

In reviewing a *pro se* complaint, the Court must construe it liberally, and interpret it “to raise the strongest arguments it suggests.” *Abbas v. Dixon*, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). Even so, the complaint must still “include sufficient facts to afford the defendants fair notice of the claims and the grounds upon which they are based and to demonstrate a right to relief.” *Shabazz v. Valentine*, No. 3:14-cv-1711, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167220, at *1-2, 2014 WL 6850773, at *1 (D. Conn. Dec. 3, 2014); *see also Bell Atlantic v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007) (plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face”). A claim has the requisite “facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Conclusory allegations are not sufficient; a pleading that only “tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement” will not suffice. *Id.*

In addition, section 1915(e)(2) “accords judges not only the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint’s factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.” *Neitzke*, 490 U.S. at 327; *see Denton v. Hernandez*, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992) (holding that a finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible, whether or not there are judicially noticeable facts available to contradict them”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); *see also id.* at 33 (recognizing that “ district courts, who are all too familiar with factually frivolous claims, are in the best position to determine which cases fall into this category”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

