

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

ERNEST A. CRUMP,)	
)	
Plaintiff,)	
)	
v.)	Civ. No. 08-506-SLR
)	
CARL DANBERG, RICK KEARNEY,)	
PERRY PHELPS, CORRECTIONAL)	
MEDICAL SERVICES, JAMES)	
WELCH, and PAUL HOWARD,)	
)	
Defendants.)	

MEMORANDUM ORDER

At Wilmington this ^{30th} day of January, 2009, having screened the case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and § 1915A;

IT IS ORDERED that the claims against defendants Carl Danberg, Rick Kearney, and Paul Howard are dismissed as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and § 1915A, and that plaintiff may proceed against defendants Perry Phelps, Correctional Medical Services, and James Welch for the reasons that follow:

1. **Background.** Plaintiff Ernest A. Crump, Jr., ("plaintiff"), an inmate at the James T. Vaughn Correctional Center ("VCC), Smyrna, Delaware, filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (D.I. 2) An amended complaint was filed on October 20, 2008. (D.I. 9) Plaintiff appears pro se and has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis.

2. **Standard of Review.** When a litigant proceeds in forma pauperis, 28 U.S.C. § 1915 provides for dismissal under certain circumstances. When a prisoner seeks

redress from a government defendant in a civil action, 28 U.S.C. § 1915A provides for screening of the complaint by the court. Both 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b)(1) provide that the court may dismiss a complaint, at any time, if the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. An action is frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” *Neitzke v. Williams*, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).

3. The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to § § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A is identical to the legal standard used when ruling on 12(b)(6) motions. *Courteau v. United States*, 287 Fed. Appx. 159, 162 (3d Cir. 2008); *Allah v. Seiverling*, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000); *Tourscher v. McCullough*, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999)(applying Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) standard to dismissal for failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)). The court must accept all factual allegations in a complaint as true and take them in the light most favorable to plaintiff. *Erickson v. Pardus*, 551 U.S. 89, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007). A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” *Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964 (2007) (quoting *Conley v. Gibson*, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. A complaint does not need detailed factual allegations, however, “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”

Id. at 1965 (citations omitted). The “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all of the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” *Id.* (citations omitted).

4. Plaintiff is required to make a “showing” rather than a blanket assertion of an entitlement to relief. *Phillips v. County of Allegheny*, 515 F.3d 224, 232 (3d Cir. 2008). “[W]ithout some factual allegation in the complaint, a claimant cannot satisfy the requirement that he or she provide not only ‘fair notice,’ but also the ‘grounds’ on which the claim rests.” *Id.* (citing *Twombly*, 127 S.Ct. at 1965 n.3). Therefore, “‘stating . . . a claim requires a complaint with enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest’ the required element.” *Id.* at 235 (quoting *Twombly*, 127 S.Ct. at 1965 n.3). “This ‘does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage,’ but instead ‘simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element.’” *Id.* at 234. Because plaintiff proceeds *pro se*, his pleading is liberally construed and his complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” *Erickson v. Pardus*, 127 S.Ct. at 2200 (citations omitted).

5. **Discussion.** Plaintiff alleges that in January 2006 he filed a medical grievance and requested a colonoscopy. Plaintiff ultimately prevailed and on September 27, 2006, Director of Medical Services James Welch (“Welch”) determined that plaintiff would receive the colonoscopy. (D.I. 9, ex. 6) Bureau Chief Rick Kearney (“Kearney”) (now retired) upheld the decision on November 29, 2006. (*Id.* at ex. 7) As of June 27, 2008, plaintiff had yet to undergo the colonoscopy and he advised Warden Perry Phelps

of the problem. (*Id.* at ex. 8)

6. **Personal Involvement/Respondeat Superior.** Plaintiff names Commissioner Carl Danberg (“Danberg”), Kearney, and Paul Howard (“Howard”) as defendants based upon their supervisory positions. More particularly, plaintiff alleges that Kearney should have seen to it that his predecessor implemented his actions. Plaintiff alleges that prior to Howard’s retirement he should have seen that his appeal decisions were implemented.

7. “A defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs” to be liable. *Sutton v. Rasheed*, 323 F.3d 236, 249 (3d Cir. 2003)(quoting *Rode v. Dellarciprete*, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988). As is well established, supervisory liability cannot be imposed under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory. See *Monell v. Department of Social Services*, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); *Rizzo v. Goode*, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). “ ‘A[n individual government] defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongdoing; liability cannot be predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior.’” *Evancho v. Fisher*, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting *Rode v. Dellarciprete*, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988). Personal involvement can be shown through allegations that a defendant directed, had actual knowledge of, or acquiesced in, the deprivation of a plaintiff’s constitutional rights. *Id.*; see *Monell v. Department of Social Services* 436 U.S. 658, 694-95 (1978). Supervisory liability may attach if the supervisor implemented deficient policies and was deliberately indifferent to the resulting risk or the supervisor’s actions and inactions were “the moving force” behind the harm suffered by the plaintiff. *Sample*

v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1117-118 (3d Cir. 1989); see also *City of Canton v. Harris*, 489 U.S. 378 (1989); *Heggenmiller v. Edna Mahan Corr. Inst. for Women*, 128 Fed. Appx. 240 (3d Cir. 2005).

