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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DANIEL LUDLOW, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated; and WILLIAM LANCASTER, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

v.

FLOWERS FOODS, INC., a Georgia corporation; FLOWERS BAKERIES, LLC, a Georgia limited liability company; and FLOWERS FINANCE, LLC, a limited liability company,

Defendants.

Case No.: 18cv1190-JO-JLB

**ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’
MOTION TO COMPEL
ARBITRATION AS TO EIGHTEEN
OPT-IN PLAINTIFFS**

Plaintiffs bring a wage and hour class action asserting a collective claim under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and class action claims under California law.¹ Dkt. 56 (FAC). Defendants Flowers Foods, Inc. (“Flowers Foods”), Flowers Bakeries, LLC (“Flowers Bakeries”), and Flowers Finance, LLC (“Flowers Finance”) (collectively,

¹ While the FLSA and Federal Rule 23 are both mechanisms for group resolution, they require different procedures such as the need for a plaintiff to affirmatively “opt in” to a collective action under the FLSA for his or her claim to be adjudicated.

1 “Defendants”) have filed a motion to compel arbitration as to eighteen plaintiffs (the
2 “Arbitration Plaintiffs”) who opted in to the above-captioned action under the FLSA. Dkt.
3 225. The Court held oral argument on March 30, 2022. For the reasons discussed below,
4 Defendants’ motion is DENIED.

5 I. BACKGROUND

6 Plaintiffs are a putative class of delivery drivers alleging they were misclassified as
7 independent contractors instead of employees. FAC ¶¶ 1, 12. Plaintiffs work for Flowers
8 Foods², which manufactures and sells packaged bakery products to restaurant and retail
9 customers. *Id.* ¶ 16. Flowers Foods relies on delivery drivers such as Plaintiffs—which
10 they refer to as “distributors”—to deliver the bakery products to the customer locations.

11 The distributor relationship is governed by a Distributor Agreement (“DA”) entered
12 between a distributor and a local operating subsidiary of Flowers Foods. *Id.* ¶ 22. Each of
13 the eighteen Arbitration Plaintiffs signed a DA with an arbitration clause incorporating a
14 separate signed arbitration agreement. Dkts. 225-9–225-26, 225-29 (the “Arbitration
15 Agreement”). The Arbitration Agreements at issue were signed by an Arbitration Plaintiff
16 and two local operating subsidiaries of Flower Foods—namely, Flowers Modesto or
17 Flowers Henderson. *Id.* The Arbitration Agreement, which identifies “COMPANY” as
18 the local operating subsidiary, requires claims and disputes involving the DA to be resolved
19 through binding arbitration:

20 The parties agree that any claim, dispute, and/or controversy
21 except as specifically excluded herein, that either
22 DISTRIBUTOR (including its owner or owners) may have
23 against COMPANY (**and/or its affiliated companies** and its

24 ² Flowers Foods’ corporate structure is organized as multiple layers of parent
25 companies. Specifically, Flowers Foods is the parent company of Defendant Flowers
26 Bakeries—a subsidiary “charged with sales related activities”—which in turn is the parent
27 company of numerous local operating subsidiaries such as non-parties Flowers Baking Co.
28 of Modesto, LLC (“Flowers Modesto”) and Flowers Baking Co. of Henderson, LLC
29 (“Flowers Henderson”). *Id.* ¶¶ 16, 17, 18. Defendant Flowers Finance is another
30 subsidiary of Flowers Foods that provides financing services for Flowers Foods. *Id.* ¶ 19.

1 and/or their directors, officers, managers, employees, and agents
2 and their successors and assigns) or that COMPANY may have
3 against DISTRIBUTOR (or its owners, directors, officers,
4 managers, employees, and agents), arising from, related to, or
5 having any relationship or connection whatsoever with: (i) the
6 Distributor Agreement between DISTRIBUTOR and
7 COMPANY (“Agreement”), (ii) the termination of the
8 Agreement, (iii) services provided to COMPANY by
9 DISTRIBUTOR or by DISTRIBUTOR to COMPANY, or (iv)
10 any other dealings between DISTRIBUTOR and COMPANY
11 (“Covered Claims”) shall be submitted to and determined
12 exclusively by binding arbitration under the Federal Arbitration
13 Act (9 U.S.C. §§ 1, et seq.) (“FAA”) in conformity with the
14 Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration
15 Association (“AAA” or “AAA Rules”), or any successor rules,
16 except as otherwise agreed to by the parties and/or specified
17 herein. Arbitration Agreement at ¶ 1(emphasis added).

