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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARIANO VALENZUELA,

Plaintiff,

v.

**CITY OF CALEXICO, SERGEANT
FRANK URIARTE, OFFICER PETER
J. WEST, OFFICER VICTOR
FLORES, OFFICER CARLOS
RAMIREZ, Chief of Police POMPEYO
TABAREZ, Former Chief of Police
JIM NEUJAHR, and DOES 1 through
25, inclusive,**

Defendants.

Case No. 14-cv-481-BAS-PCL

ORDER RE:

**PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL
DISCOVERY**

[Doc. 17]

I. INTRODUCTION

Now before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion to Compel, filed on January 27, 2015 pursuant to the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, Rule 37(a)(1). (Doc. 17.) Plaintiff seeks to compel the Defendants to: (1) respond to Plaintiff's interrogatories, Set One, Nos. 11 and 12; (2) comply with Plaintiff's request for production of documents, Set One, No. 31; and (3) respond to Plaintiff's requests for admissions, Set One, Nos. 19 through 31. (Id.)

1 The Court has read and considered all of the documents filed in connection with this
2 motion, including Plaintiff’s moving papers (Doc. 17), Plaintiff’s exhibits (Docs. 17-1 through
3 17-5), and supporting declaration of Brody McBride (Doc. 17-1); Defendants’ Opposition (Doc.
4 21), objections to Mr. McBride’s declaration (Doc. 21-1), and Request for Judicial Notice (Doc.
5 21-2); and Plaintiff’s Reply (Doc. 24). As discussed below, the Court **DENIES** Plaintiff’s
6 Motion to Compel.

7 **II. BACKGROUND**

8 This case arises from the alleged illegal arrest of the Plaintiff, Mr. Valenzuela, and the
9 use of excessive force during that arrest by Defendants Ramirez and Flores on June 11, 2013.
10 (Doc. 1, at 6-9.) Plaintiff’s causes of action arising from this incident include: (1) false arrest and
11 imprisonment; (2) battery; (3) negligence; (4) unlawful seizure, arrest, and detention; (5)
12 unlawful entry into home; (6) use of excessive force; (7) a claim against Defendant City of
13 Calexico under Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Serv. of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); (8)
14 failure to properly train; (9) failure to supervise and discipline; and (10) violations of the Bane
15 Act, California Civil Code §§ 52.1 and 52. (Id.)

16 **III. DISCUSSION**

17 **A. Standard on Motion to Compel**

18 Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure enables the propounding party to bring a
19 motion to compel responses to discovery. Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(a)(3)(B). The party opposing
20 discovery bears the burden of resisting disclosure. Miller v. Pancucci, 141 F.R.D. 292, 299
21 (C.D.Cal.1992). Additionally, the moving party carries the burden of informing the court: (1)
22 which discovery requests are the subject of his motion to compel; (2) which of the defendants’
23 responses are disputed; (3) why the responses are deficient; (4) the reasons defendants’
24 objections are without merit; and (5) the relevance of the requested information to the
25 prosecution of his action. See, e.g., Brooks v. Alameida, No. CIV S-03-2343-JAM-EFB P,
26 2009 WL 331358, at *2 (E.D.Cal. Feb.10, 2009) (“Without knowing which responses plaintiff
27 seeks to compel or on what grounds, the court cannot grant plaintiff’s motion.”); Ellis v. Cambra,
28 No. CIV 02-05646-AWI-SMS PC, 2008 WL 860523, at *4 (E.D.Cal. Mar.27, 2008) (“Plaintiff

1 must inform the court which discovery requests are the subject of his motion to compel, and, for
2 each disputed response, inform the court why the information sought is relevant and why
3 Defendant's objections are not justified.”). Williams v. Adams, 105-CV-00124AWISMSPC,
4 2009 WL 1220311 (E.D. Cal. May 4, 2009). Additionally, a litigant may not file suit in order to
5 “use discovery as the sole means of finding out whether [she has] a case.” Szabo Food Serv. Inc.
6 v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073, 1083 (7th Cir.1989).

7 Lastly, when deciding whether to grant a motion to compel response to discovery request
8 or interrogatory, the court considers the prior efforts of the parties to resolve the dispute, the
9 relevance of the information sought, and the burden or expense of production. Barnes v. D.C.,
10 289 F.R.D. 1 (D.D.C. 2012).