8. Additionally, participation in the after-the-fact review of a grievance is not enough to establish personal involvement. See, e.g., *Brooks v. Beard*, 167 Fed. Appx. 923, 925 (3d Cir. 2006) (allegations that prison officials and administrators responded inappropriately to inmate's later-filed grievances do not establish the involvement of those officials and administrators in the underlying deprivation). See also *Cole v. Sobina*, Civ. No. 04-99J, 2007 WL 4460617 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 19, 2007); *Ramos v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr.*, Civ. No. 06-1444, 2006 WL 2129148 (M.D. Pa. July 27, 2006); *Jefferson v. Wolfe*, Civ. No. 04-44 ERIE, 2006 WL 1947721 (W.D. Pa. July 11, 2006). Nor does a prison official's failure to respond to an inmate's grievance state a constitutional claim. *Wilson v. Horn*, 971 F. Supp. 943, 947 (E.D. Pa. 1997), *aff'd*, 142 F.3d 430 (3d Cir. 1998).

9. Plaintiff's allegations against Danberg, Kearney, and Howard fall under the auspices of a respondeat superior theory. Moreover, it is evident from the pleadings that these defendants only became aware of plaintiff's medical condition after plaintiff submitted grievances. For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff's claims against Danberg, Kearney, and Howard lack an arguable basis in law or in fact and, therefore, fail to state a cognizable § 1983 claim. Therefore, the claims are dismissed as frivolous and for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b)(1).

10. **Conclusion.** For the above reasons, the claims against Carl Danberg, Rick Kearney, and Paul Howard are dismissed for failure to state a claim and as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b)(1). Plaintiff will be allowed to proceed with his medical needs claim against defendants Perry Phelps, Correctional Medical Services, and James Welch.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

1. The Clerk of the Court shall cause a copy of this order to be mailed to plaintiff.
2. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3) and (d)(1), plaintiff shall complete and return to the Clerk of the Court an **original** "U.S. Marshal-285" form for **remaining** defendants Perry Phelps, Correctional Medical Services, and James Welch as well as for the Chief Deputy Attorney General of the State of Delaware, 820 N. FRENCH STREET, WILMINGTON, DELAWARE, 19801, pursuant to DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 § 3103(c). Plaintiff shall provide the Court with copies of the amended complaint (D.I. 9) for service upon the remaining defendants. Plaintiff is notified that the United States Marshal will not serve the complaint until all "U.S. Marshal 285" forms have been received by the Clerk of the Court. **Failure to provide the "U.S. Marshal 285" forms for each remaining defendant and the chief deputy attorney general within 120 days of this order may result in the amended complaint being dismissed or defendants being dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m).**
3. Upon receipt of the form(s) required by paragraph 2 above, the United States Marshal shall forthwith serve a copy of the complaint, this order, a "Notice of Lawsuit" form, the filing fee order(s), and a "Return of Waiver" form upon each of the defendants

so identified in each 285 form.

4. Within **thirty (30) days** from the date that the "Notice of Lawsuit" and "Return of Waiver" forms are sent, if an executed "Waiver of Service of Summons" form has not been received from a defendant, the United States Marshal shall personally serve said defendant(s) and said defendant(s) shall be required to bear the cost related to such service, unless good cause is shown for failure to sign and return the waiver pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(1) and (2) .


5. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(3), a defendant who, before being served with process timely returns a waiver as requested, is required to answer or otherwise respond to the complaint within **sixty (60) days** from the date upon which the complaint, this order, the "Notice of Lawsuit" form, and the "Return of Waiver" form are sent. If a defendant responds by way of a motion, said motion shall be accompanied by a brief or a memorandum of points and authorities and any supporting affidavits.

6. No communication, including pleadings, briefs, statement of position, etc., will be considered by the Court in this civil action unless the documents reflect proof of service upon the parties or their counsel.

7. **NOTE: ***** When an amended complaint is filed prior to service, the Court will **VACATE** all previous Service Orders entered, and service **will not take place**. An amended complaint filed prior to service shall be subject to re-screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(a). *******

8. **Note: ***** Discovery motions and motions for appointment of counsel filed prior

to service will be dismissed without prejudice, with leave to refile following service. ***


UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE