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CLERK US DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL J. BOOTH, Civil No. 10-1236 WQH (NLS) CDCR #G-27872, Plaintiff. **ORDER:** (1) GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S **MOTION TO PROCEED IN** FORMA PAUPERIS, IMPOSING NO INITIAL PARTIAL FILING FEE AND GARNISHING BALANCE FROM PRISONER'S TRUST VS. ACCOUNT PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [Doc. No. 2]; (2) DENYING MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL WITHOUT PREJUDICE PURSUANT GEORGE NEOTTI, Warden; TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) AND JOHN DOE, 2d Watch Correctional REFERRING CASE TO SAN DIEGO Sergeant, Fac. 2, Bldg. 8; R. BOLDING, Correctional Officer; COUNTY VOLUNTEER LAWYER PROGRAM T. ARMSTEAD, Correctional Officer, [Doc. No. 3] **AND** Defendants. (3) DIRECTING U.S. MARSHAL TO **EFFECT SERVICE OF COMPLAINT** PURSUANT TO FED.R.CIV.P. 4(c)(3) & 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)

Michael J. Booth ("Plaintiff"), a state prisoner currently incarcerated at California Rehabilitation Center ("CRC") in Norco, California, and proceeding in pro se, has filed a civil

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rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff claims prison officials at Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility ("RJD") violated his Eighth Amendment rights by failing to protect him from being drugged and violently and repeatedly raped by his cell mate while he was housed in RJD's Administrative Segregation Unit in June 2009. (Compl. ¶¶ 9-18, 22; Pl.'s Decl., Ex. C.) Plaintiff has exhausted his administrative remedies as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). (Id. ¶ 19 & Ex. H.) Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief as well as compensatory and punitive damages, and both his Complaint and Declaration in support are verified under penalty of perjury pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746. (Id. ¶¶ 25-28, Pl.'s Ex. C.)

Plaintiff has not prepaid the \$350 filing fee mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); instead he has filed a Motion to Proceed *In Forma Pauperis* ("IFP") pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [Doc. No. 2], as well as a Motion for Appointment of Counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) [Doc. No. 3].

I.

MOTION TO PROCEED IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of \$350. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a plaintiff's failure to prepay the entire fee only if the plaintiff is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, prisoners granted leave to proceed IFP remain obligated to pay the entire fee in installments, regardless of whether their action is ultimately dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, as amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), a prisoner seeking leave to proceed IFP must submit a "certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for the prisoner for the six-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); *Andrews v. King*, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified trust account statement, the Court must assess an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, or

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(b) the average monthly balance in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The institution having custody of the prisoner must collect subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the preceding month's income, in any month in which the prisoner's account exceeds \$10, and forward those payments to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

The Court finds that Plaintiff has no available funds from which to pay filing fees at this time. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that "[i]n no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil action or criminal judgment for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee."); Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a "safety-valve" preventing dismissal of a prisoner's IFP case based solely on a "failure to pay ... due to the lack of funds available to him when payment is ordered."). Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion to Proceed IFP [Doc. No. 2] and assesses no initial partial filing fee per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). However, the entire \$350 balance of the filing fees mandated shall be collected and forwarded to the Clerk of the Court pursuant to the installment payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

H.

MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

Plaintiff has also submitted a Motion for Appointment of Counsel [Doc. No. 3]. "[T]here is no absolute right to counsel in civil proceedings." *Hedges v. Resolution Trust Corp. (In re Hedges)*, 32 F.3d 1360, 1363 (9th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). Thus, federal courts do not have the authority "to make coercive appointments of counsel." *Mallard v. United States District Court*, 490 U.S. 296, 310 (1989); *see also United States v.* \$292,888.04 in U.S. Currency, 54 F.3d 564, 569 (9th Cir. 1995).

However, districts courts have discretion to "request" that an attorney represent indigent civil litigants upon a showing of exceptional circumstances pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). See Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991); Burns v. County of King, 883 F.2d

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819, 823 (9th Cir. 1989). "A finding of exceptional circumstances requires an evaluation of both the 'likelihood of success on the merits and the ability of the plaintiff to articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved.' Neither of these issues is dispositive and both must be viewed together before reaching a decision." *Id.* (quoting *Wilborn v. Escalderon*, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986)).

Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff does appear to have an adequate grasp of his case as well as the legal issues involved. *See Terrell*, 935 F.2d at 1017. As noted below, Plaintiff's Complaint alleges facts sufficient to survive the initial screening required by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A. Thus, because Plaintiff has not satisfied the stringent standards required for an appointment of counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), Plaintiff's Motion for Appointment of Counsel must be DENIED.

