

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO  
Judge Robert E. Blackburn**

Civil Case No. 10-cv-00403-REB-BNB

MEDVED CHRYSLER JEEP DODGE, INC., a Colorado corporation, and  
LAKEWOOD CHRYSLER-PLYMOUTH, INC., d/b/a MEDVED CHRYSLER JEEP, INC.,  
a Colorado corporation,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

CHRYSLER GROUP, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company,

Defendants.

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**ORDER OF RECUSAL**

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**Blackburn, J.**

This matter comes before me *sua sponte*. To eschew the appearance of  
impropriety, I conclude that I must recuse myself from this case.

As a general rule, recusal is required when "a reasonable person armed with the  
relevant facts would harbor doubts about the judge's impartiality." ***Maez v. Mountain  
States Telephone & Telegraph, Inc.***, 54 F.3d 1488, 1508 (10<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995). Pursuant to  
28 U.S.C. § 455, a judge should recuse himself from a case when his participation in  
the case creates an appearance of impropriety. **See *United States v. Pearson***, 203  
F.3d 1243, 1264 (10<sup>th</sup> Cir.), ***cert. denied***, 120 S.Ct. 2734 (2000). The standard under  
28 U.S.C. § 455(a) is an objective one, requiring recusal only "if a reasonable person,  
knowing all the relevant facts, would harbor doubts about the judge's impartiality."

***United States v. Cooley***, 1 F.3d 985, 993 (10<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1993) (citations omitted).

I am a customer of a related MEDVED dealership in the Denver metro area. I

continue to do business with and receive service from this related dealership. Thus, my proposed participation in this case could very well create the appearance of impropriety. Accordingly, my recusal is warranted.

**THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED** as follows:

1. That under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), I **RECUSE** myself from this civil case; and
2. That this case **SHALL BE REASSIGNED** pursuant to D.C.COLO.LCivR 40.1B. and F.

Dated February 25, 2010, in Denver, Colorado.

**BY THE COURT:**

  
Robert E. Blackburn  
United States District Judge