18 The Arbitration Agreement covers claims challenging the independent
19 contractor status of the Distributor:

20 The Covered Claims covered under this Arbitration Agreement
21 include, but are not limited to: breach of contract, any claims
22 challenging the independent contractor status of
23 DISTRIBUTOR, claims alleging that DISTRIBUTOR was
24 misclassified as an independent contractor, any other claims
25 premised upon DISTRIBUTOR’s alleged status as anything
26 other than an independent contractor, tort claims, discrimination
27 claims, retaliation claims, and claims for alleged unpaid
28 compensation, civil penalties, or statutory penalties either under
federal or state law. Arbitration Agreement at ¶ 7.

On February 21, 2019, Plaintiffs filed an amended collective and class action
complaint asserting claims arising from their alleged misclassification as independent
contractors: failure to pay overtime under the FLSA, injunctive relief and restitution under
California’s Unfair Competition Law, fraud, and wage-and-hour claims under the
California Labor Code. *See generally* FAC. Plaintiffs also asserted usury-related claims
against Flowers Finance. *Id.* Approximately 115 total plaintiffs (“Opt-In Plaintiffs”),
including the eighteen Arbitration Plaintiffs at issue in this motion, opted in to the proposed

1 FLSA collective class. The Arbitration Plaintiffs opted to join the action between June
2 2019 and November 2019. Dkt. 225-5 at 6–7. On June 8, 2021, Defendants filed the
3 instant motion to compel the Arbitration Plaintiffs to arbitration pursuant to the Arbitration
4 Agreements.

5 After Arbitration Plaintiffs opted to join the action and prior to Defendants’ filing of
6 the motion to compel arbitration, the parties actively litigated the action. During this time,
7 Defendants served substantial discovery requests and engaged in various discovery
8 disputes requiring court intervention. For example, on November 15, 2019, the Court held
9 a discovery conference regarding a dispute over Defendants’ discovery requests on each of
10 the 115 Opt-In Plaintiffs. Dkt. 148. On December 11, 2019, the Court held another
11 discovery conference regarding, in part, continued concern over Defendants’ overbroad
12 discovery requests on the Opt-In Plaintiffs. Dkt. 160. On July 6, 2020, following motion
13 practice, the Court ordered each Opt-In Plaintiff (including Arbitration Plaintiffs) to
14 respond to ten RFPs and one set of five interrogatories, and fifteen randomly selected Opt-
15 In Plaintiffs to respond to an additional seven RFPs and sit for deposition. Dkt. 181.

16 Additionally, on August 13, 2019, Defendants filed a motion to stay the action
17 pending the California Supreme Court’s decision on whether the ABC Test articulated in
18 *Dynamex Operations West Inc. v. Superior Court*, 4 Cal. 5th 903 (2018), applies
19 retroactively.³ Dkt. 116. On September 20, 2019, while the motion to stay was pending,
20 Defendants filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings with regard to the fraud and usury
21 claims. Dkt. 123. After the stay was lifted, Defendants filed a renewed motion for
22 judgment on the pleadings on February 24, 2021, which resulted in the dismissal of the
23 fraud and usury claims. Dkts. 200, 252. On March 29, 2022, one day before oral argument
24 on the motion to compel arbitration, Defendants filed a motion for decertification of the
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27 ³ On February 18, 2020, the Court granted Defendants’ motion to stay, and the entire
28 action was stayed until January 29, 2021, by which the California Supreme Court issued a
written decision holding that *Dynamex* does apply retroactively. Dkts. 174, 197.

1 FLSA collective claim, which cited to discovery from certain Arbitration Plaintiffs. Dkt.
2 297.

3 II. LEGAL STANDARD

4 The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) provides that arbitration agreements are
5 “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds [that exist] for the revocation
6 of any contract.” 9 U.S.C. ¶ 2. A district court may, therefore, decline to enforce an
7 arbitration agreement based on generally applicable contract defenses, such as waiver,
8 without contravening the FAA. *See Ferguson v. Countrywide Credit Indus.*, 298 F.3d 778,
9 782 (9th Cir. 2002). While there is a “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration,” *AT&T*
10 *Mobility LLC v. Conception*, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011), the court “should apply ordinary
11 state-law principles” governing contracts to determine whether to invalidate or enforce an
12 arbitration agreement. *Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc.*, 328 F.3d 1165, 1170 (9th Cir.
13 2003) (quoting *First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan*, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995)).

14 III. DISCUSSION

15 Arbitration Plaintiffs argue that (1) Defendants cannot enforce the Arbitration
16 Agreement because they are not signatories to the agreement; (2) even if Defendants could
17 enforce the Arbitration Agreement, they waived their right to arbitrate; and (3) even if there
18 were no waiver, the Arbitration Agreement is unconscionable and therefore invalid. The
19 Court first examines whether Defendants can enforce the Arbitration Agreement as a non-
20 signatory, and then turns to whether the Arbitration Agreement has been waived. Because
21 the Court determines that there is waiver, it does not reach the unconscionability argument.

