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**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**

TYRONE ROGERS,
CDCR #V-35389,

Plaintiff,

vs.

G.J. GIURBINO; DOMINGO URIBE, Jr.;
UNKNOWN, AGPA; R. BRIGGS;
D. FOSTON;

Defendants.

Civil No. 11cv0560 IEG (RBB)

ORDER:

**(1) GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION TO PROCEED *IN FORMA
PAUPERIS*, IMPOSING NO
INITIAL PARTIAL FILING FEE,
GARNISHING \$350.00 BALANCE
FROM PRISONER’S TRUST
ACCOUNT [ECF No. 2];**

**(2) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S
REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENT
OF COUNSEL; and**

**(3) DISMISSING COMPLAINT
FOR FAILURE TO STATE A
CLAIM PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2) AND 1915A(b);**

Tyrone Rogers, a state prisoner currently incarcerated at Centinela State Prison located in Imperial, California, and proceeding pro se, have submitted a civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In his Complaint, Plaintiff has also submitted a request for appointment of counsel. (See Compl. at 8.) Additionally, Plaintiff has filed a Motion to Proceed *In Forma Pauperis* (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [ECF No. 2].

1 I.

2 MOTION TO PROCEED IFP [ECF No. 2]

3 All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the United
4 States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of \$350. See 28
5 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to prepay the entire fee
6 only if the plaintiff is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See
7 *Rodriguez v. Cook*, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, prisoners granted leave to
8 proceed IFP remain obligated to pay the entire fee in installments, regardless of whether their
9 action is ultimately dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); *Taylor v. Delatoore*, 281 F.3d
10 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).

11 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, as amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), a
12 prisoner seeking leave to proceed IFP must submit a “certified copy of the trust fund account
13 statement (or institutional equivalent) for the prisoner for the six-month period immediately
14 preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); *Andrews v. King*, 398 F.3d 1113,
15 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified trust account statement, the Court must assess an initial
16 payment of 20% of (a) the average monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, or
17 (b) the average monthly balance in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater,
18 unless the prisoner has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The
19 institution having custody of the prisoner must collect subsequent payments, assessed at 20%
20 of the preceding month’s income, in any month in which the prisoner’s account exceeds \$10, and
21 forward those payments to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C.
22 § 1915(b)(2).

23 The Court finds that Plaintiff has no available funds from which to pay filing fees at this
24 time. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner be prohibited
25 from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil action or criminal judgment for the reason that
26 the prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee.”); *Taylor*,
27 281 F.3d at 850 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” preventing
28 dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP case based solely on a “failure to pay ... due to the lack of funds

1 available to him when payment is ordered.”). Therefore, the Court **GRANTS** Plaintiff’s Motion
2 to Proceed IFP [ECF No. 2] and assesses no initial partial filing fee per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).
3 However, the entire \$350 balance of the filing fees mandated shall be collected and forwarded
4 to the Clerk of the Court pursuant to the installment payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C.
5 § 1915(b)(1).

6 **II.**

7 **REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL**

8 Plaintiff also requests the appointment of counsel to assist him in prosecuting this civil
9 action. The Constitution provides no right to appointment of counsel in a civil case, however,
10 unless an indigent litigant may lose his physical liberty if he loses the litigation. *Lassiter v.*
11 *Dept. of Social Services*, 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981). Nonetheless, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1),
12 district courts are granted discretion to appoint counsel for indigent persons. This discretion may
13 be exercised only under “exceptional circumstances.” *Terrell v. Brewer*, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017
14 (9th Cir. 1991). “A finding of exceptional circumstances requires an evaluation of both the
15 ‘likelihood of success on the merits and the ability of the plaintiff to articulate his claims pro se
16 in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved.’ Neither of these issues is dispositive and
17 both must be viewed together before reaching a decision.” *Id.* (quoting *Wilborn v. Escalderon*,
18 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986)).

19 The Court denies Plaintiff’s request without prejudice, as neither the interests of justice
20 nor exceptional circumstances warrant appointment of counsel at this time. *LaMere v. Risley*,
21 827 F.2d 622, 626 (9th Cir. 1987); *Terrell*, 935 F.2d at 1017.

