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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 CLINICOMP INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
12 Plaintiff,
13 v.
14 CERNER CORPORATION,
15 Defendant.

Case No.: 17-cv-02479-GPC (DEB)

**ORDER AWARDING DEFENDANT
ATTORNEYS' FEES UNDER 35
U.S.C. § 285**

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17 On February 3, 2023, the Court granted Defendant Cerner Corporation (“Cerner”)’s
18 motion for attorneys’ fees pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 285; found this case to be “exceptional;”
19 and awarded Cerner its reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred since August 29, 2022. (Dkt.
20 No. 133.) On February 24, 2023, Cerner filed its brief in support of its request for its
21 attorneys’ fees incurred since August 29, 2022. (Dkt. No. 136.) On March 10, 2023,
22 CliniComp filed its response to Cerner’s request for attorneys’ fees. (Dkt. No. 141.) On
23 March 17, 2023, Cerner filed its reply. (Dkt. No. 149.) For the reasons set forth below,
24 the Court awards Cerner \$802,334.60 in attorneys’ fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285.

25 **I. BACKGROUND**

26 CliniComp is the owner of U.S. Patent No. 6,665,647 (“the ’647 Patent”) by
27 assignment. (Dkt. No. 1, Compl. ¶ 2.) In the present action, CliniComp alleged that Cerner
28 directly infringes claims 1, 2, 5, 10-13, 15-18, and 20-23 of the ’647 Patent by making,

1 using, selling, and/or offering to sell within the United States Cerner’s CommunityWorks,
2 PowerWorks, and Lights on Network services (collectively “the accused services”). (Dkt.
3 No. 103, Ex. 2 at 21; see also Dkt. No. 1, Compl. ¶¶ 15-16.)

4 On December 11, 2017, CliniComp filed a complaint for patent infringement against
5 Cerner, alleging infringement of the ’647 Patent. (Dkt. No. 1, Compl.) On May 16, 2018,
6 the Court granted Cerner’s motion to dismiss CliniComp’s claims for willful infringement
7 and indirect infringement as well as the relief sought in connection with these claims of
8 injunctive relief, treble damages, and exceptionality damages. (Dkt. No. 18 at 21.) On
9 June 25, 2018, Cerner filed an answer to CliniComp’s complaint. (Dkt. No. 19.)

10 On March 5, 2019, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”) instituted an *inter*
11 *partes* review (“IPR”) as to claims 1-25 and 50-55 of the ’647 Patent. (Dkt. No. 30-1, Ex.
12 A.) On March 7, 2019, the Court granted a stay of the action pending completion of the
13 IPR proceedings. (Dkt. No. 31.) On March 26, 2020, the PTAB issued a final written
14 decision, determining that claims 50-55 of the ’647 Patent are not patentable in light of the
15 prior art, but that claims 1-25 of the ’647 Patent are patentable.¹ (Dkt. No. 32, Ex. A at 93-
16 94.) On April 20, 2021, the Federal Circuit affirmed the PTAB’s determination that claims
17 1-25 of the ’647 Patent are patentable.² (Dkt. No. 38-2, Ex. B at 10.) On June 24, 2021,
18 the Court granted the parties’ joint motion to lift the stay of the action. (Dkt. No. 44.)

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21 ¹ Specifically, the PTAB concluded that Cerner had shown by a preponderance of the
22 evidence that: (1) claims 50-52 are not patentable based on Evans; (2) claims 53 and 54 are
23 not patentable based on Evans and Rai; (3) claims 50-53, and 55 are not patentable based
24 on Johnson and Evans; and (4) claim 54 is not patentable based on Johnson, Evans, and
25 Rai. (Dkt. No. 32, Ex. A at 93-94.) The PTAB further concluded that Cerner had not
26 shown by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) that claims 1-5, 10-13, and 15-25 are
unpatentable based on Johnson and Evans; or (2) that claims 6-9, and 14 are unpatentable
based on Johnson, Evans, and Rai. (*Id.* at 93.)

27 ² On November 15, 2021, the PTO issued an *inter partes* review certificate for the
28 ’647 Patent, stating: “Claims 1-25 are found patentable” and “Claims 50-55 are cancelled.”
(Dkt. No. 71-2, Ex. A at A-20–A-21.)

