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6	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT	
7	SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA	
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9	ANDREW NILON, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated,	CASE NO. 3:12-CV-00930-LAB (BGS)
10	Plaintiff,	ORDER TENTATIVELY VACATING CLASS CERTIFICATION AND
11	VS.	DISMISSING CASE WITHOUT PREJUDICE
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13	NATURAL-IMMUNOGENICS CORP., Defendant.	
14	Delendant.	
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17	The Court issues the following tentative order vacating class certification and	
18	dismissing this case without prejudice.	
19	I. Factual Background	
20	A. Brief Case Background	
21	On March 5, 2012, this case was filed in the Superior Court of California, County of	
22	San Diego. It was removed to this Court on April 16, 2012. While the pre-suit demand letter	
23	sent by Plaintiff's counsel to Natural-Immunogenics referred to their client as "her," the	
24	Complaint named Andrew Nilon as lead Plaintiff. (See Docket no. 1, 1-1 at 19.) The Court	
25	granted Plaintiff's motion for class certification on April 15, 2014. (Docket no. 41.) The class	
26	is defined as:	
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1	Products either from a retail location or over the internet at any time during the four years preceding the filing of this complaint through the date of trial in this action.		
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4	(<i>Id</i> . at 5.)		
5	From April 2013 to May 2014, Natural-Immunogenics noticed four deposition dates		
6	for then-class Plaintiff Nilon. (Docket no 55 at 2:5-3:11.) Plaintiff's counsel failed to produce		
7	Nilon for any of the depositions, repeatedly cancelling the depositions on short notice. <i>Id</i> .		
8	Magistrate Judge Skomal imposed monetary sanctions on Plaintiff's law firm, Newport Trial		
9	Group, for their failure to produce Nilon for the fourth deposition. (Id. at 7:5-14, 10:17-22.)		
10	Judge Skomal explained		
11	sanctioned for the spate of excessive cancellations at an earlier point in this litigation. Defendant's failure to bring this behavior to the Court's attention at an earlier time is inexcusable.		
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15	(<i>Id</i> . at 7:5-14.)		
16	On July 9, 2014, Plaintiff filed a motion to substitute Giovanni Sandoval for Andrew		
17	Nilon as lead plaintiff. (Docket no. 51.) Plaintiff included a proposed Second Amended		
18	Complaint (SAC) as an exhibit to the motion. (Docket no. 51-6.) The SAC introduced		
19	Sandoval as "a resident of San Diego County, California" who "purchased Sovereign Silver		
20	in this County in 2013." Id. at 5. On August 20, 2014, the Court granted the motion to		
21	substitute Giovanni Sandoval for Andrew Nilon as lead plaintiff. (Docket no. 62). The Court		
22	admonished both parties to depose Sandoval immediately. <i>Id.</i> at 7-8. The Court warned:		
23	[t]he parties are to schedule a deposition of Sandoval forthwith, and Sandoval must also reply promptly and meaningfully to any written discovery. There is		
24	simply no excuse for the repeated failure on the part of Newport Trial Group to produce its lead plaintiff for a deposition; the equities in this case in that		
25	regard are clearly on the side of Natural-Immunogenics.		
26	Id. Plaintiff filed the SAC on August 25, 2015. (Docket no. 63). Plaintiff never updated his		
27	Initial Disclosures in light of the substitution, and Sandoval was never named on any Fed.		
28	R. Civ. P. 26 disclosure.		

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Despite the Court's order to proceed with Sandoval's deposition forthwith, and after
 a further unexplained delay of eight months, Natural-Immunogenics finally took Sandoval's
 deposition on April 20, 2015. (Docket no. 108.) Sandoval's deposition testimony raises
 serious concerns regarding his suitability to serve as class representative.

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B. Sandoval's Deposition Testimony

6 Contrary to the representation made in the SAC, Sandoval testified that his current 7 address is 2681 South Virginia Drive, Yuma, Arizona. (Docket no. 113-2 at 24.) He 8 estimated that he has lived in Arizona for about a year, and that he "officially" moved to 9 Arizona in about April 2014, but he's "just kind of going back and forth from my job from San 10 Diego to Arizona, but I officially moved all of my stuff over there about a year ago." *Id.* Thus, 11 he admits he was not a "resident of San Diego County" when the motion to substitute or SAC 12 were filed. Nor is it clear when, if ever, Sandoval was a California resident. Indeed, 13 Sandoval testified that he has forgotten his California address. Id.

14 Even more troubling, Sandoval's publicly available criminal history demonstrates that 15 he has lived at the same 2681 South Virginia Drive address in Yuma, Arizona since 2008— 16 much longer than one year. See, e.g., https://apps.supremecourt.az.gov/publicaccess/ 17 (website for the Arizona Judicial Branch); see also Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. McPherson, 18 2008 WL 4183981, at *5 (N.D.Cal. Sept. 9, 2008) (noting that the information on government 19 agency websites has often been treated as a proper subject for judicial notice and citing 20 cases from numerous circuits). The same records show that Sandoval has been on 21 probation since at least January 2012, and the terms of his probation require him to obtain 22 permission from the Arizona Probation Department before leaving the state of Arizona. Id.; 23 Uniform Conditions of Supervised Probation, § 6-207 of the Arizona Code of Judicial 24 Administration and Appendix A thereto. The evidence indicates that Sandoval may have 25 made several other false statements during his deposition testimony. For example, as 26 relevant to this order, he testified that he has a driver's license with a California address (id. 27 at 39:21-25). Natural-Immunogenics has filed public records showing that Sandoval's 28 California driver's license was suspended in 2006. (Docket no. 113-3, 4.)