22 **III.**

23 **CLASS ACTION CLAIMS**

24 As an initial matter, Plaintiff has labeled his Complaint a “class action” and refers to
25 himself as “Lead” Plaintiff. (Compl. at 1.) However, because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se,
26 he has no authority to represent the legal interest of any other party. *See Cato v. United States*,
27 70 F.3d 1103, 1105 n.1 (9th Cir. 1995); *C.E. Pope Equity Trust v. United States*, 818 F.2d 696,
28 697 (9th Cir. 1987); *see also* FED.R.CIV.P. 11(a) (“Every pleading, written motion, and other

1 paper shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney’s original name, or if the
2 party is not represented by an attorney, shall be signed by the party.”). Here, while Plaintiff
3 purports to bring this action on behalf of an unidentified class, he may not do so.

4 IV.

5 INITIAL SCREENING PER 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1)

6 Notwithstanding IFP status or the payment of any partial filing fees, the Court must
7 subject each civil action commenced pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) to mandatory screening
8 and order the sua sponte dismissal of any case it finds “frivolous, malicious, failing to state a
9 claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeking monetary relief from a defendant immune
10 from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); *Calhoun v. Stahl*, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir.
11 2001) (“[T]he provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners.”); *Lopez v.*
12 *Smith*, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (noting that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) “not
13 only permits but requires” the court to sua sponte dismiss an *in forma pauperis* complaint that
14 fails to state a claim).

15 Before its amendment by the PLRA, former 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) permitted sua sponte
16 dismissal of only frivolous and malicious claims. *Lopez*, 203 F.3d at 1130. However, as
17 amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) mandates that the court reviewing an action filed pursuant to
18 the IFP provisions of section 1915 make and rule on its own motion to dismiss before directing
19 the U.S. Marshal to effect service pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 4(c)(3). *See Calhoun*, 254 F.3d at
20 845; *Lopez*, 203 F.3d at 1127; *see also McGore v. Wrigglesworth*, 114 F.3d 601, 604-05 (6th Cir.
21 1997) (stating that sua sponte screening pursuant to § 1915 should occur “before service of
22 process is made on the opposing parties”).

23 “[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all
24 allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the
25 plaintiff.” *Resnick v. Hayes*, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000); *Barren*, 152 F.3d at 1194
26 (noting that § 1915(e)(2) “parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”);
27 *Andrews*, 398 F.3d at 1121. In addition, the Court has a duty to liberally construe a pro se’s
28 pleadings, *see Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t*, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988),

1 which is “particularly important in civil rights cases.” *Ferdik v. Bonzelet*, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261
2 (9th Cir. 1992). In giving liberal interpretation to a pro se civil rights complaint, however, the
3 court may not “supply essential elements of claims that were not initially pled.” *Ivey v. Board*
4 *of Regents of the University of Alaska*, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

5 Section 1983 imposes two essential proof requirements upon a claimant: (1) that a person
6 acting under color of state law committed the conduct at issue, and (2) that the conduct deprived
7 the claimant of some right, privilege, or immunity protected by the Constitution or laws of the
8 United States. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; *Nelson v. Campbell*, 541 U.S. 637, 124 S.Ct. 2117, 2122
9 (2004); *Haygood v. Younger*, 769 F.2d 1350, 1354 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc).

10 Here, Plaintiff makes generalized claims regarding alleged constitutional violations but
11 fails to identify any specific factual allegation that would link any of the named Defendants to
12 an action that related directly to Plaintiff. “A plaintiff must allege facts, not simply conclusions,
13 that show that an individual was personally involved in the deprivation of his civil rights.”
14 *Barren v. Harrington*, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998). A person deprives another of a
15 constitutional right under section 1983, where that person ““does an affirmative act, participates
16 in another’ s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which [that person] is legally required
17 to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.”” *Preschooler II v. Clark County*
18 *School Bd. of Trustees*, 479 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting *Johnson v. Duffy*, 588
19 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)). The “requisite causal connection may be established” not only
20 by some kind of direct personal participation in the deprivation, but also by setting in motion “a
21 series of acts by others which the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others
22 to inflict the constitutional injury.” *Id.* (citing *Johnson*, 588 F.2d at 743-44).

