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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SHERI CLARK,

Plaintiff,

v.

HOMESERVICES LENDING LLC, *et*  
*al.*,

Defendants.

Case No. 11-cv-1451-L(MDD)

**ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND  
DENYING IN PART MOTION FOR  
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS  
[DOC. 33]**

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On June 30, 2011, Plaintiff Sheri Clark commenced this action against Defendants Homeservices Lending LLC d/b/a Homeservices and Doherty Employment Group, Inc. to recover unpaid wages under federal and state law. On December 2, 2011, Plaintiff accepted Defendants' Rule 68 Offer of Judgment in the amount of \$37,102.00, which also allows Plaintiff to seek reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. Plaintiff now moves for an award of attorneys' fees and costs in the amount \$52,550.50. This is one of three requests for attorneys' fees among a group of seven related cases against Defendants to recover unpaid wages. Defendants oppose.

The Court found this motion suitable for determination on the papers submitted and without oral argument. *See* Civ. L.R. 7.1(d.1). (Doc. 34.) For the following reasons, the Court **GRANTS IN PART** and **DENIES IN PART** Plaintiff's motion for attorneys' fees and costs.

11cv1451

1 **I. ANALYSIS<sup>1</sup>**

2 Plaintiffs are entitled to attorneys’ fees under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”). 29  
3 U.S.C. § 216(b); *see also Newhouse v. Robert’s Ilima Tours, Inc.*, 708 F.2d 436, 441 (9th Cir.  
4 1983) (“The FLSA grants prevailing plaintiffs a reasonable attorney’s fee.”). Courts in the Ninth  
5 Circuit calculate an award of attorneys’ fees using the lodestar method, whereby a court  
6 multiplies “the number of hours the prevailing party reasonably expended on the litigation by a  
7 reasonable hourly rate.” *Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc.*, 523 F.3d 973, 978 (9th Cir. 2008)  
8 (internal quotation marks omitted). The fee applicant bears the burden of demonstrating that the  
9 number of hours spent were “reasonably expended” and that counsel made “a good faith effort to  
10 exclude from [the] fee request hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.”  
11 *Hensley v. Eckerhart*, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983). It is likewise the fee applicant’s burden to  
12 “submit evidence supporting the hours worked and rates claimed . . . . Where the documentation  
13 of hours is inadequate, the district court may reduce the award accordingly.” *Id.* at 433. “The  
14 party opposing the fee application has a burden of rebuttal that requires submission of evidence  
15 to the district court challenging the accuracy and reasonableness of the hours charged or the facts  
16 asserted by the prevailing party in its submitted affidavits.” *Gates v. Deukmejian*, 987 F.2d  
17 1392, 1397-98 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing *Blum v. Stenson*, 465 U.S. 886, 892 n.5 (1984); *Toussaint*  
18 *v. McCarthy*, 826 F.2d 901, 904 (9th Cir. 1987)).

19 “Although in most cases, the lodestar figure is presumptively a reasonable fee award, the  
20 district court may, if circumstances warrant, adjust the lodestar to account for other factors  
21 which are not subsumed within it.” *Ferland v. Conrad Credit Corp.*, 244 F.3d 1145, 1149 n.4  
22 (9th Cir. 2001). Those factors—also known as the *Kerr* factors—include:

23 //

24 \_\_\_\_\_  
25 <sup>1</sup> The collection of related cases against Defendants also includes: *Buchanan v.*  
26 *Homeservices Lending LLC*, No. 11-cv-922-L-MDD; *Shaw v. Homeservices Lending LLC*, No.  
27 11-cv-924-L-MDD; *Dawson v. Homeservices LLC*, No. 11-cv-1037-L-MDD; *McGraw v.*  
28 *Homeservices Lending LLC*, No. 11-cv-1138-L-MDD; *Butler v. Homeservices Lending LLC*,  
No. 11-cv-2313-L-MDD; and *Olmsted v. Homeservices Lending LLC*, No. 12-cv-745-L-MDD.  
*Dawson* and *McGraw* both have nearly identical motions for attorneys’ fees and costs also  
pending.

1 (1) the time and labor required, (2) the novelty and difficulty of the  
2 questions involved, (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service  
3 properly, (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to  
4 acceptance of the case, (5) the customary fee, (6) whether the fee is  
5 fixed or contingent, (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the  
6 circumstances, (8) the amount involved and the results obtained, (9) the  
7 experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys, (10) the  
8 “undesirability” of the case, (11) the nature and length of the  
9 professional relationship with the client, and (12) awards in similar  
10 cases.

