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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COU

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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N RE FERRERO LITIGATION			Case No. 11-cv-205 H (CAB)
		)	OBJECTOR MICHAEL E. HALE'S
		)	RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO
•	•	)	MOTION FOR APPEAL BOND

COMES NOW Objector, Michael E. Hale ("Hale"), and files this Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Appeal Bond.

#### INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Motion and Motion for Appeal Bond and state that a bond should be set to insure the payment of the following components likely to be by the Court of appeal: costs incurred in opposing the appeal, administrative costs of keeping in contact with claimants about the status of their claim pending appeal and post judgment interest which total \$21,970.72. None of these reasons support the necessity for a bond. Importantly, Hale has never failed to pay costs on appeal for any appeal of any objection he has filed or related to any class settlement where he was ordered by the court to do so. The risk that he will fail to pay costs on appeal in this case if ordered to do so in a final non-appealable order is not a risk that justifies a cost bond.

Hale seeks leave to file this response to the extent necessary. It is going to be filed on the submission date via federal express and Hale respectfully requests that the Court consider this response.

More to the point, the issues are not whether objectors are "serial objectors" or what incidental costs might be, but rather whether the appeal itself is frivolous and whether or not a bond

Rule 7 FRAP requires a bond only if necessary to insure payment of costs on appeal. Drey and Pridham objectors have paid all costs on appeal in every case in which they were involved.

is necessary to insure payment of the direct costs of appeal. The answer to both questions is "no".

"Frivolous appeal", on the other hand, is a question for the Court of Appeals (see below).

## A. Supposed Grounds for a Cost Bond

The basis of Class Plaintiffs' argument to require the posting of a bond is that the appeals being filed are without merit and are being filed by serial or professional objectors.

#### **RESPONSE**

Class Plaintiffs sought a class definition that incorporated Michael Hale into the class. Class Plaintiffs based their application for incentive awards and their attorneys' fees on the supposed "benefits" conferred upon the class which included Michael Hale. After shaping the class to include Michael Hale they cannot now be heard to complain of objectors inclusion in the action, or any hardship their inclusion might cause.

## B. <u>Class Counsel's Motion Is Inappropriate</u>

Class Plaintiffs may obtain a bond for anticipated costs under Rule 7 FRAP, but those costs are limited to those set forth in Rule 39 FRAP. The bond sought is not conservative and is not for costs, but rather to deter appeals. Class Plaintiffs' claimed bond cost items are not bondable on appeal under the facts of this case. Even if objectors' appeal is unsuccessful, Plaintiffs would not be allowed to recover "incidental costs". Under Rule 7 FRAP, a bond cannot include attorneys' fees or administrative costs. Objectors/Appellants' objections to the Settlement, Class Counsel's attorneys' fees, and their appeal from the order overruling their objections to the settlement are facially not frivolous and their appeal is highly unlikely to be declared so by the appellate panel.

It is clear that Class Counsel is seeking a total bond of \$21,970.72 in an attempt to stifle objectors' appeal from this Court's approval of the settlement and their attorneys' fees. That is not

a proper use of the rules relating to bonding, and the Court should not allow it pursuant to Rule 7 FRAP.

## C. Neither the Objections to Attorneys' Fees or the Appeals Are Frivolous

The overarching theme of Class Plaintiffs' request for a total bond of \$21,970.72 bond in this case is that Objectors/Appellants' objection to the settlement and Class Counsel's fees are frivolous, and that Objectors/Appellants' counsel are "professional objectors" who pursue objections for improper purposes. The allegation is made that by filing appeals, the objectors hope to receive fees but it goes without saying that Class Counsel can simply refuse and allow the appeal to be decided by an appellate court. Thus the remedy they seek is one the already possess.

First, an appeal is frivolous if "the result is obvious or if the claims of error are wholly without merit." *DeWitt v. Western Pacific Railroad Co.*, 719 F.2d 1448, 1451 (9th Cir. 1983).