22 A. Defendants Can Enforce the Arbitration Agreement as Third-Party 23 Beneficiaries

24 First, Arbitration Plaintiffs argue that Defendants cannot enforce the Arbitration
25 Agreements because only the local operating subsidiaries—Flowers Modesto or Flowers
26 Henderson—and not Defendants, signed the Arbitration Agreement with the Arbitration
27 Plaintiffs. The Court is not persuaded.

1 Generally, “a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute [with
2 another] which he has not agreed so to submit.” *See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. NASA*
3 *Services, Inc.*, 957 F.3d 1038, 1041 (9th Cir. 2020) (internal citations omitted). However,
4 a party to an arbitration agreement may still be compelled to arbitration by a non-signatory
5 pursuant to state contract law principles. *Arthur Anderson, LLP v. Carlisle*, 556 U.S. 624,
6 631–32 (2009); *Murphy v. DIRECTV, Inc.*, 724 F.3d 1218, 1233–34 (9th Cir. 2013). Under
7 California law, non-signatories to an agreement may enforce a contract if the agreement is
8 “made expressly for their benefit.” *Ronay Fam. Ltd. P’ship v. Tweed*, 216 Cal. App. 4th
9 830, 838 (2013) (citing Cal. Civ. Code § 1559). An arbitration agreement is made
10 expressly for the benefit of certain parties if the arbitration clause provides that it covers
11 claims involving those parties. *See id.* at 839. Here, the Arbitration Agreement
12 encompasses claims between Arbitration Plaintiffs and the “affiliated companies” of
13 Flowers Modesto or Flowers Henderson. Arbitration Agreement at ¶ 1. The Arbitration
14 Agreement does not define the term “affiliated companies” or specifically name any
15 affiliated entities. Thus, the Arbitration Agreement is enforceable by Defendants if
16 Defendants are “affiliated companies” of Flowers Modesto or Flowers Henderson.

17 The Court now examines whether Defendants are affiliated companies of Flowers
18 Modesto or Flowers Henderson that benefit from the Arbitration Agreement such that they
19 can enforce the agreement. The words of a contract are to be understood in their ordinary
20 and popular sense. Cal. Civ. Code § 1644. An “affiliate” is generally understood as “a
21 company effectively controlled by another or associated with others under common
22 ownership or control.” *Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, Inc.*, 569 F.3d 946, 955 (9th Cir.
23 2009) (quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 35 (2002)). Courts have
24 found a parent company to be an “affiliate” of a subsidiary. *Hajibekyan v. BMW of North*
25 *America, LLC*, 839 Fed. Appx. 187, 188 (9th Cir. 2021) (holding that parent company is
26 “affiliate” and can enforce arbitration agreement); *Kaselitz v. hiSoft Tech. Int’l, Ltd.*, 2013
27 WL 622382, at *6–7 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 15, 2013) (a “parent” of a corporation is an “affiliate”
28 of such corporation).

1 The Court finds that the Arbitration Agreement is made for the benefit of Defendants
2 because it covers claims involving them as “affiliated companies.” Here, Flowers Foods
3 is the parent company of Flowers Bakeries, which is the parent company of Flowers
4 Modesto and Flowers Henderson, the local operating subsidiaries that signed the
5 Arbitration Agreements with Arbitration Plaintiffs. FAC ¶¶ 16, 17, 18. Both Flowers
6 Foods and Flowers Bakeries are parent companies and associated under common
7 ownership with the signatory subsidiaries. They are thus affiliates of those subsidiaries.
8 *See Haijbekyan*, 839 Fed. Appx. at 188. Arbitration Plaintiffs argue that Defendants cannot
9 be affiliates because they have denied any control over the operating subsidiaries. The
10 Court rejects Arbitration Plaintiffs’ argument on the grounds that the ordinary definition of
11 “affiliate,” as explained above, also includes an association with others under common
12 ownership that does not require a degree of control. Accordingly, the Court finds that
13 Defendants are a beneficiary of the Arbitration Agreement as “affiliated companies” and
14 can thus enforce the arbitration provisions of the Arbitration Agreement.

15 **B. Defendants Waived Their Right to Arbitration**

16 Second, Arbitration Plaintiffs argue, and the Court agrees, that even if Defendants
17 can enforce the Arbitration Agreement, Defendants have waived their right to compel
18 arbitration due to their litigation conduct thus far.