However, the Court will refer Plaintiff's Complaint to the San Diego Volunteer Lawyer Program pursuant to S.D. Cal. Local Civil Rule 83.8. Plaintiff is hereby cautioned that this referral does not guarantee that attorney assistance will be offered or made available to him; this Order merely notifies and requests that the Volunteer Lawyer Program attempt to locate probono counsel for Plaintiff.

III.

SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b)

The PLRA also obligates the Court to review complaints filed by all persons proceeding IFP and by those, like Plaintiff, who are "incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] accused of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program," "as soon as practicable after docketing." See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). Under these provisions of the PLRA, the Court must sua sponte dismiss complaints, or any portions thereof, which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or which seek damages from defendants who are immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A; Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (§ 1915(e)(2)); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 446 (9th Cir. 2000) (§ 1915A); see also Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (discussing

§ 1915A).

"[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." *Resnick*, 213 F.3d at 447; *Barren*, 152 F.3d at 1194 (noting that § 1915(e)(2) "parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)"). In addition, the Court's duty to liberally construe a pro se's pleadings, *see Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept.*, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988), is "particularly important in civil rights cases." *Ferdik v. Bonzelet*, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992). However, in giving liberal interpretation to a pro se civil rights complaint, the court may not "supply essential elements of claims that were not initially pled." *Ivey v. Board of Regents of the University of Alaska*, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). "Vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss." *Id.*

As currently pled, the Court finds Plaintiff's allegations are sufficient to survive the sua sponte screening required by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-27; Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833-34 (1994) ("Prison officials have a duty ... to protect prisoners from violence."). Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiff is entitled to U.S. Marshal service on his behalf. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) ("The officers of the court shall issue and serve all process, and perform all duties in [IFP] cases."); FED.R.CIV.P. 4(c)(3) ("[T]he court may order that service be made by a United States marshal or deputy marshal ... if the plaintiff is authorized to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.").

IV.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Good cause appearing therefor, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff's Motion for Appointment of Counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) [Doc. No. 3] is **DENIED**. However, the Court hereby **REFERS** Plaintiff's Complaint to the San Diego Volunteer Lawyer Program pursuant to S.D. CAL. CIV. L.R. 83.8(a) for purposes of

Plaintiff is cautioned that "the sua sponte screening and dismissal procedure is cumulative of, and not a substitute for, any subsequent Rule 12[] motion that [a defendant] may choose to bring." *Teahan v. Wilhelm*, 481 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1119 (S.D. Cal. 2007).

- 2. Plaintiff's Motion to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [Doc. No. 2] is **GRANTED**.
- 3. The Secretary of California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, or his designee, shall collect from Plaintiff's prison trust account the \$350 balance of the filing fee owed in this case by collecting monthly payments from the account in an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the preceding month's income and forward payments to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in the account exceeds \$10 in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL PAYMENTS SHALL BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION.
- 4. The Clerk of the Court is directed to serve a copy of this Order on Matthew Cate, Secretary, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 1515 S Street, Suite 502, Sacramento, California 95814.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

- 5. The Clerk shall issue a summons as to Plaintiff's Complaint [Doc. No. 1] upon Defendants and shall forward it to Plaintiff along with a blank U.S. Marshal Form 285 for each Defendant. In addition, the Clerk shall provide Plaintiff with a certified copy of this Order and a certified copy of his Complaint and the summons so that he may serve Defendants. Upon receipt of this "IFP Package," Plaintiff is directed to complete the Form 285s as completely and accurately as possible, and to return them to the United States Marshal according to the instructions provided by the Clerk in the letter accompanying his IFP package. Upon receipt, the U.S. Marshal shall serve a copy of the Complaint and summons upon Defendants as directed by Plaintiff on the USM Form 285s. All costs of service shall be advanced by the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d); FED.R.CIV.P. 4(c)(3).
- 6. Defendants are thereafter **ORDERED** to reply to Plaintiff's Complaint within the time provided by the applicable provisions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(a). See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2) (while a defendant may occasionally be permitted to "waive the right to reply to any action brought by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility

under section 1983," once the Court has conducted its sua sponte screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b), and thus, has made a preliminary determination based on the face on the pleading alone that Plaintiff has a "reasonable opportunity to prevail on the merits," the defendant is required to respond).

7. Plaintiff shall serve upon the Defendants or, if appearance has been entered by counsel, upon Defendants' counsel, a copy of every further pleading or other document submitted for consideration of the Court. Plaintiff shall include with the original paper to be filed with the Clerk of the Court a certificate stating the manner in which a true and correct copy of any document was served on Defendants, or counsel for Defendants, and the date of service. Any paper received by the Court which has not been filed with the Clerk or which fails to include a Certificate of Service will be disregarded.

DATED: 6/13//0

HON. WILLIAM Q./HAYES United States District/Judge