

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STRIKE 3 HOLDINGS, LLC,  
  
Plaintiff,  
  
v.  
  
JOHN DOE subscriber assigned IP address  
107.204.75.203,  
  
Defendant.

Case No.: 21cv591-CAB (MSB)

**ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S EX  
PARTE APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO  
SERVE A THIRD-PARTY SUBPOENA  
PRIOR TO A RULE 26(f) CONFERENCE  
[ECF NO. 4]**

On April 21, 2021, Plaintiff Strike 3 Holdings, LLC (“Strike 3”) filed an “Ex-Parte Application for Leave to Serve a Third-Party Subpoena Prior to a Rule 26(f) Conference” (“Ex Parte Application”). (ECF No. 4.) Plaintiff seeks to subpoena Defendant John Doe’s Internet Service Provider (“ISP”) AT&T U-verse for “limited, immediate discovery . . . so that Plaintiff may learn Defendant’s identity, further investigate Defendant’s role in the infringement, and effectuate service.” (ECF No. 4-1 at 7–8.) Because Defendant has not been identified, no opposition or reply briefs have been filed. For the following reasons, the Ex Parte Application is **GRANTED**.

///  
///  
///

1 **I. BACKGROUND**

2 Plaintiff owns the copyright to certain motion pictures. (ECF No. 4-2 at 4.) On  
3 April 5, 2021, Plaintiff filed a Complaint alleging that Defendant John Doe, an internet  
4 subscriber assigned Internet protocol (“IP”) address 107.204.75.203, has been using the  
5 BitTorrent protocol to commit “rampant and wholesale copyright infringement” by  
6 downloading and distributing fifty-seven of Plaintiff’s copyrighted works over an  
7 extended period of time. (ECF No. 1 at 1–2.) Plaintiff alleges it used its proprietary  
8 forensic software, VXN Scan, to discover that Defendant’s IP address was illegally  
9 distributing Plaintiff’s copyrighted motion pictures. (ECF No. 4-1 at 7; ECF No. 4-2 at 19–  
10 20.)

11 On April 21, 2021, Plaintiff filed the instant Ex Parte Application to seek leave to  
12 serve a subpoena pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45 on Defendant’s ISP,  
13 AT&T U-verse. (ECF No. 4-1 at 8.) Plaintiff maintains that the Rule 45 subpoena “will  
14 only demand the true name and address of Defendant[,]” and Plaintiff “will only use this  
15 information to prosecute the claims made in its Complaint.” (Id.) Plaintiff further claims  
16 that “[w]ithout this information, Plaintiff cannot serve Defendant nor pursue this  
17 lawsuit and protect its copyrights.” (Id.)

18 **II. LEGAL STANDARD**

19 Generally, formal discovery is not permitted before the parties have conferred  
20 pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f). Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d)(1). Courts,  
21 however, have made exceptions “in rare cases . . . permitting limited discovery to ensue  
22 after filing of the complaint to permit the plaintiff to learn the identifying facts  
23 necessary to permit service on the defendant.” Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185  
24 F.R.D. 573, 577 (N.D. Cal. 1999). Courts in the Ninth Circuit apply a “good cause”  
25 standard to decide whether to permit early discovery. Semitool, Inc. v. Tokyo Electron  
26 Am., Inc., 208 F.R.D. 273, 275–76 (N.D. Cal. 2002). “Good cause” is established “where  
27 the need for expedited discovery, in consideration of the administration of justice,  
28 outweighs the prejudice to the responding party.” Id.

1            “[W]hen the defendants’ identities are unknown at the time the complaint is  
2 filed, courts may grant plaintiffs leave to take early discovery to determine the  
3 defendants’ identities ‘unless it is clear that discovery would not uncover the identities,  
4 or that the complaint would be dismissed on other grounds.’” 808 Holdings, LLC v.  
5 Collective of Dec. 29, 2011 Sharing Hash E37917C8EEB4585E6421358FF32F29C  
6 D63C23C91, Civil No. 12cv00186 MMA(RBB), 2012 WL 12884688 (S.D. Cal. May 8, 2012)  
7 (quoting Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980)). “A district court’s  
8 decision to grant discovery to determine jurisdictional facts is a matter of discretion.”  
9 Columbia Ins. Co., 185 F.R.D. at 578.