23 Here, Plaintiff fails to allege facts sufficient to show that any of these named Defendants
24 were personally involved in the alleged deprivation of his civil rights. Moreover, he appears to
25 seek to hold some of these Defendants liable in their supervisory capacity. However, there is
26 no respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. *Palmer v. Sanderson*, 9 F.3d 1433,
27 1437-38 (9th Cir. 1993). Instead, “[t]he inquiry into causation must be individualized and focus
28 on the duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are

1 alleged to have caused a constitutional deprivation.” *Leer v. Murphy*, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th
2 Cir. 1988) (citing *Rizzo v. Goode*, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71 (1976)).

3 **A. Religious Claims**

4 1. First Amendment and RLUIPA claims

5 In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that prison officials have “violated Plaintiff’s right to
6 attend religious services.” (Compl. at 4.) However, Plaintiff offers no other specific factual
7 allegations nor does he clarify whether he intends to bring these claims under the First
8 Amendment or pursuant to the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
9 (“RLUIPA”).

10 As to either Plaintiff’s potential First Amendment or RLUIPA claims, he fails to allege
11 facts sufficient to state a claim. “The right to exercise religious practices and beliefs does not
12 terminate at the prison door.” *McElyea v. Babbitt*, 833 F.2d 196, 197 (9th Cir. 1987) (per
13 curiam). In order to implicate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, the Plaintiff
14 must show that their belief is “sincerely held” and “rooted in religious belief.” *See Shakur v.*
15 *Schiro*, 514 F.3d 878, 884 (citing *Malik v. Brown*, 16 F.3d 330, 333 (9th Cir. 1994).

16 In addition to First Amendment protections, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
17 Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 *et. seq.*, provides:

18 No government shall impose a *substantial burden on the religious exercise*
19 of a person residing in or confined to an institution . . . even if the burden results
20 from a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that
21 imposition of the burden on that person – [¶] (1) is in furtherance of a *compelling*
governmental interest; and [¶] (2) is the *least restrictive means* of furthering that
compelling governmental interest.

22 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a) (emphasis added); *see also San Jose Christian College v. Morgan Hill*,
23 360 F.3d 1024, 1033-34 (9th Cir. 2004) (“RLUIPA ‘replaces the void provisions of RFRA’ . . .
24 and prohibits the government from imposing ‘substantial burdens’ on ‘religious exercise’ unless
25 there exists a compelling governmental interest and the burden is the least restrictive means of
26 satisfying the governmental interest.”).

27 RLUIPA defines religious exercise to include “any exercise of religion, whether or not
28 compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A); *San Jose*

1 *Christian College*, 360 F.3d at 1034. The party alleging a RLUIPA violation carries the initial
2 burden of demonstrating that a governmental practice constitutes a substantial burden on his
3 religious exercise. *See* 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-1(a); 2000cc-2(b) (“[T]he plaintiff shall bear the
4 burden of persuasion on whether the law (including a regulation) or government practice that is
5 challenged by the claim substantially burdens the plaintiff’s exercise of religion.”). Here,
6 Plaintiff has only referenced a failure to attend an unspecified “religious service.” (Compl. at
7 4.) Thus, Plaintiff has alleged no facts on which to base either a First Amendment or RLUIPA
8 claim.

9 **B. Outdoor Exercise claims**

10 Plaintiff also appears to allege that he was denied outdoor exercise of a few occasions
11 during lockdowns that lasted for only a few days with each occurrence. (*See* Compl. at 3.)
12 “Whatever rights one may lose at the prison gates, ... the full protections of the eighth
13 amendment most certainly remain in force. The whole point of the amendment is to protect
14 persons convicted of crimes.” *Spain v. Proconier*, 600 F.2d 189, 193-94 (9th Cir. 1979) (citation
15 omitted). The Eighth Amendment, however, is not a basis for broad prison reform. It requires
16 neither that prisons be comfortable nor that they provide every amenity that one might find
17 desirable. *Rhodes v. Chapman*, 452 U.S. 337, 347, 349 (1981); *Hoptowit v. Ray*, 682 F.2d 1237,
18 1246 (9th Cir. 1981). Rather, the Eighth Amendment proscribes the “unnecessary and wanton
19 infliction of pain,” which includes those sanctions that are “so totally without penological
20 justification that it results in the gratuitous infliction of suffering.” *Gregg v. Georgia*, 428 U.S.
21 153, 173, 183 (1976); *see also Farmer v. Brennan*, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); *Rhodes*, 452 U.S.
22 at 347. This includes not only physical torture, but any punishment incompatible with “the
23 evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” *Trop v. Dulles*, 356
24 U.S. 86, 101 (1958); *see also Estelle v. Gamble*, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976).