1 On July 23, 2021, Cerner filed an amended answer to CliniComp’s complaint. (Dkt.
2 No. 52.) On October 7, 2021, the Court issued a scheduling order for the action. (Dkt. No.
3 55.) On July 28, 2022, the Court issued a claim construction order, construing the disputed
4 claim terms from the ’647 Patent. (Dkt. No. 91.)

5 On November 15, 2022, the Court granted Cerner’s motion for summary judgment
6 of non-infringement. (Dkt. No. 120.) Specifically, the Court held that Cerner demonstrated
7 that the accused services do not infringe the asserted claims of the ’647 Patent as a matter
8 of law. (Id. at 44.) On November 16, 2022, the Court entered a judgment in the action in
9 favor of Defendant Cerner and against Plaintiff CliniComp. (Dkt. No. 121.)

10 On December 30, 2022, the Clerk of Court taxed costs in favor of Cerner in the
11 amount of \$8,265.80. (Dkt. No. 131 at 3.) On February 3, 2023, the Court granted Cerner’s
12 motion for attorneys’ fees pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 285, and the Court awarded Cerner its
13 reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred since August 29, 2022. (Dkt. No. 133 at 23.) By the
14 present briefing, Cerner requests that the Court award it \$802,334.60 for its attorneys’ fees
15 incurred since August 29, 2022. (Dkt. No. 144 at 1, 11; Dkt. No. 149 at 6.)

16 II. DISCUSSION

17 Cerner requests that the Court award it \$802,334.60 in attorneys’ fees under the
18 lodestar method. (Dkt. No. 144 at 1-2; Dkt. No. 149 at 6.) An award of attorneys’ fees
19 under 35 U.S.C. § 285 must be “reasonable.” Kilopass Tech., Inc. v. Sidense Corp., 82 F.
20 Supp. 3d 1154, 1164 (N.D. Cal. 2015); see SRI Int’l, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 930 F.3d
21 1295, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“Section 285 permits a prevailing party to recover reasonable
22 attorneys’ fees.”). “The requirement that fees awarded be reasonable is a safeguard against
23 excessive reimbursement.” IPS Grp., Inc. v. Duncan Sols., Inc., No. 15-CV-1526-CAB
24 (MDD), 2018 WL 3956019, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2018) (citing Mathis v. Spears, 857
25 F.2d 749, 754 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).

26 In calculating an attorneys’ fee award under § 285, “a district court usually applies
27 the lodestar method, which provides a presumptively reasonable fee amount by multiplying
28 a reasonable hourly rate by the reasonable number of hours required to litigate a

1 comparable case.” Lumen View Tech. LLC v. Findthebest.com, Inc., 811 F.3d 479, 483
2 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542, 551, 554 (2010));
3 see also Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 965 (9th Cir. 2003) (“When a statute provides
4 for such fees, it is termed a ‘fee-shifting’ statute. Under a fee-shifting statute, the court
5 ‘must calculate awards for attorneys’ fees using the ‘lodestar’ method.”). “Ultimately, a
6 ‘reasonable’ number of hours equals ‘the number of hours which could reasonably have
7 been billed to a private client.” Gonzalez v. City of Maywood, 729 F.3d 1196, 1202 (9th
8 Cir. 2013) (quoting Moreno v. City of Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1111 (9th Cir. 2008)).
9 A district court should not award “fees for hours expended by counsel that were ‘excessive,
10 redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.” SRI, 930 F.3d at 1311 (quoting Hensley v.
11 Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983)); accord Gonzalez, 729 F.3d at 1203.

12 “The fee applicant bears the burden of establishing entitlement to an award and
13 documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly rates.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437;
14 see Welch v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 480 F.3d 942, 945–46 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The party
15 seeking fees bears the burden of documenting the hours expended in the litigation and must
16 submit evidence supporting those hours and the rates claimed.”). “Once the party seeking
17 fees meets that initial burden of adequately documenting the hours requested, the burden
18 shifts to the opposing party” to challenge the accuracy and reasonableness of the hours
19 billed. Maloney v. T3Media, Inc., No. CV 14-05048-AB VBKX, 2015 WL 3879634, at
20 *4 (C.D. Cal. May 27, 2015); see Hiken v. Dep’t of Def., 836 F.3d 1037, 1045 (9th Cir.
21 2016) (“[T]he party opposing the fee application has a burden of rebuttal that requires
22 submission of evidence to the district court challenging the accuracy and reasonableness
23 of the hours charged or the facts asserted by the prevailing party in its submitted
24 affidavits.”) (quoting Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1397–98 (9th Cir. 1992)).