10            District Courts in the Ninth Circuit typically apply a three-factor test when  
11 considering motions for early discovery to identify Doe defendants. Id. at 578–80. First,  
12 the moving party should be able to “identify the missing party with sufficient specificity  
13 [] that the Court can determine that [the] defendant is a real person or entity who could  
14 be sued in federal court.” Id. at 578. Second, the movant “should identify all previous  
15 steps taken to locate the elusive defendant” to ensure “that [the movant has made] a  
16 good faith effort to comply with the requirements of the service of process and  
17 specifically identifying defendants.” Id. at 579. Third, the plaintiff “should establish to  
18 the Court’s satisfaction that plaintiff’s suit against defendant could withstand a motion  
19 to dismiss.” Id.; see also Gillespie, 629 F.2d at 642 (stating early discovery to identify  
20 unknown defendants should be permitted unless the complaint would be dismissed on  
21 other grounds).

22            In addition to satisfying all three factors, plaintiff should provide “reasons  
23 justifying the specific discovery requested [and] identification of a limited number of  
24 persons or entities on whom discovery process might be served and for which there is a  
25 reasonable likelihood that the discovery process will lead to identifying information  
26 about defendant that would make service of process possible.” Columbia Ins. Co., 185  
27 F.R.D. at 580; see also Gillespie, 629 F.2d at 642 (explaining that early discovery is  
28 precluded if it is not likely to provide the identity of the defendant). These safeguards

1 are intended to ensure that early discovery “will only be employed in cases where the  
2 plaintiff has in good faith exhausted traditional avenues for identifying a civil defendant  
3 pre-service, and will prevent the use of this method to harass or intimidate.” Columbia  
4 Ins. Co., 185 F.R.D. at 578.

### 5 III. ANALYSIS

6 Plaintiff seeks leave to serve a subpoena pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil  
7 Procedure 45 on Defendant’s ISP AT&T U-verse. (ECF No. 4-1 at 8.) The Cable Privacy  
8 Act generally prohibits a cable operator from disclosing “personally identifiable  
9 information concerning any subscriber without the prior written or electronic consent of  
10 the subscriber concerned[.]” 47 U.S.C. § 551(c)(1). A cable operator, however, may  
11 disclose the information if the disclosure is made pursuant to a court order and the  
12 cable operator notifies the subscriber of the order. 47 U.S.C. § 551(c)(2)(B). A cable  
13 operator is “any person or group of persons” who “provides cable service over a cable  
14 system and directly or through one or more affiliates owns a significant interest in such  
15 cable system,” or “otherwise controls or is responsible for, through any arrangement,  
16 the management and operation of such a cable system.” 47 U.S.C. § 522(5).

17 AT&T U-verse is a cable operator, and the information Plaintiff seeks falls within  
18 the exception to the Cable Privacy Act’s disclosure prohibition. See 47 U.S.C.  
19 §551(c)(2)(B). Accordingly, if Plaintiff satisfies the multi-factor test used by district  
20 courts to determine whether early discovery is warranted, Doe defendants’ ISP may  
21 disclose the requested information pursuant to this Court’s order.

#### 22 A. Plaintiff Has Identified Defendant with Sufficient Specificity

23 Plaintiff must identify Defendant with enough specificity to allow the Court to  
24 determine that Defendant is a real person or entity, subject to the jurisdiction of this  
25 Court. See Columbia Ins. Co., 185 F.R.D. at 578. “[A] plaintiff identifies Doe defendants  
26 with sufficient specificity by providing the unique IP addresses assigned to an individual  
27 defendant on the day of the allegedly infringing conduct, and by using ‘geolocation  
28

1 technology' to trace the IP addresses to a physical point of origin." 808 Holdings, LLC,  
2 2012 WL 12884688, at \*4.

