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7	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT	
8	SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA	
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10	STRIKE 3 HOLDINGS, LLC,	Case No.: 22cv828-JO (MSB)
11	Plaintiff,	ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S EX
12	v.	PARTE APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO
13	JOHN DOE subscriber assigned IP address	SERVE A THIRD-PARTY SUBPOENA PRIOR TO A RULE 26(f) CONFERENCE
14	24.24.202.203,	[ECF No. 4]
15	Defendant.	
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On June 21, 2022, Plaintiff Strike 3 Holdings, LLC ('Strike") filed an "Ex-Parte Application for Leave to Serve a Third-Party Subpoena Prior to a Rule 26(f) Conference" ("Ex Parte Application"). (ECF No. 4.) Plaintiff seeks to subpoena Defendant John Doe's Internet Service Provider ("ISP") Spectrum for "limited, immediate discovery . . . so that Plaintiff may learn Defendant's identity, further investigate Defendant's role in the infringement, and effectuate service." (ECF No. 4-1 at 1.) Because Defendant has not been identified, no opposition or reply briefs have been filed. For the following reasons, the Ex Parte Application is **GRANTED**.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff owns the copyright to certain motion pictures. (ECF no. 4-1 at 1.) On June 6, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Complaint alleging that Defendant John Doe, an internet subscriber assigned Internet protocol ("IP") address 24.24.202.203, has been using the

BitTorrent protocol to commit "rampant and wholesale copyright infringement" by
 downloading and distributing twenty-five of Plaintiff's copyrighted works over an
 extended period of time. (ECF No. 1 at 2.) Plaintiff alleges it used its proprietary
 forensic software, VXN Scan, to discover that Defendant's IP address was illegally
 distributing Plaintiff's copyrighted motion pictures. (ECF No. 4-1 at 5; ECF No. 4-2 at 1.)

On June 21, 2022, Plaintiff filed the instant Ex Parte Application to seek leave to
serve a subpoena pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45 on Defendant's ISP,
Spectrum. (ECF No. 4 at 1.) Plaintiff maintains that the Rule 45 subpoena "will only
demand the true name and address of Defendant[,]" and Plaintiff "will only use this
information to prosecute the claims made in its Complaint." (ECF No. 4-1 at 2.) Plaintiff
further claims that "[w]ithout this information, Plaintiff cannot serve Defendant nor
pursue this lawsuit and protect its copyrights." (Id.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Generally, formal discovery is not permitted before the parties have conferred pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f). Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d)(1). Courts, however, have made exceptions "in rare cases . . . permitting limited discovery to ensue after filing of the complaint to permit the plaintiff to learn the identifying facts necessary to permit service on the defendant." <u>Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com</u>, 185 F.R.D. 573, 577 (N.D. Cal. 1999). Courts in the Ninth Circuit apply a "good cause" standard to decide whether to permit early discovery. <u>Semitool, Inc. v. Tokyo Electron</u> <u>Am., Inc.</u>, 208 F.R.D. 273, 275–76 (N.D. Cal. 2002). "Good cause" is established "where the need for expedited discovery, in consideration of the administration of justice, outweighs the prejudice to the responding party." <u>Id.</u>

"[W]hen the defendants' identities are unknown at the time the complaint is
filed, courts may grant plaintiffs leave to take early discovery to determine the
defendants' identities 'unless it is clear that discovery would not uncover the identities,
or that the complaint would be dismissed on other grounds.'" <u>808 Holdings, LLC v.</u>
Collective of Dec. 29, 2011 Sharing Hash E37917C8EEB4585E6421358FF32F29C

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<u>D63C23C91</u>, Civil No. 12cv00186 MMA(RBB), 2012 WL 12884688, at *3 (S.D. Cal. May 8,
 2012) (quoting <u>Gillespie v. Civiletti</u>, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980)). "A district court's
 decision to grant discovery to determine jurisdictional facts is a matter of discretion."
 <u>Columbia Ins. Co.</u>, 185 F.R.D. at 578.