25 To assert an Eighth Amendment claim for deprivation of humane conditions of
26 confinement, a prisoner must satisfy two requirements: one objective and one subjective.
27 *Farmer*, 511 U.S. at 834; *Allen v. Sakai*, 48 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 1994). “Under the
28 objective requirement, the prison official’s acts or omissions must deprive an inmate of the

1 minimal civilized measure of life's necessities." *Id.* This objective component is satisfied so
2 long as the institution "furnishes sentenced prisoners with adequate food, clothing, shelter,
3 sanitation, medical care, and personal safety." *Hoptowit v. Ray*, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir.
4 1982); *Farmer*, 511 U.S. at 833; *Wright v. Rushen*, 642 f.2d 1129, 1132-33 (9th Cir. 1981).

5 The subjective requirement, relating to the defendants' state of mind, requires "deliberate
6 indifference." *Allen*, 48 F.3d at 1087. "Deliberate indifference" exists when a prison official
7 "knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health and safety; the official must be both
8 aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm
9 exists, and he must also draw the inference." *Farmer*, 511 U.S. at 835. Finally, the Court must
10 analyze each claimed violation in light of these requirements, for Eighth Amendment violations
11 may not be based on the "totality of conditions" at a prison. *Hoptowit*, 682 F.2d at 246-47;
12 *Wright*, 642 F.2d at 1132.

13 In *Spain*, the court stated that "regular outdoor exercise is extremely important to the
14 psychological and physical well being of the inmates." *Spain*, 600 F.2d at 199. A temporary
15 denial of outdoor exercise would not necessarily rise to the level of a constitutional violation.
16 *See Lopez v.*, 203 F.3d at 1122 (complete denial of outdoor recreation for six and one half weeks
17 was sufficient to satisfy the objective requirement). Here, it appears that the deprivation of
18 outdoor exercise only lasted for a few days. In addition, Plaintiff must also allege that
19 Defendants acted with "deliberate indifference to an excessive risk to inmate health." *Farmer*,
20 511 U.S. at 837. Plaintiff has failed to allege that any of the named Defendants acted with
21 "deliberate indifference." In fact, Plaintiff makes no reference to any specific Defendant with
22 regard to this Eighth Amendment claim. Thus, if Plaintiff chooses to file an Amended
23 Complaint, he must specifically identify those Defendants whom he claims acted with
24 "deliberate indifference" to his Eighth Amendment right.

25 C. Access to Courts

26 Plaintiff further alleges that he was denied access to the prison's law library during the
27 lockdowns but offers no other specific factual allegations with regard to this claim. Prisoners
28 do "have a constitutional right to petition the government for redress of their grievances, which

1 includes a reasonable right of access to the courts.” *O’Keefe v. Van Boening*, 82 F.3d 322, 325
2 (9th Cir. 1996); accord *Bradley v. Hall*, 64 F.3d 1276, 1279 (9th Cir. 1995). In *Bounds*, 430
3 U.S. at 817, the Supreme Court held that “the fundamental constitutional right of access to the
4 courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful
5 legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from
6 persons who are trained in the law.” *Bounds v. Smith*, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977). To establish
7 a violation of the right to access to the courts, however, a prisoner must allege facts sufficient
8 to show that: (1) a nonfrivolous legal attack on his conviction, sentence, or conditions of
9 confinement has been frustrated or impeded, and (2) he has suffered an actual injury as a result.
10 *Lewis v. Casey*, 518 U.S. 343, 353-55 (1996). An “actual injury” is defined as “actual prejudice
11 with respect to contemplated or existing litigation, such as the inability to meet a filing deadline
12 or to present a claim.” *Id.* at 348; see also *Vandelft v. Moses*, 31 F.3d 794, 796 (9th Cir. 1994);
13 *Sands v. Lewis*, 886 F.2d 1166, 1171 (9th Cir. 1989); *Keenan v. Hall*, 83 F.3d 1083, 1093 (9th
14 Cir. 1996).