3 In support of its Ex Parte Application, Plaintiff submitted the Declaration of David  
4 Williamson, an Information Systems and Management Consultant. (See ECF No. 4-2.)  
5 Mr. Williamson uses Plaintiff's infringement detection system, VXN Scan, to identify the  
6 IP addresses used by individuals infringing Plaintiff's movies through the BitTorrent  
7 protocol. (Id. at 8.) Further, although the BitTorrent protocol contains some default  
8 and automatic functions, the functions that Plaintiff accuses Defendant of using require  
9 human operation. See Christopher Civil, Mass Copyright Infringement Litigation: Of  
10 Trolls, Pornography, Settlement and Joinder, 30 Syracuse J. Sci. & Tech. L. 2, 12 (2014)  
11 ("BitTorrent transfers do not involve a centralized server that hosts or transfers the data  
12 files in question. Instead, BitTorrent involves users interacting directly with other users  
13 to upload and download the content."). Accordingly, Plaintiff has established that an  
14 actual human was involved in the downloading and sharing of Plaintiff's allegedly  
15 infringed works.

16 Plaintiff also submitted the Declaration of Patrick Paige, a managing member at  
17 Computer Forensics, LLC, where Mr. Paige contends that he utilized Packet Capture  
18 ("PCAP"), "a computer file containing captured or recorded data transmitted between  
19 network devices[,] and VXN Scan to connect Defendant's IP address to the alleged  
20 "piece of an infringing copy of Plaintiff's works." (ECF No. 4-2 at 20.) According to Mr.  
21 Paige, "[t]he PCAP contains a record data concerning that transaction, including, but not  
22 limited to, the [IP] Addresses used in the network transaction, the date and time of the  
23 network transaction, the port number used to accomplish each network transaction,  
24 and the Info Hash value that the VXN Scan used as the subject of its request for data."  
25 (Id.) Mr. Paige contends that the contents of the PCAP confirm that the infringing  
26 activity connected to the IP address 107.204.75.203 was initiated on March 7, 2021, at  
27 21:16:15 UTC. (Id.) Mr. Paige concludes that "the PCAP evidence shows that within that  
28 transaction, IP address 107.204.75.203 uploaded a piece or pieces of a file corresponded

1 to hash value [representing Plaintiff's works] to VXN Scan." (Id.) This date and time  
2 correspond with the date and time when one of Plaintiff's works were allegedly illegally  
3 downloaded according to Exhibit A of Plaintiff's Complaint. (ECF No. 1-2 at 1.)

4 In addition, Plaintiff submitted the Declaration of Emilie Kennedy, Plaintiff's in-  
5 house General Counsel, in which Ms. Kennedy asserts geolocation was done by an  
6 unspecified person to identify the location of Defendant on three separate occasions.  
7 (ECF No. 4-2 at 29.) First, "[a]fter [Plaintiff] received infringement data from VXN Scan  
8 identifying IP address 107.204.75.203 as infringing its works, the IP address was  
9 automatically inputted into Maxmind's Geolocation Database . . . on March 25,  
10 20121[.]" (Id.) Based on this search, Ms. Kennedy contends that "Maxmind determined  
11 that the IP address traced to a location in San Diego, California, which is within this  
12 Court's jurisdiction." (Id.) Defendant's IP address was subsequently inputted by Plaintiff  
13 into Maxmind's Database prior to the filing of Plaintiff's Complaint, and prior to the  
14 filing of the instant Ex Parte Application. (Id.) On both occasions the IP address linked  
15 to Defendant, 107.204.75.203, traced to this district.<sup>1</sup>

16 Plaintiff has provided sufficient information about infringing activity tied to  
17 Defendant's unique IP address, the specific date and time associated with the activity,  
18 and the location of the activity. Therefore, Plaintiff has demonstrated with sufficient  
19 specificity that Defendant is a real person or entity, likely subject to the jurisdiction of  
20 this Court. See Crim. Prods., Inc. v. Doe-72.192.163.220, Case No. 16-cv-2589 WQH  
21 (JLB), 2016 WL 6822186, at \*3 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2016) (holding that the sufficient  
22 specificity threshold is satisfied when the IP address identified by Maxmind geolocation  
23 services identifies a physical location within the court's jurisdiction).

24 ///

25 ///

---

26  
27 <sup>1</sup> Attached as Exhibit 1 to Ms. Kennedy's Declaration is a chart reflecting the results of the third and  
28 final MaxMind Database search, showing the IP address alleged to be involved in the illegal downloads  
and confirming that the location traces to San Diego, CA. (ECF No. 4-2 at 32-33.)

1           **B.     Plaintiff Made a Good Faith Effort to Identify Defendant**

2           Plaintiff must also demonstrate that it has taken previous steps to locate and  
3 serve the Defendant. See Columbia Ins. Co., 185 F.R.D. at 579. Although Plaintiff  
4 maintains it diligently attempted to identify Defendant by searching for Defendant’s IP  
5 address “on various web search tools, including basic search engines like  
6 www.google.com,” Plaintiff does not submit evidence supporting this claim. (ECF No. 4-  
7 1 at 14.) However, Ms. Kennedy’s Declaration and the MaxMind results attached as  
8 Exhibit 1 indicate that Plaintiff took substantial steps to locate Defendant’s IP address  
9 and identify Defendant’s ISP. (ECF No. 4-2 at 29–32.) Despite these efforts, Plaintiff was  
10 unable to correlate the IP address to Defendant’s identity. Plaintiff maintains that it has  
11 been “unable to identify any other way to go about obtaining the identities of its  
12 infringers and does not know how else it could possibly enforce its copyrights from  
13 illegal piracy over the Internet.” (ECF No. 4-1 at 14.) The Court therefore finds that  
14 Plaintiff has made a good faith effort to identify, locate, and serve the Defendant. See  
15 Malibu Media, LLC v. John Does 1 through 6, Civil No. 12–cv–1355–LAB (DHB), 2012 WL  
16 4471538, at \*3 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2012) (finding plaintiff’s efforts to identify Doe  
17 defendant were sufficient because “there is no other way for [p]laintiff to obtain  
18 [d]efendants’ identities, except by serving a subpoena on [d]efendants’ ISPs demanding  
19 it[.]”); see also Digital Sin, Inc. v. Does 1-5698, No. C 11-04397 LB, 2011 WL 5362068, at  
20 \*2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2011) (finding plaintiff’s attempts to identify and locate defendant  
21 sufficient, where the plaintiff “investigated and collected data on unauthorized  
22 distribution of copies of the [alleged infringed work] on BitTorrent-based peer-to-peer  
23 networks.”).

24           **C.     Plaintiff’s Suit Could Withstand a Motion to Dismiss**

25           Plaintiff must further show that the Complaint in this case could withstand a  
26 motion to dismiss. See Columbia Ins. Co., 185 F.R.D. at 579. A suit may be dismissed  
27 pursuant to Rule 12(b) on several bases. Of all the bases that bear dismissal, those  
28 relevant here are lack of subject matter jurisdiction, lack of personal jurisdiction, and

1 failure to state a claim. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), (2), (6). As to both subject matter and  
2 personal jurisdiction, Plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.  
3 For subject matter jurisdiction, Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that “[t]his Court has subject  
4 matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question); and  
5 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (jurisdiction over copyright actions).” (ECF No. 1 at 2.) On the issue of  
6 personal jurisdiction, Plaintiff maintains it used geolocation technology to determine  
7 that Defendant’s IP address correlates to a physical address in San Diego, CA, which falls  
8 within the jurisdiction of the Southern District of California. (Id.)

9 A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure  
10 tests the sufficiency of the allegations in the Complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729,  
11 732 (9th Cir. 2001). Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges a single cause of action against  
12 Defendant for direct copyright infringement. (ECF No. 1 at 7–8.) To allege a claim for  
13 direct copyright infringement, a plaintiff must show: “(1) ownership of a valid copyright;  
14 and (2) that the defendant violated the copyright owner’s exclusive rights under the  
15 Copyright Act.” Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2004). “In addition,  
16 direct infringement requires the plaintiff to show causation (also referred to as  
17 ‘volitional conduct’) by the defendant.” Perfect 10, Inc. v. Giganews, Inc., 847 F.3d 657,  
18 666 (9th Cir. 2017).