25 The determination of the amount of reasonable attorneys’ fees under § 285 is “‘a
26 matter that is committed to the sound discretion of a district court judge.” In re Rembrandt
27 Techs. LP Pat. Litig., 899 F.3d 1254, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Lumen View, 811
28 F.3d at 483). In awarding fees, a district court must “explain how it came up with the

1 amount,” and that explanation “must be ‘concise but clear.’” Moreno, 534 F.3d at 1111
2 (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437); see also United Steelworkers of Am. v. Phelps Dodge
3 Corp., 896 F.2d 403, 407 (9th Cir. 1990) (“[H]ours actually expended in the litigation are
4 not to be disallowed without a supporting rationale.”). “Where the difference between the
5 lawyer’s request and the court’s award is relatively small, a somewhat cursory explanation
6 will suffice. But where the disparity is larger, a more specific articulation of the court’s
7 reasoning is expected.” Moreno, 534 F.3d at 1111.

8 In support of its fees request, Cerner explains that the undiscounted hourly rates for
9 defense counsel in this action are as follows: (1) \$1,465, \$1,120, and \$1,055 for the three
10 partners; (2) \$805 and \$610 for the two associates; and (3) \$495, \$420, and \$415 for the
11 three paralegals. (Dkt. No. 144 at 2-3.) Cerner further explains that the actual hourly rates
12 paid by Cerner are lower than this due to the benefit of a negotiated discount that Cerner
13 received from defense counsel. (Id. at 2-3.)

14 The Court finds these hourly rates to be reasonable. First, “rate determinations in
15 other cases . . . are satisfactory evidence of the prevailing market rate.” United
16 Steelworkers, 896 F.2d at 407. District courts in other complex patent cases have found
17 similar rates to be reasonable in awarding attorneys’ fees. See, e.g., Orthopaedic Hosp. v.
18 Encore Med., L.P., No. 319CV00970JLSAHG, 2021 WL 5449041, at *13 (S.D. Cal. Nov.
19 19, 2021) (approving hourly rates of up to \$1,260 for partners and \$1,065 for associates as
20 reasonable); NuVasive, Inc. v. Alphatec Holdings, Inc., No. 3:18-CV-347-CAB-MDD,
21 2020 WL 6876300, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2020) (approving hourly rates of \$1,005 and
22 \$860 for partners as reasonable); Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., No. 08-CV-
23 05780-LHK, 2017 WL 3394754, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2017) (approving Orrick’s hourly
24 rates of up to \$1,200 for a partner, \$800 for an associate, and \$430 for a paralegal as
25 reasonable); Healthier Choices Mgmt. Corp. v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., No. 1:20-CV-
26 4816-TCB, 2022 WL 870206, at *4 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 22, 2022) (approving hourly rates of
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1 up to \$1,318 for partners, \$935 for associates, and \$450 for paralegals as reasonable).³
2 Second, “[t]he reasonableness of the requested rates is strongly supported by the fact that
3 these are the rates that counsel billed to [Cerner] and that [Cerner] has already paid.”
4 Facebook, 2017 WL 3394754, at *7; see Wi-LAN, 2022 WL 1224901, at *4 (“The Federal
5 Circuit has explicitly approved the award of attorney fees under § 285 at the rates that the
6 attorneys actually charged.” (citing SRI, 930 F.3d at 1311)). Third, that Cerner received a
7 discount on the hourly rates at issue also supports the reasonableness of the rates. See
8 Orthopaedic Hosp., 2021 WL 5449041, at *14. Fourth, “the fact that this matter is a
9 complex, high-stakes patent litigation” further supports the reasonableness of the rates. Id.;
10 see also Yufa v. TSI Inc., No. 09-CV-01315-KAW, 2014 WL 4071902, at *5 (N.D. Cal.
11 Aug. 14, 2014) (“[T]he field of intellectual property law requires specialized knowledge.”).
12 Finally, CliniComp does not challenge the reasonableness of Cerner’s hourly rates.