19 The right to arbitration, like other contractual rights, can be waived. *United States*
20 *v. Park Place Assocs., Ltd.*, 563 F.3d 907, 921 (9th Cir. 2009). The party arguing waiver
21 of the right to arbitration bears a heavy burden of proof. *Britton v. Co-op Banking Group*,
22 916 F.2d 1405, 1412 (9th Cir. 1990). To carry this burden, the Ninth Circuit has previously
23 required a party to demonstrate three elements: (1) the moving party had knowledge of the
24 existing right to compel arbitration; (2) the party acted inconsistently with that right; and
25 (3) the inconsistent acts resulted in prejudice. *Newirth by and through Newirth v. Aegis*
26 *Senior Cmtys., LLC*, 931 F.3d 935, 940 (9th Cir. 2019). The Supreme Court recently
27 clarified that the third element, a showing of prejudice, is not a condition of the waiver of
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1 the right to arbitrate. *Morgan v. Sundance, Inc.*, Case No. 23-328, 596 U.S. __ (May 23,
2 2022).

3 Defendants do not contest they had knowledge of their right to compel arbitration,
4 and so the Court examines only whether Defendants waived their right to arbitration by
5 engaging in litigation conduct that is inconsistent with such a right. “There is no concrete
6 test to determine whether a party has engaged in acts that are inconsistent with its right to
7 arbitrate.” *Martin v. Yasuda*, 829 F.3d 1118, 1125 (9th Cir. 2016). Instead, the question
8 of waiver turns on the “totality” of the moving party’s actions, including a party’s
9 “extended silence and delay in moving for arbitration” and its active litigation of the case
10 “to take advantage of being in federal court.” *Id.* Taking strategic advantage of being in
11 federal court includes actions such as conducting discovery and seeking a judicial judgment
12 on the merits of an issue. *Id.* “A statement by a party that it has a right to arbitration in
13 pleadings or motions is not enough to defeat a claim of waiver.” *Id.* In *Yasuda*, for
14 example, the Ninth Circuit held that defendants in a collective and class action lawsuit,
15 despite repeatedly asserting arbitration as an affirmative defense, waived their right to
16 arbitrate because they spent seventeen months litigating the case, entered into a protective
17 order, answered discovery, and conducted depositions. *Id.* at 1125–26.

18 Here, like in *Yasuda*, Defendants waited nearly two years after Arbitration Plaintiffs
19 opted in to the action to seek to compel them to arbitration. In that time, Defendants filed
20 a successful motion to stay the entire action that resulted in a stay of almost a year, which
21 relieved Defendants from otherwise engaging in piecemeal litigation and arbitration while
22 waiting to see how the California court would rule on a key substantive issue. Moreover,
23 Defendants directed discovery at Arbitration Plaintiffs—choosing to benefit from
24 Arbitration Plaintiffs’ presence in the federal forum by taking advantage of the court’s
25 discovery mechanisms—that they subsequently relied on in their motion for decertification
26 of the FLSA collective claim in this action. Defendants also filed a motion on the merits
27 that resulted in the dismissal of the fraud and usury claims brought by Plaintiffs.
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1 Defendants have thus gained a strategic advantage during the course of the litigation based
2 on their conduct toward Arbitration Plaintiffs.

3 Defendants contended during oral argument that they did not act inconsistently with
4 arbitration because they had repeatedly informed opposing counsel that they intended to
5 compel the arbitration of any Opt-In Plaintiffs who had arbitration agreements. The Court
6 rejects this argument on the grounds that such statements reserving their arbitration right
7 while still actively litigating in federal court—that is, hedging their bets in both forums—
8 are not sufficient to defeat waiver. *See Yasuda*, 829 F.3d at 1125–26. The *Yasuda* court
9 found that defendant waived its arbitration right, despite pleading arbitration as an
10 affirmative defense and maintaining that each plaintiff executed an arbitration agreement
11 in its joint status reports, because it continued to seek discovery and litigate key merits
12 issues to benefit from being in a federal forum. *Id.* Similarly, here, Defendants’ statements
13 to opposing counsel that they intended to seek arbitration do not circumvent waiver because
14 they continued to engage in litigation conduct, as described above, to their advantage. The
15 Court finds that this element is satisfied because the totality of Defendants’ actions is
16 inconsistent with exercising their right to arbitrate. The Arbitration Agreements have,
17 therefore, been waived.⁴

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24 ⁴ Even if prejudice to Arbitration Plaintiffs were a requirement for waiver, the Court
25 finds that such a requirement has been met. As a result of Defendants’ delay in seeking
26 arbitration, Arbitration Plaintiffs were forced to expend time and expense responding to
27 discovery requests and engaging in motion practice that they otherwise would not have
28 incurred had Defendants properly sought to compel arbitration when the Arbitration
Plaintiffs first joined the action. Defendants also gained a strategic advantage from use of
such discovery in motion practice on the merits in federal court, such as the motion for
decertification of the FLSA collective claim.

1 **IV. CONCLUSION**

2 For the reasons discussed above, Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration as to the
3 Arbitration Plaintiffs is DENIED.

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5 **IT IS SO ORDERED.**

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7 Dated: June 1, 2022

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10 Honorable Jinsook Ohta
11 United States District Judge
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