19 Plaintiff alleges it owns the copyrights to the works that are the subject of this suit  
20 and claims that the works “have been registered with the United States Copyright  
21 Office.” (ECF No. 1 at 7.) Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant “used the BitTorrent file  
22 network to illegally download and distribute Plaintiff’s copyrighted motion pictures[,]”  
23 and did so “without authorization.” (Id. at 5, 7.) Assuming Plaintiff’s allegations are  
24 true, they state a claim on which relief can be granted. See A&M Recs., Inc. v. Napster,  
25 Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1013–14 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding plaintiffs sufficiently demonstrated  
26 ownership and infringement by showing Napster allowed its users to download  
27 copyrighted music, up to seventy percent of which was owned or administered by the  
28 plaintiffs); see also Malibu Media, LLC v. Doe, Case No. 16CV1916-GPC(JMA), 2016 WL



1 6216183, at \*2 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2016) (holding plaintiff alleged a prima facie case of  
2 copyright infringement against defendant by alleging that plaintiff owned twelve  
3 copyrighted movies at issue, and that defendant infringed plaintiff's copyrights by  
4 copying and distributing plaintiff's movies through the BitTorrent network without  
5 plaintiff's permission). Therefore, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a prima facie  
6 elements of copyright infringement, and its Complaint will likely withstand a motion to  
7 dismiss.

#### 8 **D. Whether Requested Discovery Will Lead to Identifying Information**

9 Finally, Plaintiff is required to demonstrate that "there is a reasonable likelihood  
10 that the discovery process will lead to identifying information about defendant that  
11 would make service of process possible." Columbia Ins. Co., 185 F.R.D. at 580. As  
12 discussed above, Plaintiff's forensic investigation uncovered the unique IP address  
13 107.204.75.203. (ECF No. 4-2 at 20.) Further, Plaintiff submits the declaration of Susan  
14 B. Stalzer, who, among other things, states that she used the American Registry for  
15 Internet Numbers to determine that the ISP AT&T U-verse owned Defendant's IP  
16 address at the time of the infringement. (Id. at 26.) Based on his experience in similar  
17 cases, Mr. Paige explains that "AT&T U-verse is the only entity that can correlate"  
18 Defendant's IP address to the IP address owner's identity. (Id. at 22.) Accordingly, if  
19 AT&T U-verse provides Plaintiff with Defendant's name and address, this will likely lead  
20 to information making it possible for Plaintiff to effectuate service on Defendant.

#### 21 **IV. CONCLUSION**

22 For the foregoing reasons, the Court **GRANTS** the Ex Parte Application for Leave  
23 to Serve a Third-Party Subpoena Prior to a Rule 26(f) Conference [ECF No. 4] as follows:

24 1. Plaintiff may serve a subpoena pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure  
25 45 on AT&T U-verse, seeking only the name and address of the subscriber assigned to  
26 the IP address 107.204.75.203. Plaintiff may not subpoena additional information about  
27 the subscriber;

1           2.     Plaintiff may only use the disclosed information to protect its copyrights in  
2 the instant litigation;

3           3.     Within fourteen (14) calendar days after service of the subpoena, AT&T U-  
4 verse shall notify the subscriber assigned the IP address 107.204.75.203 that his, her, or  
5 its identity has been subpoenaed by Plaintiff;

6           4.     The subscriber whose identity has been subpoenaed shall have thirty (30)  
7 calendar days from the date of the notice to challenge the disclosure of his, her, or its  
8 name and address by filing an appropriate pleading with this Court contesting the  
9 subpoena;

10          5.     If AT&T U-verse wishes to move to quash the subpoena, it shall do so  
11 before the return date of the subpoena. The return date of the subpoena must allow  
12 for at least forty-five (45) days from service to production. If a motion to quash or other  
13 customer challenge is brought, AT&T U-verse shall preserve the information sought by  
14 Plaintiff in the subpoena pending resolution of the motion or challenge;


15          6.     Plaintiff shall serve a copy of this Order with any subpoena obtained and  
16 served to AT&T U-verse pursuant to this Order;

17          7.     AT&T U-verse must provide a copy of this Order along with the required  
18 notice to the subscriber whose identity is sought pursuant to this Order.

19          8.     No other discovery is authorized at this time.

20           **IT IS SO ORDERED.**

21 Dated: April 23, 2021

22   
23 \_\_\_\_\_  
24 Honorable Michael S. Berg  
25 United States Magistrate Judge  
26  
27  
28