The fact that there is a body of federal jurisprudence regarding attorney's fees shows reasonable people often differ on this issue. 28 U.S.C. Section 1927 which might support a bond for "vexatious litigation conduct," is inapplicable to this appeal as it requires "bad faith or intentional misconduct by counsel." Although the imposition of attorney's fees on appeal as a sanction is allowed under rule 38 FRAP, it is only available after the appeals court finds the appeal frivolous, and only upon further motion and hearing. See *Azizian v. Federated Department Stores*, *Inc.*, 499 F.3d 950, 960 (9th Cir. 2007).

It is well established that whether an appeal is frivolous is solely within the purview of the appellate court, not the district court. *Vaughn v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc.*, 507 F.3d 295, 299 (5th Cir. 2007); *Cooter & Gell v. Hartmax Corp.*, 496 U.S. 384, 407 (1990); *In re American President Lines, Inc.*, 779 F.2d 714, 717 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Only the appellate court has the authority to impose sanctions for a frivolous appeal. *Azizian*, 499 F.3d at 960; *In re Vasseli*, 5 F.3d

351, 353 (9th Cir. 1993) citing In re American President Lines, Inc., 779 F.2d 714, 717 (D.C. Cir. 1985).

# D. <u>Bondable Costs Do Not Include Additional Administrative Expenses, Delay in Distribution or Attorney's Fees</u>

Apart from their claim that frivolity of the appeal supports a bond for attorneys' fees, Class Plaintiffs suggest that this Court has the authority to include prospective attorneys' fees as items of Rule 7 FRAP costs. In fact, the majority rule among circuit courts, endorsed by the Second, Sixth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits, is that a district court may include attorney's fees in a rule 7 Bond, but only if those attorney's fees would be considered recoverable costs under an applicable fee shifting statute. See *Azizian*, 499 F.3d at 958.

The bond that Class Plaintiffs seek is simply not permitted by Rule 7 FRAP where a court's discretion is limited to costs available under rule 39 FRAP. Class Plaintiffs have made no showing that these appellate costs supposedly caused by the Objectors/Appellants will be anywhere near \$160,000 that is sought. Costs recoverable under Rule 39 FRAP for an appellee and thus allowed to be included in a Rule 7 FRAP appeal bond are the 'necessary copies of a brief or appendix," "preparation and transmission of the record," and "the reporter's transcript."

The Plaintiffs have no grounds to insinuate that an appeal by Michael Hale, or indeed any of the other appeals, is in bad faith. The attempt to require objectors to each post a bond in varying amounts is nothing but a thinly disguised attempt to deny class members their rights to have the settlement reviewed.

Plaintiffs are incorrect that there is no good faith basis for appealing the court's order approving settlement. Appeals should be decided by appellate courts; and to the extent that an appellate court finds an appeal is "frivolous," the remedy is a motion in the appellate court under Rule 38 FRAP and/or a Rule 27 FRAP motion to summarily dismiss an appeal, not a district court order issuing a punitive appeal bond.

1	Plaintiffs' only basis for the bond amount is other reported district court opinions that are
2	based on facts specific to those appeals. The proposed amount is excessive under Rule 7 FRAP.
3	By failing to present any evidence of actual marginal appellate costs in their motion, Plaintiffs have
4	waived the issue. There is no basis for a bond, period.
5	E. Other Responses
6	Michael E. Hale hereby adopts and incorporates herein the responses found in the
.8	Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Appeal Bond filed by objectors Drey and Pridham on October
9	29, 2012.
10	CONCLUSION
11	There is no basis for the posting of a bond. The appeal is based upon good faith and
12	founded on precedent. The Objector, Michael E. Hale, prays that Class Plaintiffs' motion be denied.
13	RELIEF
14	Objector Michael Hale requests the Court to deny the Motion for Appeal Bond.
15 16	November 6, 2012
17	Respectfully submitted,
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19	My 420-
20	Michael E. Hale
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2	<u>CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE</u>
3	I certify that a true and correct copy of this document has been forward to all those listed
4	below by Federal Express on this the 6 <sup>th</sup> day of November 2012.
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17	U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California
18	880 Front Street, Ste. 4290
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20	Michael E. Hate
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