11 *Ballen v. City of Redmond*, 466 F.3d 736, 746 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting *McGrath v. Cnty. of*  
12 *Nevada*, 67 F.3d 248, 252 (9th Cir. 1995)); *see also Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc.*, 526 F.2d  
13 67, 70 (9th Cir. 1995) .

14 The parties do not dispute that Plaintiff is entitled to seek reasonable attorneys’ fees. Nor  
15 do they dispute applying the lodestar method. They do, however, disagree whether the number  
16 of hours were reasonably expended. Plaintiff argues that her request is reasonable because her  
17 counsel expended a reasonable and necessary amount of time litigating against Defendants’  
18 vigorous defense. (Pl.’s Mot. 10:13–22.) Defendants respond that the hours sought are  
19 unreasonable because they are excessive and duplicative. (Defs.’ Opp’n 5:18–7:6.) But they do  
20 not challenge the costs sought.

#### 21 **A. Recoverable Hours**

22 To support their contention that the hours billed are excessive and duplicative,  
23 Defendants present several charts. The first, included in Defendants’ opposition, presents work  
24 that was purportedly duplicative. The second and third, both attached as exhibits, summarize  
25 “additional items . . . which are completely erroneous since they could have been done by a legal  
26 assistant at a much lower rate,” and “what Defendants believe would be [a] reasonable attorneys’  
27 fees amount.” (Defs.’ Notice of Lodgment, Exs. 1 & 2 [Doc. 37-8].) Plaintiff responds that  
28 Defendants’ contentions are meritless, and the charts are irrelevant and lack foundational  
support.

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1 Plaintiff is correct that the charts in and of themselves do not provide any evidentiary  
2 support for Defendants. In particular, the second and third charts fail to meet Defendants'  
3 burden of rebuttal. *See Gates*, 987 F.2d at 1397-98. Those two charts do not provide any  
4 substance to challenge Plaintiff's request, but rather merely in conclusory fashion state  
5 Defendants' belief that some items could have been billed at a lower rate and their perception of  
6 reasonable attorneys' fees should be. That is wholly insufficient.<sup>2</sup> *See id.*

7 However, Defendants' chart summarizing duplicative billing is different. Though the  
8 chart itself is not evidence, it refers to documents already put forth as evidence, namely  
9 Plaintiff's billing records. Additionally, this chart also references court documents filed by  
10 Plaintiff in not only this case, but also in the two related cases with pending motions for  
11 attorneys' fees. Defendants also include these documents as exhibits to its opposition.<sup>3</sup> (*See*  
12 *Kaufman Decl. Exs. 1–27.*) After comparing Defendants' chart of duplicative work with the  
13 billing records and other evidence submitted, the Court finds that the chart is accurate.

14 Looking at these documents, the Court agrees with Defendants that the filings identified  
15 involved duplicative work. For example, after closer inspection, it is clear that the complaints in  
16 this case, *Dawson*, and *McGraw* are virtually identical. There are minor tweaks to names and  
17 some details, but the factual and legal allegations are identical. Moreover, even the paragraph  
18 numbering tracks 1-to-1 between these three complaints. Plaintiff's motion to strike and motion  
19 to quash are also nearly identical to the same motions filed in *Dawson* and *McGraw*. Lending  
20 further credence to Defendants' contention is that almost all of these items listed as duplicative  
21 span the exact same dates in their respective billing records. For example, attendance of a  
22 telephonic ENE is listed in all three cases as having occurred on 8/25/11, drafting discovery in  
23 all three occurred from 9/12/11 to 11/10/11, and review of the protective order in all three

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24  
25 <sup>2</sup> Defendants also challenge work billed for alleged improper subpoenas to Plaintiff's  
26 current employer. (Defs.' Opp'n 11:21–12:24.) It is unclear which exact billing values  
27 Defendants are challenging. Given that it is not the Court's job to sift through detailed and  
28 voluminous billing records, the Court rejects this challenge. *See Gates*, 987 F.2d at 1397-98.

<sup>3</sup> Additionally, the Court takes judicial notice of all documents filed in the related cases  
identified above.

1 occurred on 9/13/11 and 10/4/11.