15 Here, Plaintiff has failed to alleged any actions with any particularity that have *precluded*
16 his pursuit of a non-frivolous direct or collateral attack upon either his criminal conviction or
17 sentence or the conditions of his current confinement. See *Lewis*, 518 U.S. at 355 (right to
18 access to the courts protects only an inmate’s need and ability to “attack [his] sentence[], directly
19 or collaterally, and ... to challenge the conditions of [his] confinement.”). In addition, Plaintiff
20 must also describe the non-frivolous nature of the “underlying cause of action, whether
21 anticipated or lost.” *Christopher v. Harbury*, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002) .

22 In short, Plaintiff has not alleged that “a complaint he prepared was dismissed,” or that
23 he was “so stymied” by any individual defendant’s actions that “he was unable to even file a
24 complaint,” direct appeal or petition for writ of habeas corpus that was not “frivolous.” *Lewis*,
25 518 U.S. at 351; *Christopher*, 536 U.S. at 416 (“like any other element of an access claim[,] ...
26 the predicate claim [must] be described well enough to apply the ‘nonfrivolous’ test and to show
27 that the ‘arguable’ nature of the underlying claim is more than hope.”). Therefore, Plaintiff’s
28 access to courts claims must be dismissed for failing to state a claim upon which section 1983

1 relief can be granted. *See Lopez*, 203 F.3d at 1126-27; *Resnick*, 213 F.3d at 446.

2 Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a section 1983 claim
3 upon which relief may be granted, and is therefore subject to dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
4 §§ 1915(e)(2)(b) & 1915A(b). The Court will provide Plaintiff with an opportunity to amend
5 his pleading to cure the defects set forth above. Plaintiff is warned that if his amended complaint
6 fails to address the deficiencies of pleading noted above, it may be dismissed with prejudice and
7 without leave to amend.

8 **V.**

9 **CONCLUSION AND ORDER**

10 Good cause appearing, **IT IS HEREBY ORDERED** that:

- 11 1. Plaintiff's request for appointment of counsel is **DENIED** without prejudice.
12 2. Plaintiff's Motion to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [ECF No. 2] is
13 **GRANTED**.

14 3. The Secretary of California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, or his
15 designee, shall collect from Plaintiff's prison trust account the \$350 balance of the filing fee
16 owed in this case by collecting monthly payments from the account in an amount equal to twenty
17 percent (20%) of the preceding month's income and forward payments to the Clerk of the Court
18 each time the amount in the account exceeds \$10 in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).
19 **ALL PAYMENTS SHALL BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER**
20 **ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION.**

21 4. The Clerk of the Court is directed to serve a copy of this Order on Matthew Cate,
22 Secretary, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 1515 S Street, Suite 502,
23 Sacramento, California 95814.

24 **IT IS FURTHER ORDERED** that:

25 5. Plaintiff's Complaint is **DISMISSED** without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
26 §§ 1915(e)(2)(b) and 1915A(b). However, Plaintiff is **GRANTED** forty five (45) days leave
27 from the date this Order is "Filed" in which to file a First Amended Complaint which cures all
28 the deficiencies of pleading noted above. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint must be complete in

1 itself without reference to the superseded pleading. *See* S.D. Cal. Civ. L. R. 15.1. Defendants
2 not named and all claims not re-alleged in the Amended Complaint will be deemed to have been
3 waived. *See King v. Atiyeh*, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). Further, if Plaintiff's Amended
4 Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, it may be dismissed without
5 further leave to amend and may hereafter be counted as a "strike" under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
6 *See McHenry v. Renne*, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177-79 (9th Cir. 1996).

7 6. The Clerk of Court is directed to mail a court approved form § 1983 complaint to
8 Plaintiff.

9 **IT IS SO ORDERED.**

10 DATED: 4/20/11



HON. IRMA E. GONZALEZ, Chief Judge
United States District Court

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