
8 two named plaintiffs in the second action were also parties to the first action, there were 39 other class  
9 members from the first action that qualified as members of the plaintiffs' proposed class in the second  
10 action, and the FLSA and the Washington Minimum Wage Act contained "materially identical  
11 definitions of the administrative capacity exemption." Finally, in Adoma, 2010 WL 1797263, the court  
12 found the "first to file" rule to apply where the proposed classes in both actions sought to represent  
13 at least some of the same individuals and both actions raised FLSA claims, although the second action  
14 also alleged an additional unpaid overtime theory.

15 Accordingly, in this case, because the claims alleged in the two actions are not "substantially  
16 similar," the third factor also weighs against the application of the "first to file" rule.

17 D. Exception

18 Even if the factors somehow favored the application of the "first to file" rule, the Court could  
19 still exercise its discretion to "disregard it in the interests of equity." Adoma, 2010 WL 1797263, at  
20 \*6. The Ninth Circuit has explained that the application of the "first to file" should not be  
21 "mechanical." See Alltrade, 946 F.2d at 627-28. According to the court, "district court judges can, in  
22 the exercise of their discretion, dispense with the first-filed principle for reasons of equity." Id. at 628.  
23 Thus, in Adoma, although the district court found all three factors to be satisfied, the court exercised  
24 its discretion not to apply the rule where the second action involved additional claims and different  
25 relief under California law. 2010 WL 1797263, at \*\*6-7. According to the court:

26 Further, plaintiff brings additional theories of recovery. Moreover, the fact that  
27 plaintiff also seeks relief under California state law, which requires entirely different  
28 calculations for overtime compensation, demonstrates that judicial resources will not  
be significantly conserved. California courts will, if plaintiff is successful, notice a  
class action concerning overtime pay, and these class members will be required to  
participate in two separate claims for overtime compensation.

1 Id. at \*7. The same is true here. Even if all of the “first to file” factors weighed in favor of its  
2 application (which they do not), in light of the distinct California state claims raised and relief  
3 requested in the *Gardner* action, the application of the “first to file” rule would not result in any  
4 significant conservation of judicial resources.


5 For the foregoing reasons, the Court **DENIES** Defendant’s motion to dismiss or, in the  
6 alternative, transfer or stay the present action based on the “first to file” rule.

7 **CONCLUSION**

8 Accordingly, the Court **DENIES** Plaintiff’s motion to remand and **DENIES** Defendant’s  
9 motion to dismiss, transfer, or stay.

10 **IT IS SO ORDERED.**

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12 **DATED: July 6, 2010**

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14 **IRMA E. GONZALEZ, Chief Judge**  
15 **United States District Court**

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