11 **B. Relevance**

12 It is well established that a party may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged
13 matter that is relevant to any claim or defense. Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1). Relevant information need
14 not be admissible at trial so long as the discovery appears to be reasonably calculated to lead to
15 the discovery of admissible evidence. Id. Relevance is construed broadly to include any matter
16 that bears on, or reasonably could lead to other matter that could bear on, any issue that may be
17 in the case. Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351, 98 S.Ct. 2380, 57 L.Ed.2d
18 253 (1978) (citing Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501, 67 S.Ct. 385, 91 L.Ed. 451 (1947))
19 (footnote omitted). However, liberal discovery does not mean unlimited discovery,
20 Oppenheimer, 437 U.S. at 351–52, and Rule 26 vests the trial judge with broad discretion to
21 tailor discovery narrowly and dictate its sequence. CrawfordEl v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 598, 118
22 S.Ct. 1584, 140 L.Ed.2d 759 (1998). District courts have broad discretion to determine
23 relevancy for discovery purposes. Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir.2002).

24 On August 22, 2014, Plaintiff served Defendants with discovery requests, Set One. (Doc.
25 17-1, “Declaration of Brody McBride,” ¶3.)^{1/} On October 3, 2014, Defendants responded to Set

27 1. The Court has no original copy of Plaintiff’s discovery requests, Set One, to verify this
28 date. The interrogatories, requests for production of documents, and requests for admissions
themselves are produced for the Court, in full, only through Defendant’s Responses. (Docs. 17-3;
17-4; 17-5.)

1 One and objected to Interrogatories Nos. 11 and 12, Request for Production of Documents No.
2 31, and Requests for Admissions, Nos. 19, 23, and 28, as irrelevant. (Id. at 9-10.) Interrogatories
3 11 and 12 present the following requests:

4 11. State any and all reasons why CPD Sergeant German Duran approached
5 Plaintiff while Plaintiff was in Alex Rivera Park on May 23, 2014.

6 12. If CPD Chief Pompeyo Tavaréz and CITY employee Nick Servin have ever
7 had any conversations in which Plaintiff's name was mentioned, please state the
8 content of any and all such conversations, including any facts pertaining to
9 Plaintiff or the mention of Plaintiff's name.

10 (Doc. 17-3, at 9.) Plaintiff's Request for Production of Documents No. 31 states:

11 31. Please produce any and all DOCUMENTS relating to any calls or reports
12 received by the CPD that people were having sex in Alex Rivera Park on May 23,
13 2014.

14 (Doc. 17-4, at 14.) Lastly, Plaintiff's Requests for Admissions, Nos. 19, 23, and 28, state:

15 19. Admit that on the morning of May 23, 2014, CPD sergeant German Duran
16 approached Plaintiff while Plaintiff was in Alex Rivera Park.

17 23. Admit that on or about June 20, 2014, CPD Chief Pompeyo Tavaréz and
18 Officer C. Gonzalez met with CITY employee Nick Servin.

19 28. Admit that after CPD Chief Pompeyo Tavaréz and officer C. Gonzalez met
20 with CITY employee Nick Servin on or about June 20, 2014, Mr. Servin
21 instructed CITY employee Nick Fenly to write a reprimand to Plaintiff.

22 (Doc. 17-5, at 8-10.)

23 Defendant provided identical responses to interrogatories 11 and 12, request for
24 production of documents No. 31, and request for admissions Nos. 19 and 23, which read:

25 Objection. This [request] seeks information which is neither relevant to any claim
26 or defense, nor reasonably calculated to lead to discovery of admissible evidence.

27 (Doc. 17-3, at 9; Doc. 17-4, at 14; Doc. 17-5, at 8-10.) Defendant's response to Request for
28 Admission No. 28 presents a relevance objection as well, but also objects to the form of the
request for admission as compound. (Doc. 17-5, at 10-11.)