5 District Courts in the Ninth Circuit typically apply a three-factor test when 6 considering motions for early discovery to identify Doe defendants. Id. at 578–80. First, 7 the moving party should be able to "identify the missing party with sufficient specificity [] that the Court can determine that [the] defendant is a real person or entity who could 8 9 be sued in federal court." Id. at 578. Second, the movant "should identify all previous steps taken to locate the elusive defendant" to ensure "that [the movant has made] a 10 11 good faith effort to comply with the requirements of the service of process and specifically identifying defendants." Id. at 579. Third, the plaintiff "should establish to 12 13 the Court's satisfaction that plaintiff's suit against defendant could withstand a motion to dismiss." Id.; see also Gillespie, 629 F.2d at 642 (stating early discovery to identify 14 15 unknown defendants should be permitted unless the complaint would be dismissed on other grounds). 16

17 In addition to satisfying all three factors, plaintiff should provide "reasons" 18 justifying the specific discovery requested [and] identification of a limited number of 19 persons or entities on whom discovery process might be served and for which there is a 20 reasonable likelihood that the discovery process will lead to identifying information 21 about defendant that would make service of process possible." Columbia Ins. Co., 185 22 F.R.D. at 580; see also Gillespie, 629 F.2d at 642 (explaining that early discovery is 23 precluded if it is not likely to provide the identity of the defendant). These safeguards 24 are intended to ensure that early discovery "will only be employed in cases where the 25 plaintiff has in good faith exhausted traditional avenues for identifying a civil defendant pre-service, and will prevent the use of this method to harass or intimidate." Columbia 26 27 Ins. Co., 185 F.R.D. at 578.

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III. ANALYSIS

2 Plaintiff seeks leave to serve a subpoena pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 3 Procedure 45 on Defendant's ISP Spectrum. (ECF No. 4-1 at 7.) The Cable Privacy Act 4 prohibits a cable operator from disclosing "personally identifiable information 5 concerning any subscriber without the prior written or electronic consent of the subscriber concerned[.]" 47 U.S.C. § 551(c)(1). A cable operator, however, may disclose 6 7 the information if the disclosure is made pursuant to a court order and the cable operator notifies the subscriber of the order. 47 U.S.C. § 551(c)(2)(B). A cable operator 8 9 is "any person or group of persons" who "provides cable service over a cable system and 10 directly or through one or more affiliates owns a significant interest in such cable 11 system," or "otherwise controls or is responsible for, through any arrangement, the 12 management and operation of such a cable system." 47 U.S.C. § 522(5).

Spectrum is a cable operator, and the information Plaintiff seeks falls within the exception to the Cable Privacy Act's disclosure prohibition. <u>See</u> 47 U.S.C. §551(c)(2)(B). Accordingly, if Plaintiff satisfies the multi-factor test used by district courts to determine whether early discovery is warranted, Defendant's ISP may disclose the requested information pursuant to this Court's order.

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A. <u>Plaintiff Has Identified Defendant with Sufficient Specificity</u>

Plaintiff must identify Defendant with enough specificity to allow the Court to determine that Defendant is a real person or entity, subject to the jurisdiction of this Court. <u>See Columbia Ins. Co.</u>, 185 F.R.D. at 578. "[A] plaintiff identifies Doe defendants with sufficient specificity by providing the unique IP addresses assigned to an individual defendant on the day of the allegedly infringing conduct, and by using 'geolocation technology' to trace the IP addresses to a physical point of origin." <u>808 Holdings, LLC</u>, 2012 WL 12884688, at *4.

In support of its Ex Parte Application, Plaintiff submitted the Declaration of David
Williamson, an Information Systems and Management Consultant. (See ECF No. 4-2 at
2-15.) Mr. Williamson uses Plaintiff's infringement detection system, VXN Scan, to

identify the IP addresses used by individuals infringing Plaintiff's movies through the
BitTorrent protocol. (Id. at 8-14.) Further, although the BitTorrent protocol contains
some default and automatic functions, the functions that Plaintiff accuses Defendant of
using require human operation. See Christopher Civil, Mass Copyright Infringement
Litigation: Of Trolls, Pornography, Settlement and Joinder, 30 Syracuse J. Sci. & Tech. L.
2, 12 (2014) ("BitTorrent transfers do not involve a centralized server that hosts or
transfers the data files in question. Instead, BitTorrent involves users interacting
directly with other users to upload and download the content."). Accordingly, Plaintiff
has established that an actual human was involved in the downloading and sharing of
Plaintiff's allegedly infringed works.