13 Turning to the reasonable number of hours expended, “to determine whether
14 attorneys for the prevailing party could have reasonably billed the hours they claim to their
15 private clients, the district court should begin with the billing records the prevailing party
16 has submitted.” Gonzalez, 729 F.3d at 1202. As part of its fee request, Cerner has provided
17 the Court with detailed billing records with time billed in one-tenth of an hour increments
18 and with specific narratives detailing each billed task. (See Dkt. No. 144, Bobrow Decl.
19 Ex. 1.) After reviewing these billing records, the Court finds the hours expended by
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22 ³ Although the Court cites to cases from the Northern District of California and the
23 Northern District of Georgia, this is permissible because as another court in this District
24 has explained: “based on the Court’s knowledge of local billing rates and of the practices
25 of national law firms, large national law firms . . . do not charge different rates based on
26 the jurisdiction in which a complex patent lawsuit is filed.” NuVasive, 2020 WL 6876300,
27 at *3 n.1; see also Wi-LAN Inc. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., No. CV 15-379-LPS, 2022 WL
28 1224901, at *4 (D. Del. Apr. 25, 2022) (“[T]his Court remains of the view that the
appropriate ‘market’ for assessing rates in a high-stakes patent litigation like the instant
case is the market for national (and Delaware) counsel who litigate patent cases in
Delaware.”).

1 Cerner’s counsel to be reasonable.

2 Although CliniComp does not challenge the total number of hours billed by Cerner’s
3 attorneys, CliniComp challenges Cerner’s requested fees on the grounds that the amount
4 reflects a disproportionately high use of partners for routine matters. (Dkt. No. 141 at 1-
5 5.) CliniComp contends that district courts have held that when a case is appropriately
6 staffed, partner time should account for no more than 30% of the total time. (Id. at 2 (citing
7 Larson v. United Nat. Foods W. Inc., No. CV-10-00185-PHX-DGC, 2013 WL 4507473,
8 at *2 (D. Ariz. Aug. 23, 2013).)⁴ CliniComp notes, for example, that Cerner’s partners
9 accounted for 71% of the hours expended on Cerner’s motion for summary judgment and
10 72% of the hours expended on Cerner’s motion for attorneys’ fees.⁵ (Id. at 3.) CliniComp
11 argues that, in light of this “top-heavy billing” by Cerner, the Court should exercise its
12 discretion and reduce Cerner’s requested fee amount by 50%, to correct a purported 82%

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15 ⁴ The Court notes that to support this contention, CliniComp cites to a single district
16 court case that involved claims for violation of the Family Medical Leave Act and for
17 disability discrimination and did not involve complex claims for patent infringement. See
18 Larson, 2013 WL 4507473, at *1. Further, in that case, the district court did not broadly
19 state that when a case is appropriately staffed, partner time should generally account for no
20 more than 30% of the total time. Rather, the district court specifically stated “a reasonable
21 fee *in this case* includes no more than 30% of the time at partner rates.” Id. at *2 (emphasis
22 added).

23 ⁵ In its brief, CliniComp asserts that achieving summary judgment on claims that a
24 party considered to be meritless does not require that most of the work be done by a partner,
25 and CliniComp notes that Cerner asserted that CliniComp’s claim for patent infringement
26 was meritless following the issuance of the Court’s claim construction order. (Dkt. No.
27 141 at 3 (citing Larson, 2013 WL 4507473, at *2.) The Court notes that although this may
28 generally be true, the present case involved complex technology. Further, as explained in
the Court’s February 3, 2023 order granting Cerner’s motion for attorneys’ fees,
CliniComp changed its theory of infringement at least three times during the summary
judgment stage of this case. (See Dkt No. 133 at 13-19.) A theory of infringement that
changes three times in a few months, even if meritless, probably demands more attention
from partners at the summary judgment stage than a meritless claim for patent infringement
that is static. (See also Dkt. No. 149 at 2-4.)