Defendants' responses are effectively boilerplate, if not marginally better, and their
objections should have been argued with specificity. See Walker v. Lakewood Condo. Owners
Ass'n, 186 F.R.D. 584, 587 (C.D.Cal.1999) ("Boilerplate, generalized objections are inadequate
and tantamount to not making any objection at all.") However, Defendants have elaborated on
their relevance argument in their opposition, and the Court will consider that argument here. See

1 Calderon v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., 290 F.R.D. 508, 516 n. 4 (D. Idaho 2013).

2 The Court agrees with Defendants that the alleged events of May 23, 2014 are irrelevant
3 to this action as pleaded. Indeed, “the complaint makes no claim of harassment or retaliation”
4 stemming from any incident other than the events of June 11, 2013. (Doc. 21, at 2.) The scope
5 of the complaint does not appear to contemplate any theory of ongoing harassment or retaliation
6 which makes post-event evidence relevant: “harassment” is mentioned only in relation to the
7 alleged events of June 11, 2013, and retaliation is not mentioned at all. (See Doc. 1.) While the
8 Court recognizes that “post-event evidence is not only admissible for purposes of proving the
9 existence of a municipal defendant’s policy or custom, but may be highly probative with respect
10 to that inquiry,” Henry v. Cnty. of Shasta, 132 F.3d 512, 519 (9th Cir.1997), as amended, 137
11 F.3d 1372 (9th Cir.1998), there are simply no allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint which suggest
12 the events on May 23, 2014 are relevant to the events of June 11, 2013. (See Doc. 1.)

13 Similarly, there are no allegations in the complaint which explain the nature, or even the
14 presence, of a prevalent custom or policy instituted by Defendants. To succeed on his Monell
15 cause of action, Plaintiff must prove, and thus allege, that his constitutional rights were violated
16 as a result of a widespread policy, practice, or custom that Defendants were aware of but failed
17 to correct. Monell, 436 U.S. 658, 694. In order to prevail on this theory of liability, Plaintiff must
18 prove more than just one, or two, or even three instances of similar constitutional violations
19 resulting from the widespread custom of the defendants. See Thomas, 604 F.3d at 303 (citing
20 Cosby v. Ward, 843 F.2d 967, 983 (7th Cir.1998). Further, “Plaintiff must demonstrate that there
21 is a policy at issue rather than a random event.” Id.

22 In his complaint, Plaintiff describes the underlying events as resulting from a “permanent
23 and settled culture, policy, and/or practice.” (Doc. 1, at 18-20.) However, Plaintiff makes no
24 allegations to suggest the events of May 23, 2014 are connected to his Monell claim by similar
25 constitutional violations, to wit, that the events of May 23, 2014 are an example of a particular
26 custom or policy that has a common thread with the underlying events. For example, Plaintiff
27 argues in his Reply that “It is difficult to imagine an act that demonstrates ratification,” of a
28 custom or policy within the meaning of Monell, “more clearly than [Defendants] harassing

1 Plaintiff” on May 23, 2014, but fails to make clear what custom or policy is being ratified, and if
2 that custom is the same one that caused the underlying events of June 2013. (Doc. 24, at 3.)
3 Therefore, it is difficult to entertain this encounter as anything other than a random event.

4 Further, Plaintiff failed to allege or otherwise demonstrate that a constitutional violation,
5 similar or dissimilar to the underlying events, occurred on May 23, 2014. Plaintiff readily states
6 that, “Defendants did not arrest Mr. Valenzuela, nor did they issue Mr. Valenzuela any sort of
7 citation” on May 23, 2014. (Doc. 17-1, at 3.) The fact that no constitutional violation is alleged
8 to have occurred on May 23, 2014 makes that encounter significantly less relevant to a Monell
9 claim. “If a person has suffered no constitutional injury at the hands of the individual police
10 officer, the fact that the departmental regulations might have authorized the use of
11 constitutionally excessive force is quite beside the point.” City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475
12 U.S. 796, 799, 106 S. Ct. 1571, 1573, 89 L. Ed. 2d 806 (1986).

13 At this time, the Court has nothing in the complaint or motion to compel on which to find
14 the events of May 23, 2014 are relevant to Plaintiff’s underlying action. The Court therefore
15 seeks to limit the scope of discovery to the allegations, claims, and defenses present in the
16 complaint.

17 IV. CONCLUSION

18 Based on the foregoing, the Court finds the contested discovery requests are not relevant
19 to the claims in Plaintiff’s Complaint. The Motion to Compel is **DENIED**.

20 **IT IS SO ORDERED.**

21 DATED: March 4, 2015

22 
23 United States Magistrate Judge

24 cc: The Honorable Cynthia Bashant
25 All Parties and Counsel of Record

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