Plaintiff also submitted the Declaration of Patrick Paige, a Managing Member at Computer Forensics, LLC, where Mr. Paige contends that he utilized Packet Capture ("PCAP"), "a computer file containing captured or recorded data transmitted between network devices," and VXN Scan to connect Defendant's IP address to the alleged "piece" of an infringing copy of Plaintiff's works." (ECF No. 4-2 at 18-20.) According to Mr. Paige, "[t]he PCAP contains a record data concerning that transaction, including, but not limited to, the [IP] Addresses used in the network transaction, the date and time of the network transaction, the port number used to accomplish each network transaction, and the Info Hash value that the VXN Scan used as the subject of its request for data." (Id.) Mr. Paige contends that the contents of the PCAP confirm that the infringing activity connected to the IP address 24.24.202.203 was initiated on May 1, 2022, at 13:33:33 UTC. (Id.) Mr. Paige concludes that "IP address 24.24202.203 engaged in a transaction that included the transmission of a piece or pieces of a file" corresponding to hash value representing Plaintiff's works. (Id. at 22.) This date and time correspond with the date and time when one of Plaintiff's works were allegedly illegally downloaded according to Exhibit A of Plaintiff's Complaint. (Id.)

In addition, Plaintiff submitted the Declaration of Emilie Kennedy, Plaintiff's inhouse General Counsel, in which Ms. Kennedy asserts geolocation was done by an

unspecified person to identify the location of Defendant on three separate occasions.
(ECF No. 4-2 at 29.) First, "[a]fter [Plaintiff] received infringement data from VXN Scan
identifying IP address 24.24.202.203 as infringing its works, the IP address was
automatically inputted into Maxmind's Geolocation Database" on May 26, 2022. (Id.)
Based on this search, Ms. Kennedy contends that "Maxmind determined that the IP
address traced to a location in San Diego, California, which is within this Court's
jurisdiction." (Id.) Defendant's IP address was subsequently input by Plaintiff into
Maxmind's Database prior to the filing of Plaintiff's Complaint, and prior to the filing of
the instant Ex Parte Application. (Id.) On both occasions the IP address linked to
Defendant, 24.24.202.203, traced to this district.¹

Plaintiff has provided sufficient information about infringing activity tied to
Defendant's unique IP address, the specific date and time associated with the activity,
and the location of the activity. Therefore, Plaintiff has demonstrated with sufficient
specificity that Defendant is a real person or entity, likely subject to the jurisdiction of
this Court. See Crim. Prods., Inc. v. Doe-72.192.163.220, Case No. 16-cv-2589 WQH
(JLB), 2016 WL 6822186, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2016) (holding that the sufficient
specificity threshold is satisfied when the IP address identified by Maxmind geolocation
services identifies a physical location within the court's jurisdiction).

B. <u>Plaintiff Made a Good Faith Effort to Identify Defendant</u>

Plaintiff must also demonstrate that it has taken previous steps to locate and serve the Defendant. <u>See Columbia Ins. Co.</u>, 185 F.R.D. at 579. Plaintiff maintains it diligently attempted to identify Defendant by searching for Defendant's IP address "on various web search tools, including basic search engines like www.google.com," but does not submit evidence supporting this claim. (ECF No. 4-1 at 14.) It further conducted its own research to identify Defendant by additional authority, including

¹ Attached as Exhibit 1 to Ms. Kennedy's Declaration is a chart reflecting the results of the third and final MaxMind Database search, showing the IP address alleged to be involved in the illegal downloads and confirming that the location traces to San Diego, CA. (ECF No. 4-2 at 32.)

1 "legislative reports, agency websites, information technology guides, governing case 2 law, etc." (Id.) Despite these efforts, Plaintiff was unable to identify Defendant's 3 identity from the IP address. The Court therefore finds that Plaintiff has made a good 4 faith effort to identify, locate, and serve Defendant. See Malibu Media, LLC v. John Does 5 1 through 6, Civil No. 12–cv–1355–LAB (DHB), 2012 WL 4471538, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 6 26, 2012) (finding plaintiff's efforts to identify Doe defendant's identity were sufficient 7 where "there is no other way for Plaintiff to obtain Defendants' identities, except by serving a subpoena on Defendants' ISPs demanding it"); see also Digital Sin, Inc. v. Does 8 9 1-5698, No. C 11-04397 LB, 2011 WL 5362068, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2011) (finding 10 plaintiff's attempts to identify and locate defendant sufficient, where the plaintiff 11 "investigated and collected data on unauthorized distribution of copies of the [alleged 12 infringed work] on BitTorrent-based peer-to-peer networks").

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C. Plaintiff's Suit Could Withstand a Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff must further show that the Complaint could withstand a motion to dismiss. <u>See Columbia Ins. Co.</u>, 185 F.R.D. at 579. Of all the bases that bear dismissal, those relevant here are lack of subject matter jurisdiction, lack of personal jurisdiction, and failure to state a claim. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), (2), (6). As to both subject matter and personal jurisdiction, Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to survive a motion to dismiss. For subject matter jurisdiction, Plaintiff's Complaint alleges that "[t]his Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question); and 28 U.S.C § 1338 (jurisdiction over copyright actions)." (ECF No. 1 at 2.) Regarding personal jurisdiction, Plaintiff has identified Defendant's IP address associated with the alleged infringing downloading and copying, and traced it to a physical address in San Diego, California. (<u>Id.</u>) This location is within the geographical boundaries of this district.