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- 1 II. Discussion
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A. Case Dispositive Sanctions

Sandoval's deposition testimony demonstrates that Plaintiff's counsel has repeatedly
failed to nominate a proper class representative, despite plenty of opportunity. Public
records verify this, showing that Sandoval fell outside the class definition well before the
class was certified. If counsel had exercised even the slightest amount of diligence, it would
have known that Sandoval wasn't "located within California" and therefore wasn't a member
of the class he purported to represent.

9 Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 "imposes on any party who signs a pleading, motion, or other 10 paper . . . an affirmative duty to conduct a reasonable inquiry into the facts and the law 11 before filing" and "the applicable standard is one of reasonableness under the 12 circumstances." *Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enterprises, Inc.*, 498

13 U.S. 533, 551 (1991). The Ninth Circuit has further explained:

Sanctions should be imposed if (1) after reasonable inquiry, a competent attorney could not form a reasonable belief that the pleading is [or other paper]
is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification or reversal of existing law or if (2) a pleading [or other paper] has been interposed for any improper purpose.

17 Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531, 1537 (9th Cir. 1986)

18 (quotation omitted). Even if no motion for sanctions is made, Rule 11(c)(3) empowers the

19 Court to impose sanctions sua sponte. Failure to comply with the Local Rules of Practice or

20 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may result in sanctions, up to and including case-dispositive

21 sanctions. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).

Before counsel drafted and filed the assertion in the SAC that Sandoval "is a resident
of San Diego County, California," they should have conducted a reasonable inquiry to make
sure this assertion was true.¹ Sandoval's deposition testimony and criminal record
demonstrate they did not. But for the SAC's false statement about Sandoval's residency, the

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^{Additionally, as soon as Plaintiff's counsel learned that Sandoval wasn't a resident of California (or a member of the class) they were required to notify the Court of this "false statement of material fact . . . previously made to the tribunal."} *In re Hubbard*, 2013 WL 435945, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2013).

Court would not have granted the motion for substitution. See Faria v. Allstate Merch. Serv.,
 LLC, 2010 WL 1541576, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 13, 2010) (denying motion to substitute
 because proposed new lead plaintiff wasn't a member of the class). Counsel's performance
 falls short of Rule 11's mandate. It also calls into question their adequacy to serve as
 counsel for a class. *Cf. Bodner v. Oreck Direct*, LLC, 2007 WL 1223777, at *2 (N.D. Cal.
 Apr. 25, 2007).

As discussed above, this isn't an isolated occurrence—Plaintiff's counsel has displayed a cavalier attitude towards discovery obligations practically from the get-go. Based on counsels' demonstrated shortcomings, it would be reasonable for the Court to dismiss this case with prejudice. But, while warranted, such a sanction would harm the members of the class, who were doubtless unaware of their counsels' unprofessional behavior. With the interest of class members in mind, the Court declines to issue case dispositive sanctions at this time.

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B. Vacating Class Certification

15 A class action is "an exception to the usual rule that litigation is conducted by and on 16 behalf of the individual named parties only." Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S.Ct. 1426, 17 1432 (2013) (quoting Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 700–01 (1979)). To come within 18 the exception, a party seeking to maintain a class action "must affirmatively demonstrate his 19 compliance" with Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. 20 Dukes, 131 S.Ct. 2541, 2551–52 (2011). Courts have "broad discretion" to revisit 21 certification throughout the legal proceedings and, where certification was improvidently 22 granted, may vacate class certification. Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849, 872 (9th Cir. 23 2001) (abrogated on other grounds); Lierboe v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 350 F.3d 24 1018, 1023 (9th Cir. 2003).

A class representative "cannot represent a class of whom they are not a part." *Bailey v. Patterson*, 369 U.S. 31, 32–33 (1962); *see also Hayes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.*, 725 F.3d
349, 360 (3d Cir. 2013) ("It is axiomatic that the lead plaintiff must fit the class definition[,]"
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because "plaintiffs cannot represent a class of whom they are not a part.") (internal citation
 omitted). Sandoval isn't a member of the class. Therefore he can't serve as lead plaintiff.

3 Despite ample opportunity, Plaintiff's counsel has failed to find a qualified class representative. They displayed this inability by making false representations about Sandoval. 4 5 Because Nilon repeatedly failed to appear for scheduled depositions, and Sandoval isn't a 6 member of the class, the putative class members' interests have been compromised. The 7 record indicates that Sandoval is the third inadequate class representative nominated by 8 Plaintiff's counsel in this case. Based on counsel's conduct and repeated inability to propose 9 an adequate class representative, the Court believes that it is in the best interest of class 10 members to vacate certification and dismiss this case without prejudice. Dismissal without 11 prejudice means that putative members of the class will be free to pursue individual actions 12 with counsel of their choice.

Plaintiff may file a response to this tentative ruling no later than May 15, 2015. The
response shall be no longer than fifteen pages, not counting any lodged or appended
materials. Natural-Immunogenics may file a reply no later than May 19, 2015. The reply
shall be no longer than ten pages, not counting any lodged or appended materials.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

19 DATED: May 11, 2015

AMI A. BUNN

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN Burns United States District Judge