

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**

WILBUR LANN PITTMAN,  
CDCR #F-64353,

Civil No. 10-1083 JM (BLM)

VS.

Plaintiff.

GARY SANDOR: MARY FERNANDEZ

## Defendants.

**ORDER DISMISSING CIVIL  
ACTION WITHOUT PREJUDICE  
FOR FAILING TO PAY  
FILING FEE REQUIRED  
BY 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a)**

18 Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and currently incarcerated at the California  
19 Rehabilitation Center in Norco, California, has filed a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

## **I. Failure to Pay Filing Fee or Request IFP Status**

21 All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the United States,  
22 other than a writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of \$350. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action  
23 may proceed despite a party’s failure to pay only if the party is granted leave to proceed *in forma*  
24 *pauperis* (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). *See Rodriguez v. Cook*, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th  
25 Cir. 1999).

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1 Plaintiff has not prepaid the \$350 filing fee required to commence this action, nor has he  
2 submitted a Motion to Proceed IFP. Therefore, the action is subject to immediate dismissal pursuant  
3 to 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). Moreover, the Court notes that while it would ordinarily grant Plaintiff leave  
4 to file a Motion for IFP, he is no longer entitled to that privilege.

5 Section 1915 of Title 28 of the United States Code allows certain litigants to pursue civil  
6 litigation IFP, that is, without the full prepayment of fees or costs. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2). However,  
7 the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) amended section 1915 to preclude the privilege to proceed  
8 IFP:

9 . . . if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated  
10 or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the  
11 United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous,  
malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,  
unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.

12  
13 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). “This subdivision is commonly known as the ‘three strikes’ provision.” *Andrews*  
14 *v. King*, 398 F.3d 1113, 1116 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005) (hereafter “*Andrews*”). “Pursuant to § 1915(g), a  
15 prisoner with three strikes or more cannot proceed IFP.” *Id.*; *see also Andrews v. Cervantes*, 493 F.3d  
16 1047, 1052 (9th Cir. 2007) (hereafter “*Cervantes*”) (under the PLRA, “[p]risoners who have repeatedly  
17 brought unsuccessful suits may entirely be barred from IFP status under the three strikes rule[.]”). The  
18 objective of the PLRA is to further “the congressional goal of reducing frivolous prisoner litigation in  
19 federal court.” *Tierney v. Kupers*, 128 F.3d 1310, 1312 (9th Cir. 1997).

20 “Strikes are prior cases or appeals, brought while the plaintiff was a prisoner, which were  
21 dismissed on the ground that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim,” *Andrews*, 398  
22 F.3d at 1116 n.1 (internal quotations omitted), “even if the district court styles such dismissal as a denial  
23 of the prisoner’s application to file the action without prepayment of the full filing fee.” *O’Neal v.*  
24 *Price*, 531 F.3d 1146, 1153 (9th Cir. 2008). Once a prisoner has accumulated three strikes, he is  
25 prohibited by section 1915(g) from pursuing any other IFP action in federal court unless he can show  
26 he is facing “imminent danger of serious physical injury.” *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); *Cervantes*, 493  
27 F.3d at 1051-52 (noting § 1915(g)’s exception for IFP complaints which “make[] a plausible allegation  
28 that the prisoner faced ‘imminent danger of serious physical injury’ at the time of filing.”).

1 And while the PLRA does not require a prisoner to declare that § 1915(g) does not bar a request  
2 to proceed IFP, *Andrews*, 398 F.3d at 1119, “[i]n some instances, the district court docket records may  
3 be sufficient to show that a prior dismissal satisfies at least one of the criteria under § 1915(g) and  
4 therefore counts as a strike.” *Id.* at 1120. That is the case here.

5 A court ““may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal  
6 judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.”” *Bias v. Moynihan*, 508  
7 F.3d 1212, 1225 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting *Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc.*, 285 F.3d 801, 803 n.2 (9th Cir.  
8 2002)); *see also United States ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc.*, 971 F.2d  
9 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, this Court takes judicial notice that Plaintiff has had at *least* three  
10 prisoner civil actions dismissed on the grounds that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a  
11 claim upon which relief may be granted.<sup>1</sup> They are:

12 1) *Pittman v. Van Stralen, et al.*, Civil Case No. 08-1747 (PLA) (C.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2008  
13 Order denying motion to proceed IFP and finding Complaint to be legally and/or  
14 patently frivolous) (strike one);  
15 2) *Pittman v. Stacie*, Civil Case No. 08-1900 (PLA) (C.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2009 Order denying  
16 motion to proceed IFP and finding Complaint to be legally and/or patently frivolous)  
17 (strike two); and  
18 3) *Pittman v. Martel*, Civil Case No. 08-1899 (PLA) (C.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2009 Order  
19 denying motion to proceed IFP and finding Complaint to be legally and/or patently  
20 frivolous) (strike three).

21 Accordingly, because Plaintiff has, while incarcerated, accumulated three “strikes” pursuant to  
22 § 1915(g) and his present Complaint contains no “plausible allegations,” of imminent danger of serious  
23 physical injury at the time he filed it, he is not entitled the opportunity to proceed IFP in this action.  
24 *See Cervantes*, 493 F.3d at 1055; *Rodriguez*, 169 F.3d at 1180 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) “does  
25 not prevent all prisoners from accessing the courts; it only precludes prisoners with a history of abusing  
26 the legal system from continuing to abuse it while enjoying IFP status”); *see also Franklin v. Murphy*,

<sup>1</sup> The Court also notes that according to PACER, Plaintiff has filed more than 120 civil rights actions in the Central, Southern and Eastern Districts of California since November 10, 2008.

1 745 F.2d 1221, 1231 (9th Cir. 1984) (“[C]ourt permission to proceed IFP is itself a matter of privilege  
2 and not right.”).

3 **II. Conclusion and Order**

4 For the reasons set forth above, the Court hereby:

5 (1) **DISMISSES** this action sua sponte without prejudice for failing to prepay the \$350 filing  
6 fee pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); and

7 (2) **CERTIFIES** that an IFP appeal from this Order would be frivolous and, therefore, would  
8 not be taken in good faith pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). *See Coppedge v. United States*, 369 U.S.  
9 438, 445 (1962); *Gardner v. Pogue*, 558 F.2d 548, 550 (9th Cir. 1977) (indigent appellant is permitted  
10 to proceed IFP on appeal only if appeal would not be frivolous).

11 The Clerk shall close the file.

12 **IT IS SO ORDERED.**

13 DATED: May 27, 2010



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15 Hon. Jeffrey T. Miller  
16 United States District Judge

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