1 overbilling by partners. (Id. at 4-5.)

2 In response, Cerner contends that its staffing decisions were reasonable and justified
3 by the demands of its clients in the legal market. (Dkt. No. 149 at 1.) Cerner contends: “It
4 is widely recognized that, for the last decade, clients have been pushing back on the use of
5 junior lawyers, particularly given the increase in associate salaries and billing rates.
6 Clients, including Cerner, find it more efficient to use more senior attorneys because they
7 get the work done in significantly less time than junior lawyers.” (Id. (citing Dkt. No. 149-
8 1, Bobrow Decl. ¶ 5).) Cerner explains that this is underscored by “the shrinking delta
9 between partner and non-partner billing rates as associate salaries increase.” (Id.) Cerner
10 further notes that the discounted hourly rates for two of its partners on this case were less
11 than or commensurate with the rates of non-partner attorneys that courts in this District
12 have found to be reasonable in other cases. (Id. at 1-2.)

13 Although the Court agrees with CliniComp that Cerner’s law firm could have better
14 utilized its associates in this case,⁶ Cerner’s counsel has provided reasonable explanations
15 for its staffing decisions. (See Dkt. No. 149 at 1-4; Dkt. No. 149-1, Bobrow Decl. ¶¶ 5-7.)
16 Further, the Court agrees with Cerner that the problem with CliniComp’s challenge is that
17 it fails to consider the discounted hourly rates that Cerner was paying the partners at issue.
18 In light of those discounts, Cerner was essentially paying reasonable senior associate-level
19 hourly rates for the work of two of three partners in this case. See, e.g., Orthopaedic Hosp.,
20 2021 WL 5449041, at *13 (approving hourly rates of up to \$1,065 for associates as
21 reasonable); Healthier Choices, 2022 WL 870206, at *4 (approving hourly rates of up to
22 \$935 for associates as reasonable); Facebook, 2017 WL 3394754, at *7 (approving
23 Orrick’s hourly rates of up to \$800 for an associate). As such, the Court rejects
24 CliniComp’s characterization of Cerner’s staffing decisions as “top-heavy billing,” and the
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27 ⁶ The Court acknowledges that it also appears to be true that CliniComp’s law firm
28 could have better utilized its associates in this case as well. (See Dkt. No. 149 at 2; Dkt.
No. 149-1, Bobrow Decl. ¶ 8.)

1 Court rejects CliniComp’s request to reduce Cerner’s requested fee amount by 50%. See
2 also Finjan, Inc. v. Juniper Network, Inc., No. 3:17-CV-05659-WHA, 2021 WL 3674101,
3 at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 20, 2021), report and recommendation adopted by Finjan, Inc. v.
4 Juniper Networks, Inc., No. C 17-05659 WHA, 2021 WL 3140716 (N.D. Cal. July 26,
5 2021) (“In its strongest form, Finjan’s argument appears to be that Juniper could only
6 reasonably defend the case by employing a model where its lead counsel only parachuted
7 in for hearings and trial. That is not the only way to reasonably staff a case, or even
8 necessarily advisable given the benefits that experienced counsel can bring to a case.”).


9 Finally, CliniComp asserts that even if the Court finds Cerner’s hourly rates and
10 hours expended to be reasonable, the Court may make a discretionary 10% reduction to the
11 requested fees. (Dkt. No. 141 at 5.) The Ninth Circuit has explained that in determining
12 the reasonableness of a fees request, a “district court can impose a small reduction, no
13 greater than 10 percent—a “haircut”—based on its exercise of discretion and without a . .
14 . specific explanation.” Gonzalez, 729 F.3d at 1203 (quoting Moreno, 534 F.3d at 1112).
15 The Court, exercising its sound discretion, declines to perform a “haircut” to Cerner’s
16 requested amount of fees.

17 III. CONCLUSION

18 For the reasons above, the Court awards Cerner \$802,334.60 in attorneys’ fees under
19 35 U.S.C. § 285.

20 IT IS SO ORDERED.

21 Dated: March 22, 2023

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23 Hon. Gonzalo P. Curiel
24 United States District Judge
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