Lastly, a suit may be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b) for "failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Plaintiff's Complaint
alleges a single cause of action against Defendant for direct copyright infringement. (ECF)

No. 1 at 7-9). To allege a claim for direct copyright infringement, a plaintiff must show:
 "(1) ownership of a valid copyright; and (2) that the defendant violated the copyright
 owner's exclusive rights under the Copyright Act." <u>Ellison v. Robertson</u>, 357 F.3d 1072,
 1076 (9th Cir. 2004). "In addition, direct infringement requires the plaintiff to show
 causation (also referred to as 'volitional conduct') by the defendant." <u>Perfect 10, Inc. v.</u>
 <u>Giganews, Inc.</u>, 847 F.3d 657, 666 (9th Cir. 2017).

7 Plaintiff alleges that it is the copyright owner of the adult motion pictures that are the subject of this suit. (ECF No. 1 at 7.) Plaintiff also alleges Defendant used the 8 9 BitTorrent file network to illegally download and distribute Plaintiff's copyrighted 10 motion pictures without authorization, permission, or consent. (Id.) Assuming 11 Plaintiff's allegations are true, they state a claim on which relief can be granted. See 12 A&M Recs., Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1013–14 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding 13 plaintiffs sufficiently demonstrated ownership and infringement by showing Napster allowed its users to download copyrighted music, and more than seventy percent of 14 15 which was owned or administered by the plaintiffs); see also Malibu Media, LLC v. Doe, 16 Case No. 16CV1916-GPC(JMA), 2016 WL 6216183, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2016) (holding 17 plaintiff alleged a prima facie case of copyright infringement by alleging that plaintiff 18 owned twelve copyrighted movies at issue, and that defendant infringed plaintiff's 19 copyrights by copying and distributing plaintiff's movies through the BitTorrent network without plaintiff's permission). Therefore, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a prima facie 20 21 claim of copyright infringement which could withstand a motion to dismiss.

D. Whether Requested Discovery Will Lead to Identifying Information

Lastly, the Plaintiff must prove that the requested discovery is likely to lead to identifying information. <u>Columbia Ins. Co.</u>, 185 F.R.D. at 580. As discussed above, Plaintiff's forensic investigation directly connected Defendant's IP address 24.24.202.203 to the alleged infringements, and the only entity that can identify Defendant based on this information is Spectrum. (ECF No. 4-2 at 20-22.) Accordingly,

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1 if Spectrum provides Plaintiff with Defendant's name and address, this will likely lead to 2 information making it possible for Plaintiff to effectuate service on Defendant.

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IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff has demonstrated good cause to conduct early discovery and **GRANTS** the Ex Parte Application for Leave to Serve a Third-Party Subpoena Prior to a Rule 26(f) Conference [ECF No. 4] as follows:

1. Plaintiff may serve a subpoena pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45 on Spectrum, seeking only the name and address of the subscriber assigned to the IP address 24.24.202.203. Plaintiff may not subpoena additional information about the subscriber;

11 2. Plaintiff may only use the disclosed information to protect its copyrights in 12 the instant litigation;

3. Within fourteen (14) calendar days after service of the subpoena, Spectrum shall notify the subscriber assigned the IP address 24.24.202.203 that his, her, or its identity has been subpoenaed by Plaintiff;

16 4. The subscriber whose identity has been subpoenaed shall have thirty (30) calendar days from the date of the notice to challenge the disclosure of his, her, or its 18 name and address by filing an appropriate pleading with this Court contesting the subpoena;

5. If Spectrum wishes to move to quash the subpoena, it shall do so before the return date of the subpoena. The return date of the subpoena must allow for at least forty-five (45) days from service to production. If a motion to quash or other customer challenge is brought, Spectrum shall preserve the information sought by Plaintiff in the subpoena pending resolution of the motion or challenge;

6. Plaintiff shall serve a copy of this Order with any subpoena obtained and served to Spectrum pursuant to this Order;

27 7. Spectrum must provide a copy of this Order along with the required notice 28 to the subscriber whose identity is sought pursuant to this Order.

1	8. No other discovery is a	uthorized at this time.
2	IT IS SO ORDERED.	
3	Dated: July 26, 2022	-07
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5		Honorable Michael S. Berg United States Magistrate Judge
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