2 Accordingly, the Court reduces all of the duplicative entries in Plaintiff's billing records  
3 by two-thirds, with the exception of the work done drafting the ENE briefs. The Court finds that  
4 such reduction is reasonable and warranted to account for the duplicative work divided among  
5 two or three cases, and that Plaintiff failed to meet her burden showing that a good-faith effort  
6 was made to exclude these redundant hours. *See Hensley*, 461 U.S. at 434. The total reduction  
7 of attorneys' fees in this case as a result of duplicative billing will thus amount to \$5,596.67.<sup>4</sup>

8  
9 **B. Lodestar Multiplier**

10 Under the lodestar approach, "[t]he court may . . . enhance the lodestar with a  
11 'multiplier', if necessary, to arrive at a reasonable fee in light of all the circumstances of the  
12 case." *Van Vranken v. Atl. Richfield Co.*, 901 F. Supp. 294, 298 (N.D. Cal. 1995). The court  
13 may "adjust[] the lodestar figure on the basis of [the] *Kerr* factors not already subsumed in the  
14 initial calculation."<sup>5</sup> *McGrath*, 67 F.3d at 252. "Application of a multiplier is completely within  
15 the Court's discretion." *Hess v. Ramona Unified Sch. Dist.*, No. 07-CV-49 W(CAB), 2008 WL  
16 5381243, at \*8 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2008) (Whelan, J.).

17 Plaintiff argues that she should be granted a 1.5 multiplier because of the contingent  
18 nature of the case, considerable financial risk to Plaintiff's counsel, and the time and labor  
19 required. (Pl.'s Mot. 16:19–19:11.) Plaintiff particularly emphasizes the first argument.  
20 However, "[f]ederal law, unlike California law, does not allow for contingency multipliers."

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23 <sup>4</sup> [\$2,500.00 (Drafting Complaint) + \$965.00 (Drafting Motion to Strike) + \$175.00  
24 (Attend Telephonic ENE) + \$4,200.00 (Drafting Discovery) + \$205.00 (Review Protective  
Order) + \$350.00 (Drafting Motion to Quash)] $\times$  2/3 = \$8,395.00  $\times$  2/3 = \$5,596.67.

25 <sup>5</sup> Courts have also applied a similar six-factor analysis to decide whether a percentage  
26 increase of attorneys' fees is fair and reasonable. *See, e.g., Schiller v. David's Bridal, Inc.*, No.  
27 10-cv-616, 2012 WL 2117001, at \*16 (E.D. Cal. June 11, 2012). These factors include: (1) the  
28 results achieved; (2) the risk of litigation; (3) the skill required; (4) the quality of work  
performed; (5) the contingent nature of the fee and the financial burden; and (6) the awards  
made in similar cases. *Id.* These factors clearly and substantially overlap with the *Kerr* factors.  
However, the parties do not address which list of factors is applicable here. For the sake of  
completion, the Court will also take into account appeals to any of these six factors.


1 *Murillo v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co.*, No. CIV 2:08-1974, 2010 WL 2889728, at \*10 (E.D. Cal. July  
2 21, 2010). Given that Plaintiff seeks attorneys' fees under the FLSA, a federal statute, applying  
3 a contingency multiplier is not appropriate. (*See* Pl.'s Mot. 2:22–3:1.) Similarly, the financial  
4 risk of non-payment that Plaintiff contemplates is a result of the contingent nature of the case.  
5 Thus, applying a multiplier for that reason is also not appropriate. To justify the multiplier on  
6 the basis of time and labor required, Plaintiff merely states that it spent approximately 105.29  
7 hours litigating this case, and achieved “absolute victory” against a “huge company” and “one of  
8 the biggest and most respected law firms in the United States.” (Pl.'s Mot. 19:3–9.) That  
9 explanation is wholly insufficient. Accordingly, the Court finds that applying a multiplier is not  
10 necessary to arrive at a reasonable fee. *See Van Vranken*, 901 F. Supp. at 298.

11  
12 **II. CONCLUSION & ORDER**

13 In light of the foregoing, the Court **GRANTS IN PART** and **DENIES IN PART**  
14 Plaintiff's motion for attorneys' fees and costs, and **AWARDS** Plaintiff **\$28,976.83** in attorneys'  
15 fees and **\$690.25** in costs.<sup>6</sup> (Doc. 33.)

16 **IT IS SO ORDERED.**

17  
18 DATED: June 25, 2012

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20   
M. James Lorenz  
United States District Court Judge

21 COPY TO:

22 HON. MITCHELL D. DEMBIN  
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

23 ALL PARTIES/COUNSEL  
24  
25  
26

27 <sup>6</sup> Plaintiff seeks \$52,550.50 in attorneys' fees and costs. That total accounts for  
28 \$34,573.50 times the 1.5 lodestar multiplier plus \$690.25 in costs. The Court's attorneys' fees  
calculation removes the multiplier and subtracts \$5,596.67 for the reasons discussed above. That  
total amounts to \$28,976.83 in attorneys' fees.